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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines foreign market re-entry after exit, demonstrating with empirical evidence that exit 
is not an irreversible, win or lose process characterised by location and asset specificity. Organisations 
repeatedly attempt to return to once failed internationalisation projects. Drawing upon insights from 
organisational learning and institutional perspectives, this study examines the changes (if any) in 
commitment mode between exit and re-entry, the timing of re-entry, and whether developed and 
emerging market re-entrants differ in their re-entry choices. The highlights of this research are as 
follows; 1) for some re-entrants, re-entry carries with it learning inertia in that (both developed and 
emerging market) firms tend to re-enter via the same commitment modes in which they were operating 
prior to exit irrespective of prior knowledge and experience accumulated over time; 2) favourable host 
institutional changes, in turn, lead to commitment escalation; 3) early re-entries are motivated by the 
quality of host institutional environments, the choice to imitate the behaviour of other foreign 
(re)entrants to gain legitimacy, and the re-entrant’s strategic intent; and 4) how firms interpret exit 
plays a key role in their re-entry commitment and timing decisions, together with institutional pressures 
for legitimacy. Contrary to prior studies on de novo foreign market entry, this study proposes that it is 
not just the experience accumulated over time that influences the effectiveness and applicability of 
organisational learning. For re-entrants, prior experience does not necessarily lead to learning and 
more relevant tend to be institutional changes and pressures for legitimacy, how re-entrants interpret 
the market exit process and the re-entrant’s strategic objectives concerning the previously abandoned 
market. From a practitioner’s viewpoint, there may be significant consequences of not being able 
to transform prior knowledge and experience into learning and routines in the short term, and 
subsequently, leverage the lessons learned when making re-entry decisions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
News of multinational enterprises (MNEs) expanding their operations into new host markets is 
increasingly commonplace and an integral part of business press reporting. Foreign market entry 
is a critical managerial decision that has attracted significant scholarly attention (Brouthers, 2002; 
Delios and Henisz, 2003; Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Hitt, Hoskisson and Kim, 1997; Hoskisson, 
Wright, Filatotchev and Peng, 2013; Madhok, 1997; Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009). 
Extant research on MNEs entering foreign markets have broadly focused on initial or de novo 
market entry by examining, inter alia, the patterns and antecedents of entry mode selection (e.g., 
Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2008a; Brouthers, 2013; 
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Delios and Henisz, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009), motives to enter 
foreign markets such as learning in the foreign market and/or access to market (e.g., Buckley, 
Forsans and Munjal, 2012; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Deng, 2009; Nachum and Zaheer, 
2005), market entry timing decisions (e.g., Araujo and Rezende, 2003; Gao and Pan, 2010; 
Isobe, Makino and Montgomery, 2000; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) and location patterns 
including the choice between developed and emerging host markets (e.g., Buckley, Devinney 
and Louviere, 2007a; Hi et al., 2000; Makino, Lau and Yeh, 2002; Rugman, 2005).  
Notwithstanding these advancements, scholars have observed that exit is not always permanent 
(Bonaccorsi, 1992; Chang, 1995; Loustarinen, 1979). Anecdotal evidence reveals numerous 
cases of firms returning to markets previously exited. Some noteworthy examples include the 
Fiat brand Alfa Romeo (Italy) recently re-entering South Korea (IHS Global Insight, 2014), the 
decision of Pepsi Co. (US), Carlsberg Group (Denmark), and Heineken International 
(Netherlands) to renew their operations in Myanmar (Beverage Daily, 2013; FT, 2014) and fast 
food chains such as Dunkin’ Brands (US) and Wendy’s (US) returning to Singapore (World 
Franchise Associates, 2010). These examples further suggest that foreign market re-entry is also 
an ongoing phenomenon. What is more, together with developed market multinationals, firms 
from emerging economies are also making their way back into previously exited markets; 
examples include Mahindra and Mahindra’s (India) recently returning to the UK (2016) and the 
US (2015), Dusit Hotels and Resorts (Thailand) returning to Myanmar (2015), SABMiller (South 
Africa) going back to Brazil after a three-year absence (2015), and TATA Motors (India) returning 
to multiple markets including Russia (2014), Australia (2013), Philippines (2012), UK (2007), 
Egypt (2006) and Iraq (2004). Though the previous examples highlight the activities of firms that 
have already re-entered foreign markets, the business press frequently describe firms which are 
considering and/or planning their ‘re-entry’, such as France’s PSA Peugeot Citroën attempting 
to return to the US car market, - which it exited over two decades ago (FT, 2016). Google is also 
expected to find its way back to mainland China, five years after shutting down its operations 
there following disagreements with the local government (Forbes, 2016). The competition in the 
Indian telecom market is expected to become fiercer as both AT&T (US) and Virgin Media (UK) 
are planning their second coming into the market (The Times of India, 2016). Nokia (Finland), 
Sharp (Japan), Toshiba (Japan), Peugeot (France) and Honda Civic (Japan) are also amongst 
12 
 
the firms planning their return into the Indian market (Business Insider 2016; China Post, 2016). 
A majority of reported re-entry considerations go seemingly unactualized although there is some 
evidence suggesting that amongst firms which exit foreign markets, a large proportion express 
intentions to re-enter after a time-out period (cf. Crick, 2004; Freeman, 2007).  
This may suggest a number of key differences and difficulties with re-entry decisions compared 
to initial or de novo foreign market entries. A primary difference between de novo entry and re-
entry decisions is that managers are able to draw from their previous experience in the market. 
Furthermore, the experience associated with the market exit process may also influence how re-
entry is interpreted and what decisions firms make upon re-entry. MNEs tend to re-consider 
exited markets for various reasons. MNEs tend to exit foreign markets because of lack of 
necessary resources and capabilities to compete effectively in a foreign market and or because 
of external socio-political and economic jolts in the host business environment that make the host 
market unattractive (e.g., Bonaccorsi, 1992; Mellahi, 2003; Pauwels and Matthyssens, 1999; 
Song, 2013). Firms may have a limited number of resources to compete, thus choosing to re-
allocate these in other markets and re-focusing on growth in the home market (Dass, 2000) and 
return to previously exited foreign markets when more resources are available and or when the 
host environment is more favourable. In the main, the organisation and its managers may have 
a relatively negative and/or unsuccessful experience to draw from. Thus, firms leave and 
subsequently re-enter a foreign market, potentially carrying with them the stigma associated with 
exit. Whereas the risk mindset associated with de novo entry may be one of exploiting potential 
market opportunities; managers planning a re-entry perhaps operate from a more risk-averse 
position, orientated toward limiting threats and possibly even recouping previous losses. This 
distinction may be a critical one, as increased global and industry competition is often cited by 
business analysts as a key motivation for firms returning to previously exited markets (Forbes, 
2016). This means that firms, rather than self-selecting opportunities for growth are instead 
increasingly forced through competition to review markets they may have previously failed to 
penetrate. The extent of knowledge and experience that the re-entrant would have accumulated 
about the host market by operating there and how the exit experience itself is interpreted 
distinguishes the re-entry process from the initial foreign market entry decision. 
Second, re-entrants spend a period of time out between exit and re-entry which may potentially 
cause a disruption in their ability to learn from prior knowledge and experience. Specifically, the 
longer re-entrant firms spend out of the market prior to re-entering, the more likely it may be for 
prior learning and experience - such as knowledge attained from network relationships, 
understanding of consumer preferences, host market specific knowledge - to have dissipated. 
Time-out period between exit and re-entry may range between a short re-evaluation of a firm’s 
activities in the host market to a long period of absence that may bring with it organisational 
forgetfulness, but also changes in the overall goals of the organisation, as well as changes in 
management attitudes and beliefs towards that market, which, in turn, may lead to voluntarily or 
involuntarily unlearning prior routines and behaviours. These aspects add complexity to the re-
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entry decision as there may be significant variations in how companies withdraw from the host 
market and approach re-entry. Depending on the duration of the time spent out of the market 
after the decision to exit, foreign market re-entrants may also be able to recover some of the 
losses incurred upon market exit such as broken distribution partnerships and abandoned 
business networks (Belderbos and Zou, 2009). Re-entering a market previously exited ads 
greater risk and importance to the (re)entry decision than entering a market for the first time, 
particularly if the host environment which the firm returns to has changed significantly during the 
time-out period, thus potentially limiting, even more, the exploitation of lessons learned from prior 
knowledge and experience. This study proposes that for re-entrants, the potential and usefulness 
of learning from prior experience accumulated in the past may significantly depend on the 
duration of the time-out period between foreign market exit and re-entry.  
Foreign market re-entrants may be subject to the influence of prior international experience as 
well as potentially newer influences pertaining to the external environment of the firm. Therefore, 
a third key distinction between de novo entry and re-entry decisions is that firms considering re-
entry may also be motivated by institutional, competitive and other contextual changes rather 
than host market stability (Hernandez et al., 2015; Peng, 2003; Xia et al., 2009). This distinction 
problematises managers’ previous experience of the market as the ‘rules of the game’ may have 
shifted during the time-out period. In such cases, firms without clear and objective processes to 
manage the formal planning of re-entry may - potentially - be influenced by the subjective and 
often outdated experience of managers. In light of these points, the international business 
discipline has yet to offer specific or general managerial advice with regards to re-entry decisions. 
This has left organisations seemingly ill-equipped to objectively navigate the process of re-entry, 
leaving managerial decisions to re-enter vulnerable to be influenced by managerial biases. The 
combination of increasing pressure to re-enter previously exited markets and a deficit in 
managerial advice concerning re-entry may be contributing to increased cases of firms’ planned, 
yet unrealised re-entries as reported in the business press in recent years. 
Surprisingly, only three studies have investigated specifically why (Javalgi, Deligonul, Dixit and 
Cavusgil, 2011; Welch and Welch, 2009) and how (Vissak and Francioni, 2013) firms return to 
previously exited foreign markets. Of these, none offer a rigorous nor robust empirical analysis 
of re-entry and re-entrants. Although Welch and Welch (2009) provide a definition of foreign 
market re-entry (which they refer to as re-internationalisation) and highlight some key theoretical 
elements concerning the re-entry phenomenon, such as the time-out period, there is little 
appreciation as to how time-out may affect market re-entry decisions. In turn, the institutional and 
contextual changes that may have taken place during the time-out period as well as the effects 
of the market exit process on re-entry, remain undertheorised in all three studies. Overall, foreign 
market re-entry is absent from the conversation concerning the effect of organisational prior 
learning and changes in pressures for institutional legitimacy on firm strategic behaviour.  
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In view of these limitations, this study contributes to our understanding of re-entry and re-
entrants, by exploring three key re-entry decisions, namely re-entry commitment mode 
(compared to the mode prior to exit); timing of re-entry to elucidate why some firms re-enter 
early versus late; and location patterns of re-entrants i.e. who re-entrants are (i.e. developed 
versus emerging market firms) and which host markets they re-enter. These three market 
(re)entry decisions are considered amongst the “dilemmas” that challenge internationalising firms 
(Francis, Zheng and Mukherji, 2009; Huang and Sternquist, 2007; Peng, 2004). In particular, the 
question of how multinational firms expand into foreign markets, i.e. the re-entry mode 
commitment question, has long been considered a critical issue in international business and 
together with being the most studied aspect of foreign market entry decisions (see Surdu and 
Mellahi, 2016 for a more recent review), mode of entry has also been viewed as very important 
for the success and survival of internationalising firms (notably, Brouthers, 2002; Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991; Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Madhok, 1997; Makino and 
Neupert, 2000; Root, 1987). Concerning mode of entry commitment decisions, a growing number 
of studies have observed that past entry mode choices co-determine present ones (Chan and 
Makino, 2007; Gao and Pan, 2010; Guillén, 2003; Lu, 2002; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999, 
Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Even so, little research has been 
devoted to further understanding why it is that firms tend to replicate prior decisions over 
choosing new modes of entry even when their circumstances may have changed. Thus, market 
re-entry also provides a novel context in which to revisit the entry mode literature, by examining 
the foreign market re-entry commitment decisions of firms, as re-entrants may opt to return via 
the same mode of commitment, escalate their commitment in the host market or de-escalate by 
reducing their commitment upon re-entry into that market. 
(Re-)entering a foreign market at the right time is also generally viewed as key to the success of 
a firm’s international expansion (e.g., Chan et al., 2006; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Gaba, Pan 
and Ungson, 2002; Murray, Min and Gao, 2012). In the case of re-entry, firms may opt to wait 
longer prior to returning to the market, and perhaps re-enter as soon as the host economic and 
or institutional environment has recovered or when the firm is in a stronger position to re-enter. 
This is particularly important as firms deal with increased uncertainty because, whilst being a first 
mover in the market may bring significant benefits to successful entrants (Li et al., 2003; 
Sivakumar, 2002; Tuppura, Saarenketo et al., 2008), pioneering also involves high risks and 
investment that may not be reaped (Buckley and Casson, 1998; Li, 2003; Murray et al., 2012; 
Powell, 2014). Some companies remain highly committed to the host market and re-enter within 
a short period of time in order to capitalise on the host market specific experience and business 
relationships, as well as to prevent significant loss of staff (e.g., Hadjikhani, 1996). In turn, to re-
entrants which spend a longer time out of the exited market, re-entry may, in fact, be perceived 
more like de novo entry due to the changes that may have occurred within the firm and its 
environment in the time-out period and the potential challenges of relying significantly on learning 
from experiential knowledge. Since most re-entrants are likely to fall somewhere between these 
two extremes, the decision concerning how long to wait prior to re-entering a previously exited 
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foreign market may be significantly more complex and thus the antecedents of re-entry timing 
are deserving of empirical exploration.  
The third aspect of the re-entry decision-making process is concerned specifically with who re-
entrants are and what explains their host market location patterns. As firms seek to re-enter 
foreign markets, they opt for the locations that are perceived as most attractive, whilst at the 
same time characterised by lower levels of uncertainty (Belderbos et al., 2011; Xia et al., 2008). 
When firms cannot fully observe and assess the most relevant factors that may affect their 
performance in a given host market location, and are uncertain as to the advantages of different 
locations, firms are expected to (re)enter other countries within their region (Rugman, 2005). 
Furthermore, (re-entrant) firms’ resources and adversity to risk are expected to depend on which 
locations (re)entrants originate from. Developed and emerging market multinationals are 
suggested to be somehow different in regards to why, how and when they (re)enter foreign 
markets (Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006). More specifically, the emerging nature and 
transitional characteristics of non-Western markets have led some scholars to suggest that 
emerging markets possess unique characteristics which should be incorporated into existing 
foreign market (re)entry literature (Buckley et al., 2012; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Hoskisson 
et al., 2000; Meyer and Peng, 2004; Lin, 2010). Since institutions are important influences on 
business activities (North, 1990), this study also characterises and explores the factors affecting 
the re-entry decisions of both developed and emerging market re-entrants. 
A better understanding of re-entry decisions would, therefore, make an important contribution 
both academically and practically. This research can address some of the recent calls to revitalise 
the foreign market entry agenda by looking for instance, beyond the initial foreign market entry 
decisions of firms (Brouthers, 2013; Buckley, 2002; Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Peng, 2004; 
Shaver, 2013; Surdu and Mellahi, 2016). What is more, the market entry literature has historically 
viewed international market entry as a linear, ‘either/or’ phenomenon of ‘either’ succeeding and 
staying ‘or’ failing and exiting foreign markets. Following this well-established logic, international 
expansion is broadly a linear and irreversible process, and so foreign firms can only deal with 
host market uncertainty by exploiting previously accumulated knowledge and experience 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). Nevertheless, organisational learning itself may not be a linear, 
incremental process and the usefulness and relevance of prior learning and experience may, 
therefore, be questioned in the context of re-entry. Organisational learning should not be viewed 
as a rational adaptation to changes in the internal or external environment of the firm, nor can it 
be reduced to cases of individual behaviour. This study proposes that organisational learning 
has its very own level of complexity which can potentially be better reflected in the foreign market 
re-entry context as re-entrant firms may need to unlearn previously established practices and 
routines when re-entering foreign markets following a time-out period. This thesis empirically 
explores the effect of the different stages of a firm’s re-entry process, focusing on initial 
international experience, exit and time-out - as these may be characterised by a range of 
organisational lessons and managerial experience that shape re-entry decisions. 
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In addition, this study models how the contextual environment of re-entrant firms shapes their re-
entry commitment decisions. Since host institutions are not stable and tend to change over time 
(Newman, 2000; Peng, 2003; Xia et al., 2009), such changes in institutional pressures for 
legitimacy may have occurred in the time-out period between exit and re-entry. Transformations 
occurring in the national institutional environments of host markets may, in turn, increase the 
chances of a foreign re-entrant being accepted and gaining legitimacy in the previously exited 
foreign market. Although institutional changes have been theorised in parallel with institutional 
pressures (North, 1990; Scott, 2008), the idea that institutions, and thus, pressures for legitimacy 
can change over time has been overlooked in empirical research. In turn, the tendency of 
international business scholars to avoid engagement with the role of institutional changes on 
organisational strategies has been considered to prevent scholars from making significant 
contributions in this area (Peng, 2003; Xia et al., 2009). Thus, this study also addresses calls for 
a greater recognition of the role of changes in the institutional environments of firms that may 
serve as reference points for decision-making together with learning from prior experience 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Xia et al., 2009). By looking at the interaction between past experience 
and institutional legitimacy as well as changes in institutional pressures for legitimacy, this study 
may also contribute to the growing conversation on why firms display heterogeneous responses 
to institutional environments (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). For re-entrants, changes in 
institutional pressures for legitimacy may reduce the benefits of learning from experience and 
even lead to unlearning prior routines and behaviours and adapting to the new pressures for 
legitimacy. Re-entry is specifically conducive to combining learning and institutional rationales. 
Consequently, work which unpacks the market re-entry phenomenon and the factors influencing 
firms’ decisions to do so are of both theoretical as well as practical importance, as firms are 
increasingly observed to be planning a market re-entry yet not all of them commit to doing so. 
This may be due to a lack of sound managerial advice and/or objective tools and frameworks 
designed to assist re-entrants to remove the potential biases of negative prior experience and to 
appropriately navigate the strategic choices for re-entry. Firms which follow the prescription that 
foreign market entry is an irreversible process may miss out on potential host market 
opportunities by not considering re-entry as a viable strategic option or by waiting a very long 
time to re-enter. Thus, it should be emphasised here the importance for potential re-entrants to 
assess the contextual influence of the failed attempt and allow for some flexibility in planning 
international expansion. MNEs that are encouraged by local institutions such as governments, 
to capitalise on institutional changes are considered more likely to receive support and resources 
from those institutions (Banalieva, Eddleston and Zellweger, 2015; Meyer et al., 2009; Peng, 
2003). In turn, institutional support may decrease the need to possess significant prior market 
knowledge. For instance, the decision to re-enter via a higher commitment mode may present 
risks in host environments that have recently transitioned, but may also present benefits for firms 
to capitalise on growing markets. Case in point, in markets such as South Africa or Myanmar, 
and more recently Iran, where restrictions were imposed on foreign investment and forced firms 
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to exit, the lifting of trade barriers represents a seemingly perfect opportunity to overcome 
adverse market exit experience and achieve early re-entry into largely untapped host markets.  
Consequently, re-entry provides a novel context in which to revisit and extend the market entry 
literature, particularly the theoretical rationale explaining the influence of institutional contexts, 
including institutional change and organisational knowledge and learning on foreign market 
commitment, timing and location. By examining re-entry, this thesis depicts the international 
expansion decision as non-sequential and non-linear and which unfolds over time, through a 
process of trial, error, endogenous learning, external change, and perhaps even reorganisation. 
In doing so, this thesis offers the first empirical evidence of foreign market re-entry and re-
entrants. Hypotheses are tested using an original and unique database compiled by the author, 
and consisting of 1,020 foreign market re-entries established by 725 MNEs between 1980 and 
2015, originating from 62 home countries and re-entering 101 host countries (developed and 
emerging markets) and operating in 13 industries (manufacturing and non-manufacturing).   
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one presents the background literature. Given 
the lack of research on foreign market re-entry decisions, the thesis relies on the broader foreign 
market entry literature, which is an established field of research within international business. A 
review of the main theories used to explain market entry decisions and how they have evolved 
over time is followed in Chapter two by a conceptualisation of the foreign market re-entry 
phenomenon. In Chapter two, this study highlights the expected similarities between de novo 
entry and re-entry and most importantly, conceptualises the expected differences. Next, Chapter 
three is an overview of the methodology used to study re-entry, including a detailed account of 
data collection procedures, sample design and the variables used in the empirical sections of the 
thesis. Chapter four addresses how firms re-enter foreign markets; specifically, this chapter 
examines foreign market re-entry commitment, investigating whether re-entrants alter their 
commitment or whether they opt for the same modes in which they were operating prior to exit. 
Chapter five focuses on the issue of why some re-entrants take longer to return to previously 
exited markets than others, which is referred to as re-entry timing. Chapter six follows with an 
exploratory study on the re-entry determinants of developed and emerging market re-entrants. 
Finally, Chapter seven summarises the key findings and contributions of this study to academics 
and practitioners, sets out limitations and identifies areas for further research.   
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CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction  
As a phenomenon, foreign market re-entry has been defined as “a process involving a period of 
international business activity, then exit from international operations, followed by a time-out 
period of some duration, then a process of international re-entry, concluding with successfully 
renewed international operations” (Welch and Welch, 2009, p.568). Because there is currently 
limited empirical evidence on the topic of foreign market re-entry and re-entrants, this review of 
the literature critically revisits what is known about the foreign market entry decision in general. 
Whilst there are only three studies investigating specifically the existence of market re-entries 
and re-entrants, initial or “de novo” foreign market entry remains one of the most studied subjects 
in international business (see Surdu and Mellahi, 2016 for a recent review). Re-entry draws from, 
and may contribute to the broader foreign market entry literature by revisiting and extending the 
applicability of extant theories and conceptualisations. 
This chapter provides a critical evaluation of research that studies market entry decisions of 
multinational firms such as foreign entry mode commitment, host location decisions and timing 
of foreign market entries1. Although a number of reviews of the foreign market entry literature 
have been published over the years (e.g., Datta, Herrmann and Rasheed, 2002; Hitt, Tihanyi, 
Miller and Connelly, 2006; Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012), none has looked at theoretical 
foundations underpinning the research (for an exception, see Surdu and Mellahi, 2016). In 
particular, the broader field of the foreign market entry is undergoing a theoretical flourishing, as 
scholars are drawing on a multitude of theoretical perspectives to examine foreign market entry 
related decisions, each reflecting differently how foreign market entry phenomena are shaped.  
While the analysis of the literature pays special attention to recent work, it includes earlier 
research that planted the intellectual seeds of the field and laid the theoretical foundations for 
contemporary foreign market entry studies. Because the literature on the initial foreign market 
entry decisions of firms is vast, it is interesting to consider how “old/established” foreign market 
entry theories have been revised, set aside, discarded or superseded by new theories. 
Furthermore, since the 2000s scholars have started to adopt new theories as well as combine 
theoretical perspectives to capture the complexity of market entry decisions. What is not clear, 
however, is whether the integration of multiple and disparate theories is resulting in a further 
                                                          
1 This review of the literature is part of a larger systematic review of the foreign market entry literature; the methodology 
employed to select and analyse the articles included in the review is detailed in Appendix 1. See full reference: Surdu, I. 
& Mellahi, K. (2016). “Theoretical foundations of equity based foreign market entry decisions: A review of the literature 
and recommendations for future research”. International Business Review, 25(5): 1169-1184.  
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fragmentation of research in this area, or if it is providing a better understanding of the 
phenomenon and exciting directions for future research, such as research in the area of re-entry.  
Most importantly therefore, a review of the origins and evolutionary path of theories used to 
examine initial foreign market entry decisions, would not only discuss the theoretical progress in 
the field so far, but would strengthen the theoretical arguments about the benefits and drawbacks 
of the current theoretical diversity, and the ability of traditional theories to explain re-entry. 
Overall, the aim of this critical literature analysis is to provide a research agenda that helps frame 
the theoretical rationale of re-entry and illustrate how, by investigating re-entry, this thesis can, 
in turn, add to, and even enrich the broader foreign market entry agenda.  
Traditionally, researchers have dealt with the antecedents of market entry decisions, associated 
with reaping benefits from the exploitation of firm-specific advantages and reducing transaction 
costs by opting for high levels of commitment in host markets regarded as more attractive and 
less risky (Brouthers, 2002; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1991; Madhok, 1997; 
Makino and Neupert, 2000). Even though learning about, and dealing with, the environments of 
different host markets has become an important part of research on foreign market entry, 
scholars continue to examine initial entry as an irreversible, ‘win’ or ‘lose’ process. However, 
firms may exit a foreign market for various reasons and, at a later stage, engage in potentially 
high-risk decisions such as returning to previously failed market entry attempts. Whereas initial 
entrants may make rational choices, re-entrants’ behaviour is perhaps not as straightforward, as 
the latter are also influenced by how they interpret and learn from prior knowledge and 
experience and potentially adapt to changes in their social and institutional environments.  
This next section starts by exploring the main theories that have been used to study market entry 
related decisions and the key antecedents associated with foreign market entry mode, timing and 
location choices. The third section examines more recent research on foreign market entry 
published since the 2000s and includes a succinct overview consisting of the key contributions 
of those three studies on re-entry. Finally, the fourth section reflects on the previous discussion 
to develop a research agenda and identify key gaps in existing knowledge, some of which can 
be addressed by investigating the foreign market re-entry decisions of multinational firms.   
 
Theoretical foundations of foreign market entry research (1970s-1990s) 
The 1970s laid the theoretical and conceptual groundwork for foreign market entry research. This 
decade was dominated by stage theories explaining the episodic nature of the firm’s 
internationalisation process, and the industrial organisation perspective tackling big questions 
such as ‘Why do MNEs exist?  These two perspectives were used to underpin foreign market 
entry research in over 90 percent of studies published in the 1970s. The two stage theories, 
namely Vernon’s international product life cycle (Vernon, 1966) and the Uppsala stage model of 
internationalisation (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977), evolved independently of each other because 
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they dealt with different foreign market entry questions. The product lifecycle theory focuses on 
the “where” question, i.e. location of production. The model was initially proposed by Vernon 
(1966) who noted that increased foreign market competition led firms from well-endowed home 
regions to engage in direct investments (as opposed to exports) to control foreign operations and 
protect export market shares. In the later stages of the internationalisation process, growing local 
competition was associated with developed market firms moving production to lower cost 
locations. The international lifecycle theory was predominantly used to frame the discussion on 
how the initial foreign market entry decisions (i.e. entry mode choices) of US firms are contingent 
on the locational characteristics of the host country (e.g., Stopford, 1976).  
The second stage theory, the Uppsala model, deals with the process of foreign market entry, 
from “how” firms should expand internationally to “when” and “where” they should go. Based on 
evidence from Swedish companies, the stage theory proposed that firms can overcome 
competitive disadvantages abroad, stemming largely from the liability of foreignness, by 
experientially learning about the foreign market (Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975; 
Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). The main thrust of the Uppsala model of internationalisation, 
proposed by Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) and later Johanson and Vahlne (1977), is 
that the MNE’s internationalisation process deepens over time as a function of knowledge gained 
to deal with uncertainties associated with ‘psychic distance’; i.e. with the “factors that make it 
difficult to understand foreign environments” (for a succinct review of the theory see Johanson 
and Vahlne, 2009, p. 1412-1413). Indeed, the Uppsala theory was the first theory advocating 
that foreign market entry mode and entry timing are contingent on the psychic distance between 
home and host countries and the ability of firms to reduce this distance by specifically acquiring 
experiential knowledge. There is the implicit assumption here that, over time, this knowledge can 
be leveraged and transferred to new strategic decisions, resulting in firms engaging in new 
modes of commitment and new host markets.  
In turn, studies drawing on industrial organisation perspectives rest on the assumption that, due 
to structural market imperfections from barriers to entry and government restrictions over 
international trade (Dunning and Rugman, 1985), (monopolistic) firms from well-endowed 
countries tend to utilise local resources, such as superior technology, managerial skills, and 
reputable brand names to engage in foreign market entry and pre-empt the emergence of local 
competitors in final product markets (Hymer, 1976). Thus, competing firms were expected to 
follow one another into foreign markets so that no firm develops superior advantages over the 
competition (e.g., Knickerbocker, 1973). Drawing on Hymer’s market imperfection hypothesis 
and the transaction costs economics view (TCE), Buckley and Casson (1976) developed the 
internalisation thesis which unpacks foreign market entry into two interdependent decisions: best 
location for, and most efficient mode to control, a firm’s bundle of resources; thus, retaining 
control of production activities abroad through vertical integration to minimise transactions costs 
(rather than other forms, such as licensing and franchising). With the minimisation of transaction 
costs considered the primary reason for the existence of international production, internalisation 
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theory helped scholars link the characteristics of transaction costs required to enter a foreign 
market with efficient market entry mode selection. Scholars also began to develop contingency 
models arguing that the optimal mode of commitment is a function of experience and level of 
product diversification (Stopford and Wells, 1972) or of the fit between characteristics of the host 
market and a firm’s reservoir of resources and capabilities (Hood and Young, 1979).  
 
Theoretical refinements and supremacy of internalisation/TCE approaches 
In the 1980s, the bulk of foreign market entry research continued to focus primarily on appropriate 
entry modes, entry mode decisions, and costs and benefits associated with entering foreign 
markets (Beamish and Banks, 1987). As firms intensified their international activities, there was 
a growing recognition of the need for a foreign market entry theory that centres on identifying, for 
instance, the most appropriate foreign locations or the most efficient foreign market entry modes 
(Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart, 1986). The relative number of foreign market entry 
papers that used the industrial organisation perspective dropped significantly in the 1980s (25 
percent, 14 studies). In contrast, studies focusing on organisational economics theories such as 
internalisation/TCE approaches grew exponentially to about 60 percent (35 studies). In this 
context, the internalisation theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976) became the theory of choice and 
the bedrock of foreign market entry research in the 1980s (see also Dunning and Rugman, 1985; 
Rugman, 1981). Internalisation/TCE logic was expected to help scholars conceptualise the link 
between transaction costs and foreign market entry decisions. In particular, scholars used the 
theory to explain entry mode decisions and reduce uncertainties associated with foreign market 
activities (e.g., Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Beamish and Banks, 1987). Anderson and 
Gatignon (1986) drawing on TCE logic posited that the appropriateness of foreign market entry 
mode choices is based on the trade-off between control by the entrant firm and the cost of 
resource commitment, which may increase with a firm’s exposure to internal and external 
uncertainties associated with operating in a foreign market. Anderson and Gatignon’s (1986) 
proposition that appropriateness of foreign market entry mode is contingent on resource 
commitment was replicated by several studies in the 1990s (Hill, Hwang and Kim, 1990). 
Scholars were even proposing theoretical extensions to internalisation theory. Notably, Hisey 
and Caves (1985) purported that prior international knowledge and experience motivated firms 
to engage in foreign market entry activities by reducing the transaction costs associated with 
initial foreign market entry uncertainty. In a similar vein, Hill and Kim (1988) put forward a more 
dynamic view of internalisation advocating that changes in environmental uncertainty were 
associated with higher transaction costs which would potentially reduce initial benefits from 
entering foreign markets through high commitment modes.  
Theoretical refinements and extensions of the internalisation theory and dissatisfaction with 
partial explanations of when, where and how firms engage in foreign activities (Dunning, 1979) 
also formed the basis for Dunning and colleagues’ (1980, 1988) eclectic framework to explain 
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foreign market entry decisions. The eclectic paradigm, commonly known as the Ownership, 
Location, and Internalisation (OLI) paradigm, draws on multiple theoretical lenses, including 
Hymer’s market imperfections and the internalisation theories, and incorporates both country and 
firm-level factors. The paradigm explains the MNE phenomenon as a function of ownership, 
locational and internalisation decisions. The eclectic theory - OLI paradigm - invigorated foreign 
market entry research as several scholars sought to extend it by taking a closer look at the 
characteristics of transactions. For instance, non-market knowledge and expertise concerning 
relevant governmental regulations were proposed as valuable ownership advantages. Nigh 
(1985) argued that the internalisation of political skills by firms was positively associated with 
protection of non-market know-how and consequently, tend to be an important antecedent of 
foreign market entry related decisions. Also, when differences between home and host national 
cultures were significant, MNEs were found to opt for lower commitment in the form of joint 
ventures to avoid the risks of post-acquisition integration (see Kogut and Singh, 1988).  
A steady stream of research in the late 1980s specifically addressed the potential knowledge and 
revenue gains from commitment modes such as international alliances (e.g., Hennart, 1988; 
Beamish and Banks, 1987; Beamish and Wang, 1989). Although scholars used organisational 
economics theories to explain strategic alliances, they highlighted the limitations of theories such 
as TCE in explaining exchange relationships between partners. Most notably, Beamish and 
Banks (1987) suggested that internalisation rationales should incorporate the importance of trust 
and commitment between foreign business partners in overcoming host market uncertainty. Even 
so, the core thesis across studies drawing on organisational economics theories such as TCE 
and the OLI paradigm remains that foreign market entry is a function of the characteristics of the 
transaction and decisions about how or when to first enter foreign markets must be thought of in 
terms of their ability to minimise costs associated with those transactions. 
 
Theoretically diverse landscape  
“Non-traditional” theoretical tenets emerged in the 1990s (see Figure 1.1) purporting to explain 
initial foreign market entry and its impact on performance. Most notable among studies published 
in the 1990s were scholars’ attempts to connect with other business and management fields by 
embracing broader and multi-theoretical frameworks, drawing in particular on the increasing 
repertoire of knowledge available in adjacent disciplines such as strategic management. The 
need for a unified framework drawing on multiple theories is captured by Hill, Hwang, and Kim ’s 
(1990, p.117) description of the state of foreign market entry literature “unfortunately much of the 
existing literature on the choice of entry mode focuses in a piece meal fashion on many seemingly 
unrelated factors… there is a clear need for a unified framework… while transaction cost 
explanations are of major importance, transaction cost logic alone does not provide all of the 
answers”. Whereas the internalisation/TCE/OLI perspectives remained prevalent (48 percent, 84 
studies), 11 percent of papers published in the 1990s (20 studies) combined them with newly 
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introduced theories such as RBV (Barney, 1991), organisational learning (Barkema, Bell and 
Pennings, 1996) and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) to shed new lights on market entry 
(Hitt et al., 1997; Madhok, 1997). Madhok (1997) compared and contrasted market entry 
decisions from TCE and dynamic capabilities perspectives disputing that the dynamic capabilities 
view “may be more in tune with today’s business context” (p. 39). Even so, at that point, few 
studies argued explicitly for the substitution of old perspectives with new theorisations.  
The 1990s also witnessed scholarly efforts geared towards extending and refining earlier 
theories. Amongst established foreign market entry theories, the stage theory of 
internationalisation, often labelled as the Uppsala model, regained momentum in the 1990s (see 
Figure 1.1). Although it continued to be used as a theoretical basis for some empirical studies 
published in the 1990s (Johanson and Vahlne, 1990), scholars also illuminated the inherent 
limitations of the theory, particularly with regards to accurately depicting the timing and sequence 
of foreign market entries. The theory is often (re)labelled as the “evolutionary theory” of 
internationalisation to emphasise the importance of learning as firms increase their international 
involvement. In their research, Benito and Gripsrud (1992, p. 474) found “only a weak tendency 
for the first investments to be made in countries that are culturally closer than those where later 
investments were made”. Eriksson, Johanson, Majkgard and Sharma in 1997 and later in 2000 
revisited key assumptions of the model by “identify(ing) and delineate(ing) components of 
experiential knowledge in the internationalisation process” (Eriksson et al., 1997, p. 337) and 
questioning whether and when country-specific experience is applicable to all markets (see also 
Barkema et al., 1996). O’Grady and Lane (1996) argued that more evidence is needed to 
illustrate whether operating in familiar environments results in greater learning and subsequently 
leveraging this learning for further expansion or better foreign market performance. 
 
Amongst what is classified as organisational economics theories, the OLI/eclectic paradigm was 
increasingly drawn on in the 1990s foreign market entry literature. Building on foundations 
provided by the eclectic paradigm, Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) addressed the independent 
as well as the joint influence of OLI factors on market entry; noting that MNEs which lack strong 
ownership advantages tend to enter highly attractive host locations through joint ventures. Kumar 
and Subramaniam (1997) added to this theoretical reasoning by examining the contingent 
relationship between OLI specific advantages and managerial expectations, time and resource 
constraints throughout the foreign market entry process. Dunning and Kundu (1995) investigated 
entry mode selection activities in the hotel industry, concluding that OLI advantages influence 
entry mode choice in a manner similar to that of manufacturing firms. Brouthers, Brouthers and 
Werner (1996) studied mode decisions of small- and medium-sized computer software firms, 
confirming the applicability of the eclectic paradigm to SMEs as well as another service sector. 
Schroath, Hu and Haiyang (1993), and later Tse, Yigang and Au (1997) tested previous 
knowledge about the relationship between OLI and foreign market entry, in the context of entry 
into China. As illustrated later in the chapter (see Table 1.2a), studies published in the 1990s 
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continue to test, occasionally extend, but mostly find support for, the theoretical underpinnings 
of TCE theories, with little attention directed towards challenging assumptions.  
 
Drawing on emergent management theories  
In addition to refining established theories, scholars started drawing significantly on then newly 
introduced strategic and other management theories, such as the resource-based view (RBV) to 
examine and theorise initial or de novo foreign market entries in the 1990s. In particular, 
resource-based theories (RBTs) posit that firms compete primarily on capabilities, and that de 
novo market entry decisions are strategic decisions that serve as mechanisms for the creation 
and transformation of firms’ critical resources (14 percent, 25 studies) (Barkema, Shenkar, 
Vermeulen and Bell, 1997). This marks a shift in focus from transaction cost minimisation to the 
deployment, acquisition and development of resources and capabilities. RBTs challenge the 
implicit assumption in the TCE literature that firms already possess the required capabilities to 
minimise transaction costs and make efficient foreign market entry mode decisions (Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998). Implicit in these assumptions is that foreign market entrants may decide 
to bear higher transaction costs to develop and enhance valuable resources, because the 
performance of market entry decisions is mainly driven by the resources and capabilities the firm 
is able to deploy, acquire or develop in the international market. Although scholars drawing on 
RBT rationales proposed that firms may bear short-term financial losses in favour of long-term 
gains in the form of access to unique and superior resources and new markets, only a few studies 
use resource based rationales to investigate beyond the initial foreign market entry decision.  
As scholars began to probe into emerging market contexts, there was also a greater appreciation 
of understanding the institutional differences between entering advanced versus emerging host 
markets. Kostova (1999) introduced the concept of institutional distance which promises to 
expand the location context beyond the narrow focus of only examining psychic distance 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) or cultural distance (Kogut and Singh, 1988). The thrust of this line 
of research is that institutional environments, namely the regulative institutions, social values, 
and cognitive structures in society, are likely to impact a firm’s initial entry decisions into a foreign 
host market. In new, emerging market contexts, MNEs were considered less likely to benefit from 
importing firm-specific organisational practices, requiring an understanding of local 
organisational behaviours (cf. Zaheer, 1995). Even so, studies drawing on institutional theory to 
investigate foreign market entry were scarce in the 1990s (only five studies). 
 
Pick and mix approach and theoretical diversity: 2000s 
Multi-theoretical approaches gained momentum in the 2000s (27 percent, 145 studies). As 
presented in Table 1.1, this is particularly prevalent for traditional theories in that 109 out of 145 
multi-theoretical studies include organisational economics theories, i.e. internalisation 
theory/TCE. Studies using the Uppsala stage theory decreased to 16 percent in the 2000s (83 
25 
 
studies), and over half of these studies used it in combination with other theories (see Table 1.1). 
Although they remain the overriding perspectives for theorising market entry, TCE theories are 
represented in a smaller percentage of studies in the 2000s (see Figure 1.1).  
 
 Table 1.1: Combinations of theoretical perspectives in the foreign market entry literature (1970-2013) 
 
Note: Total number of studies (see in bold) is cumulative (includes single and multi-theoretical studies). Some multi-theoretical studies have 
multiple entrances as they combine more than two theories. Since the majority of papers using network theories address, and aim to overcome, 
the limitations of the stage model of internationalisation; - it is relatively more challenging to distinguish between single-theory studies and multi-
theoretical studies in this case. Other “emergent” theories can include: Resource dependence theory, Upper echelons theory, Contingency 
theory, Regionalisation thesis, and emerging market-specific theorisations (the springboard perspective, LLL). 
 
Internalisation, TCE: Framework of debate or dead end? 
Scholars continued to draw on internalisation/TCE assumptions to understand initial foreign 
market entry related decisions. Meyer (2001) explained that, in transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE), managerial know-how such as tacit knowledge is internalised due to 
knowledge dissipation risks. Brouthers and Brouthers (2003) drew on TCE’s reasoning to further 
contribute to the debate on whether service and manufacturing firms’ foreign market entry modes 
differ (see Brouthers et al., 2003). Merchant (2005) found that US multinationals’ resources are 
a better fit with a location in developed markets leading to higher venture performance. 
Maekelburger, Schwens and Kabst (2012) applied TCE core assumptions on asset specificity to 
explain small and medium-sized enterprises entry modes. Buckley, Forsans and Munjal (2012) 
argued for adding the role of country-specific network linkages to the eclectic paradigm; noting 
that, home-host country linkages were important in the decisions of Indian firms to make 
overseas acquisitions. In addition, scholars tested whether TCE assumptions are applicable to 
more refined foreign market entry mode decisions. Lou and Tan (2003) find that international 
alliances contract completeness was suggested to increase transactional performance by 
reducing the risk of opportunism. Also concerning alliance governance, Dhanaraj and Beamish 
(2004) suggested that lower level of commitment can equal low levels of transparency and 
transaction costs and partner opportunism might not be reduced. Commenting on the role of 
internalisation/TCE theories in investigating foreign market entry related decisions, scholars 
(Martin and Salomon, 2003; Meyer, 2001) predicted that it will lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy by 
which the threat of opportunism can increase.  
 
TCE/ 
Internalisation 
theory/OLI 
RBTs 
Institutional 
theory 
Uppsala 
stage 
theory 
Real options 
theory 
Network  
theory 
Other 
“emergent” 
theories 
 
TCE/ 
Internalisation 
theory/OLI 
109       
RBTs 57 90      
Institutional theory 25 17 47     
Uppsala stage 
theory 
12 11 2 42    
Real options theory 4 1 0 0 5   
Network theory 0 0 1 14 0 15  
Other “emergent” 
theories 
 
11 4 2 3 0 0 20 
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Fig. 1.1: The theoretical evolution of the foreign market entry literature (1970-2013) 
Note: The figures in bold represent the total number of papers in which each major theory has been studied  – some foreign market entry studies are double counted due to authors drawing 
on two or more theoretical perspectives starting with the 1990s.  Between parentheses I captured the number of single theory studies for  each theoretical perspective (Details on the specific 
distribution of multi-theoretical studies can be found on the previous page in Table 1.1).   
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Notwithstanding the contribution of TCE and related theories to our understanding of foreign 
market entry decisions, the findings of these studies do not fundamentally extend or challenge 
the core assumptions which internalisation/TCE theory rests on. Surprisingly perhaps, thus far, 
only a few studies have explicitly questioned the applicability of traditional TCE theories. Amongst 
notable exceptions, we have Luo, Shenkar and Nyaw’s (2001) empirical paper on the relationship 
between level of control and joint venture performance amongst foreign and Chinese parents; 
noting that, transaction costs analysis is found more applicable to foreign parents but not Chinese 
parents as the latter did not associate a higher level of control in the venture with joint venture 
performance (see also Filatotchev et al., 2007). As illustrated in Table 1.2a, scholars tend to cite 
academic papers published in the 1980s or 1990s, whereas recent papers employing transaction 
TCE theories have not been as cited. These results appear to indicate that this line of research 
is saturated with extensions of previous studies which often lack theoretical tensions that were 
apparent some decades back. Most studies are little more than a rehash of old ideas with few 
new original insights. Based on the analysis of the literature, it is unlikely that a line of research 
based solely on transaction cost-based rationales would yield significantly new insights into why, 
how and when firms re-enter foreign host markets. 
 
Combining TCE and Institutional Theory: Entering emerging markets, institutional immaturity and 
transaction costs 
The increased popularity of, and empirical support received by, studies drawing on institutional 
theory (Table 1.2b) has not only led to a re-assessment of the concept of distance between 
countries (see Berry, Guillén and Zhou, 2010 for a discussion on the dimensions of distance), 
but it has also explicitly challenged some of the basic assumptions of organisational economics 
models. Foreign market entry scholars proposed institutional theory as an alternative explanation 
to organisational economics theories, switching focus from the factors that influence individual 
transactions to broader institutional contexts and their impact on foreign organisational strategic 
decisions. Because institutions provide the context in which transactions between firms occur, 
more studies published in the 2000s sought to combine institutional theory with TCE.  
Multi-theoretical studies engaging with a finer grained analysis of foreign market entry recognised 
that when and how firms initially enter foreign markets is not only different in firm-specific 
advantages but it may vary with the affiliations of firms with institutional environments (e.g. 
Brouthers, 2013; Luo, 2005; Demirbag, Glaister and Tatoglu, 2007; Isobe et al., 2000; Ma and 
Delios, 2007; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Consequently, scholars suggested that host markets 
characterised by institutional pressures tend to influence managers’ perceptions of transaction 
costs and business risks thereby influencing initial entry decisions (Isobe et al., 2000; Meyer and 
Peng, 2005). Isobe et al. (2000) argued that entry depends not only on the ability of firms to 
innovate and exploit technological advantages; noting that identifying institutional idiosyncrasies 
in the host market and securing strong relationships with local communities is increasingly viewed 
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as a source of competitive advantage and an important motivation for early market entry (see 
also Henisz, 2003). Thus, an MNE’s potential to create rent is expected to increase when firms 
have the ability to manage the pressures posed generally by host institutional environments. 
Adding institutional distance factors to the TCE logic is deemed to have more explanatory power, 
particularly when entering non-developed market contexts characterised by institutional 
immaturity (e.g., Luo, 2005; Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Specifically, 
institutional variables such as legal restrictions on foreign ownership, investment risk (Brouthers, 
2002), host government intervention (Henisz, 2003) and corruption (Rodriguez et al., 2005) are 
suggested to extend the TCE logic by capturing how institutional idiosyncrasies create market 
imperfections that determine the value of, and potential to expand, firm-specific advantages. In 
underdeveloped institutional environments, it was suggested that host market institutional 
frameworks shaped transaction costs, business risks and executive perceptions of stability, 
thereby influencing the choice of initial mode of entry (Demirbag, Tatoglu and Glaister, 2008). 
For instance, foreign entry mode studies drawing solely on TCE emphasised that MNEs entering 
emerging markets would opt for wholly owned entries to avoid the risks of knowledge dissipation; 
whereas according to institutional theory proponents, the coercive power of host institutions 
stimulates uncertainty avoidance behaviour, increasing the likelihood of joint ventures over other 
entry strategies (see Meyer, 2001). Meyer (2001) found that firms entering emerging (Eastern 
European) markets internalised only managerial knowledge via wholly owned subsidiaries, 
whereas all modes were suitable for transferring technological knowledge, due to the availability 
of technological skills in the region. Ma and Delios (2007) found that the variance in sub-national 
institutional environments may also affect initial entry mode choices, in that government agencies 
administrating foreign investment into China influenced transactions in political orientated 
locations (i.e. Beijing), leading to underperforming joint ventures, compared with locations where 
liberalisation had strengthened market mechanisms and reduced the need for local partnerships.  
In addressing how institutional uncertainties may be overcome, scholars suggested that larger 
firms have higher bargaining power over host institutions (Gaba et al., 2002); imitating the entry 
decisions of earlier entrants tends to reduce uncertainty (Ma and Delios, 2007; Yiu and Makino, 
2002); whilst designing more complete contractual arrangements, accounting for unanticipated 
contingencies and their management was expected to lower transaction costs and enhance 
performance in uncertain environments (Luo, 2005). Appendix 2 lists the most influential multi-
theoretical studies on initial foreign market entry and their current impact to this area of research. 
The aforementioned studies extend transaction cost rationales by adding factors associated with 
the host market institutional contexts which multinational firms are entering for the first time. 
However, if combining transaction cost and institutional rationales is the way forward, perhaps 
more focus should now be on a longer term view concerning how the institutional environments 
of host markets (and their subsequent evolution) may influence the ability of firms to exploit their 
pre-existing competitive advantages post initial market entry.  
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Stage-evolutionary model of internationalisation: Is it still relevant?  
Studies using stage theory focus on its limitations and the relevance of the theory. Specifically, 
it is advocated that, given the decreased relevance of geographic distance because of the 
information revolution and rapid dispersion of technology, the foreign market entry process is no 
longer constrained by stages as suggested by the Uppsala model. Fletcher (2001) reported that 
MNEs were starting to adopt a more dynamic approach to foreign market entry by adapting the 
timing of entry to changing market environments. Several studies highlighted the theory’s 
simplistic approach to learning (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Forsgren, 2002). Whereas knowledge 
of host cultural environments and consumer preferences may have represented a source of 
uncertainty for firms going from developed into other developed markets; other sources of 
uncertainty play an increasingly important role in market entry decisions. It is advocated that the 
stage model should be extended to incorporate the importance of knowledge about host market 
policy environments as well as the role of home country contexts in choosing the optimal 
investment timing (see Delios and Henisz, 2003).  
Following concerns about the relevance of the theory, Johanson and Vahlne (2003) revised and 
reconceptualised the Uppsala model, focusing less on the focal firm and more on the different 
types of useful knowledge that could be obtained from external sources such as firm and 
individual networks and business relationships (see also Johanson and Vahlne, 2009). This view 
was particularly applied to explain the behaviour of early internationalisers that operate within 
international networks which facilitate their learning process enabling them to leapfrog over 
stages and engage in direct investment (Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003). In their study, 
Johanson and Johanson (2006) recognised that knowledge about host markets is not always a 
precondition for market entry in that firms tend to make new knowledge discoveries throughout 
the market entry process, particularly in transition economies characterised by high uncertainty. 
Amongst the most notable foreign market entry papers drawing on the Uppsala stage theory of 
internationalisation, most studies (e.g., Delios and Henisz, 2003; Elango and Pattnaik, 2007) 
provide partial or no empirical support for its original theoretical assumptions (see Table 1.2a). 
In turn, the relative decline in the proportion of studies using the stages theory of 
internationalisation is paralleled by an increase in the use of network theory in international 
business research (see Parkhe, Wasserman and Ralston, 2006) from six studies in the 1990s to 
almost nine percent of studies in the 2000s (47 studies) (Figure 1.1). Broadly, network theory 
proponents argued that the costs and constraints associated with initial market entry and lack of 
experiential knowledge could be overcome and/or reduced through becoming embedded in 
partner networks (Lu and Beamish, 2001). More recent studies also debate the role of network 
tie utilisation in overcoming uncertainty associated with entering ‘non-traditional’, emerging host 
market contexts for the first time (e.g., Li, Poppo and Zhou, 2008a). Additionally, emerging market 
firms are considered to be particularly highly motivated to use business (and or institutional) 
networks to acquire (scarce) resources necessary for starting their international expansion, such 
as knowledge and financial capital (Elango and Pattnaik, 2007).  
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‘Emergent’ strategy theories: Resource-based theories (RBTs) 
Scholars drew extensively on the RBV and related perspectives in the 2000s. The idea that the 
value of foreign market entry related decisions is contingent on the firm’s reservoir of resources 
and capabilities became well established. Resource-based proponents conceptualised foreign 
market entry decisions in terms of their potential to deploy and or augment the resource base of 
the firm in foreign markets (Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney and Manrakhan, 2007; Hitt, Bierman, 
Uhlenbruck and Shimizu, 2006b; Sapienza et al., 2006). For instance, Hitt et al (2000) and later 
Meyer et al (2009) found that the capabilities firms sought to leverage, the need to access 
complementary resources and learn from local partners drove multinational firms to increasingly 
engage in international joint ventures. Concerning the timing and sequence of market entries, 
Sapienza et al. (2006) advocate that the earlier a firm internationalises, the more likely it is to 
develop dynamic capabilities and exploit market opportunities (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2007). 
Meyer et al. (2009, p.571) (re) conceptualise the foreign market entry mode decision by arguing 
that “…firms with geographically fungible resources may focus on exploiting their own resources, 
beneﬁting more from low resource-augmenting entry modes. Firms rich in location-bound 
resources may need to acquire local complements, and thus ﬁnd it worth-while to enter through 
resource-augmenting modes”. As shown in Table 1.2b, notable empirical studies drawing on 
RBTs provide support for the theoretical assumptions of these theories.  
A significant strand of the RBT literature considered the influence of resources and capabilities 
on the performance implications of foreign market entry such as market entry timing (Barkema 
and Drogendijk, 2007), international alliance formation (Lavie and Miller, 2008); and international 
acquisition decisions (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). The potential to support intangible 
resources such as knowledge, experience and learning in different international markets became 
important in studies published in the 2000s (notably, Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001).     
Indeed, in comparison to the 1990s, there is a growing emphasis on MNEs’ abilities to attain and 
deploy new knowledge, experience and various other resources in foreign host markets. RBT 
scholars advocate that because firms are endowed with different levels and types of resources, 
their ability to increase performance through market entry differs amongst MNEs. Kotabe et al. 
(2002) found that unique resources, such as R&D and dynamic marketing capabilities, facilitate 
the implementation of firm strategies across different international environments, enabling MNEs 
to achieve the differential advantages of being internationally diversified (see also Fang and Zou, 
2009). Hitt et al. (2006b) added that intangible resources such as human and relational capital 
have been associated with foreign market entry performance for professional service firms. Also, 
whereas previous studies (e.g., Johanson and Vahlne, 2003) recognised knowledge as an 
important part of the foreign market entry process; they often referred to it as ‘generic’ knowledge 
about the host market. Barkema and Drogendijk (2007) proposed that successful companies 
tend to balance short-term knowledge exploitation with new host market exploration to enhance 
future growth. Gao, Pan, Lu and Tao (2008) explored the different types of knowledge and 
experience resources motivating US firms to enter emerging markets such as China.  
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In the 2000s, there was a growing recognition that firms need to balance the exploitation of 
existing knowledge with an exploration of new knowledge in foreign markets to enhance their 
performance. Here, scholars argued that whilst concerns of opportunism, risks and cultural 
distance are relevant in the initial market entry stages when firms followed a dynamic entry 
process of accumulating and adapting knowledge; those factors were less likely to affect them 
(Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). Given the growth in popularity of RBTs, scholars combine them 
with traditional, TCE and related theories, in around 40 percent of multi-theoretical studies 
published in the 2000s (Table 1.1). Amongst proponents of multi-theoretical approaches, some 
also emphasised that the relevance and importance of resources may be contingent upon formal 
and/or informal host institutions (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Gaur and Lu, 2007; Meyer et al., 2009).  
 
Table 1.2a: Most influential foreign market entry studies (1970-2013) 
 
Note: I included all studies with >=10 citations per year; Source: Web of Knowledge  
Abbreviations: J, journal; TC, total citations since publication; Y, year of publication; TC/Y, total citations per year since publication until 
Sept. 2015 
 Theory J TC Author(s) Y TC/Y 
Empirical 
support 
1 OLI JIBS 463 Dunning, J. H. 1998 27.24 Conceptual  
2 TCE/Internalisation theory AMJ 269 
Lu, J. W.; Beamish, P. W. 
 
2004 24.45 
Partial 
support 
3 TCE/Internalisation theory JIBS 543 Anderson, E.; Gatignon, H. 1986 18.72 Supported  
4 OLI JIBS 356 Agarwal, S.; Ramaswami, S. N. 1992 15.48 Supported  
5 TCE/Internalisation theory MS 346 Hennart, J.-F. 1991 14.42 Supported  
6 OLI JIBS 450 Dunning, J. H. 1980 12.86 Supported  
7 OLI SMJ 312 
Hill, C. W. L.; Hwang, P.; Kim, 
W. C. 
1990 12.48 Conceptual  
8 TCE/Internalisation theory JIBS 211 Buckley, P. J., Casson, M. C. 1998 12.41 Conceptual  
9 TCE/Internalisation theory SMJ 205 Hennart, J.-F.; Reddy, S. 1997 11.39 Supported  
10 Agency theory JIBS 90 
Filatotchev, I.; Strange, R.; 
Piesse, J.; Yung-Chih, L. 
2007 11.25 Supported  
11 TCE/Internalisation theory JMS 122 
Brouthers, K. D.; Brouthers, L. 
E. 
2003 10.17 Supported  
12 TCE/Internalisation theory MS 219 Hennart, J.-F.; Park, Y.-R. 1993 10.00 Supported  
13 
Uppsala theory/Network 
theory 
JIBS 339 Johanson, J.; Vahlne, J.-E. 2009 56.50 Conceptual  
14 Uppsala theory JIBS 1530 Johanson, J.; Vahlne, J.-E. 1977 40.26 Supported  
15 Uppsala theory SMJ 472 
Barkema, H. G.; Bell, J. H. J.; 
Pennings, J. M. 
1996 24.84 
Partial 
support 
16 Uppsala theory JIBS 344 
Eriksson, K.; Johanson, J.; 
Majkgard, A.; Sharma, D. D. 
1997 19.11 No support 
17 
Uppsala theory/Network 
theory   
MIR 136 Johanson, J.; Vahlne, J.-E. 2006 15.11 Conceptual  
18 Uppsala theory SMJ 167 Delios, A.; Henisz, W. J. 2003 13.92 
Partial 
support  
19 Uppsala theory JMS 541 
Johanson, J.; Wiedersheim-
Paul, F. 
1975 13.53 Supported  
20 Uppsala theory JIBS 108 Elango, B.; Pattnaik, C. 2007 13.50 
Partial 
support 
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Table 1.2b: Most influential foreign market entry studies (1970-2013) 
Note: I included all studies with >=10 citations per year; Source: Web of Knowledge  
Abbreviations: J, journal; TC, total citations since publication; Y, year of publication; TC/Y, total citations per year since publication until 
Sept. 2015 
 
 
Combining transaction-, and resource-based theories: Inseparable considerations of risk, 
commitment and firm capabilities  
Critics of internalisation/TCE theories also advocate that these theories conceptualise foreign 
market entry decisions as static, disregarding the dynamic characteristics of firm resources (Fang 
and Zou, 2009). Given this important limitation, scholars advocate that combining the 
internalisation/TCE logic with RBV would lead to more encompassing explanations of foreign 
market entry decisions than either theory individually (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Li, Eden, 
Hitt and Ireland, 2008b). The core assumption here is that typically managers are expected to 
make foreign market entry decisions based on inseparable considerations of risk and control 
(TCE) as well as firm capabilities (RBTs) in that, intangible firm capabilities (such as knowledge 
and experience) can influence perceived host market costs thereby affecting firm motivation to 
 Theory J TC Author(s) Y TC/Y 
Empirical 
support 
21 Network theory IBR 481 Madsen, T. K.; Servais, P. 1997 26.72 Supported  
22 Network theory SMJ 137 Li, J. J.; Poppo, L.; Zhou, K. Z. 2008a 19.57 Supported  
23 Network theory IBR 219 Sharma, D. D.; Blomstermo, A. 2003 18.25 Supported   
24 
Dynamic capabilities 
view 
AMR 
257 
 
Sapienza, H. J.; Autio, E.; 
George, G.; Zahra, S. A. 
2006 28.56 Conceptual  
25 
Organisational 
learning theory 
AMJ 438 Barkema, H. G.; Vermeulen, F. 1998 25.76 Supported 
26 
RBV, Organisational 
learning theory 
AMJ 371 
Hitt, M. A.; Dacin, M. T.; Levitas, 
E.; Arregle, J.-L.; Borza, A. 
2000 24.73 Supported 
27 
Organisational 
learning theory 
AMJ 268 Vermeulen, F.; Barkema, H. 2001 19.14 Supported 
28 RBV AMJ 159 
Hitt, M. A.; Bierman, L.; 
Uhlenbruck, K.; Shimizu, K. 
2006b 17.67 Conceptual  
30 RBV JIBS 189 
Kotabe, M.; Srinivasan, S. S.; 
Aulakh, P. S. 
2002 14.54 Supported 
31 Institutional theory JIBS 85 Berry, H.; Guillén, M. F.; Nan, Z. 2010 17.00 Supported 
32 Institutional theory JWB 101 Deng, P. 2009 16.83 Supported 
33 Institutional theory OS 183 
Hitt, M. A.; Ahlstrom, D.; Dacin, 
M. T.; Levitas, E.; Svobodina, L. 
2004 16.64 Supported 
34 Institutional theory AMR 203 Xu, D.; Shenkar, O. 2002 15.62 Conceptual  
35 Institutional theory OS 189 Yiu, D.; Makino, S. 2002 14.54 Supported 
36 Institutional theory JMS 28 
Hoskisson, R. E., Wright, M., 
Filatotchev, I.; Peng, M. W. 
2013 14.00 Conceptual  
37 Institutional theory SMJ 62 Holburn, G. L. F.; Zelner, B. A. 2010 12.40 Supported 
38 Institutional theory JMS 121 Meyer, K. E., Nguyen, H. V.  2005 12.10 Supported 
39 Institutional theory IBR 122 
Bevan A., Estrin, S., Meyer, K. 
E. 
2004 11.09 Supported 
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engage in initial foreign market entry. For instance, a notable study by Chang and Rosenzweig 
(2001) suggested that as MNEs learn about local practices and gain experience in managing 
foreign affiliates, the initial liability of foreignness disappears, motivating firms to engage in further 
expansion in areas of business where they appeared to lack a superior advantage.  
The view, informed by internalisation theory, that knowledge assets have the potential to support 
foreign market entry investments because they are easily replicated abroad, is complemented 
by the RBT logic which advocates that only over time firms truly learn how to transfer resources 
abroad, which in turn, is expected to positively influence subsequent foreign market entries (e.g., 
Martin and Salomon, 2003; Xia et al., 2009). In summarising these views, Pitelis (2007) proposed 
that a more dynamic and forward-looking strategy theory could be developed by investigating 
how managers’ efforts to influence the internal and external environment of the firm based on 
their prior learning can shape ownership, locational and internalisation decisions. Interestingly, 
he explains that O, L, I decisions made by firms based on prior knowledge and experience may 
appear sub-optimal and imperfect at first, but prove successful over time if and when market 
conditions change as anticipated by decision makers (see Pitelis, 2007). In a recent paper, Teece 
(2014) reinforces this idea that combining TCE theories and resource-based perspectives such 
as organisational learning and or the dynamic capabilities view, has the potential to help us better 
understand how initial firm advantages erode over time, as well as when and how organisations 
should change to remain competitive. New ideas are emerging concerning how initial market 
entries should be viewed not only in terms of the initial investment costs but also in regards to 
how acquiring (host) market experience may be leveraged for subsequent entries and 
performance both in that specific host market and internationally. 
TCE and RBT perspectives are also combined to attain a more nuanced understanding of the 
various challenges and rewards associated specifically with different commitment modes. The 
limited predictability of the TCE logic is further extended to argue that over time, as MNEs 
accumulate experience, the value of partnering may diminish and as firms become self-sufficient, 
they may opt for more integrated modes of entry into foreign markets (c.f. Jung, Beamish and 
Goerzen, 2008). Thus, foreign market entry mode decisions are re-conceptualised as capability-
related decisions, based not solely on risk minimisation, as proposed by TCE, but also on 
considerations of value created through generating new firm capabilities (see Martin and 
Salomon, 2003). MNEs can choose entry mode strategies that reduce risk by balancing control 
over critical assets with the attainment of new resources from local partners, to offset the initial 
liability of foreignness. For instance, Meyer and Estrin (2001) found that the optimal foreign 
market entry mode for Western firms entering Central and Eastern European markets, “matches 
the resources required for the strategic objectives of the entry with those available within the 
multinational enterprise, in local firms and in unbundled form in local markets, taking into account 
the pertinent transaction and integration costs” (p. 577). Overall, whilst TCE emphasises partner 
ability to appropriate alliance benefits and reduce opportunism, RBT perspectives highlight the 
value and potential drawbacks of a long term relationship of resource sharing.  
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Combining resource-based rationales with institutional theory: Resource-based advantages in 
an institutional context 
Amongst multi-theoretical foreign market entry studies published in the 2000s, around 12 percent 
combined insights from institutional and RBT perspectives (17 studies) to examine the interaction 
between institutional factors and MNEs’ ability to attain and deploy resources and capabilities. 
The assumption here is that home/host country institutional environments are key determinants 
of firm resources, strategy and structure (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2008a; Buckley, Clegg, Cross, 
Liu, Voss, and Zheng, 2007b). Consequently, scholars such as Brouthers et al. (2008a, p. 189) 
proposed explicitly that “adding the moderating influence of national institutional environment to 
a resource based perspective better explains strategic decisions in an international context than 
does a mere resource-based approach” (see also Xu and Shenkar, 2002).  
Particularly for emerging market firms, research postulates that surrounding domestic cultural 
and social environments imprint on their international strategies (Liu, Li and Xue, 2011). 
Resource-based rationales were extended with the institutional view to explain that emerging 
market MNEs internationalised to acquire new resources that were not available in their home 
institutional environments (c.f. Wan, 2005; Wang, Hong, Kafouros and Boateng, 2012). For 
instance, empirical studies on Chinese MNEs pointed to a relationship between institutional 
legacies and the dynamic capabilities of management, such as strategy flexibility and political 
awareness in facilitating the pursuit of international strategies (e.g. Buckley, Clegg et al., 2007b; 
Yiu et al., 2007). Buckley, Clegg et al. (2007b) pointed to a relationship between institutional 
legacies and the dynamic capabilities of management, such as strategic flexibility and political 
awareness necessary to utilise those legacies. Also in the context of Chinese MNEs, it was 
suggested that home government support affected risk-taking capabilities and reduced the 
importance of learning from prior knowledge and experience, thereby motivating inexperienced 
firms to engage in market entries. Despite lacking the knowledge and experience of developed 
market multinationals, emerging market firms were subject to home government intervention 
which was expected to increase the likelihood of their engagement in international expansion 
(e.g. Wang et al, 2012). Interestingly, as MNEs accumulate experience of operating in 
institutionally distant environments, the impact of contextual factors is hypothesised to differ 
between first and subsequent entries (Contractor, 2007; Estrin, Baghdasaryan and Meyer, 2009). 
A line of research combining resource and institutional rationales suggests that the perspective 
whereby resources are independent of the context to which they are employed, put forward by 
organisational economics proponents is likely to be flawed. Table 1.6 in Appendix 2 summarises 
the multi-theoretical studies that have received most academic attention in the international 
business and management literature. Scholars synthesised RBTs such as organisational 
learning view and DCs, with institutional theory to explain that in the initial entry stage, foreign 
entry commitment modes tend to vary in their implications for performance depending on the 
institutional distance between home and host markets (Contractor, 2007; Gaur and Lu, 2007). 
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Over time, despite experiencing periods of uncertainty and even decline, resources such as 
multinational flexibility (Chung and Beamish, 2005) were hypothesised to enable MNEs to re-
adapt to their external environments, leading to higher survival likelihood in institutionally distant 
markets. Broadly, scholars agree that, as opposed to research that studies either institutional 
theory or RBTs, combining them facilitates an understanding of how resource effectiveness 
varies cross-nationally, potentially also influencing the performance outcomes of foreign market 
entry (Brouthers et al., 2008b; Yiu, Lau and Bruton, 2007; Xu and Shenkar, 2002).  
 
Extant conceptualisations of foreign market ‘re-entry’  
As mentioned previously, the review of extant literature revealed that only three studies have 
examined the decision to re-enter a foreign market after initial entry and exit. A brief overview of 
this (so far) small body of literature is considered useful to highlight the contribution of this current 
study. Welch and Welch’s (2009) theoretical paper calls for research on re-entry or ‘re-
internationalisation’ by stating that, amongst firms which have exited foreign markets, some re-
engage in those markets after a period of time-out. Whilst the authors do not engage with any 
one theoretical perspective to conceptualise re-entry, the paper emphasises the time-out period 
between exit and re-entry and how internal changes that may have occurred during time-out may 
influence a firm’s decision to re-enter the exited market. Furthermore, their study proposes that 
the international heritage of re-entrants, - consisting of their experience of having previously 
operated in the host market, prior networks and business relationships -, distinguishes them from 
de novo foreign market entrants. Although Welch and Welch (2009) point towards some key 
theoretical elements concerning the re-entry phenomenon, such as the time-out period, there is 
little appreciation as to how the duration of the time-out period may affect re-entry. In turn, the 
institutional and contextual changes that may have taken place during the time-out period as well 
as the effects of the market exit process on re-entry, remain undertheorised.  
In their study on foreign market re-entry, Javalgi et al. (2011) also expect there to be significant 
differences between initial entrants and re-entrants due to the latter having already acquired 
experience with operating in the market prior to exiting. The authors focus more on the motives 
firms have to return to previously exited markets such as the need to increase their international 
presence as well as the removal of host market barriers, thereby conceptualising re-entry as a 
function of the degree of risk (which varies according to the degree of prior experience) and host 
market attractiveness. Compared to the previous study, Javalgi et al. (2011) provide some limited 
empirical evidence of re-entrants by listing thirty examples of companies that have exited and re-
entered foreign markets between the 1920s and 2005, in some cases also capturing their modes 
of commitment at re-entry. In turn, the third and most recent study by Vissak and Francioni (2013) 
used some of the rationales put forward by Welch and Welch (2009) and Javalgi et al. (2011) 
and discussed the motivations to re-enter and the multiple exit and re-entry events of MVM, an 
Italian medium size firm. In using this case example, Vissak and Francioni (2013) provide a 
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passing critique of the Uppsala stage model of internationalisation by emphasising that firms’ 
international expansion processes do not always occur in stages as firms may also exit and re-
enter foreign markets. Although these three studies engage, to some degree, with concepts such 
as experience, knowledge and organisational learning, they do not provide the theoretical 
lens(es) from which we can draw in order to examine re-entry phenomena.        
 
Summary and research agenda 
This review mapped out the conceptual landscape of foreign market entry and re-entry research 
and provided an overall trajectory of how the field has evolved over time. The systematic review 
of the literature facilitates an assessment of the relevance and potential of the theoretical 
perspectives to contribute to our understanding of foreign market re-entry. Perhaps surprisingly, 
internalisation/TCE rationales remain the most drawn on theoretical perspectives. Furthermore, 
although some scholars have made some initial steps towards theorising market re-entry after 
exit (Francioni and Vissak, 2013; Javalgi et al., 2011; Welch and Welch, 2009), the analysis 
revealed that the empirical literature has, thus far, focused almost exclusively on initial entry. 
Thus, contributions to this body of literature can be made both theoretically and in regards to the 
topics studied to gain a more updated understanding of the international activities of firms.  
Theoretically, the literature analysis shows that studies that deal with the tensions between 
traditional and dominant market entry theories such as TCE and other perspectives are under-
represented. This is perhaps intertwined with the rarity of warring camps and rifts in the foreign 
market entry scholarly community. Hence, market entry research is geared overwhelmingly 
towards applying theories and perhaps unsurprisingly, the assessment of recent studies drawing 
on internalisation/TCE perspectives suggests that they are little more than a rehash of past work, 
with a few original contributions to this literature. Most of the big questions associated with TCE 
rationales were tackled in the 1970s and 1980s and it is unlikely that significant new insights will 
emerge from this line of research in the future. Thus, it is possible to seriously question the ability 
of TCE theories to help understand foreign market re-entry phenomena.  
Similarly, the Uppsala theory has been a key theory within foreign market entry research and 
even mentioned in discussions concerning re-entry (e.g., Vissak and Francioni, 2013) as it 
emphasises the incremental and sequential stages of market entry. Early studies drawing on the 
Uppsala theory explained how MNEs increased their commitment to international markets 
through a series of sequential decisions guided by management experience and perceptions 
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1990). In turn, recent studies have concentrated on expanding the 
explanatory power of the theory by adding a new set of explanatory variables and relationships 
such as speed of internationalisation, psychic distance and learning capacity of the MNE 
(Casillas, Barbero and Sapienza, 2015; Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003). Interestingly, the stage 
theory of internationalisation is potentially the only dominant market entry theory that has been 
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put to stringent tests of appropriateness. Although the stage theory emphasises the role of 
learning from experience on market entry related decisions (concepts exported to other 
theoretical perspectives, i.e. RBV, organisational learning), what drives firms to move from one 
internationalisation stage to another has not been tackled in the literature. The Uppsala theory 
assumes that firms internationalise by following iterative cycles of experiential learning and 
subsequent commitment escalation. However, as firms progress in their international operations, 
commitment can decrease as well as increase, an idea that has not really been explored (for an 
exception, see Santangelo and Meyer, 2011; Vissak and Francioni, 2013). In the case of foreign 
market re-entry, what happens in the time-out period may be relevant to re-entrants. Specifically, 
the exploitation of knowledge and experience accumulated in the past may be moderated by 
changes that may have occurred in the institutional environments of re-entrants during that time-
out period. Thus, the Uppsala stage model, at it is currently applied to explicate initial market 
entry, may also not bring significant insights to the market re-entry phenomenon.   
While the early foreign market entry literature made significant and unique contributions to the IB 
discipline, the recent literature has been borrowing from the broader management literature. This 
said what we labelled non-traditional “new or emergent” theories continue to represent a small 
proportion of the foreign market entry literature. Studies drawing on RBT perspectives view the 
MNE as the primary unit of analysis and focus on its unique bundle of resources and capabilities. 
The analysis of the most impactful empirical studies drawing on RBT perspectives reveals that 
their predictions are broadly supported in that an alignment between MNEs’ resources and 
capabilities and market entry choices enhances firm performance. Amongst RBT proponents, 
organisational learning proponents tend to emphasise the role of knowledge resources, by 
focusing not only on experiential knowledge but also on the roles of acquiring general knowledge 
about operating internationally and experience or knowledge with certain types of decisions, i.e. 
entry mode experience (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Xia et al., 2009).   
Interestingly, in spite of the large number of “competing” theories used to frame foreign market 
entry research, scholars are beginning to accentuate the complementarity of theories in multi-
theoretical frameworks. For instance, studies that combine resource and transaction cost 
theories argue that whilst the latter explain the control mechanisms and hierarchical structures 
that reduce the costs of venturing abroad, RBTs emphasise that MNEs may enter foreign markets 
as a means of acquiring value (Li et al., 2008b). There is also a greater emphasis that contingent 
(institutional) factors, i.e. home and host country environments can intervene to increase the 
transaction costs associated with initial market entries. Scholars adhering to this rationale have 
suggested that, by making market entry decisions that fit the organisational capabilities and goals 
of the firm as well as environmental contingencies and pressures for legitimacy, transactional 
hazards associated with entry into emerging markets can be mitigated (Brouthers et al., 2008a; 
Henisz, 2003). Some scholars, although fewer at this point, focused specifically on combining 
emergent perspectives i.e. RBTs and institution-based perspectives to test how contingencies 
arising particularly from uncertain home and or host market institutions influence the ability of 
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internationalisers to attain new resources and capabilities successfully (notably, Brouthers et al., 
2008a). This stream of research addresses, in part, the need to incorporate more contextual 
variables in the theoretical reasoning of RBTs (Meyer and Peng, 2005). The integration of RBT 
and institutional perspectives is justified by the fact that, despite the empirical support for RBT 
predictions, one of the key shortcomings of these perspectives is that it does not account for the 
institutional factors that affect foreign market entry together with firm resources such as 
knowledge and experience. The next step here would be to develop frameworks that examine 
the simultaneous interaction between macro institutional and firm level - RBT- level factors. Thus 
far, attempts at integrating the two perspectives have shown significant effects for the inter-
relationship between institutional pressures and firm resources and capabilities such as prior 
learning and experience on de novo foreign market entry decisions (see Brouthers et al., 2008a; 
Li et al., 2007; Xia et al., 2009). 
In regards to the themes studied in the market entry literature, in recent years, scholars have 
called for more research to advance theorisations regarding what occurs following the initial entry 
decision, highlighting that the IB agenda seems to be running out of steam (Buckley, 2002; 
Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Surdu and Mellahi, 2016) and falling behind issues that are of 
importance to business practitioners (Javalgi et al., 2011; Welch and Welch, 2009; Xia et al., 
2009). Particularly, some studies have observed strong effects of cumulative entry mode 
experience on the type and pace of sequential entry mode decisions confirming that past entry 
mode choices may co-determine present ones (e.g., Chan and Makino, 2007; Gao and Pan, 
2010; Guillén, 2003; Lu, 2002; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999, Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; 
Yiu and Makino, 2002). Even so, little research has been devoted to understanding whether and 
why firms replicate prior decisions even when their internal and or external, institutional 
circumstances have changed. Scholars continue to examine market entry as a linear, often 
irreversible process. In fact, firms exit foreign markets for various reasons and re-enter at a later 
stage potentially employing strategies that are different from those employed by initial entrants.  
This means that some relevant empirical phenomena such as re-entry may have escaped 
research attention because they do not fit perfectly within any of the current single theoretical 
frameworks, particularly theories based on transaction cost rationales which focus primarily on 
individual transactions and economic exchanges between firms. For re-entrants, transaction 
costs and perceived uncertainty are likely to be already high given that these firms have once 
unsuccessfully pursued entry into the market. Following a costs based logic, re-entrants are less 
likely to possess, and thus internalise the resource advantages necessary to do well in the host 
market (following their initial ‘failed attempt’), in which case re-entrants would internationalise 
generally through lower resource commitment modes such as exports. However, firms re-enter 
via commitment modes such as joint ventures and acquisitions (Javalgi et al., 2011). When 
investigating decisions post initial market entry, it is perhaps necessary to consider the effect of 
prior experience (organisational learning) as well as the social view of firms (institutional theory) 
which is not static and evolves over time (Martinez and Dacin, 1999). For firms operating in 
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transitional environments, the initial market entry strategy may be revisited in order to alter it and 
potentially address the changing pressures for legitimacy in those markets.  
Since the losses that firms may incur from changes in host institutions are believed to be 
significant, the stability of institutions over time is also flagged as important (Li et al., 2007; Xia 
et al., 2009). Institutional theory was brought in primarily to capture the influence of institutional 
factors in emerging economies and highlight the impact of institutional distance on market entry 
choices and performance. To make theoretical progress in this area, we must tackle more 
nuanced questions, such as regarding what may prevent firms from responding to changes in 
institutions. This is important because, whilst in markets characterised by stable institutional 
environments, the foreign firm would be aware of host institutional conditions and negotiate its 
market (re)entry accordingly, when institutions change, there may be new forces influencing a 
foreign (re)entrant’s ability to learn and subsequently utilise its prior knowledge and experience.  
In sum, this chapter critically examined the theoretical evolution of the market entry and re-entry 
literatures highlighting that traditional theoretical perspectives developed in the 1970s continue 
to dominate the market entry literature, whilst studies drawing on newer perspectives represent 
a relatively smaller proportion of this body of research. Furthermore, this literature review noted 
that only three studies discuss foreign market re-entry without presenting significant empirical 
evidence regarding the re-entry phenomenon. Based on the results of the review - particularly 
concerning the growing legitimacy of multi-theoretical studies in the market entry literature - in 
this next chapter, I extend and integrate current organisational learning and institutional theory 
rationales to conceptualise the foreign market re-entry after initial entry and exit. Following from 
this systematic overview of the market entry literature, the conceptualisation of the re-entry 
phenomenon revolves around the similarities and more interestingly perhaps, the expected 
differences between ‘initial’ or ‘de novo’ market entry and re-entry.  
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I illustrated that foreign market re-entry remains an understudied, and 
thus, theoretically overlooked area in strategy and international business. Most of the extant 
research focuses on initial or de novo foreign market entry and depicts firm behaviour as rational 
and typically economic driven. As also illustrated in Chapter 1, many empirical studies that draw 
on theories such as TCE build on the economic perspective that first identifies the resources 
firms need to obtain an advantage over competitors and then concludes in the most effective 
manner to structure the subsidiary (through the choice of entry mode) in order to reduce 
transaction costs. Such studies that view market entry as mostly driven by the costs and benefits 
of exploiting firm-specific advantages whilst simultaneously reducing transaction costs, are 
increasingly criticised (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Fang and Zou, 2009; Martin and Solomon, 
2003; Pitelis, 2007; Surdu and Mellahi, 2016; Teece, 2014; Xia et al., 2009).  
This chapter proposes that, although MNEs make rational choices, their re-entry behaviour may 
not be as straightforward; thus, theorisations that have gained most acceptance in the market 
entry literature (i.e. TCE) alone may have little scope for the behavioural and sociological 
explanations that underlie foreign market re-entry phenomena.  
Specifically, this chapter discusses the similarities and differences between de novo entry and 
re-entry from an organisational learning and institutional legitimacy perspectives. In particular, 
organisational learning has been broadly understood as a cognitive process of incrementally 
accumulating knowledge over time, in order to learn to detect and correct organisational errors, 
which in turn, is transformed into organisational routines that are associated with superior 
strategic decisions (Cyert and March 1963; Feldman and Rafaeli, 2002; Feldman, 2003; Feldman 
and Pentland, 2003; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Levitt and March, 1988). This has been its 
interpretation and application in the market entry literature as well (e.g., Autio, Sapienza and 
Almeida, 2000; Barkema et al., 1996; Brouthers et al., 2008a; Eriksson et al., 1997; Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977; Xia et al., 2009). This chapter builds on the logic that one should study 
organisational learning not only as a linear, sequential process - whereby the firm accumulates 
knowledge and experience over time which is then transferred to subsequent re-entry decisions 
- but by also examining the factors that influence the value derived from applying the same 
knowledge and routines to new situations, and the possibility of organisational forgetfulness or 
unlearning. It also highlights that whilst institutional development in a country is indeed important, 
over time institutions may change and affect the ability of firms to learn from and successfully 
apply past knowledge and experience to new decisions.  
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Whilst this chapter conceptualises the expected similarities between initial entry and re-entry, it 
focuses predominantly on the differences between the two phenomena. Because re-entry is, at 
least to some extent, related to de novo entry, I consider it appropriate to assume that de novo 
entry offers a partial explanation for re-entry. However, other factors may play a more crucial role 
in understanding the decision to return to a foreign market after initial entry and exit. Specifically, 
three key aspects may potentially differentiate the re-entry process from the initial market entry, 
namely, the nature of market exit motivations, the duration of the time-out period and potential 
host institutional changes that may have occurred during the time-out period between exit and 
re-entry. Thus, it may also be appropriate to consider whether differences exist in how firms make 
re-entry decisions as a result of learning from (or unlearning) prior experience, and of responding 
to potential (changes in) legitimacy pressures from their institutional environments.  
This chapter is structured as follows; the first section outlines the boundaries of the re-entry 
phenomenon and the rationale concerning the expected theoretical similarities as well as 
differences between de novo entry and re-entry. The following section unpacks what is currently 
assumed about the effects of learning and institutional pressures for legitimacy in the market 
entry literature to emphasise the expected similarities between initial market entry and re-entry. 
The latter half of this chapter elaborates further on how and why organisational learning and 
institutional theory are considered particularly relevant to investigating foreign market re-entry.   
 
Outlining the boundaries of foreign market re-entry: Similarities and differences between 
initial or de novo foreign market entry and re-entry 
Over the years, the foreign market entry literature has become relatively more vocal in 
recognising that the prior learning, history and experience resources of the firm are important 
factors in determining initial market entry choices and their performance outcomes. An 
organisational learning perspective (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Levitt and 
March, 1988; Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen and Volberda, 2007) suggests that firm behaviour 
tends to be path dependent; in that strategic decisions such as foreign market entry, are the 
result of firms learning from different types of prior knowledge and experience (e.g., Barkema et 
al., 1996; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Gao and Pan, 2010; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Li et 
al., 2007; Padmanabhan and Rao, 1999; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Xia et. al., 2009). 
Although the research field of market re-entry is a novel one, there may be similarities between 
de novo market entry and foreign market re-entry decisions in some key theoretical respects. 
Indeed, from an organisational learning perspective, it may be argued that, prior to exiting a 
foreign market, firms are left with some level of experiential knowledge and learning from 
operating in that given market (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) even when most physical assets 
would have been lost. Furthermore, re-entrant firms may then exploit this knowledge and 
experience when returning to the previously exited market, which might give them an advantage 
compared to other players entering a foreign host market for the first time.  
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Also, possessing prior knowledge and experience has been associated with a lower likelihood of 
firms manifesting risk adverse behaviours when entering foreign markets (Barkema et al., 1996; 
Brouthers et al., 2008b; Casillas et al., 2015; Chang, 1995; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Gao and 
Pan, 2010; Guillén, 2003; Huang and Sternquist, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Xia et al., 
2008). In the case of re-entrants, possessing prior knowledge and experience may decrease 
their adversity to risk, thus leading to re-entrants engaging in higher resource commitment modes 
and or re-entering locations with high pressures for institutional legitimacy.  
Furthermore, prior research has shown that institutional factors can have a significant direct as 
well as moderating impact on international expansion decisions (Chan et al., 2006; Delios, Gaur 
and Makino, 2008; Uhlenbruck, Meyer and Hitt, 2003; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh and Eden, 
2006; Xia et al., 2009; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Under conditions of political instability such as 
spurious changes in tax codes, local competitors may take advantage of foreign entrants by 
leveraging their knowledge of operating in weak institutional environments (Delios and Henisz, 
2000). For instance, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) showed how the pervasiveness of corruption 
influenced the choice between contractual and equity arrangements as foreign entrants were 
struggling to match entry mode decisions with the need to achieve host market legitimacy. Thus, 
from an institutional theory perspective, the re-entry decisions of firms may also be influenced by 
institutional legitimacy pressures (e.g., Chan et al., 2006; Chan and Makino, 2007; Guillén, 2002; 
Hernandez and Nieto, 2015) imposed by the host environment upon re-entry, particularly as most 
re-entrants have exited and subsequently returned to what are generally referred to as 
transitional and institutionally idiosyncratic host market environments. Thus, foreign market re-
entry decisions may also be influenced by a re-entrant’s ability to choose the right time to re-
enter and or select organisational structures that would enable it to (re)attain legitimacy and 
social acceptance in that host market location. 
However, examples of foreign market re-entry events suggest that there may be key distinctions 
between de novo entry and re-entry. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the underlying, 
taken for granted (Tsang, 2008; Tsang and Zahra, 2008) assumptions of learning theories are 
that prior knowledge and experience have a positive effect on organisational learning and that 
learning is transferable to subsequent strategic decisions. Thus, the general sense from the 
organisational learning literature is that the process of transferring experience and knowledge is 
a sequential and linear one. Extant theorisations do not take into account that the applicability of 
experience and knowledge resources may, in fact, be revisited by firms in a similar context (i.e. 
re-entry). For example, a number of Italian fashion retailers, such as Gas Jeans S.P.A., Diesel 
S.P.A. and the Sixty Group re-entered the Indian market in 2010 after having withdrawn two 
years earlier. Compared to their initial entry into India, where they had all established joint 
ventures agreements to operate in the market, Gas Jeans returned to own and operate their own 
store, the Sixty Group found a local franchise partner and only Diesel returned to serve the 
market via another joint venture after their first partnership fell through due to goal incompatibility. 
In turn, Gas Jeans emphasised the importance of directly managing operations and staff in the 
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market, a lesson learned from previously operating in India, which resulted in a change in the 
mode of operation as the company opted for more control over their business there. Similarly, 
the Sixty Group who tried unsuccessfully to improve relationships with their joint venture partner 
exited the market; however, the retailer renewed its activities there, only this time around, by 
decreasing its commitment in the market. Also interesting is the case of the French retailer 
Galeries Lafayette which waited twelve years to return to the previously exited Chinese market, 
whilst Gucci’s (Italy) time-out period prior to returning to China was only a six-year hiatus. Prior 
to re-entering China, retailer Gucci also re-entered India after only a one-year hiatus. These are 
only a few amongst numerous other examples demonstrating that re-entry decisions may vary 
amongst re-entrants. This may be the case even when re-entrants initially appear to have similar 
levels of knowledge and experience resources and therefore, similar opportunities to learn to 
exploit and re-deploy the knowledge and experience accumulated over time. 
One may, therefore, question the applicability and usefulness of learning from prior experience, 
particularly the idea that learning is a linear and sequential process of knowledge accumulated 
from prior experience as well as subsequent exploitation of this knowledge in current and future 
decisions. Organisational learning may not always unfold as a sequential, linear process for re-
entrants. Re-entrants may make strategic re-entry decisions based on their success (or lack 
thereof) of the initial foray into the market, reflected in the motivations to exit. More specifically, 
the market exit process may affect re-entrants’ willingness to take risks, thus influencing market 
re-entry decisions such as which re-entry mode to adopt, how long to wait until returning to the 
market and which markets to re-enter, which in turn may have a significant impact on their 
competitive advantage and performance in that host market. Secondly, the duration of the time-
out period is also potentially important, because it may take time for an organisation to distill 
lessons learnt from the previous venture and when a long time has passed since exit, there may 
be a degree of organisational forgetfulness or unlearning involved. Third, re-entrants may also 
be affected by pressures to learn how to become legitimate in the host market which may, in turn, 
vary according to the duration of the time-out period. Here, one could argue that prior learning 
and experience possessed by firms may not have the same level of applicability when 
environmental conditions change, therefore requiring adherence to new institutional rules to 
attain host legitimacy (Priem and Butler, 2001; Brouthers et al., 2008a). Adding an institutional 
perspective to the organisational learning logic may, therefore, provide some insights into 
whether firms with different levels of experience resources respond differently to legitimacy 
pressures (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; Xia et al., 2009).  
With this in mind, this next section examines in more detail the main theoretical elements of the 
foreign market re-entry phenomenon that are expected to share similarities with the wider foreign 
market entry literature and those that are most likely to differ. 
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Framing re-entry based on what we already know: An organisational learning perspective 
of the internationalising firm 
Since its beginning in the 1960s (Cyert and March, 1963), research on organisational learning 
has flourished, particularly in the international business and management literatures, as learning 
is expected to enable organisations to understand and interpret factors within their external 
environments and develop viable strategies (e.g., Chang, 1995; Gao and Pan, 2010; Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1977; 2009; Sapienza et al., 2006; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Drawing upon 
the concept of “learning-by-doing”, organisational research has promoted the idea that 
experience is a good measure of organisational learning and thus, a key explanatory factor for 
strategic decisions. Concepts such as learning and experience have become increasingly 
widespread as they are used by organisational economists, behavioural scientists and 
sociologists alike to understand organisational behaviours such as foreign market entry decisions 
(Autio et al., 2000; Barkema et al., 1996; Brouthers et al., 2008a; Li et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2009).  
Most notable amongst organisational learning proponents, Cyert and March (1963) and Levitt 
and March (1988) explained that organisational behaviour is history dependent and routine-
based, in that “the experiential lessons of history are captured by routines in a way that makes 
the lessons, but not the history, accessible to organisations and organisational members who 
have not themselves experienced the history” (Levitt and March, 1988, p. 320). The generic term 
“routines” is meant to incorporate the rules, conventions, culture, beliefs, strategies and 
processes around which organisations are built and which enable them to operate effectively 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000) and are therefore perceived as 
valuable sources of “understandings” between organisational members (Feldman and Rafaeli, 
2002; Feldman, 2003). In the same vein, Schwandt (1993, p. 8) defined organisational learning 
as “a system of actions, actors, symbols, and processes that enable an organisation to transform 
information into valued knowledge” (see also Schwandt and Marquardt, 2000). March (1991) 
further unpacked the concept of organisational learning noting that there are two types of 
organisational learning; exploitative learning, which refers to the acquisition of new knowledge 
having as a foundation some pre-existing insights; and explorative learning which tends to occur 
when organisations acquire knowledge and experience that are fundamentally different from pre-
established routines. Overall, these seminal papers put forward the assumption that prior 
experience are captured through routines making them accessible to decision makers who may 
not have experienced the history of the organisation (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000).  
Despite the widespread acceptance of the notion of learning and its importance to understanding 
market entry, there is no one widely accepted theory or model of organisational learning. 
Generally, learning within multinational organisations is considered most effective when attained 
incrementally because that allows firms to absorb the knowledge acquired from past experience 
and make sense of them (Barkema et al., 1997; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Johanson and Vahlne 
1977). Extant definitions and interpretations of organisational learning tend to be complementary 
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rather than conceptually different (Wang and Ahmed, 2003) and the focus tends to be on the 
exploitative aspects of learning and incrementally building new knowledge over time that would 
ultimately transform into increased involvement in the host market (e.g., Barkema and 
Drogendijk, 2007; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 1990; Welch and Loustarinen, 1988).  
Foreign market entry research generally builds on the interpretation of organisational learning 
put forward by the seminal work of Cyert and March (1963) and later March (1991) who 
emphasised the following inter-related aspects concerning the process of learning; namely that 
behaviour in an organisation is driven by pre-established routines; and that organisational actions 
are often path, or history dependent (Chan et al., 2006; Guillén, 2002; Sapienza et al., 2006; 
Slangen and Hennart, 2008; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Xia et al., 2009). Broadly, market 
entry scholars support this “routine-based” view of organisational learning (Hong, Easterby-Smith 
and Snell, 2006) according to which prior experience provides a reference point to understand 
subsequent foreign market entries. This, in turn, has resulted in the idea that stocks of knowledge 
accumulated in the past can transform into routines that positively shape the expansion of the 
firm into foreign market environments (for more recent studies, see Li, Qian and Yao, 2015).  
Furthermore, even when multinational firms have disadvantages in foreign markets compared to 
local firms, these disadvantages can be overcome effectively by gaining knowledge and 
experience applicable to that host country and perhaps even related settings (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). Thus, a firm’s knowledge base and competitive advantages increase with its host 
market experience (e.g., Zahra, Ireland and Hitt, 2000; Delios and Beamish, 2001) leading, for 
instance, to reduced host market uncertainty and a likelihood of firms making higher commitment 
foreign entries in those markets as they learn to operate across different modes (Barkema et al., 
1996; Casillas et al., 2015; Chang, 1995; Chetty et al., 2006; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Eriksson 
et al., 1997; Gao and Pan, 2010; Guillén, 2003). In other words, learning is viewed as a 
cumulative process whereby previous experience generate knowledge that is then applied to the 
firm’s ongoing business operations in the foreign market. Implicit in these assumptions is also 
the idea that organisations have a collective memory that enables the perpetuation of routines 
leading to repetition of the knowledge base and greater ability to manage uncertainties 
encountered in the host environment (see Guillén, 2003; Levinthal and March, 1993; Li et al., 
2007; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Xia et al., 2009; Zahra et al., 2000).  
Because re-entrants follow the hypothesised sequence of entry and experience accumulation, 
their intrinsic disadvantages in the host market may have dissipated because their capabilities 
would have improved with the accumulation of prior experience. In an indirect mention of the re-
entry process, Loustarinen and Welch (1990) proposed a direct and positive effect of 
organisational learning from prior knowledge and experience on the possibility of firms returning 
to previously exited markets. In other words, prior learning and experience may increase the 
likelihood of firms re-entering previously exited foreign markets. Indeed, it cannot be discounted 
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that re-entrants may enjoy superior competitive advantages over initial foreign market entrants 
from possessing some degree of prior knowledge and experience associated with that market.  
However, even when organisations record past experience to develop a consistent set of 
routines, it is likely that only part of an organisational memory can be retrieved at a given moment 
in time to make decisions (Levitt and March, 1988). Levitt and March (1988) specified that the 
availability of organisational memory “is associated with the frequency of use of a routine, the 
recency of its use, and its organisational proximity” (p. 328). Thus, organisations may have a 
relatively harder time retrieving older, unused knowledge and experience, whilst the repetitive 
use of certain routines, may make them more accessible to organisational decision makers 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Over time, scholars discovered that, indeed, routines which 
record prior knowledge and experience that are essential to an organisation’s core activities, are 
more likely to become encoded in repositories of organisational learning and exploited for future 
decisions making (Barkema et al., 1996; Barkema and Vermeulen, 2001; Casillas et al., 2015; 
Lu, 2002; Padmanabhan and Rao, 1999; Xia et al., 2009). Notably, in their study on the relevance 
of effectiveness of prior learning on market entry decisions, Padmanabhan and Rao (1999) 
concluded that “the relevance and the extent of transferability of prior experience depend critically 
on the degree of similarity between the current decision and prior decisions” (p. 28). For instance, 
acquisitions in unrelated product domains are considered less likely to foster organisational 
learning since the acquiring firm lacks the necessary prior capabilities and experience to absorb 
the new knowledge (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Since re-entry, by definition, involves a 
second entry into the same foreign market, this contention may be valid.  
For instance, re-entry mode commitment decisions could reflect an increase in the experience 
and subsequently, the confidence of the firm in its ability to manage international operations in 
that market. Similarly, the time needed to learn about a new market may decrease as firms 
acquire more knowledge and become less risk adverse (e.g., Chang, 1995; Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001; Li, 2010; Tuppura et al., 2008). In this case, re-entrants may return to the 
host market at a faster pace compared with de novo entrants, if and when the former are able to 
draw from their pre-existing stocks of knowledge and experience concerning the local culture and 
how businesses operate in that host market. By comparison, firms entering a foreign market for 
the first time, may lack this type of experiential knowledge and opt for lower commitment modes 
until gaining the confidence to invest more resources over time.  
 
An inertia based view of organisational learning 
Thus far, we have learned that firms are conditioned in their decision making by prior decisions 
that they have already tried and tested (Cyert and March, 1963) because current strategic 
decisions are not separable from previous decision making (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; 
Feldman, 2003; Hannan, Polos and Carroll, 2002; Rumelt, 1995) and once a decision has been 
made, the range of options available is perceived as reduced (Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
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Huang and Sternquist, 2007; Lu, 2002). In other words, we now know that organisations are 
expected to learn when they encounter a problem, look for a solution, adopt a solution and keep 
that solution for future use. In this case, when past routines become a blueprint for how a firm 
operates in the host market, re-entrant firms may then make little efforts to divert from prior types 
of decisions. This routine problem-solving strategy tends to be referred to as “learning inertia” 
(notably, Chan et al., 2006; Li et al., 2007; Xia et al., 2009).  
Following this logic, when confronted with the uncertainty of returning to a previously failed 
venture, re-entrants may also repeat past experience and routines which have already become 
legitimised in the host market. For example, re-entering via the same commitment mode may 
mean a reduction in the costs of learning how a new type of ownership works in the host market. 
Re-entrants may benefit in the re-entry process by also reversing some of the losses incurred 
upon exit. Whilst firms may have incurred sunk costs such as investments in physical plants and 
personnel particularly when entry modes are reversed (Belderbos and Zou, 2009), a firm may 
still be able to salvage intangible investments such as distribution partnerships and business 
networks by, for instance returning via the same mode or not waiting too long to re-enter.  
Thus, regardless of the usefulness of learning from prior experience, when confronted with 
uncertainty, re-entrants may repeat experience and organisational structures and routines which 
they are familiar with. In turn, this learning inertia may inhibit the re-entrant’s ability to acquire 
new knowledge and update its capabilities. Over time, learning inertia has even been associated 
with a tendency to become rigid due to the constant repetition of the same knowledge base 
(Feldman, 2003; Levinthal and March, 1993; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). 
 
An institutional legitimacy perspective: Exploring the expected similarities between de 
novo entry and re-entry 
Each organisation is embedded in its own internal environment consisting of systems, practices 
and routines that help make decisions relevant to the current strategy and that have been 
legitimised in the past (Meyer and Rowan, 1977); and an external, institutional environment that 
it shares with other organisations as well as other institutional stakeholders (Granovetter, 1985). 
In the case of re-entry, the rationale here is that both the internal environment of the firm, 
consisting of its learning from prior experience and the institutional environment, consisting of 
pressures for legitimacy to adhere to the rules of the different host market contexts, affect re-
entrants’ decisions when returning to the market. Managers are constrained by the ability to focus 
on specific stimuli that direct managerial attention at a given moment in time (Hutzschenreuter 
et al., 2007; Oliver, 1991). Consequently, MNEs may not respond uniformly to institutional 
pressures with their responses ranging from compliance to avoidance, manipulation and even 
defiance (Oliver,1991; 1992) which may depend on prior knowledge and experience.  
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Throughout the social sciences, the unique contribution of institutional theory has been its 
emphasis on how institutional norms, uncertainties, and regulations interact with organisations 
and thus, organisational decision-making (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Institutional theory is 
grounded in the notion that institutional norms shape the evolution of economic activities between 
countries and regulate the behaviour of firms (notably, Scott, 1995; Kostova, 1999; North, 1990; 
Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Institutional scholars emphasise that organisational actions and 
routines are not context free, but their outcomes are affected by the (institutional) environments 
in which organisations are embedded (notably, North, 1990; Scott, 2008).  
 
Key bases for institutional legitimacy  
In order to enter, and perform successfully in foreign host markets, firms may need to achieve 
institutional legitimacy which has been defined as “a generalised perception or assumption that 
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Firms pursue 
legitimacy because this is associated with increased credibility from relevant institutional actors 
(e.g., governments) which is considered a prerequisite for success particularly in challenging and 
uncertain institutional environments (Chan et al., 2006; Lu, 2002). Building on a game analogy 
that positions institutions as the “rules of the game”, North (1990) defined institutions as “the 
humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” and that affect the performance of 
the economy by their effects on the costs of exchange and production (p. 5-6), further 
emphasising formal rules/institutions which include laws and regulations that are determined by 
authority and formal position and can be in the form of government incentives, contractual terms 
or ownership restrictions. In turn, informal institutions refer to the social norms, customs and 
routines in a country; informal rules are mainly socially derived and unlikely to be sanctioned 
formally (North, 1990). The idea here is that firms go through this process of institutionalisation 
because, when legitimising actors are familiar with certain organisational forms or practices, 
those practices become the norm, and are more likely to be accepted (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Suchman, 1995). Firms may also gain legitimacy by imitating the organisational practices 
adopted by other (more legitimate) firms (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Mezias, 1990).  
Scott (1995) provides an overarching framework by arguing that, at the most fundamental level, 
the basis of legitimacy varies according to three pillars that underlie the quality of institutions and 
can be key sources of institutional pressures on organisational strategy (see also Scott, 2008)2. 
First, the regulative pillar refers to formal rules and enforcement mechanisms generally controlled 
and enforced by institutional actors on which firms depend, such as the state (e.g., North, 1990). 
                                                          
2 Although institutional theory has been studied from an economic perspective (e.g., North, 1990) as well as a sociological 
perspective (e.g., Scott, 1995), scholars have found these approaches to be complementary rather than competing (c.f. 
Peng and Heath, 1996; Peng, 2003). Furthermore, it is viewed as natural for management scholars to combine the two 
views when conceptualising institutional pressures (see Peng and Heath, 1996, for a more detailed discussion). Thus, 
both here and in the empirical chapters, the discussion draws broadly on institutional theory rationales without engaging 
with the disciplinary backgrounds of the institutional perspective.  
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Second, the normative pillar comprises the values and norms in society which define the socially 
accepted behaviours of organisational actors by comparing them with already established 
standards. MNEs are expected to deal with a variety of pressures arising from the values, norms 
and behaviours that have become legitimised in different countries and may exert significant 
influence on their competitiveness and organisational practices (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; 
Zaheer, 1995). Finally, the cognitive pillar (e.g., Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) refers to the cultural 
beliefs, social values and interpretations that are culturally supported and internalised by 
organisations and “constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which meaning 
is made” (Scott, 2008, p. 57). Cognitive frameworks are expected to help organisational actors 
make sense of the world around them and make judgements on how to behave. 
Institutional scholars (cf. Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) pay explicit attention to the sociological 
rationale of organisational behaviour. Although compliance with normative and cognitive 
pressures is not legally reinforced, institutional isomorphism has been directly associated with 
firms achieving competitive advantage (e.g., Chan et al., 2006; Li and Yao, 2010; Yiu and Makino, 
2002). To survive, organisations must conform to the rules and belief systems of their respective 
institutional environments, because institutional isomorphism, i.e. imitating or mimicking the 
behaviours of other foreign entrants, will also earn them legitimacy (Chan et al., 2006; Dacin, 
1997; Guillén, 2002). Hence, in the face of uncertainty associated with unknown institutional 
forces, organisations have been found to model themselves after, and adopt the same frames of 
reference as, other organisations considered as similar or more legitimate (Chan et al., 2006; 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Guillén, 2002; Scott, 2001; 2008). Conforming to organisational 
practices that have achieved legitimacy in the eyes of relevant institutional actors (Lu, 2002; Yiu 
and Makino, 2002) can help organisations fit within their institutional environment; thus, 
legitimacy is expected to enable the firm to perform its activities with relatively less constraint.  
Legitimacy, therefore, tends to vary according to how well firms conform to the rules of their 
institutional environments (Chan et al., 2006; Lu, 2002) and becomes more important when firms 
perceive an environment as uncertain, generally, because they lack the information and ability 
to pre-empt the potential threats and opportunities that exist within that environment (Guillén, 
2003). In the case of re-entrants, when little information is available about the institutional 
idiosyncrasies of host markets and about the costs and benefits of returning to those markets, 
firms run a greater risk of making mistakes, particularly when the stakes are high (i.e. re-entering 
via a wholly owned subsidiary). To avoid making such mistakes, re-entrants may opt to re-enter 
markets characterised by lower pressures for legitimacy or may choose to re-enter when other 
foreign firms are (re)entering, which may signal ease of establishing legitimate operations in that 
market. Thus, similar to initial entry, institutional pressures for legitimacy may also determine re-
entry decisions such as how and when to re-enter as well as which markets to re-enter.  
Even so, some re-entrant firms may be abler than others to gain legitimacy, in that the effect of 
institutional legitimacy on re-entry decisions may vary according to each re-entrant’s own 
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knowledge and capabilities to reduce uncertainty by identifying and adopting potential institution-
based advantages. For re-entrants, it may not be just the organisational practices of other firms 
that are important, but also those of the re-entrant firm itself prior to exiting the market; re-entrants 
may repeat the same organisational practices that were in place prior to exit, unless those 
practices were, in themselves, illegitimate and thus, a motivation to exit the foreign market. 
Furthermore, as proposed later in more detail, firms may also change their perceptions of what 
constitutes institutional legitimacy and not always follow the behaviour of others or their own as 
it may lead to inertia in the long run (Chan et al., 2006). A weakening of institutional consensus 
and a revisiting of what constitutes as legitimate can lead re-entrants to alter strategies that were 
once legitimate in the host market, thus potentially differentiating the initial entry from re-entry. 
 
Institutional legitimacy and foreign market entry related decisions  
Although significantly present in 1990s management discussions (Kostova, 1997; Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999), it was not until the 2000s that foreign market entry scholars started drawing on 
institutional theory. In the foreign market entry literature specifically, scholars used the 
institutional lens mainly to propose that establishing external legitimacy by adapting to the 
regulative, normative and cognitive rules of host environments in institutionally distant foreign 
markets is more significant in making foreign market entry decisions than for instance, efficiency 
concerns (e.g., Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Chan et al., 2006; Deng, 2009; Guillén, 2002; 
Hoskisson et al., 2013; Makino, Isobe and Chan, 2004). This line of research has received 
empirical support, particularly in studies concerned with international expansion to and from, new 
and emerging market contexts (considered more likely to be subject to institutional voids) (e.g. 
Bangara, Freeman and Schroder, 2012; Deng, 2009; Hitt et al., 2004). Xu and Shenkar’s (2002) 
highly cited paper advocates that MNEs’ firm advantages are rooted in their ability to bridge 
institutional distances and exploit the uneven distribution of resources that rests in their home 
and host environments.  
Several studies also emphasised the importance of the heterogeneity of institutional contexts 
within host market environments, particularly for market entry location; notably, Meyer and 
Nguyen (2005) reported that firms were influenced by institutional pressures for legitimacy arising 
mainly from institutional actors such as host country governments. Whilst location decisions were 
previously modelled as location specific advantages of chosen markets (TCE), institutional theory 
is also used to understand that firms tend to enter apparently uncertain and risky host 
environments (Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Interestingly, when 
entering other emerging markets, firms from countries characterised by weak institutions are 
expected to be less deterred by factors such as host country policy risks because they already 
possess experience with operating in idiosyncratic institutional environments; thus, challenging 
the conventional wisdom that location decisions should be viewed as location specific 
advantages of chosen markets (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). This means that, as firms return to 
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markets within their proximity, and thus, characterised by similar institutional idiosyncrasies, they 
may enter via high resource commitment and or take less time to re-enter those markets. 
Other scholars explored how the quality of institutions, as opposed to transactional concerns, 
influenced foreign market entry mode decisions. Highly restrictive host institutional environments 
are expected to motivate investors to opt for co-operative modes of entry to facilitate MNEs’ 
adaptation to local institutional contexts (Meyer et al., 2009; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Amongst 
other institutional factors, the pervasiveness of corruption is associated with foreign firms’ inability 
to establish legitimacy in the local market, leading to a higher likelihood of joint ventures over 
wholly-owned subsidiaries (Meyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck and Eden, 2005). For 
emerging market MNEs, which do not possess experience and knowledge advantages 
traditionally associated with older, developed market multinationals, home institutional 
environments can offer other types of advantages (Deng, 2009; Hitt et al., 2004; Hoskisson et 
al., 2013). For instance, Chinese firms are provided with incentives from home governments to 
enter developed host environments via mergers and acquisitions strategies to acquire strategic 
assets and capabilities from firms in economically advanced host regions (Deng, 2009). It would 
be interesting to test these ideas for emerging market re-entrants, mainly in terms of whether 
these firms are, to some degree, deterred by host institutional pressures for legitimacy. 
As mentioned earlier, institutional theory proponents also advocate that over time organisations 
sharing the same environments tend to become isomorphic with one another. For instance, 
Chinese multinationals’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals are considered a unique 
characteristic of their home institutional environment (notably, Deng, 2009). In turn, past 
internationalisation experience is expected to reduce isomorphic behaviour amongst 
internationalising firms (Yang et al., 2009) and, in turn, increase the likelihood of firms opting for 
the commitment modes that have gained them legitimacy in the past (Xia et al., 2009). On the 
other hand, environmental uncertainty, particularly home market intervention, is expected to 
increase the likelihood of firms displaying isomorphic behaviour, thus lowering the likelihood of 
firms displaying heterogeneous responses to institutional pressures (Rugman, Nguyen and Wei, 
2014). Here as well, it would be interesting to examine the effect of institutional pressures for 
legitimacy on re-entry decisions such as location, commitment and timing patterns and assess 
whether these decisions vary with re-entrants’ degree of prior knowledge and experience.   
 
Expected conceptual differences between de novo foreign market entry and re-entry: 
Interplay between organisational learning and unlearning for re-entrants 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I explained why and how the foreign market entry literature is a 
good starting point to conceptualise the factors that may affect the re-entry phenomenon. The 
aim of this next section is to highlight that, although useful, it is not sufficient to apply the same 
concepts that have been used in the literature on initial entry to study foreign market re-entry 
phenomena. This section builds on some key underlying rationales; namely that organisational 
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learning is not linear and forgetfulness or unlearning may occur as firms exit and re-enter a 
foreign market after a period of time-out; that firms may attempt to adapt to institutional pressures 
for legitimacy, particularly when host institutions change significantly; and that responses to 
legitimacy pressures as well as institutional changes may, in turn, vary according to a re-entrant’s 
prior levels of learning from knowledge and experience accumulated in the past.    
Having discussed the benefits of learning it is also necessary to consider the obverse side of the 
issue, namely organisational unlearning. Some mentions of organisational unlearning exist. 
Lane, Salk and Lyles (2001) viewed unlearning as “the process of reframing past success 
programs in order to fit them with changing environmental and situational conditions” (p. 691). 
Cegarra-Navarro and Moya (2005) argued that unlearning is “the dynamic process that identifies 
and removes ineffective and obsolete knowledge and routines which block the collective 
appropriation of new knowledge and opportunities (p. 162). Since Levitt and March (1988) 
referred to organisational learning as a process of “encoding inferences from history into routines 
that guide behaviour” (p. 320), organisational unlearning can perhaps simply be defined as 
partially or entirely renouncing existing routines to make way for new behaviours. 
A key tenet of organisational unlearning conceptualisations is that the past may not be a good 
predictor of the future, particularly if the experience and learning organisations possess is no 
longer in line with the complexities and changes in their environment (Tsang and Zahra, 2008). 
Whilst discussions of the concept of organisational learning are advancing, management 
scholars’ understanding of organisational unlearning is lagging behind (Bettis and Prahalad, 
1995; Hedberg, 1981; Tsang and Zahra, 2008), and is essentially inexistent in the context of 
market (re)entry related decisions. The concept of organisational unlearning perhaps fits better 
within March’s (1991) idea of explorative learning, whereby the firm steps outside its current 
knowledge base, norms and routines and acquires capabilities that can potentially differ 
significantly from existing insights. Rather than viewing learning and unlearning as opposite 
concepts, some scholars have recognised the link between the two concepts. Notably, Hedberg 
(1981) stressed that “[k]nowledge grows, and simultaneously it becomes obsolete as reality 
changes. Understanding involves both learning new knowledge and discarding obsolete and 
misleading knowledge. The discarding activity – unlearning – is as important a part of 
understanding as is adding new knowledge.” (p. 3). Hence, elements of the previous experience 
may be disregarded from decision making, whilst they may or may not be disregarded from 
organisational memory (Hedberg, 1981). In other words, unlearning can involve a process of 
reprioritising what is known by organisations to allow for the addition of novel and more relevant 
knowledge to be drawn from (de Holan and Philips, 2004; Cegarra-Navarro and Moya, 2005).  
Consequently, when firms unlearn, some prior learning and experience may be retained although 
perhaps no longer viewed as applicable to new circumstances (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995). In 
fact, one may argue that, since foreign market re-entry is, by its very nature a dynamic process 
consisting of de novo entry-exit-re-entry, unlearning prior routines and behaviours may occur to 
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allow for new information to be acquired that may be more useful and more applicable at re-
entry. The rationale here is that, unlearning or disregarding prior knowledge, experience, habits 
and routines may prompt a change in re-entrants’ behaviour to avoid replication of prior mistakes 
and adjust to potential changes that may have occurred in the time-out period. 
Yet, little is known about whether re-entrants behave differently from de novo entrants and if so, 
in what way. Re-entrants’ prior learning and experience in the host market would have left them 
with an international heritage consisting of experiential knowledge, managerial attitudes and 
even network relationships (Javalgi et al., 2011; Welch and Welch, 2009). Whereas all re-
entrants are expected to possess some degree of international heritage, its applicability in making 
subsequent re-entry decisions may vary significantly amongst re-entrant firms. The limited 
evidence on foreign market re-entry as well as some initial casual empiricism are considered 
here to conceptualise the foreign market re-entry phenomenon.  
Figure 2.1 below presents a conceptualisation of the re-entry phenomenon emphasising the key 
theoretical differences that may exist between de novo entrants and re-entrants. Evidence 
suggests that the international heritage and thus, the learning from prior knowledge and 
experience of re-entrants may be shaped by the nature of market exit, by how long they have 
spent out of that market prior to re-entering and by the degree of host institutional changes that 
may have occurred during the time-out period (see Figure 2.1). These aspects that are specific 
to the foreign market re-entry decision may lead to firms unlearning, forgetting or disregarding 
prior routines and behaviours whilst adapting to potentially new pressures for institutional 
legitimacy. These aspects will be empirically tested in the later chapters of this thesis in order to 
understand the direct (or moderating) effects of time-out, market exit motivations and host 
institutional changes on re-entry commitment mode, timing and location patterns. The proposed 
theoretical differences between de novo entry and re-entry are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Proposition #1: Organisational unlearning and market exit motivations 
Thus far, the literature on organisational learning stresses the positive effects of experiential 
learning on firm behaviour. Learning from past experience is expected to broaden the range of 
experience and stimulate more learning that then increases the absorptive capacity of the 
organisation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). However, as illustrated in Figure 2.1, it is not just the 
experience that re-entrants have accumulated in the past that may influence the re-entry process, 
but it is also the experience associated with the market exit process itself that may influence how 
re-entry is interpreted. In order to understand re-entry, one may need to go beyond previous 
assumptions and consider the positive as well as negative effects of prior knowledge and 
experience on organisational learning and subsequently, on re-entry decisions.  
This said, the links between international experience, learning, organisational memory and 
attitudes may be less straightforward for re-entrants. In fact, it may be difficult to anticipate which 
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lessons re-entrants have learnt from their initial market foray. Some empirical studies suggest 
that the prior international experience may be sufficiently negative for internationalisers to decide 
against considering a future re-entry into previously exited foreign markets (e.g., Crick, 2002; 
2004). For instance, although retailers such as Marks and Spencer (UK) successfully renewed 
their operations in mainland Europe; Sainsbury’s (UK) in Egypt, Wal-Mart (US) in Germany and 
Tesco (UK) in China are examples of companies which have not re-entered despite the growing 
attractiveness of host markets. Even when host market conditions appear favourable, firms may 
still not re-enter, leaving potential profits untapped. This section proposes that, in order to 
understand re-entry behaviour, including whether learning from experience facilitates re-entry, it 
is necessary to conceptualise the effects on re-entry of market exit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A conceptualisation of the expected differences between de novo entry and re-entry  
Particularly relevant here is drawing on key research from the de-internationalisation or market 
exit literature. The market exit itself is an underdeveloped area of research precisely because of 
the effects that market exit is expected to have on organisational psychic and behaviour post exit 
(Javalgi et al., 2011; Mellahi, 2003). A firm’s decision to exit the market may follow a decrease in 
performance in the foreign market as a result of decline in demand for the firm’s products (Cairns 
et al., 2008), such as Ford’s (US) decision to pull out their Mustang range from India as there 
was not enough demand for luxury cars in the period around 2009. The impetus for market exit 
could also be organisational dissatisfaction, conflict with institutional actors or poor performance 
from not understanding how to operate and establish legitimacy in the host market (e.g., Mellahi, 
2003). Some examples of companies that have failed to gain legitimacy due to the large number 
of competitors already operating in the host market include La Senza’s (Canada) exit from the 
US in 2005, Philips’s (Netherlands) withdrawing their smartphone business from India in 2007, 
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Meiji Dairies’ (Japan) exit from China in 2013, Mattel Inc.’ (US) exit from China in 2011, Renault’s 
(France) exit from China’s passenger car market in 2002, Movenpick’s (Switzerland) exit from 
India in 2004 and so on. Of the re-entrants that have exited due to poor performance, inadequate 
preparation to serve the market was often cited; notable examples include US brands such as 
Dunkin Donuts and Yum Brands, which exited the UK market in the mid-1990s as they failed to 
adapt to consumer tastes, only to return some 20 years later.  
Other internal forces such as changes in ownership (and or the management team) and overall 
shifts in strategy can also play an important role in market exit as managers may not be able to 
deal with international expansion decisions whilst simultaneously re-focusing operations in the 
home market/region (Cairns et al., 2008; 2010). Esprit Holdings’ (Hong Kong) exit from the US 
and Whirlpool Co.’s (US) exit from Australia were to a great extent attributed to a series of 
ownership changes. For instance, Whirlpool exited the Australian white goods market in the early 
1980s because its partner sold their stake in the venture to a company uninterested in renewing 
the license to sell the brand in the market despite it being successful. When given the chance a 
decade later to re-enter the market, the new CEO argued that given the past success of the 
Whirlpool brand in Australia during the 1970s, the company needed to re-enter as “[t]he Whirlpool 
brand was an asset that was sitting here [the Australian market] unused”. Examples of market 
exits attributed to firms re-directing resources to markets in their home regions include, but are 
not limited to 3I Group Plc (UK) and Acer Inc. (Taiwan) exiting the US market, Aviva Plc. (UK) 
exiting Singapore, or Danone S.A. (France) exiting India. A particularly mediatised case of 
strategic market exit is that of LG Electronics (South Korea) which tactically exited foreign 
markets in the Middle East, Africa, India and Brazil in 2009 only to return some two years later 
after re-vamping its laptop business line. These are all examples of what have been 
conceptualised as the voluntary market exits (see Mellahi, 2003 for a discussion).   
However, firms may exit foreign markets not only due to poor performance or as a result of overall 
shifts in strategy (Mellahi, 2003), but also in response to external, generally institutionally related 
market shocks. So, involuntary market exit is generally associated with external factors such as 
government pressures to exit (Fletcher, 2001). Most highly notable examples are perhaps those 
of foreign insurance companies which exited various markets as a result of regulations against 
foreign insurers and stringent government restrictions meaning that licenses were not given away 
easily to foreign entrants (e.g., Transamerica Re, Korean Re, White Mountains Insurance Group 
in Brazil; Assicurazioni Generali S.P.A. in Bulgaria; Commercial Union Ltd., AIG Group and Sun 
Life Assurance in China; Cigna Corp. in South Africa; Aviva Plc. In Sri Lanka).  
Most importantly here, given the different motivations to exit, there may be misunderstanding as 
to the implications of market exit and what has been learned from the exit experience. A number 
of re-entrants have exited and re-entered the same market multiple times. Fiat Automobiles (Italy) 
re-entered Australia both with their Fiat range and Alfa Romeo brand in 1992 and 1990, 
respectively. Whilst the reasons associated with the first exit revolved around difficulties with 
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complying with Australian design rules and keeping costs low, which, in turn, affected their 
reputation for quality in the market; Alfa Romeo’s withdrawal was due to the company refocusing 
its strategic orientation towards perfecting its strategy in European markets. Denmark’s Flsmidth 
and Co. exited and re-entered China three times, and attributed each exit to different factors such 
as high competition, poor pricing strategy, and not enough control over their operations. Further, 
this was suggested to reflect in their commitment decisions and time out. Other notable examples 
include; Burger King which has engaged in 12 re-entries between 2007 and 2014 and citing exit 
motives such as poor demand (Curacao, Cyprus, Uruguay, Finland; Indonesia), unsuccessful 
marketing campaigns (Oman, France, Hong Kong), franchise partners going into solvency 
(Romania), price wars with local competitors (Indonesia, Israel) and unsafe food quality 
(Colombia). Re-entry is also common in the automotive industry; examples including large 
automakers such as the Fiat Group (24 events), Ford Motors (16), General Motors (17), and the 
Chrysler Group (12), whose international expansion trajectories tend to be non-linear.  
From this, it may be expected that re-entry is a complex phenomenon as firms tend to re-enter 
different foreign markets at different points in time, thus potentially also dealing with changing 
exit motivations and experience. In turn, this may interrupt the linear and sequential process of 
learning as well as the usefulness and applicability of learning from prior knowledge and 
experience when facing new decisions such as re-entry.  
Furthermore, with regards to the positive effects of prior experience and knowledge on effective 
learning, it has been proposed that firms tend to learn more from their failures than they do from 
their successes (see Arino and de la Torre, 1998). For re-entrants, decisions made when 
returning to the market may seek to avoid and potentially even correct previous mistakes. Nokia’s 
exit from the Indian market was primarily attributed to poor product positioning and 
misunderstanding of consumer needs (Business Insider, 2016), in which case re-entry is 
expected to carry with it choices regarding new product positioning, leveraging strong 
partnerships and renewing former distribution relationships and re-focusing on the most 
profitable segments. Following an unsuccessful initial venture into the market, firms may exit and 
then re-enter by switching to an entry mode that requires more commitment or less commitment 
to the market. Exit may also involve a break in relationships that were important to the 
organisation, particularly for it to be present in that host market (Chetty and Agndal, 2007). In 
fact, relationships may be so broken that the company may have to reconsider its mode of re-
entry commitment if other collaboration opportunities are not available upon their return into that 
host market. This may then lead to re-entrants unlearning certain types of behaviours and 
learning new ones, such as operating with a different type of commitment when re-entering.  
Additionally, the effect of market exit may vary according to the quality (depth) of initial market 
experience. For firms with limited involvement prior to exit, experiential knowledge may not be 
significant. Here, the sunk costs associated with exit are also reduced because soft, tacit 
knowledge may not have become part of organisational memory. In turn, for firms which exited 
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their wholly owned operations due to poor performance or external market forces, the 
interpretation of the initial market foray and the usefulness of the experience accumulated in the 
past may differ. Broadly, the idea here is that even failed outcomes can lead to learning from 
mistakes (Loustarinen and Welch, 1990; Welch and Welch, 2009), such as unlearning old habits 
and behaviours and focusing on learning about the right entry modes to use in a foreign market, 
and generally, what the re-entrant can do better (differently) the second time around. 
When firms make the less appropriate inferences about the past, or in this case, the exit decision, 
they may overestimate the success of prior learning (e.g., Levinthal and March, 1993; Westhead, 
Ucbasaran and Wright, 2005). Thus, the difficulties encountered during the initial market foray 
may be overlooked and even ignored from the learning process potentially limiting the ability of 
the organisation to incorporate the lessons learned from initial entry/exit into its re-entry. For 
instance, some re-entrants have exited the market due to home and host institutional pressures, 
whilst performing successfully in the host market; these firms may re-enter by taking more risks 
as a result of their interpretations of market exit without taking into account that re-entry may 
involve new rules altogether. Similarly, a tendency to ignore previous lessons may also explain 
why some firms exit the market just to return via the same commitment merely a year later. 
Conversely, relatively negative past experience, e.g., failed operations resulting in exit, may lead 
to overestimating the challenges associated with the market and thus, making suboptimal 
decisions by choosing lower control entry modes and or waiting too long before re-entering.  
This section highlighted that, even when the analytical and scanning capabilities of organisations 
are optimal, it may still be difficult for re-entrants to establish a cause and effect relationship 
between the first market foray that led to their exit and what the firm should do when re-entering. 
Furthermore, cause and effect relationships may not be unidirectional and linear, but in fact, may 
result through an iterative process of feedback and revisiting the phenomenon in order to unlearn 
some prior routines and behaviours. This increases the likelihood of there being various 
interpretations over the initial entry and exit experience which adds complexity to the effects of 
market exit on re-entry decisions. It may even lead to organisational unlearning as re-entrants 
may make decisions based on their interpretations of the exit process irrespective of their prior 
knowledge and experience accumulated over time through operating internationally.  
 
Proposition #2: Organisational unlearning during the time-out between exit and re-entry 
Re-entrants spend a period of time-out between exit and re-entry potentially causing a disruption 
in their foreign market experience (proposition 2, Figure 2.1). A disruption in organisational 
learning and routines such as one caused after an organisational change event (which in this 
case, may be the exit process) has been associated with potential loss of competencies and 
disrupted ties with the environment and relevant stakeholders within it (Amburgey, Kelly and 
Barnett, 1993; March, 1991). Therefore, re-entrants’ ability to apply the knowledge and 
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experience gained in the market prior to exit may depend on the time spent out the host market. 
In other words, the longer the time-out period, the less likely it may be for re-entrants to access 
the knowledge and experience acquired in the past and which may have, to some degree, now 
dissipated. As reinforced by Levitt and March (1988), “[e]ven within a consistent and accepted 
set of routines, only part of an organisation’s memory is likely to be evoked at a particular time, 
or in a particular part of the organisation” (p. 328). Building on Levitt and March’s (1988) 
conceptualisation concerning the retrieval of past knowledge and experience, for re-entrants, 
some parts of organisational knowledge may be more available for retrieval than others, in that 
the usefulness of prior experience and experience and implicitly, the applicability of lessons 
learned from past experience may depend on how much time passed between exit and re-entry.  
Organisational learning scholars have already been criticised for being too cryptic about how the 
process of learning unfolds, apparently ignoring that it takes time for an organisation to absorb 
the lessons learned from experience and apply them to further decisions, and even more time 
for knowledge accumulated in the past to stick and become a routine (Schulz and Aderhold, 
2004). There may, therefore, be considerable variation between re-entrants regarding the 
duration of the time-out period. Whilst some re-entrants may not have considered re-entering the 
market soon after exiting meaning that, when re-entry does occur, it may not carry with it lessons 
learned in the last, other re-entrants may have remained highly committed to the market even 
after exit and maintained relationships and connections with local stakeholders to facilitate their 
timely return. Initial casual empiricism revealed that the time-out period between exit and re-entry 
for the firms in this study ranges from a short re-evaluation of a firm’s activities (i.e. one year) to 
a long period of absence that may bring with it organisational forgetfulness, changes in the overall 
goals of the organisation, as well as changes in management attitudes and beliefs towards the 
market, including changes in the management composition itself.  
Although the organisational learning literature tends to emphasise the importance of routines 
becoming embedded in organisational practices, other studies have emphasised the role of 
management in shaping strategy (e.g., Araujo and Rezende, 2003). Specifically, organisational 
memory at the firm level may be accompanied by tacit knowledge at the individual level (Levitt 
and March, 1988). As a manager understands more about the potential opportunities and threats 
associated with a foreign market, the uncertainty may be reduced; organisations operating in 
uncertain environments are expected to rely more on informal sharing of knowledge and 
experience than firms operating in stable environments (Levitt and March, 1988). Whereas 
routine-based conceptualisations of organisational learning assume that the lessons learned 
from prior experience are preserved within organisations despite the passage of time, managers 
tend to have their own frames of reference (Araujo and Rezende, 2003) that may dictate how 
much they remember about the previous foray into the market. In this case, there may be 
changing frames of reference of individuals (Mezirow, 2000) leading to various biases that can 
further disrupt the linear and sequential process of learning. This reinforces the idea that, for re-
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entrants at least, the transformation of prior experience into effective learning and afterwards into 
organisational routines may not be as straightforward as previously suggested. 
Further to this idea of unlearning, knowledge may also disappear from organisational memory 
because the individuals that have attained legitimacy in this context have left. Management may 
change during time-out; when market exit is perceived as unsuccessful, decision makers 
involved in the re-entry process may be replaced (Benito and Welch, 1997). In turn, changes in 
management tend to bring changes in organisational goals, thus fostering organisational 
unlearning (Benito and Welch, 1997; Bell, McNaughton, Young and Crick, 2003), in which case 
the decision to re-enter is made irrespective of whether the organisation has learned from its 
initial market foray. In this case, organisational learning is less likely to be conserved within 
organisational memory and routines, making room for unlearning to occur (Bell et al., 2003; 
Welch and Welch, 2009). For example, whilst other American franchises did not make it in Israel, 
Burger King successfully re-entered in 2016 under new management, the second time around 
by partnering with experienced local partners who also had stakes in other related businesses. 
Thus, time can be both a negative and a positive factor; change may be easier to come about 
when decision makers are replaced, despite the potential loss of learning and experience. 
Changes in management may mean that the negative experience associated with re-entry have 
been unlearned and forgotten in which case, more appropriate re-entry strategies are devised. 
Organisational forgetfulness is therefore viewed as a form of unlearning (de Holan and Philips, 
2004). In the context of foreign market re-entry, organisational unlearning/forgetfulness may have 
occurred either voluntarily, in order to forsake negative events, or involuntarily as a result of the 
unintentional loss of routines and organisational memory (e.g., Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995; de 
Holan and Philips, 2004). Either way, knowledge may no longer be available for firms or decision 
makers to access. Prior learning and experience do not become necessarily extinct, as lapses 
and relapses can occur when the decision-making context requires prior knowledge to be 
accessed (notably, Bouton, 1994). Here, a longer time-out may lead to re-entrants unlearning a 
part of their previous knowledge and experience; yet, rather than assuming previous learning 
becomes extinct, it may simply reduce the likelihood of the same behaviour being applied upon 
re-entry. In the case of re-entry modes, for instance, a longer time-out period may lead to 
changes in commitment compared to how the firm was operating prior to exit. Over time, the 
organisational memory associated with a specific routine may have eroded and re-entrants may 
pursue the same strategy differently, such as opting for a joint equity investment mode rather 
than re-entering through a wholly owned operation. New learning that may occur in the time-out 
period is not necessarily suggested to override old learning but to contribute to some changes in 
re-entrants’ behaviour as not all prior learning and experience are necessarily preserved within 
organisational routines and behaviours over time (Bell et al., 2003). This may be partly because 
transferring routines and knowledge may be harder than starting over (cf. Zhao, Luo and Suh, 
2004); firms may unlearn some routines when they re-enter a previously exited market, 
particularly when a longer time passes between market exit and market re-entry.  
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Additionally, some studies specify that diversity of experience may potentially influence the 
effectiveness of organisational learning in such a manner that moderate levels of diversity are 
considered more conducive to effective learning, whilst low experience diversity may make the 
organisation inert, and high experience diversity can lead to overstimulation thus impeding timely 
decision making (e.g., Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers et al., 2008b; Fiol and Lyles, 
1985). In the time-out period, re-entrant firms would have potentially operated in other foreign 
markets, gaining more experience that could then be drawn from when re-entering. In turn, what 
exactly has occurred in this time-out period, particularly in terms of institutional pressures and 
institutional changes may also influence how re-entrants interpret the applicability of prior 
experience irrespective of the types of experience accumulated over time. Firms re-entering non-
developed market environments that have undergone a series of institutional transitions may find 
that exit costs are harder to recover and the applicability of prior experience may be questioned. 
For this reason, the third conceptual proposition refers to the potential effect of host institutional 
changes on organisational unlearning and subsequently on re-entries.  
 
Proposition #3: Organisational unlearning during host institutional change 
For re-entrants, the institutional pressures experienced prior to exit may no longer be relevant. 
Organisational routines may erode as a result of institutional pressures for legitimacy as well as 
institutional changes that may have occurred during the time-out period (proposition 3, Figure 
2.1). In such instances, upon (re-)entry firms may need to unlearn existing routines and learn the 
new rules of the game to remain legitimate in the newly changed host environment (Newman, 
2000; Peng, 2003). In one of the first studies on drivers of knowledge acquisition in the context 
of radical change unfolding in early 1990s Hungary, Lyles and Salk (1996) highlighted that 
changes in host institutional environments can have a massive impact on the process of 
organisational learning. What is referred to as transition economies, present a particularly great 
opportunity to conceptualise, for instance, how firms may have to abandon routines that are 
associated with former socialist systems in order to (re)gain legitimacy in market-based 
economies (Newman, 2000). Learning and unlearning can happen at the same time, in that re-
entrants may acquire new knowledge about the new environment and relinquish behaviour that 
no longer applies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). Yet, many activities that have become legitimised 
within organisations may have become routines and thus, not submitted to stringent tests of 
relevance when host institutions change. Thus, organisational actors such as re-entrants might, 
in fact, pursue those activities that create resistance to change. Re-entrants may be unwilling to 
change because they are forced to reconsider the value of their prior learning and experience. 
Furthermore, the need for change may increase the uncertainty associated with re-entry. 
Broadly, the need to become legitimate in a changed host institutional environment may influence 
re-entry behaviour, particularly key decisions about how to re-enter foreign markets, which 
markets to re-enter and how long to wait until re-entering an exited market.  
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This study emphasises that for re-entrants, equally relevant are institutional pressures for 
legitimacy at a given moment in time (that are generally measured on studies examining initial 
entry) as well as the institutional changes that may have occurred in the host environment in the 
time-out period between exit and re-entry. Most of the research on how strategic decisions are 
made by organisations discusses firm behaviour in relatively stable institutional environments 
(Oliver, 1992). Thus far, studies of institutional change have been limited to industry-specific 
changes in developed, traditionally Western markets such as the US (notably, Ruef and Scott, 
1998). Significantly less if known about the greater and potentially more impactful institutional 
transitions that occur at the national level (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003). Compared to 
industry changes, institutional transitions at the national level are viewed as more impactful, 
particularly in the case of emerging economies (Newman, 2000; Peng, 2003).  
Despite similarities and synchronisations in how the economies of emerging markets have 
opened up to foreign investments, institutional changes varied significantly (Chittoor, Ray, Aulakh 
and Sarkar, 2008; Hoskisson et al., 2000). For instance, while Central and Eastern European 
countries experienced rapid transitions to market-based economies, partly due to resources and 
skills brought in by foreign investors, in other emerging economies (e.g., China, Vietnam) the 
transition to a market-based economy was more evolutionary, with governments intervening 
significantly in firms’ foreign strategies (Hitt et al., 2004). Whereas strategizing in these markets 
was not thought of as necessary in the past as these now emerging markets were closed to 
foreign investment, there are continuous institutional changes occurring in these economies that 
(re)entrants may need to navigate to (re)attain legitimacy (e.g., South Africa abandoning the 
apartheid regime and opening to foreign investment; Myanmar being officially listed on the 
Yangon Stock Exchange in 2015). This study proposes that changes in institutions can make 
institutionalised organisational practices and routines redundant (Oliver, 1992; Peng, 2003). 
Because institutions are broadly viewed as the “rules of the game” in a society, institutional 
changes have been defined as “fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the 
formal and informal rules of the game that affect organisations as players” (Peng, 2003, p. 275). 
Host institutional change may, in turn, increase the level of uncertainty associated with making 
strategic decisions and may also temporarily increase the costs of operating in transitional 
environments, particularly if there is resistance to institutional change (Newman, 2000; Oliver, 
1992). In a notable article, Peng (2003) posed an interesting (yet answered) question concerning 
how organisations may play the new institutional games when the new rules are not even 
completely known to them. In other words, even the effectiveness of formal rules may be limited 
in the first stages of institutional transition, thus reducing the ability of the firm to estimate present 
and future conditions in the host market and increasing the perceived uncertainty associated with 
operating in those markets (Henisz, 2000; Xia et al., 2009). In the case of re-entry, the presence 
of other foreign firms in a host market may serve as a signal that the host market is, indeed, 
attractive and that foreign investment is viewed as legitimate by institutional assessors. In turn, 
foreign firms exiting a market may send a different signal, namely that the host market may be 
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hostile and undesirable and the quality of institutions below par. In the latter case, firms may lack 
the necessary knowledge and experience to legitimise their operations in the local market.  
However, re-entrants may have different responses to institutional changes and perhaps not all 
organisations operating in the same environment will experience institutional pressures in a 
similar manner. Experienced firms may have built more confidence over time, and thus rely more 
closely on their prior knowledge and experience with operating in foreign markets than on the 
potential effects of changes in their environments (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Chan et al., 2006; 
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Xia et al., 2009). In contrast, one may expect weaker market 
players to be less confident and perhaps more in tune with changes in their environments, and 
thus, more likely to have developed competencies that enable them to respond to institutional 
changes. Indeed, some casual empiricism on re-entrants reveals that firms tend to have 
heterogeneous responses to host institutional changes. Some re-entrants dive right into what is 
considered a more favourable host institutional environment, whilst other re-entrants are more 
cautious. For example, Western companies exited the South African market in the mid-1980s as 
a result of conflicts between the institutions of the two countries, and returned when the trade 
sanctions imposed by the US government were removed about a decade later as the country 
was transitioning to a market-based economy (e.g., Pepsi Co., Reebok International, Yum! 
Brands, Eastman Kodak, Sara Lee Corp.; Cigna International; American International Group).  
Other re-entrants (i.e. Lenovo Group, Barclays PLC, Renault S.A., Intercontinental Hotels Group, 
Standard Chartered), however, endured a longer time-out period prior to re-entry and made 
dissimilar re-entry commitment decisions. In particular, Standard Chartered (UK) operated via an 
equity stake in the country prior to exiting and upon return only opted for a representative office, 
stating that this was a way of dipping a “toe into the water” in South Africa and that a market re-
entering acquisition was “not likely to happen” because South Africa was still viewed by 
management as “not an easy market” (Dow Jones Newswires, 2003). In the meantime, re-
entrants such as American International Group followed Cigna International in re-entering the 
South African insurance market via acquiring one hundred percent ownership stake in a local 
insurer (in the case of Cigna, simply re-acquiring a former subsidiary) as both companies hoped 
to gain early mover advantages over other foreign re-entrants because they perceived the host 
market to have “great growth potential” (Bestwire, 1995). These examples highlight the different 
responses that re-entrants exhibit to changes occurring in their host institutions during time-out.  
Thus, re-entrants may, in fact, differ in their strategic responses to host institutional pressures for 
legitimacy. Because institutional changes matter for re-entrants’ strategic choices such as re-
entry, this study proposes that integrating organisational learning/unlearning rationales with the 
institutional legitimacy/institutional change perspectives is an important first step toward 
understanding what drives the foreign market re-entry decisions of multinational firms. 
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Summary  
This chapter highlighted that relevant empirical phenomena such as re-entry may have escaped 
academic attention because they may not fit perfectly within any one of the traditional theoretical 
conceptualisations of market entry behaviour. Furthermore, this chapter makes the case that re-
entry should be studied from an organisational (un)learning and institutional legitimacy/change 
perspectives. Similarities expected to exist between de novo market entry decisions and re-entry 
choices are discussed in detail here. Most importantly, this section of the thesis highlights and 
discusses the potential differences that one might expect between de novo entry and re-entry 
decisions in regards to three key points namely, the nature of market exit motivations, the 
duration of the time-out period and the changes that may have occurred in the host institutional 
environment between market exit and re-entry. The three key theoretical propositions put forward 
in this study are as follows; 1) experience associated with the market exit process itself may 
influence how re-entry is interpreted; 2) a disruption in organisational routines, such as that 
associated with exit and then re-entry may lead to loss of competencies, potentially also affecting 
the usefulness and applicability of prior experience which, in turn, depends on the duration of the 
time-out period between exit and re-entry; and 3) institutional pressures experienced at exit may 
no longer be relevant, which means that re-entrants may have to unlearn previous behaviours 
and learn the new “rules of the game” to gain or regain legitimacy.  
The three characteristics of foreign market re-entry outlined above that may distinguish re-entry 
phenomena from de novo market entries (together with other more commonly utilised foreign 
market entry variables) are expected to affect re-entry decisions such as re-entrants’ changes in 
commitment modes (if any), the timing of re-entry and the motivations and subsequent re-entry 
decisions of both developed and emerging market re-entrants. This next chapter details the 
variables used to empirically investigate these re-entry decisions.   
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction  
This chapter will cover the overall research methodology applied in the thesis. It does not cover 
in detail the methodology specifics for each empirical chapter; it will rather present overarching 
information about the methods used and key considerations that underpin this research. The first 
section provides a succinct overview of the epistemological and ontological underpinnings that 
guided this work. Next, there is an outline of the research approach adopted in this study and 
how it aligns with previous work. In the main section of this chapter, I discuss the key data sources 
drawn from to compile a unique data set and justify the choice of data (details on the relevance 
of variables for each re-entry decision are presented in the respective empirical chapters).  
 
Research philosophy  
Epistemology refers to “what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline” (Bryman, 2008, p. 13); thus, it focuses on the nature of knowledge and how it should 
be acquired. There are two core epistemological paradigms, namely positivism and 
interpretivism, which are divided within the broader discussion on whether the social world can 
and should be studied following the same approach as the one applied to the natural sciences 
(Bryman, 2008). From a positivist perspective, the reality of the business environment is external 
to the enquirer and therefore legitimate enquiry involves understanding and predicting this true 
nature of reality, without focusing too much on how managerial perceptions influence outcomes 
(e.g., Johnson and Duberley, 2000). With regards to the subject matter in this study, however, 
the idea of a perfect reality is not supportable because a firm’s internationalisation behaviour may 
vary according to different contextual variables. For instance, institutional theory recognises 
general principles can be applied across contexts whilst understanding their limitations for locally 
specific situations. Furthermore, re-entrants also have bounded rationality when making re-entry 
decisions and exploring options available. Thus, it is probably unlikely for one theory to explain 
a phenomenon in its entirety. Further, the existence of one single truth is increasingly questioned 
by scholars as studies begin to draw on multiple theories.  
Ontology, on the other hand, refers to whether the social world is external to the actors 
(objectivism), or if it is something actors are in the process of building and modifying continuously 
(constructionism) (Bryman, 2008). If understood as a continuum between those two extremes, 
this thesis is towards the objectivist side, understanding organisations as concrete objects, with 
their own set of rules, procedures, guides, hierarchy, that exist separate from actors. This said 
one can also advocate for the existence of a connection between unobservables and the external 
reality (Bryman, 2008) because unobservable variables (e.g. culture, knowledge) may offer 
compelling explanations regarding prominent theories in market entry. For instance, when 
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changes in management occur one could attest whether the previous knowledge of individuals 
(excluding that embedded in the firm) is an important factor in re-entry; or, by looking at speed 
of entry and commitment decisions we can make assumptions regarding previous experience of 
decision makers and their approaches to risk and commitment. Overall, the position that 
underlines this study is that re-entry is an observable phenomenon, and, despite the scarcity of 
research on the topic, re-entry can be measured by grouping explanatory variables in a 
manageable form and accepting that, variables less easily observed can contribute to knowledge 
when measured through the observable variables that predict them (Mir and Watson, 2000).  
 
Research approach 
Irrespective of the advantages and drawbacks of research philosophies, some theories and 
approaches become academic consensus. Based on the analysis of the market entry literature, 
there is a strong propensity towards quantitative methodologies, typically using regression 
analysis (Surdu and Mellahi, 2016). These findings reflect the fact that leading IB and 
management journals have traditionally been dominated by quantitative methodologies. In line 
with previous notable studies (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2008a; Demirbag et al., 2007; Xia et al., 
2009), this study uses a cross-sectional research design by drawing on a unique body of 
quantitative data compiled by the author. Given the objective of understanding the predictors for 
re-entry decisions related particularly to organisational learning and institutional legitimacy, this 
study relies on regression as a method of analysis.3 The research methodology applied in this 
thesis is guided by the objective to answer three important questions on re-entry, namely 
regarding the foreign market re-entry commitment of re-entrants, the timing of re-entry and the 
location patterns of re-entrant firms. Figure 3.1 below represents the empirical scheme.  
 
Research design 
Data  
Because foreign market re-entry is an under-researched area, there are no pre-existent 
databases from which to draw the data concerning re-entries. Welch and Welch (2009) found 
that previous studies (i.e., Bonaccorsi, 1992) have treated re-entrants as new internationalisers 
because they have not identified these sub-categories in their pre-established secondary 
databases. Unless researchers pose this question specifically in their questionnaires, there is no 
way of knowing whether a firm’s entry into a country follows a previous decision to exit the market, 
how many times this has occurred and whether firms behave differently compared to initial entry. 
Furthermore - for generally undisclosed criteria - prior research uses choice sets with market 
entry events, possibly based on data availability for their specific firms or markets studied.  
                                                          
3 Methods for analysis are explained in more detail within each empirical chapter. The type of regression used varies 
according the nature of the dependent variable in each empirical chapter.  
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Accordingly, data on the incidence of foreign market re-entry events are more likely to be 
identified in business news articles rather than in traditional secondary data sources which tend 
to broadly list the population of overseas subsidiaries established by MNEs. The database 
assembled for this study represents, as far as is known, the most authoritative and up-to-date 
information on foreign market re-entry and re-entrants. 
Data come principally from business information and research databases Factiva (owned by Dow 
Jones) and LexisNexis (owned by Reed Elsevier), which list information on all private and public 
companies. Factiva and LexisNexis were chosen because they aggregate content from a large 
number of licensed and reliable data sources, most predominant being Wall Street Journal, 
Reuters, The New York Times, Huffington Post, Bloomberg, and Nikkei. These data sources 
have been used in the past to examine the international business decisions of MNEs (notably, 
see Li, Eden, Hitt and Ireland, 2008). Developing a unique and new database is also a response 
to recent studies (see McGuire et al., 2016) which criticise the fact that empirical advances in 
international business at present depend heavily on archival data collected from the most popular 
databases (i.e. Compustat Global, Osiris and or Worldscope).   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Research agenda 
To what extent do organisational learning and institutional legitimacy influence foreign market re-
entry decisions? 
Do experienced re-entrants 
behave differently compared to 
more inexperienced re-
entrants, in terms of the 
likelihood of escalating or de-
escalating commitment? 
What determines some re-
entrants to wait longer than 
others before re-entering a 
previously exited market? 
What are the antecedents and 
subsequent re-entry decisions 
of developed and emerging 
market re-entrants? 
 
Do firms change their 
commitment on re-entry? 
What drives commitment 
escalation/de-escalation over no 
changes in commitment? 
What factors moderate the effect 
of prior experience and learning 
on re-entry commitment? 
 
Do more experienced re-entrants 
re-enter early? 
Which firm characteristics are 
more likely to be found in early 
(late) entrants? 
Do host market characteristics 
(i.e. pressures for legitimacy) 
influence re-entry timing? 
 
What is the origin and destination 
of foreign market re-entries? 
Are there similarities between the 
re-entry decisions of developed 
and emerging market re-
entrants?  
Do re-entry decisions vary 
between re-entering developed 
and emerging host markets? 
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Data selection process 
After identifying the boundaries of the phenomenon, the next step was to search for the re-entry 
events in the databases. Keyword searches were used in Factiva and LexisNexis to identify the 
business news articles that presented information on foreign market re-entry and re-entrants. A 
number of keywords were chosen in line with the focus of the study and the re-entry definition 
adopted by Welch and Welch (2009). The basic selection criteria were that a firm entered a 
foreign market, exited and then re-entered the same host market following a time-out period4. 
The list of keywords consisted of references to a firm re-entering a foreign market (there were no 
exclusions based on home country origin and host country destination or industry), such as - but 
not limited to – “re-entry”/ “re-enter” / “return to” / “back in” AND “market”. Following these 
searches, a total of over 200,000 business news articles were accessed. Second, each article 
was scanned in order to eliminate duplicates and identify the events which were in line with the 
definition of foreign market re-entry. Following this process, a total of 1,377 re-entry events were 
identified. Finally, the 1,377 articles that were identified were read carefully to ensure the data 
collected does, in fact, measure re-entry as defined and investigated empirically in this study. 
Although the definition of foreign market re-entry provided by Welch and Welch (2009) is fairly 
straightforward, in practice, re-entry may pose a number of problems which should be clarified in 
order to clearly define the boundaries of the phenomena studied and enable replication of this 
study. First, there are different views on what constitutes foreign market exit or withdrawal (see 
Merrett, 2002 for a more detailed discussion). Specifically, firms may close their foreign 
subsidiaries or assembly plants but continue to maintain a limited form of international 
involvement in the host market by, for instance, exporting products there (Merrett, 2002). Some 
evidence does exist that firms also go through periods of increasing and decreasing their 
international commitment in a market (Vissak and Francioni, 2013). To create a data set for 
analysis, only cases of total market exit were included in the sample. This echoes previous 
scholars in maintaining that the reasons for reducing and subsequently enhancing international 
operations should be studied separately (Javalgi et al., 2011).  
Second, the definition of foreign market re-entry refers to the firm level of analysis, in that it 
considers companies that have exited foreign operations whilst maintaining a domestic presence 
prior to re-entry. Although entrepreneurs – who may sell a company and re-enter with a different 
firm – may be an interesting group of re-entrants, this is beyond the scope of this study and 
should be studied separately. Third, this data sample does not include firms which exited one 
foreign market and subsequently entered a different market because this activity is analytically 
different from the phenomenon of this study, and, for instance, would not permit a comparison of 
changes in host institutional environments between foreign market exit and re-entry.  
                                                          
4The parent firm is the unit of analysis. Parent firm refers to the company that is re-entering the market, whether or not it 
is re-entering through one of its divisions, e.g., Fiat re-entered Brazil with Alfa-Romeo as well as Iveco. Similarly, 
conglomerates such as General Electric have re-entered multiple host market sectors.  
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Fourth, the news announcement to re-enter was not considered sufficient, so further searches in 
the databases were undertaken to confirm that a given firm had, in fact, re-entered a previously 
exited market. Consequently, 50 articles were eliminated because data concerning re-entry was 
speculative and, to date, no confirmation exists that re-entry has, in fact, occurred. Finally, project 
operations were a dominant mode of international expansion for some firms (e.g., construction 
sector) which regularly exited and re-entered because these processes are an inherent part of 
their business model (Vissak and Francioni, 2013). Thus, another 20 re-entry events were 
excluded from the database because they were project-based businesses. A total of 215 events 
were eliminated as they referred to domestic market exit, more specifically exit from an industry 
sector, followed by re-entry into that sector. A further 72 articles were eliminated because they 
referred to product market re-entries. The observation period starts in 1980 and ends in 2015 
and includes a total of 1,020 events, that is, all re-entry events which have been identified in the 
databases and are in line with the scope of the study.  
 
Variables 
The data acquired from Factiva and LexisNexis were used to build some of the variables whilst 
other sources such as World Bank, Economic Freedom of the World Index, SEC, FTSE, 
UNCTAD, Bloomberg and company data such as annual reports were also used. Variables were 
collected from multiple sources and compiled into a comprehensive database since, as specified 
earlier, there were no pre-established secondary data sources accounting for re-entry events. 
Three different measures were used for the institutional level variables in order to check for data 
inconsistencies and conduct appropriate robustness checks. Tables 3.1a-3.1c below summarise 
the variables used, with their respective sources and values/measures.  
Firm-specific variables 
(1-5) Organisational learning was measured by combining two or more of the following five 
aspects of firm international experience (e.g., Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Chan et al., 
2006; Dow and Larimo, 2011; Luo and Peng, 1999; Brouthers et al. 2008a; Xia et al., 2009). 
Experience intensity was measured as the number of years of international and host region 
experience. The diversity of experience was measured as the number of countries in which the 
firm was operating both internationally and regionally. Most recent studies (e.g., Dow and Larimo, 
2011; Gao and Pan, 2010) tend to emphasise the importance of general international experience, 
without reference to a specific market because general experience is expected to better reflect 
the extent of learning that a firm may have acquired from operating in multiple environments over 
time, leading to a more diversified and broader knowledge base. However, the degree of host 
market involvement of the re-entrant was also measured; (5) host experiential knowledge 
represents the number of years a firm spent in the host market prior to exiting that market and 
this type of experiential learning has been suggested to integrate the acquisition of market as 
69 
 
well as institutional knowledge (Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Eriksson et al., 1997; 
Eriksson et al., 2000). Experience intensity and experience diversity were operationalised at (t-
1) exit, a year prior to the firm exiting the market and at (t-1) re-entry, specifically a year prior to 
the firm actually renewing operations in the host market. 
(6) This study accounted for firm size, which has been associated with firms owning 
comparatively more financial and other resources enabling them to make riskier entry decisions, 
and measured it as the value of total assets (re-calculated at the current euro rate for comparison 
purposes) with a logarithm transformation (see Brouthers, Brouthers and Werner, 2003; Gao and 
Pan, 2010; Meyer, 2011). Firm size was measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry. Also, (7) since 
older firms have been considered more likely to show signs of organisational inertia (e.g., Guillén, 
2002; Sapienza et al., 2006), firm age was computed as the number of years since the firm was 
founded until (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry.  
(8) Similar to prior studies on initial entry (e.g., Araujo and Rezende, 2003; Yiu et al., 2007), this 
study also proposed that management can alter the direction of a multinational firm’s re-entry 
path or re-shape it all together. Thus, this study measures changes in management according to 
whether the CEO had been replaced up to three years prior to the re-entry year.  
(9) As a firm could engage in more than one re-entry event, it was identified whether the re-
entrant was present in the host market via a different division in the same/different sector at the 
time of re-entry. MNEs which have maintained close ties with host markets by operating there 
via other businesses may be more confident with their host market operations. 
Institutional specific variables 
(10-15) Data on the first set of host institutional variables was obtained from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) which has been used in a number of market entry 
studies (notably, Kauffman, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009). The WGI index covers over 200 
countries and has been published since 1996 and consists of six indicators of institutional 
development as follows; voice and accountability represent perceptions about the extent to which 
citizens are able to select their government and enjoy the freedom of expression. Political stability 
and absence of violence reflect perceptions concerning whether the political system may be 
destabilised by unconstitutional means. Government effectiveness reflects perceptions on the 
extent to which government policies are formulated and implemented successfully. Regulatory 
quality measures perceptions on whether the government can implement policies that favour the 
development of the private sector. Rule of law scores reflect perceptions related to the extent to 
which stakeholders trust the legal system and whether contracts and property rights are enforced. 
Control of corruption reflects perceptions concerning the extent to which public power is used for 
private gain. Estimates for each dimension range between -2.5 (weak performance) to +2.5 
(strong performance). Variables are measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry. Host institutional 
change represents the difference between performance at the time of re-entry compared to exit. 
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(16-25) Data on the second set of institutional variables comes from the World Bank’s Index of 
Economic Freedom published by The Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal which 
covers 186 countries since 1995 (Meyer et al. 2009; Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles, 2003; Xia et 
al. 2009). Ten aspects of host economic freedom are measured on a 100-point scale in which a 
score of 100 indicates a high degree of freedom and 0 indicates no freedom. Property rights 
refers to the ability of stakeholders to accumulate property and wealth under an autonomous and 
accountable judicial system.  Freedom from corruption refers to the ability of the government to 
maintain the integrity of the economic system via transparent regulatory procedures. Fiscal 
freedom measures the extent to which the government permits individuals and businesses to 
manage their own wealth. Government spending measures the extent to which the money 
invested by Governments (in infrastructure, human capital) accrue benefits for stakeholders. 
Business freedom refers to whether an individual’s right to run an enterprise without undue state 
interference is respected. Labour freedom measures the ability of stakeholders to find 
employment opportunities and work in a country. Monetary freedom refers to the extent to which 
a country has a stable currency and market-determined prices. Trade freedom scores reflect an 
economy’s openness to the flow of goods and services in the international marketplace. High 
investment freedom scores translate into transparency and equity, where support is allocated to 
other than just the very large firms. Variables are measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry. 
Institutional change represents the difference between performance at re-entry compared to exit. 
(26-30)5 Economic Freedom of the World Index published by the Fraser Institute was used to 
gather data for the third set of institutional variables (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Jory 
and Ngo, 2014; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). It aggregates information about national institutions 
into five subcomponents. Most importantly, data is available for 152 countries since 1970. The 
index categories are as follows; the size of government refers to the degree to which a country 
relies on personal choice and markets rather than political decision-making. The legal system 
and property rights refer to how effectively the protective functions of the government are 
performed. Sound money measures whether a country follows policies and adopts institutions 
that lead to low (and stable) rates of inflation. Freedom to trade internationally measures whether 
a country has low tariffs, easy clearance and efficient administration of customs and few controls 
on the movement of capital. A high regulation score means that a country allows markets to 
determine prices and refrains from regulatory activities that increase costs of new business entry. 
Each sub-component is placed on a scale from “0” to “10” that reflects the distribution of the 
underlying data; then the five area ratings aforementioned are averaged to derive the summary 
rating for each country. Other secondary databases reporting institutional measures are not 
available for most of the years in our sample and thus, could not be considered in this study6.   
                                                          
5 The index is preferred in this study because it is based on two important methodological principles. First, it uses objective 
components and relies less on data based on surveys, expert panels, and generic case studies. Second, the data used 
to construct the index ratings are from reliable sources such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and World 
Economic Forum that provide data for a large number of countries. Data provided directly from a source within a country 
are rarely used (Economic Freedom of the World Project, 2016). 
6 Others (Yiu and Makino, 2002) used the World Competitiveness Index available only for the period starting in 2000.  
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 VARIABLE NAME VALUES/MEASURES SOURCES 
Firm-specific 
variables 
(1) General experience intensity  
No. of years from initial entry into any one given foreign market until (t-
1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Company history, Funding Universe 
(2) Host region experience intensity 
No. of years from initial entry into a foreign market in the host region 
until (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Company history, Funding Universe 
(3) General experience diversity 
Total no. of international markets the firm was operating in at 
(t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Annual reports  
(4) Host region experience diversity 
Total no. of markets in which the firm was operating within the host 
region at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Annual reports  
(5) Host experiential knowledge  No. of years between initial entry into the host market and market exit Factiva, LexisNexis 
(6) Firm size Total parent firm assets at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry Annual reports 
(7) Firm age No. of years from foundation to (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry Company profile  
(8) Changes in management  Changes in CEO up to 3 years prior to re-entry year Bloomberg 
(9) Already present in host market 
1= the parent firm is present in host market with another company; 
0=the parent firm in not present in the host market 
Factiva, LexisNexis, Annual reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
specific 
variables 
(10) Voice and accountability  
-2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) measured at (t-1) 
exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(11) Political stability and absence of 
violence 
-2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) measured at (t-1) 
exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(12) Government effectiveness 
-2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) measured at (t-1) 
exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(13) Regulatory quality 
-2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) measured at (t-1) 
exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(14) Rule of law 
-2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) measured at (t-1) 
exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(15) Control of corruption 
-2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance) measured at (t-1) 
exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicator (WGI) 
(16) Property rights 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory environment 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry  
World Bank 
(17) Freedom from corruption 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory environment 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry  
World Bank 
(18) Fiscal freedom 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory environment 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry  
World Bank 
Table 3.1a: Summary of dependent, independent and control variables 
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 VARIABLE NAME VALUES/MEASURES SOURCES 
Institutional 
specific 
variables 
(19) Government spending  
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(20) Business freedom 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(21) Labour freedom 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(22) Monetary freedom  
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(23) Trade freedom 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(24) Investment freedom 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(25) Financial freedom 
1 to 100 high number indicates less stringent regulatory 
environment measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
World Bank 
(26) Size of government 
1= low economic freedom to 10= high economic freedom 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Freedom of the World Index - Fraser 
Institute 
(27) Legal system and intellectual property 
rights 
1= low economic freedom to 10= high economic freedom 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Economic Freedom of the World Index - 
Fraser Institute 
(28) Sound money 
1= low economic freedom to 10= high economic freedom 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Economic Freedom of the World Index - 
Fraser Institute 
(29) Freedom to trade internationally 
1= low economic freedom to 10= high economic freedom 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Economic Freedom of the World Index - 
Fraser Institute 
(30) Regulation 
1= low economic freedom to 10= high economic freedom 
measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry 
Economic Freedom of the World Index - 
Fraser Institute 
(31) Host market institutional changes 
Measured as the difference between host market institutional 
development scores at (t-1) re-entry and (t-1) exit 
Author calculations 
 
 
Country 
specific 
variables 
(32) Home/Host economic development 1=developed; 0=emerging  
FTSE Global Equity Index 
(33) DMM-Emerging, DMM-developed, 
EMM-Emerging, EMM-developed   
1=re-entrant belongs to one of the categories; 0 = re-entrant 
belongs to any of the other categories  
Author calculations  
(34) Geographic location 
1=Europe; 2=N America; 3=South America; 4=Asia; 5=Japan; 
6=Australia & New Zealand; 7=Africa 
UNCTAD 
(35) Host market size GDP/Capita PPP measured at (t-1) exit and (t-1) re-entry World Bank 
Table 3.1b: Summary of dependent, independent and control variables  
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 VARIABLE NAME VALUES/MEASURES SOURCES 
Country specific 
variables 
(36) Changes in host market size/Host market 
growth 
GDP/Capita PPP measured as the difference between host market growth 
scores at (t-1) re-entry and (t-1) exit 
Author calculations 
(37) Host market attractiveness FDI inflows PPP measured at (t-1) re-entry and (t-1) exit World Bank 
(38) Changes in host market attractiveness 
FDI inflows PPP measured as the difference between host market 
attractiveness scores at (t-1) re-entry and (t-1) exit 
Author calculations 
(39) Regionalisation  1=yes; 0=no Author calculations 
Re-entry specific 
variables 
(40) Mode prior to exit 0=non-equity; 1=co-operative; 2=wholly owned 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
(41) Mode at re-entry 0=non-equity; 1=co-operative; 2=wholly owned 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
(42) Changes in mode commitment  0=no changes; 1=commitment de-escalation; 2=commitment escalation Author calculations  
(43) Initial entry year Any values  
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
(44) Exit year  Any values 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
(45) Re-entry year  Any values 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
(46) Time-out  Number of years between year of re-entry and the year of exit Author calculations 
(47) Involuntary exit 1=yes; =no Factiva, LexisNexis 
(48) Voluntary exit_Poor market performance 1=yes; =no Factiva, LexisNexis 
(49) Voluntary exit_Poor performance with 
mode 
1=yes; =no 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
(50) Voluntary exit_Strategic exit 1=yes; =no Factiva, LexisNexis 
(51) Motives for re-entry_More resources  1=yes; =no Factiva, LexisNexis 
(52) Motives for re-entry_Changes in strategy 1=yes; =no Factiva, LexisNexis 
(53) Motives for re-entry_Strategic intent   1=yes; =no 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
(54) Motives for re-entry_Institutional pull 1=yes; =no 
Factiva, LexisNexis 
 
 
 
Industry specific 
variables 
(55) Automotive industry Firm belongs to the automotive industry 1=yes; =no SEC classification 
(56) Retail industry Firm belongs to the retail industry 1=yes; =no SEC classification  
(57) Financial services industry Firm belongs to the financial services industry 1=yes; =no SEC classification  
(58) Consumer electronics  Firm belongs to the financial services industry 1=yes; =no SEC classification 
Table 3.1c: Summary of dependent, independent and control variables 
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 (31) Host market institutional changes refers to the changes (if any) in the institutional aspects 
of the host market that have occurred between time of re-entry and time of exit. Institutional 
change variables are measured at the time t-1 of exit and t-1 of re-entry; i.e. institutional change 
= (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit.  
 
Country specific variables  
(32) Previous studies disagree on whether emerging market firms find it more difficult to deal with 
the uncertainties of expanding internationally compared with developed market firms (Meyer, 
2001; Meyer et al., 2009). Home/Host economic development was measured by dummy 
variables which take the value of “1” if the country is classified as a developed economy and “0” 
otherwise. Data on country classification was obtained from the FTSE Global Equity Index which 
classifies countries into their respective developed and emerging categories. (33) The four 
combinations of home-host locations (i.e. “DMM-developed”, “DMM-emerging”; “EMM-
developed”, “EMM-emerging”) were then computed into four separate dichotomous variables. 
For instance, the variable “DMM-developed” measured whether the re-entrant was a developed 
market firm re-entering a developed host market and so on.  
(34) Geographic location was measured from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) which provides a widely used classification of countries into their 
respective geographic regions (see also Vermeulen and Barkema, 2002).   
(35) Host market size was measured as the value of GDP per capita based on purchasing power 
parity (PPP) to allow for a comparison of values over time and locations (c.f. Chan et al., 2006).  
(36) Changes in host market size was calculated as the difference between the value of 
GDP/capita PPP at the time of re-entry and at the time of exit. This data was calculated from the 
World Bank database; i.e. host market growth = (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit.   
(37) Host market attractiveness was measured as the net inflows of FDI in the host market. 
Similar to the host market growth measure, host market attractiveness was calculated based on 
the value of FDI inflows at the time of exit and that at the time of re-entry. This data was also 
calculated from the World Bank database.  
(38) Changes in host market attractiveness; i.e. changes in host market attractiveness = (t-1) re-
entry – (t-1) exit.    
(39) Regionalisation measures whether re-entrants tend to return to countries within their home 
region or re-enter markets further afield. This is an ongoing popular debate in the foreign market 
entry literature (notably, Rugman et al., 2014). In line with previous studies, broad types of 
regionalisation patterns were identified between countries within the European Union, North 
America, Latin America, APAC, and Africa.  
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Re-entry specific variables  
(40-41) To determine whether a firm’s re-entry mode is associated with the mode in which the 
firm was operating prior to exiting the market, data were collected on mode prior to exit, 
respectively mode of re-entry. For these measures, Factiva and LexisNexis were used. The value 
of “2” was assigned if the foreign affiliate had operated in the foreign market via a wholly owned 
subsidiary, “1” if it operated via a joint subsidiary, and “0” if the foreign affiliate did not hold equity 
in the host market (the same coding applies for re-entry commitment modes). Experiential 
learning about an entry mode also referred to as “within -orm” learning (Li et al., 2007) has been 
used to explain how firms reduce the uncertainty associated with the foreign market entry 
(Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Xia et al., 2009). 
(42) Changes in foreign market re-entry commitment refer to differences (if any) in the mode of 
operation chosen at re-entry (41) compared to the mode in which the firm was operating in the 
host market prior to exit (40). This is a categorical variable whereby a firm may opt to return via 
the same mode of operation/commitment (no change= “0”), escalate commitment (commitment 
escalation= “1”) or de-escalate by reducing its commitment in the market (commitment de-
escalation= “2”). Commitment escalation refers to firms changing commitment from a non-equity 
mode (export, franchise, license) in which it was operating prior to exiting, to a joint venture or a 
wholly owned subsidiary opted for upon market re-entry; or from a joint venture to a wholly owned 
subsidiary. Commitment de-escalation refers to firms switching operational modes from 
operating via a wholly owned subsidiary before exit to re-entering via a joint or non-equity 
venture, or to switching from a joint venture to a non-equity mode. 
(43-45) Initial entry year, exit year and re-entry year refer to when the firm first entered the market, 
when it exited and when it returned to that market. This data was obtained from the initial 
documents from Factiva and LexisNexis that reported re-entry and naturally, that were dated with 
the re-entry year (and for the most part would also report the exit year), followed by further 
examination of both databases to identify when initial entry occurred.   
(46) This study argued for the role of organisational forgetfulness in reducing the effect of 
previous experience on organisational learning (Rumelt, 1995; Tsang and Zahra, 2008). The 
ability to reduce losses incurred upon exit by salvaging key business and network partnerships 
may also vary according to how long the firm is absent from the market (Roberts and Tybout, 
1997). Time-out was calculated as the difference between re-entry year and exit year.  
(47-50) Particularly relevant are the motives for the exit. Factiva and LexisNexis were used to 
identify why firms exited and used previous typologies to unpack exit motives into two categories 
i.e. voluntary and involuntary exits (Benito and Welch, 1997; Chen and Wu, 1996; Dass, 2000; 
Mellahi, 2003; Nummela et al., 2016; Pauwels and Matthyssens, 1999; Turner, 2011). Involuntary 
exits occurred when home/host environment institutions (e.g., governments) pressured firms to 
forfeit their operations. Voluntary exits are classified as follows; “strategic motives” (e.g., strategic 
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refocus on home region); “poor market performance” (e.g., outperformed by local market 
competitors) and “poor performance with entry mode” (e.g., not sufficient reach to target key 
customers or not enough control over host operations). Four dummy variables were therefore 
created; the study tested for the effect on foreign market re-entry commitment and re-entry timing 
of firms exiting voluntarily compared to those which were forced out of the market.  
(51-54) Motives for re-entry were also coded from Factiva and LexisNexis and categorised into 
“more resources” (i.e. the re-entrant has accumulated more resources during the time-out 
period), “changes in strategy” (i.e. re-entry involves changes in product, positioning, distribution 
and or pricing strategies), “strategic intent” (i.e. the re-entrant targets expansion in the host 
region) and “institutional pull” (i.e. host governments provide incentives for foreign firms to return). 
Motives for re-entry were identified from the news articles. They were coded into the database 
and are based on either the views of CEOs, an objective analysis of the re-entry event in news 
outlets such as WSJ or FT or most often, both sources. Prior studies have already highlighted 
these factors as important drivers of market entry (see Chan et al., 2006; Peng, 2003). 
 
Industry specific variables  
(55-58) There are four industry level dummies for firms operating in the automotive, retail, 
financial services and consumer electronics sectors; almost 60 percent of re-entrants in the 
sample operate in one of these four industry sectors. 
 
Summary 
This chapter presents an overview of key methodological aspects of this thesis. A more detailed 
depiction of the analysis and sub-sampling methods used to unpack re-entry decisions are 
included in the respective empirical chapters i.e. Chapters 4, 5 and 6. This thesis uses a 
quantitative strategy throughout, and data on re-entry and re-entrants is analysed using (binomial 
and multinomial) logistic regression. The methodological choices discussed in this chapter allow 
for coverage of a large number of re-entry events and permit conducting observations of re-entry 
decisions over time. Most importantly, these methods are expected to offer the most appropriate 
alternative to answering the research questions, namely what factors determine the re-entry 
commitment and re-entry timing decisions of both emerging and developed market re-entrants.  
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CHAPTER 4: ONCE BITTEN, TWICE SHY? THE ANTECEDENTS OF 
FOREIGN MARKET RE-ENTRY COMMITMENT DECISIONS  
 
Abstract: This chapter examines foreign market re-entry commitment, namely the potential 
changes in the entry mode strategies undertaken by multinational enterprises as they return to a 
previously exited foreign market. In doing so, this study examines the effect of organisational 
learning on foreign market re-entry commitment decisions. Moreover, the analysis integrates the 
effect of host institutional changes during the time-out period, as well as motives for the exit to 
evaluate their independent as well as moderating effects on the relationship between learning 
from prior experience and re-entry commitment decisions. 
Introduction 
The question of how multinational firms expand into foreign markets has long been considered a 
critical issue in international management and has also been viewed as very important for the 
success and survival of these firms (see Surdu and Mellahi, 2016 for a review). Traditionally, 
researchers have examined the determinants of initial foreign entry mode selection, with such 
studies mainly focusing on the exploitation of firm-specific advantages and reducing transaction 
costs by opting for the most effective mode of operation in a foreign market (Brouthers, 2002; 
Hennart, 1991; Madhok, 1997; Makino and Neupert, 2000). In recent years, scholars (De Villa, 
Rajwani and Lawton, 2015; Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Shaver, 2013) have raised concerns 
regarding the explanatory limitations of theories based on transaction cost rationales. For 
example, if initial entry mode decisions are driven by economic rationales, what influences 
subsequent foreign market entries? Furthermore, is the foreign market entry mode decision an 
irreversible one? Correspondingly, this has led to growing debates over the relevance of entry 
mode research as scholars argue for the revival of this topic area with newer research questions 
and theoretical lenses (Davis et al., 2000; Hennart and Slangen, 2015; Huang and Sternquist, 
2007; Shaver, 2013). Particularly, little research has been devoted to understanding why firms 
often replicate prior decisions over choosing new modes of entry even when their circumstances 
have changed (for exceptions, see Chan et al., 2006; Xia et al., 2009). More recently, scholars 
called for the inclusion of what drives subsequent entry mode decisions in a host market to 
provide a more dynamic and complete picture of how firms enter foreign markets (Casillas et al., 
2015; Hennart and Slangen, 2015). Consequently, this study addresses these calls for research 
by examining specifically what drives the foreign market re-entry commitment decisions of firms.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign market exit is not a permanent decision (Loustarinen, 
1979). MNEs may exit foreign markets for various reasons such as lack of resources and 
capabilities to compete effectively in the market or regulatory and political instability that would 
make the host market temporarily unattractive (Mellahi, 2003; Song, 2013). Yet, the factors that 
once impeded their successful foray into that market may have dissipated allowing for a return 
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back to the host market. Moreover, firms may re-enter previously exited markets attempting to 
salvage some of the losses that they may have incurred upon withdrawal of their operations. 
Foreign market re-entry, particularly the question of how firms return to previously exited markets, 
has not received academic attention.  
In this study, foreign market re-entry commitment is defined as the difference (if any) in the 
mode of operation chosen at re-entry compared to the mode in which the firm was operating in 
the host market prior to exit. In line with this definition, a firm may opt to return via the same mode 
of operation, escalate commitment, by opting for re-entry modes that require more resource 
investment, or de-escalate by reducing its commitment in the market, which would mean 
choosing modes that typically involve a lower level of resource investment (see Figure 4.1). 
Organisational learning scholars share the perspective that in order to reduce the uncertainty 
associated with entering foreign markets, firms tend to rely on the accumulation of knowledge 
and experience in their entry mode selection decisions (Barkema et al., 1996; Dow and Larimo, 
2011; Gao et al., 2008; Xia et al., 2008; 2009). Additionally, the more experienced a firm becomes 
with operating via a certain mode of entry, the more likely it is to use that mode again (Chang 
and Rosenzweig, 2001; Huang and Sternquist, 2007; Xia et al., 2008). Learning from prior 
experience, or in other words, “learning by doing” is considered a major source of knowledge and 
a key driver of how firms choose to commit resources to foreign markets. Whilst most of this 
research is grounded in the setting of fairly stable institutional environments, institutions may 
change if a sufficient period of the time has passed. Changes in host institutional environments 
can act as a stimulus for strategic change for foreign firms wishing to (re)enter previously exited 
markets (Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; Newman, 2000; Peng, 2003). When changes in national 
institutions occur, new managerial practices become legitimised whilst old practices may be 
discarded and even forgotten particularly after a longer period of time-out. Consequently, this 
study explores the complex situation in which re-entrant firms’ prior experience and subsequent 
learning and the changes that may have occurred in the host institutional environment during the 
time-out, period jointly influence the re-entry commitment decision.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Foreign market re-entry commitment: Escalation, De-escalation or No change 
 
Consequently, this study makes several extensions to previous research. First, prior research 
has studied initial entry mode selection and did not highlight cases where the firm may have 
exited and subsequently re-entered a foreign market. Welch and Welch (2009) argued that with 
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“some firms displaying serial international exit and re-entry behaviour, it cannot be discounted 
that there are many in the category of former international operators within general studies of 
‘newly internationalising’ companies” (p. 568). This study examines foreign market re-entry after 
exit; more specifically, the potential changes in commitment between the mode of operation prior 
to exit and the mode of re-entry. Since foreign market re-entry commitment decisions may be 
different from initial or de novo entry mode choices, re-entry should be studied separately and 
the potential effect of prior entry(ies) and exit(s), captured.  
Second, drawing on organisational learning theory, this study examines the effects of prior 
experience on learning and thus, on re-entry commitment, by accounting for the effect of exit 
motives. Prior studies have focused on the positive effects of prior knowledge and experience on 
entry mode commitment decisions; yet, their focus has largely been on the effect of prior entries, 
thus ignoring that firms may also leave and subsequently re-enter a foreign market, carrying with 
them the stigma associated with market exit. Third, previous studies found that past entry mode 
choices co-determine present ones, thus supporting the “within-form” learning rationale (Chan 
and Makino, 2007; Gao and Pan, 2010; Guillén, 2003; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999, Li et al., 
2007; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001; Yiu and Makino, 2002). These studies emphasise a 
certain homogeneity in the entry modes chosen by foreign entrants, whereby firms which have 
entered via acquisitions tend to enter mostly via acquisitions (e.g., Vermeulen and Barkema, 
2001), whilst foreign entrants opting for joint ventures, are likely to re-utilise this mode again (e.g., 
Xia et al., 2009). Thus, this study also explores whether within-form learning is also common for 
re-entrants by examining what drives some firms to re-enter via the same commitment mode.   
Finally, Hennart and Slangen (2015) proposed that “there may also be a third – hitherto 
overlooked – explanation, that is, the continued presence of key factors that led the focal firm or 
its peers to use the same mode for previous entries. In this scenario past mode choices do not 
co-determine present ones, even though they are statistically correlated” (p. 118). Although some 
studies have made significant contributions to explaining how institutional factors and particularly 
the magnitude of institutional distance between home and host markets influence entry mode 
decisions (Ang, Benischke and Doh, 2015; Meyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005; Yiu and 
Makino, 2002), and a select few have hypothesised about the effects of institutional transitions 
(Hoskisson, 2000; Peng, 2003), changes in the institutional frame of a country and their effect on 
modal choices has been largely overlooked. This study measures the changes in the institutions 
of host markets during the time-out period as these changes may have important moderating 
effects on the role of prior experience and learning on re-entry commitment. Changes in the 
institutional environment may also mean that the re-entrants’ knowledge of the practices that 
were previously legitimate in the host market, may no longer be applicable and thus, an entry 
mode that was previously legitimate in the host market, may no longer be the most effective way 
in which to operate in that market upon re-entry. In particular, the focus is on the direction of 
change (Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; Zaheer, Schomaker and Nachum, 2012), which can be 
negative institutional changes (when a firm re-enters a country where the environment is less 
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stable than it was when it exited) or positive institutional changes (when the host environment is 
more favourable at the time of re-entry).  
By combining organisational learning and institutional change perspectives on re-entry 
commitment, this study addresses the following question: In the presence of host institutional 
changes, do experienced entrants behave differently compared to more inexperienced entrants, 
in terms of the likelihood of escalating or de-escalating commitment? This way, one can also 
examine whether re-entrants use the same commitment modes irrespective of changes in host 
institutions or whether there is an effect of returning to more favourable institutions on the 
decision to escalate or de-escalate commitment on re-entry.  
The remaining of this chapter is structured as follows. This study draws on the organisational 
learning perspective to develop a theoretical rationale on how prior knowledge and experience 
affect re-entry commitment. Next, it integrates the learning perspective with the institutional 
change view, to examine whether more experienced re-entrants are more likely to respond to 
favourable host institutional changes. Furthermore, this study hypothesises about the effect of 
exit motives on re-entry commitment. The hypotheses are tested using a unique sample of 1,020 
foreign market re-entries undertaken by 725 MNCs between 1980 and 2015. The study then 
follows with a discussion of the findings of the regression models and some conclusions. 
 
Literature Background  
Firms may enter foreign markets in different ways including exports, licensing, franchising and 
direct investment (Root, 1987). Re-entrants face three basic decisions: whether to change their 
commitment compared to how they previously operated in that market and where changes in 
commitment are considered preferable whether to escalate or de-escalate. This study focuses 
on the different types of commitment decisions of re-entrants and thus, includes market re-entry 
through foreign direct investment (equity joint ventures, greenfield investments and acquisitions), 
as well as through arm’s length contractual modes such as exporting, licensing, franchising and 
non-equity alliances. Similar to other studies (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001) commitment is 
associated with the degree of equity owned in the host market at re-entry and prior to exiting.  
A firm can escalate from a minority joint venture to a majority venture or to a wholly owned 
subsidiary, or from a contractual arrangement to an equity mode, and may de-escalate from 
direct investment to a contractual arrangement; or by reducing the amount of equity investment 
in a foreign venture. The level of control and resource commitment is weakest in the case of entry 
modes such as exports and strongest in the case of wholly owned entries. The degree of 
involvement in a foreign market is considered important because it affects the strategic options 
of the firm and the ability to adapt successfully to local markets (Ang et al., 2015; Chan and 
Makino, 2007; Chang, 1995). Higher involvement levels such as wholly owned entries have been 
associated with enhanced market presence (and more rapid entry, in the case of acquisitions), 
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reduced distribution costs, better service levels and more control over marketing operations (Pan 
and Tse, 2000). In turn, higher resource commitment entry modes may also limit the strategic 
flexibility of firms and constitute a source of considerable loss of financial resources on exit 
(Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Root, 1987). Irrespective of the risks of free riding and opportunistic 
behaviour, partial ownership via joint ventures has been associated with more flexibility as the 
firm can later choose to terminate the investment or further invest in the market for greater control 
of its operations (Kogut, 1991). Whereas the risks associated with host markets may be reduced 
by limiting ownership in foreign ventures, MNEs tend to learn most about foreign markets from 
direct investment strategies than exports or licensing (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Xia et al., 2009).  
 
Theoretical development and hypotheses 
Organisational experience and learning effects on re-entry commitment 
Prior attempts to understand commitment decisions have suggested that intangible assets such 
as knowledge and experience are the foundations for firm motivations to expand beyond their 
domestic markets (Brouthers et al., 2008a; 2008b). In this context, organisational learning 
derived from prior knowledge and experience is expected to facilitate a strong market position 
for a foreign firm in its host market, despite the entrant having knowledge disadvantages 
compared to local players (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Lu, Liu, Wright and Filatotchev, 2014; 
Slangen and Hennart, 2008; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). Experience provides a reference 
point to understand the risks and benefits associated with market entry which has resulted in the 
widespread idea that stocks of knowledge and experience accumulated in the past can also 
shape future foreign market entry mode decisions (Slangen and Hennart, 2008; Sapienza et al., 
2006; Zaheer, Hernandez and Banerjee, 2010). Even when multinational firms have 
disadvantages in foreign markets compared to local firms, these disadvantages can be overcome 
effectively by gaining knowledge and experience applicable to that host country or related 
settings (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Thus, a firm’s knowledge base and competitive 
advantages tend to increase with its international experience, leading to reduced uncertainty and 
a likelihood of firms making higher commitment foreign entries in those markets as, over time, 
entrants learn to operate across different modes (Barkema et al., 1996; Casillas et al., 2015; 
Chang, 1995; Delios and Beamish, 2001; Gao and Pan, 2010). 
Organisational learning scholars increasingly emphasise that experience can facilitate learning 
that is then transferred to new situations, by considering how experience accumulated from prior 
investments influences firms’ post-entry mode decisions in a foreign market. Specifically, these 
studies recorded that the accumulation of experience from prior entries leads to a change in entry 
mode in the direction of escalation (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Guillén, 2003; Li et al., 2007). 
Firms tend to escalate their resource commitment with more experience because when 
experience effects exist, uncertainty avoidance makes way for the need to capitalise on the 
accumulated pool of new knowledge (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007; Guillén, 2003; Sapienza et 
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al., 2006; Xia et al., 2009). Non-equity ventures can be stepping stones for entering via direct 
investment modes such as equity joint ventures, greenfields or acquisitions (Autio et al., 2000; 
Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Eriksson et al., 1997; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2007) in 
that on initial entry, firms may choose to opt for non-equity or lesser equity collaborations to attain 
the necessary knowledge in terms of how to deal with host institutional actors such as 
governments as well as suppliers and customers. Subsequently, building on this knowledge and 
experience they tend to escalate their commitment and even operate independently in the host 
market (Slangen and Hennart, 2007; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
Organisational learning is considered most effective when attained incrementally in that it allows 
the firm to absorb the knowledge acquired from prior experience and make sense of those 
experience in order to enable their exploitation (Barkema et al., 1997; Casillas and Moreno-
Menendez, 2014; Delios and Henisz, 2003). By following the hypothesised sequence of entry 
and experience accumulation, the intrinsic disadvantages of foreign entrants in the host market 
may then dissipate because internationalisers’ capabilities would have improved with the 
accumulation of experience (Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014). Implicit in these 
assumptions is that experienced entrants may be more willing to bear the perceived costs and 
risks associated with a different entry mode strategy to capitalise on their prior knowledge and 
experience. Even though the results of the relationship between prior knowledge and experience 
and commitment vary from one context to another (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007; Nadolska and Barkema, 2007), scholars generally expect a positive and 
significant relationship between learning from experience and the degree of foreign equity.  
In this study, it is proposed that prior knowledge and experience accumulated over time may not 
always translate into organisational learning, and subsequently strategic (re)entry commitment 
changes as previously generalised. Specifically, market re-entry commitment may be a more 
complex decision emerging from the re-entrant firms’ expectations from returning to a potentially 
changed host market environment and their interpretations of prior entry(ies) and exit(s). 
Additionally, the likelihood of prior experience being translated into organisational learning may 
dissipate over time, as generally, only recent experience tend to be retrieved (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003; Levitt and March, 1988). Some conceptual work exists that questions the idea 
that experience themselves are the main cause of organisational learning (e.g., Anand, Mulotte 
and Ren, 2014; Capron and Mitchell, 2009; Felin and Foss, 2009) proposing for more research 
being conducted to understand what disrupts the taken for granted causal relationship between 
prior experience and organisational learning (Meyer, 2007; Wang and Ahmed, 2003).  
Some evidence exists specifically supporting this idea for entry commitment decisions; notably, 
Shaver (1998) found that the choice between an acquisition and greenfield was mainly based on 
firms’ expectations of which mode was more likely to prolong their survival in the host market, 
irrespective of the previous experience of those firms (see also Slangen and Hennart, 2008). 
Concerning re-entry commitment, while prior experience may foster some learning that can be 
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exploited upon re-entry, there may also be a strong self-selection effect (Anand et al., 2014). 
Specifically, rather than a routinized pattern of behaviour, as it may be the case with initial entries, 
each re-entry commitment decision may be a discreet endogenous choice driven by performance 
expectations based on the potential changes in the environment, how long the firm spends out 
of the market and the firm’s interpretation of its initial entry performance influenced by motives 
for exit. These unique characteristics of the re-entry process make it logical to assume that 
experience accumulated in the past on its own is not sufficient to explain re-entry.  
It should be noted that this study does not mean to imply that the experience re-entrants have 
accumulated over time does not matter for re-entry commitment. However, for re-entrants, 
making the assumption that prior experience on its own will constitute the “lessons learned” and 
thus, stimulate a change in behaviour may not be accurate. Re-entrants have exited the market 
for reasons specific to their activities there and renewed their operations when new opportunities 
presented themselves which may have little to do with the number of experience themselves but 
with the factors that drove them to have those experience. The concept of “learning in stages” 
may be more useful when there is a low level of ambiguity and when organisational outcomes 
become less uncertain as time passes (Anand et al., 2014). For re-entrants, the uncertainty 
associated with the market following the exit decision may, in fact, be higher compared to de 
novo entry. All other things being equal, I expect that there will be no observable relationship 
between prior experience and re-entry commitment, stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, prior experience will not influence the likelihood of 
commitment escalation over no changes in commitment or the likelihood of commitment de-
escalation over no changes in commitment. 
 
Institutional change and foreign market re-entry commitment 
Firms tend to use both internal and external points of reference to make key strategic decisions 
such as foreign modes of (re)entry (Ang et al., 2015; Henisz and Delios, 2001; Henisz, 2003; Yiu 
and Makino, 2002; Xia et al., 2008; 2009). Nations possess unique institutional environments 
that can affect the ability of the firm to enforce contracts, thus, placing constraints on 
organisational behaviour (Scott, 1995; 2001). In such cases, local competitors may take 
advantage of foreign entrants by leveraging their knowledge of operating in weak institutional 
environments (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2003). Institutional theorists, therefore, propose 
that organisations align with their host institutional environments to attain legitimacy and support 
from legitimising actors; each host country is characterised by various legitimising actors that 
foreign subsidiaries must deal with in order to compete with the more institutionally astute local 
firms (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Chan and Makino, 2007; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Notably, 
Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) confirmed that the pervasiveness of, and uncertainty associated with, 
corruption influenced the choice between contractual and equity arrangements, in that firms, 
were found to adapt to the pressures of corruption by opting for lower risk commitment. Other 
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studies (Demirbag, Tatoglu and Glaister, 2010; Hernandez and Nieto, 2015) confirmed that the 
more restrictive the institutional environment, the more likely firms are to opt for collaborations to 
alleviate their adaptation problems. The key idea here is that firms configure commitment modes 
to align with host institutional conditions at the time of entry (Xia et al., 2008). Following the logic 
of previous studies, in institutionally stable host environments, re-entrant firms would be aware 
of host institutional conditions and negotiate re-entry commitment accordingly.  
However, institutions are not always stable, particularly if sufficient time has passed between 
market exit and re-entry. Foreign firms’ re-entries into South Africa market following the 
abolishment of the apartheid regime, or the return of financial services firms into Brazil and China 
following industry liberalisation are examples illustrating that, the re-entry process itself may, at 
least in part, occur as a result of changes in the conditions of host institutional environments, 
such as legitimising institutional actors (i.e. governments) welcoming multinational firms back 
into the market. Changes in host institutional rules and policies may de-stabilise formerly 
established organisational practices concerning the most appropriate modes of operating in the 
host market (Newman, 2000; Oilver, 1992; Xia et al., 2009). Studies on transition economies 
highlight the effect of institutional changes on firm strategy and on strategic change (e.g., 
Banalieva et al., 2015; Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Yiu and Makino, 
2002), arguing that changes in strategy may be unlikely to occur unless they are paralleled by 
changes in the (institutional) environment (see Xia et al., 2009). In the context of foreign market 
re-entry commitment modes, changes in institutions may lead to previously chosen modes no 
longer being compatible with the new institutional pressures for legitimacy.  
Consequently, to survive host market competition, multinational firms may alter some of their 
organisational practices and structures, including how they are governed and managed (i.e. their 
commitment mode decisions) in order to (re)adjust to the new requirements of the host economy 
(Xia et al., 2008; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Yiu and Makino, 2002; Zahra et al., 2000). For instance, 
a key characteristic of institutional changes in transition economies is the shift from centrally 
planned to market-based economies which are paralleled by a preference for privatisation and 
openness to foreign direct investment (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003). This shift is also 
characterised by a reduction in government intervention, and an increased acceptance of 
traditionally Western practices and norms, which means business decisions can be made based 
on market rules and not socialist norms (Meyer et al., 2009). In the context of institutional 
changes, scholars have observed a move from firms adopting collaboration modes of entry to 
higher commitment modes, generally wholly owned (De Villa et al., 2015; Peng, 2003; Xia et al., 
2009). Favourable changes in host institutional environments narrow the gap between the 
internal organisational practices and host market requirements, thus potentially decreasing the 
likelihood of lower investment commitment decisions (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Xia et al., 2008).  
Whilst efforts are being made, particularly by emerging market governments to foster institutional 
development (Li et al., 2014), institutional changes are yet to become a key factor in our 
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understanding of firm strategic responses, particularly in the context of foreign market (re)entry 
commitment. In this study, it is tested whether host institutional changes can also independently 
serve as benchmarks to explain re-entry commitment. Specifically, I propose here that changes 
in the institutional development of host markets during the time-out period may determine 
changes in organisational values and practices (Henisz and Delios, 2001), which may, in turn, 
influence how re-entrants assess the feasibility of re-entry commitment decisions. Thus,  
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, favourable institutional changes occurring in the host 
market during the time-out period will positively influence the likelihood of commitment escalation 
over no changes in commitment. 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, favourable institutional changes occurring in the host 
market during the time-out period will negatively influence the likelihood of commitment de-
escalation over no changes in commitment. 
 
The moderating effect of institutional change on learning from prior experience 
Entry mode studies have been rooted in the implicit assumption that institutional environments 
are stable over time for the experiential knowledge acquired to be of continued use to the firm 
providing it with learning capabilities (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; 
Delios and Henisz, 2003). The relationships hypothesised thus far in this study reflect the 
rationale that both prior learning and host institutional change may independently serve as 
benchmarks to assess re-entry commitment. Yet, an equally important question is whether the 
prior experience re-entrants possess has a positive effect on organisational learning when 
institutional conditions change (Priem and Butler, 2001; Brouthers et al., 2008a). In other words, 
are experienced re-entrants more likely to escalate/de-escalate commitment than more 
inexperienced entrants when host institutions change favourably? When experience meets 
institutional change, a more complex picture is likely to emerge.  
Contextualising prior learning and experience has been proposed as important in the area of 
market entry (notably, Brouthers et al., 2008a; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Xia et al., 2009). Thus, 
a logical extension to contextualising experience is assessing the applicability of prior experience 
and whether it, in fact, leads to organisational learning when host institutional environments have 
changed during a time out. A firm’s degree of experience may influence how the firm perceives 
the uncertainty associated with re-entry and whether re-entrants respond to the new market 
opportunities that a more favourable host institutional environment may be expected to offer 
(Javalgi et al., 2011). In a changed environment, inexperienced entrants may differ in their 
commitment decisions compared to firms that have operated internationally for a longer period 
of time (see also Xia et al., 2008) or in diverse institutional settings (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Xia 
et al., 2009). As experienced organisations tend to rely more significantly on their prior 
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experience, they may be less likely to change even when their environments transition (Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998; Chan et al., 2006; Guillén, 2003; Xia et al., 2009). Following this logic, 
experienced (re)entrants may have built more confidence over time (Amburgey et al., 1993) and 
may, therefore, utilise the same strategies and structures that were in place prior to exit, even 
when this may lead to less effective results. This study proposes that more experience may 
translate into re-entrants being less responsive and less sensitive to institutional changes and 
perhaps less aware of the need to overcome new legitimacy pressures.  
In contrast, re-entrants with lower levels of experience may be less confident and more in tune 
with changes in their host institutional environments (Xia et al., 2009) by adapting to the new 
environment and changing commitment in the direction of either escalation or de-escalation. 
Whilst the earlier assumption was that experience on its own is unlikely to have observable 
effects on re-entry commitment, here I propose that favourable institutional changes may not only 
incentivise firms to re-enter a previously exited foreign market (Welch and Welch, 2009), but the 
effect of prior experience and learning on the re-entry commitment decision is likely to vary with 
changes in the host institutional environment. Hence, changes that have occurred in the host 
institutional context during the time-out period between market exit and re-entry moderate the 
relationship between experience-based learning and re-entry commitment such that, 
Hypothesis 3: The more experience re-entrants have, the less likely they are to escalate 
or de-escalate commitment in response to host institutional changes that have occurred during 
the time-out period, and the more likely they are to return via the same mode. 
 
Motives for exit and their effect on re-entry commitment 
The idea that firms learn from paradigms of interpretation (cf. Schwens and Kabst, 2009) has 
been overlooked in the market entry literature. Studies examining organisational learning based 
on the idea of gradual development and accumulation of knowledge and experience over time 
(Casillas et al., 2015; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Sapienza et al., 2006; Sharma and 
Blomstermo, 2003) pay less attention to important disruptions that often occur in a firm’s path to 
international expansion and can affect the likelihood of time-based experience transforming into 
organisational learning. Prior experience can be superseded by other factors depending on the 
nuances of the phenomenon studied (Delios and Henisz, 2003). Because the re-entry event is 
not a discreet occurrence and is inter-linked with market exit (Javalgi et al., 2011; Welch and 
Welch, 2009), and given the potentially negative effect of prior exit on firm morale and attitudes 
towards the host market, one might expect the motives for exit to affect whether firms escalate 
their commitment, de-escalate their commitment or re-enter the market in the same mode in 
which they were operating prior to exit. For re-entrants, market exit may represent a source of 
uncertainty because firms tend to carry with them the negative experience associated with not 
having met their initial market entry objectives (Benito and Welch, 1997; Chen and Wu, 1996) 
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which in turn, may influence the degree of commitment in a foreign host market in further 
(re)entries (Nummela et al., 2016; Welch and Welch, 2009). 
The main distinctive feature of market exit is that it can be voluntary and involuntary (Benito and 
Welch, 1997; Mellahi, 2003; Nummela et al., 2016). Mellahi (2003, p. 151) defined exit as “a 
process of voluntarily decreasing involvement in international operations in response to 
organisational decline at home or abroad, or as a means of enhancing corporate profitability 
under non-crisis conditions”. When exit is voluntary, firms may have a limited number of 
resources to compete and actively choose to re-allocate these resources in other markets and 
re-focus on growth in the home market or decrease expansion to increase product diversification; 
this is generally referred to as strategic exit (Benito, 2005; Dass, 2000; Nummela et al., 2016). 
Because strategic exit behaviour is most likely deliberate and expected (Nummela et al., 2016), 
it is unlikely to have negative connotations on firm behaviour (Benito, 2005; Crick, 2002; 
Matthyssens and Pauwels, 2000; Welch and Welch, 2009) and consequently, it is unlikely to 
have an observable effect on market re-entry commitment.  
In turn, other types of voluntary exits, such as exit due to poor market performance stemming 
from an increase in operation costs and competition (Benito and Welch, 1997; Chang and Singh, 
1999), the choice of inappropriate target market (Hayward, Shepherd and Griffin, 2006; Welch 
and Welch, 2009), inappropriate initial entry mode choices (Javalgi et al., 2011) or a misfit of 
product to the market (Nummela et al., 2016; Welch and Welch, 2009) may affect re-entry 
commitment. Particularly exit due to poor performance may mean that the firm had little 
knowledge of how to operate in the market compared to its competitors and consequently, may 
choose not to re-invest significant resources there. In turn, a company that has been 
unsuccessful may also (re)enter the market by escalating commitment to gain more control over 
foreign operations and re-allocate resources more wisely (Hayward et al., 2006). Escalating 
commitment is often translated into having a strong market foothold and learning more about 
relevant stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and local institutions (Song, 2013). 
Furthermore, (re-entrant) firms may be victims of changing circumstances in their external 
environment that are beyond their control and can lead to involuntary market exit (Cardon et al., 
2011; Nummela et al., 2016). Involuntary exits generally refer to forces resting within the 
environments of home and host markets that are not conducive to business development and 
can impede the continuation of a firm’s activities, such as regulations against foreign investment 
(Cardon et al., 2011; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990). Negative feedback from governments and 
regulators may result in an inability of the foreign entrant to perform its operations in the market 
successfully. As a result, firms are forced to exit the host market, irrespective of their pre-exit 
performance. Thus, it may be logical to assume that the host market continues to be perceived 
as attractive, and re-entry may perhaps occur as soon as those external forces are no longer in 
place (Welch and Welch, 2009). In this case, changes in re-entry commitment tend to be more 
unlikely. Thus, this study proposes that, 
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Hypothesis 4: Strategic exit will not have observable effects on the likelihood of 
commitment escalation or commitment de-escalation over re-entering via the same mode. 
Hypothesis 5: Voluntary exit - poor market performance, poor performance with previous 
commitment mode - will increase the likelihood of commitment escalation and the likelihood of 
commitment de-escalation over re-entering via the same mode compared to involuntary exit, and 
this relationship is likely to be stronger for exit due to poor performance with previous mode.   
 
The moderating role of market exit on the relationship between prior experience and re-
entry commitment 
What is more, this study proposes for the moderating effect of market exit on the relationship 
between prior learning from prior experience and re-entry commitment; and the moderating effect 
is expected to be different from that of host institutional changes. Whereas institutional changes 
are external to the firm, they may reinforce the effect of inertial learning (Chan et al., 2006; Xia 
et al., 2009) and as proposed earlier, experienced re-entrants may be more likely not to respond 
to changes in institutions by changing their commitment. Contrastingly, I suspect an increase in 
the effect of previous experience on re-entry commitment when the analysis accounts for the 
moderating effect of market exit. Indeed, previous research has proposed that high performing 
organisations learn mostly from prior negative experience and capitalise on their knowledge base 
when making future decisions (Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Specifically, 
the market exit is expected to make firms more fearful (not to re-enter) (Crick 2002, 2004; Welch 
and Welch, 2009) or with re-entrants, it may drive them to reassess the effect of prior experience 
and alter commitment. Since the exit experience is internal to the firm, when it results in 
significant losses of capital and human resources, then exit is unlikely to be forgotten even when 
management changes (Cardon et al., 2011; Nummela et al., 2016).  
Re-entry follows a process of market exit which may be perceived by the focal firm in many forms, 
including as evidence of international market failure, depending on the motives for exit (Nummela 
et al., 2016; Welch and Welch, 2009). In this case, it may be that decisions that have been 
associated with lack of success are less likely to become embedded within the organisation and 
thus, less likely to lead to firms opting for the same level of commitment. I argue that it is unlikely 
for the re-entrant firm to return via the same mode of commitment if the market exit was voluntary, 
particularly when associated with poor performance. Experienced re-entrants are perhaps more 
likely to react to market exits as they may have already experienced similar difficulties in other 
markets, potentially using those experience as reference points to more confidently react to the 
causes for exit and change their strategies accordingly. Thus,  
Hypothesis 6: Voluntary exit (poor market performance, poor performance with previous 
mode) will moderate the effect of experience on re-entry commitment, such that the more 
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experience re-entrants have the more likely they are to escalate and de-escalate commitment 
than re-enter via the same mode, compared to those which have experienced involuntary exits.   
Hypothesis 7: Strategic exit will not have observable effects on the likelihood of 
commitment escalation or commitment de-escalation over returning via the same mode, 
irrespective of the degree of experience of re-entrants. 
 
Prior mode of entry: The effect of “within-form” learning on re-entry commitment 
Investing in multiple markets over time is not the only way firms can gain experience (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001). Firms are also conditioned in their decision making by prior decisions that 
they have already tried and tested (Cyert and March, 1963) because current strategic decisions 
are not separable from previous decision making (Hannan et al., 2002; Rumelt, 1995) and once 
a decision has been made, the range of options available is perceived as reduced (Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007; Lu, 2002). The experience profiles of a firm are various, and aside from 
experience accumulated over time, they may include what is referred to as “within-form” 
experience, i.e. the experience associated with repeated uses of a type of commitment mode (Li 
et al., 2007; Padmanabhan and Rao, 1999; Xia et al., 2009). Thus, firm actions can become 
routinized and when that is the case, firms make little efforts to divert from prior types of decisions 
(Xia et al., 2008; 2009). Past routines become a blueprint for how a firm operates in the host 
market and have been put forward as potential ownership as well as transaction-specific 
advantages (Padmanabhan and Rao, 1999). Delios and Beamish (2001) found a positive effect 
of joint venture experience on the likelihood and profitability of subsequent entries. Similarly, 
entries via international acquisitions are expected to provide knowledge concerning how to 
acquire targets and how to perform negotiations successfully (Barkema and Schijven, 2008).  
Within-form experience effects are proposed to have a stronger impact on organisational 
learning, in that they may reduce the uncertainty associated with a new type of market (re)entry 
related decision (Chan et al., 2006; Huang and Sternquist, 2007; Li et al., 2007). In turn, learning 
from the repeated use of a commitment mode tends to also lead to path-dependent behaviour, 
making changes in commitment modes less likely to occur in subsequent (re)entries (Chan and 
Makino, 2002; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Gao and Pan, 2010; Xia et. al., 2009). 
This study proposes that re-entrant firms which were operating in a given mode prior to exit will, 
other things being equal, re-enter by adopting that same mode. In a seminal paper about how 
firms make subsequent entry mode decisions, Padmanabhan and Rao (1999) specified that “the 
relevancy and the extent of transferability of prior experience depend critically on the degree of 
similarity between the current decision and prior decisions” (28). In this case, given that re-entry 
entails a firm returning to the same (previously exited) host market, this contention seems valid. 
For re-entrants, re-entering via the same commitment mode may mean a reduction in the costs 
of learning how a new type of ownership works in the host market as well as perhaps recovering 
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some of the losses incurred when the firm exited the market. Whilst firms may incur sunk costs 
such as investments in physical plants and personnel when commitment modes are reversed 
(Belderbos and Zou, 2009), a re-entrant firm may still be able to salvage intangible resources 
such as distribution partnerships and business networks by returning via the same mode.  
Particularly important here is that, since each entry mode carries different levels risk and potential 
for knowledge acquisition, learning effects may vary across modes. Some scholars (e.g., Gao 
and Pan, 2010; Xia et al., 2009) found that experience with equity ventures and wholly owned 
subsidiaries had stronger effects on speeding up the pace of sequential entries than contractual 
arrangement experience. There is a straightforward rationale here that, without deep involvement 
in operations (that generally characterises contractual arrangements) re-entrants are less likely 
to have generated significant in-house knowledge that could then be applied to re-entry 
commitment. 
Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, firms are more likely to re-enter a foreign market in the same 
commitment mode in which they were operating prior to exit, and this relationship is stronger for 
non-equity commitment. 
 
Method 
Data Source and Sample Selection 
This database represents, to my knowledge, the most authoritative and up-to-date information 
on foreign market re-entry and re-entrants. Data comes principally from business information and 
research databases Factiva (Dow Jones) and LexisNexis (Reed Elsevier), which list information 
on all private and public companies. Factiva and LexisNexis were chosen because they 
aggregate content from a large number of licensed and reliable data sources, predominantly Wall 
Street Journal, Reuters, The New York Times, Huffington Post, Bloomberg, and Nikkei. These 
data sources have been used in the past to examine the international business decisions of 
MNEs (notably, Li, Eden, Hitt and Ireland, 2008). Because foreign market re-entry is an under-
researched area, there are no pre-existent databases from which to draw data concerning re-
entries (please see Chapter 3 on the methodology for more details). The observation period 
includes a total of 1,020 events undertaken in 101 host countries, that is, all re-entry events which 
have been identified in the databases and are in line with the scope of the study. Sample 
characteristics are provided in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1: Sample description of foreign market re-entry events  (N=1,020) 
  
 No. of re-entry events % 
Panel A: Year-wise distribution    
1980s 32 3.1 
1990s 173 17.0 
2000-2010 350 34.3 
2011-2015 465 45.6 
Panel B: Host market re-entered (total= 101 countries)   
Top 15 
  
India  147 14.4 
China  76 7.5 
South Africa  74 7.3 
US 67 6.6 
UK 52 5.1 
Australia  36 3.5 
Brazil  34 3.3 
Myanmar  29 2.8 
Russia  23 2.3 
Thailand  22 2.2 
Mexico  18 1.8 
Germany  18 1.8 
Indonesia  16 1.6 
Iran  14 1.4 
Philippines  14 1.4 
Developed host markets  341 33.4 
Non-developed (emerging) host markets 681 66.6 
Panel C: Home market of re-entrant (total= 62 countries) 
Top 15 
  
US 312 30.6 
UK 120 5.9 
Japan 87 8.5 
Italy  56 5.5 
Germany  49 4.8 
France  40 3.9 
Switzerland  32 3.1 
Sweden  31 3.0 
South Korea 25 2.5 
India  23 2.3 
China 22 2.2 
Canada  18 1.8 
South Africa 17 1.7 
Australia  15 1.5 
Taiwan  12 1.2 
Developed home markets  880 86.3 
Non-developed (emerging) home markets 142 13.7 
Panel D: Major industries   
Automotive  209 20.5 
Financial services  171 16.8 
Retail 113 11.1 
Consumer electronics  85 8.3 
Industrial goods and services 75 7.4 
Media and telecommunications  66 6.5 
   
Panel E: Firm characteristics  Median  Mean  
Firm size (total assets; mil euros) 8000.00000 160937.7666 
Firm age (years) 72.000 76.81 
Host market experiential knowledge (years)  10.000 16.276 
Time-out (years) 6.000 9.082 
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Variables  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable represents the difference (if any) in the firm’s mode of operation in the 
host market prior to exit and the mode of re-entry. Table 4.2 reports the distribution of broad 
categories of entry modes chosen by firms prior to exit and upon re-entry. Particularly, the table 
shows that a large percentage of firms tend to return via the same mode of operation in which 
they were operating prior to exit (68 percent, 663 out of 978 re-entries).  
Table 4.2: Frequency of re-entry commitment decisions 
Re-entry 
Mode before exit 
Non-equity Joint equity Wholly owned Total  
No changes in commitment   399       118 146 663 
Commitment de-escalation 6***       52   97 155 
Commitment escalation  105       55    0 160 
Total  510       225  243 978 
Note: The dependent variable could not be measured in 42 out of 1,020 cases. ***Firms operating via non-equity modes 
can also de-escalate, i.e. from franchise or licensing to exports – the regression model controls for this. 
Independent Variables 
Firm experience 
Organisational learning is measured by considering three aspects of a firm’s international 
experience. Following previous studies (e.g., Luo and Peng, 1999; Brouthers et al., 2008a), the 
experience variable is measured as follows; general experience intensity (number of years 
internationally since inception), host experience intensity (number of years in the host region), 
general experience diversity (number of countries internationally) and host experience diversity 
(number of countries in the host region). The analysis also captures experiential knowledge, i.e. 
host country specific experiential knowledge which refers to the number of years the firm 
operated in that specific host market between initial entry and exit. In line with previous studies 
(see Brouthers et al., 2008a, p. 199), factor analysis conﬁrmed that the two measures of 
experience intensity loaded on a single factor (Cronbach’s alpha =.91) and the two measures of 
experience diversity loaded into another factor (Cronbach’s alpha =.78). This resulted in three 
experience measures being used in this study namely host experiential knowledge, experience 
intensity and experience diversity.  
Institutional change 
Institutional change refers to the changes in the “market norms, values, and practices in which a 
nation’s organisations are situated and in which they must operate” (Xia et al., 2009, p. 1288). In 
this study, the theoretical considerations of institutional change focus on whether institutional 
transformations that may increase investor confidence have occurred during the time-out period. 
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Data on institutional factors was collected from the Economic Freedom of the World Index (The 
Fraser Institute) which derives an overall institutional score for each country for each year whilst 
considering the following factors, namely 1) size of government, 2) legal system and intellectual 
property rights, 3) sound money, 4) freedom to trade internationally, and 5) regulation. Most 
scholars tend to use the composite indexes of economic freedom aggregated from the various 
components due to the high degree of multicollinearity between the various subcomponents (see 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Jory and Ngo, 2014; Meyer et al., 2009; Wan and 
Hoskisson, 2003). Institutional change is measured at the time t-1 of exit and t-1 of re-entry; i.e. 
institutional change = (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit. Following the lead of more recent studies (Bae 
and Salomon, 2010; Hernandez and Nieto, 2015), the focus is not on the magnitude of change 
but the direction of host institutional change; i.e. whether changes in host institutions that have 
occurred during the time-out period are negative or positive. The institutional change variable is 
transformed into a dichotomous variable which takes the value of “0” is host institutional change 
is negative (i.e. unfavourable) and “1” if the direction of change is positive (i.e. favourable).  
Market exit motivations 
A firm’s likelihood of replicating an entry mode has also been suggested to depend on the 
performance of that firm in the market, and particularly the success of the mode chosen (Lu, 
2002). Generally, scholars do not distinguish whether it is successful or unsuccessful modes that 
firms tend to replicate in the subsequent expansion (Hennart and Slangen, 2015). I used Factiva 
and LexisNexis to identify why re-entrants had exited the market and in line with previous studies 
(e.g., Benito, 2005; Nummela et al., 2016) I first classified exit motives into three categories, 
namely voluntary exits such as strategic exits; exit due to poor market performance; and 
involuntary exits (e.g., government pressures). Then, within the second category regarding exit 
due to poor performance, I distinguished and tested for the effects of exit due to poor 
performance with entry mode. Dummy variables were created for each of the four variables. 
Table 4.3. explains that voluntary exit is highly correlated to involuntary exit, in that when 
voluntary exit takes the value of “0”, involuntary exit takes the value of “1” and vice-versa (the 
likelihood of voluntary exit was compared to that of involuntary exit in the models).  
Mode of commitment prior to exit 
As most re-entry commitment decisions resulted in firms returning via the same mode in which 
they were operating prior to exit (Table 4.2), it is logical to assume that prior mode of operation 
may affect re-entry commitment. Thus, the analysis compares and discusses for which modes 
of operation the likelihood of not changing commitment is stronger. Similar to the dependent 
variable, searches in Factiva and LexisNexis allowed coding this variable into three dummies 
which took the value of “0” for non-equity, “1” for a joint equity venture and “2” for a wholly owned 
subsidiary. Each variable representing a mode of operation prior to exit took turns as the 
reference variable in the multinomial regression model to compare which mode is more likely to 
lead to escalation, de-escalation, or no changes in commitment respectively.  
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Control Variables 
This study accounted for firm size, which has been associated with firms possessing more 
resources in order to engage in higher risk and resource commitment, and measured it as the 
value of total assets with a logarithm transformation at the time of (t-1) re-entry (Gao and Pan, 
2010). Furthermore, since older firms are more likely to show signs of inertia that may prevent 
them from changing their entry mode patterns (Guillén, 2002; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), firm 
age was controlled for and computed as the number of years from when the firm had been 
founded up to one year prior to re-entry. Some notable studies (Araujo and Rezende, 2003) also 
suggested that management can alter the direction of an MNE’s international path or re-shape it 
alltogether; thus, changes in management measures whether the CEO has changed up to three 
years prior to re-entry. Because a firm could engage in more than one re-entry event, I 
documented whether a firm has been present in the host market through a different division in 
the same/different sector at the time of re-entry. MNEs which have maintained close ties with 
host markets by operating there via other businesses may be more confident with their host 
market operations and perhaps more likely to escalate commitment. Furthermore, since prior 
research (Rumelt, 1995) argued for the role of organisational forgetfulness in reducing the 
effectiveness of prior experience, this study controls for time-out. 
Changing economic factors in the host market have been associated with increased potential for 
market growth (Javalgi et al., 2011); changes in host market size from when the firm exited and 
until it re-entered the market are measured as the changes in GDP/capita; i.e. host market growth 
change = (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit. In turn, the number of foreign entrants present in a host market 
reflects the level of legitimacy foreign investments have in that market (Xia et al., 2009); this 
study also controls for the differences (if any) in the attractiveness of the host market between 
exit and re-entry; i.e. host market attractiveness change = (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit. Both market 
growth change and market attractiveness change were re-coded into dummy variables to 
measure for the direction of change; i.e. “0” if the change was negative (unfavourable) and “1” if 
the change was positive (favourable). Finally, four industry dummies are added for automotive, 
retail, financial services and consumer electronics because around 60 percent of the total sample 
of reported re-entries consists of firms operating in these industries. The standard deviations and 
pairwise correlations for all the variables are reported in Table 4.3, whilst the means and the 
variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) are reported in Table 4.4. VIF values range between 1.02 and 
3.13, suggesting no serious problems of multicollinearity for the analysis (see Field, 2009)7.  
  
                                                          
7 Exception being VIFs for exit motives “involuntary exit”, “poor market performance” and “strategic exit” which have very 
high VIF values because these variables are mutually exclusive; i.e. firms that have experienced involuntary market exits 
have not reported strategic exit as a key exit motive, nor poor market performance.  
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Model specification 
The empirical analysis is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, the re-entry commitment 
decision between not changing commitment and alternatives within escalation and de-escalation 
is modelled as a qualitative choice problem using a multinomial logistic regression model. This 
statistical method was applied due to the characteristics of the dependent variable, which is a 
categorical variable with three alternative outcomes (escalation, de-escalation and no changes 
in commitment); and the mix of both continuous and categorical predictor variables which affect 
the odds of choosing one alternative commitment over another. Compared to independent binary 
logistic models, multinomial regression is considered more efficient in simultaneously estimating 
all possible comparisons amongst decision categories (see Demirbag et al., 2010). Then, in the 
second stage of the analysis, two additional sets of regression analyses are run in order to 
investigate further into what types of escalation and de-escalation decisions account for the 
significant effects observed. Alternatives within commitment escalation - no equity to more equity 
and joint equity to wholly owned - are considered and compared to the remaining of the sample. 
Similarly, alternatives within commitment de-escalation - equity to no equity and wholly owned to 
joint equity – are also compared to the remaining of the sample. 
Robustness checks  
Additional robustness checks were conducted for the regression models. First, this study 
compiled information to measure institutional change from other databases such as the World 
Bank that have been used in some studies (e.g., Meyer et al. 2009; Xia et al., 2009) to measure 
institutional development and did not find significant differences. In fact, the databases used to 
measure the quality of institutions are highly correlated; “freedom to trade internationally” is highly 
correlated with “regulatory quality” (r=0.71) and with “property rights” (r=0.70). Similarly, for the 
variable “legal system and property rights” correlated with “rule of law” (r=0.76) and “control of 
corruption” (r=0.77). Second, I tested different year dummies to control for any variation that may 
result from the 2008 (2007, 2008, 2009) recession in Western countries and the 1997 (1996, 
1997, 1998) financial crisis in Asian countries (i.e. whether there was a concentration of market 
exit events around those periods); this did not result in any observable changes for the regression 
model’s results. Furthermore, two dummy variables were added to control for the mode prior to 
exit being exports, meaning that those firms cannot de-escalate or wholly owned subsidiaries, 
where escalation is not possible; this process did not result in any observable changes in the 
regression model. Finally, a colleague was asked to independently code for the variable motives 
for exit into separate proforma to ensure that objective categories have emerged from the 
qualitative data; their conclusions were in line with my categorisation of voluntary and involuntary 
market exits.  
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for changes in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10) 
Variables 
Std. 
Dev. 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
(1) Commitment changes 0.76 976 1                         
(2) Host experiential knowledge 17.67 975 .00 1                        
(3) Host experience intensity 33.83 986 .04 
.43 
** 
1                       
(4) General experience intensity 38.91 997 .06 
.38 
** 
.83 
** 
1                      
(5) Host experience diversity  8.07 907 .07* 
.10 
** 
.22 
** 
.22 
** 
1                     
(6) General experience diversity 57.45 901 .03 
.16 
** 
.25 
** 
0.3
1** 
.56 
** 
1                    
(7) Host institutional change 0.45 886 
.10 
** 
.01 .03 .05 .07* .03 1                   
(8) Involuntary exit 0.45 1020 .05 
.11 
** 
.17 
** 
.20 
** 
.01 .03 
.12 
** 
1                  
(9) Poor market performance 0.49 1020 .02 
-.15 
** 
-.15 
** 
-.16 
** 
.02 .01 
-.11 
** 
-.81 
** 
1                 
(10) Poor performance with mode 0.39 1020 
.28 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.12 
** 
-.11 
** 
.02 -.02 .01 
-.30 
** 
.37 
** 
1                
(11) Strategic exit 0.29 1020 -.04 .07* -.01 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.01 
-.20 
** 
-.40 
** 
-.14 
** 
1               
(12) Exit mode: No-equity venture 0.50 976 
-.09 
** 
-.02 
-.10 
** 
-
.08* 
.05 
.14 
** 
-
.08* 
-.09 
** 
.13 
** 
.01 
-.09 
** 
1              
(13) Exit mode: Joint equity venture 0.42 976 .16 -.03 -0.6 
-
.07* 
.01 -.06 
.09 
** 
-.03 .02 
.19 
** 
.01 
-.57 
** 
1             
(14) Exit mode: Wholly owned subsidiary 0.43 976 -.05 .05 
.16 
** 
.16 
** 
-
.07* 
-.10 
** 
.01 
.13 
** 
-.17 
** 
-.20 
** 
.10 
** 
-.60 
** 
-.31 
** 
1            
(15) Firm age 48.62 1020 .04 
.29 
** 
.52 
** 
.65 
** 
.09 
** 
.16 
** 
.09 
** 
.13 
** 
-.14 
** 
-
.07* 
.04 
-.13 
** 
-.01 
.16 
** 
1           
(16) Firm size 3.38 988 
.10 
** 
.20* 
.33 
** 
.38 
** 
.27 
** 
.37 
** 
.02 
** 
.11 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.03 -.00 
-.12 
** 
.02 
.11 
** 
.37 
** 
1          
(17) Changes in management 0.50 1020 .02 
.10 
** 
.05 .07* .04 .06 -.06 -.03 .01 .07* .04 .03 
-.09 
** 
.05 
.10 
** 
.18 
** 
1         
(18) Already present in the market 0.42 1020 -.01 
.10 
** 
.15 
** 
.17 
** 
.14 
** 
.28 
** 
-
.09* 
-.16 
** 
.12 
** 
-.05 .06 .06 -.04 -.03 
.11 
** 
.27 
** 
.10 
** 
1        
(19) Host market size change 0.26 813 -.03 -.06 -.01 -.07 -.04 
-
.10* 
.03 
-.27 
** 
.21 
** 
.10 
** 
.05 .04 .04 
-.10 
** 
-.08 -.05 -0.5 .07* 1       
(20) Time-out 10.51 974 .03 
.13 
** 
.42 
** 
.37 
** 
.13 
** 
.07* 
.12 
** 
.35 
** 
-.30 
** 
-.17 
** 
-.05 -.03 
-.13 
** 
.16 
** 
.23 
** 
.17 
** 
.03 -.02 .05 1      
(21) Host market attractiveness change 0.48 885 -.01 .03 .02 .03 .01 .06 
.10 
** 
.08* -.03 .02 -.05 
-
.08* 
.06 .04 .02 
.12 
** 
-.06 .02 
-
.07* 
.14 
** 
1     
(22) Automotive 0.40 1020 .05 
.15 
** 
.21 
** 
.26 
** 
.26 
** 
.44 
** 
.01 -.06 
.10 
*** 
.09 
** 
-.05 
.12 
** 
-.01 
-.12 
** 
.05 
.21 
** 
.05 
.18 
** 
.04 
.11 
** 
.04 1    
(23) Retail 0.31 1020 .05 
-.11 
** 
-.17 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.04 
-.15 
** 
.13 
** 
.08 
** 
.01 .04 
-
.08* 
.03 -.06 
-.19 
** 
-.01 
-.14 
** 
.01 
-.09 
** 
-.06 
-.18 
** 
1   
(24) Financial 0.37 1020 -.00 .07* 
.25 
** 
.25 
** 
-.12 
** 
-.22 
** 
.06 
.20 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.11 
** 
.01 
-.25 
** 
.03 
.26 
** 
.35 
** 
.20 
** 
-.01 -.05 .01 
.11 
** 
-.02 
-.23 
** 
-.16 
** 
1  
(25) Consumer electronics 0.27 1020 .04 .01 -.05 -.01 .04 .07* .02 
-
.06* 
.05 -.04 .02 .07* -.02 -.06 -.05 -.01 .00 
.17 
** 
.01 
-
.07* 
.02 
-.15 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.13 
** 
1 
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Table 4.4: Collinearity diagnostics for changes in commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
The main empirical results are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. The estimated coefficients as 
shown in the tables mean that for a unit change in the predictor variable, the logit of an outcome, 
relative to the reference group, is expected to change by its respective parameter estimate (which 
is in log-odds units). For instance, a negative coefficient in the tables signifies less likelihood of 
changes in commitment (Esc or DeEsc) over no changes in commitment. A positive coefficient 
signifies more likelihood of firms changing their commitment (Esc or DeEsc) over returning via 
the same mode they were operating in before exit. Further analysis is presented in Tables 4.7-
4.10 and is used to explore which types of commitment escalation, respectively commitment de-
escalation account for the significant effects observed in the main regression models.  
In all regression models, the first model includes only the control variables, while the second, 
third, fifth and ninth models add the main effects of the independent variables, namely prior 
experience, host institutional change, motives for the exit, and mode prior to exit. The fourth 
Variable name Mean 
Collinearity 
Tolerance 
VIFs 
Changes in commitment 0.49 0.82 1.22 
Commitment escalation (Esc) 0.24 0.79 1.26 
Commitment de-escalation (DeEsc) 0.25 0.77 1.30 
Host experiential knowledge 16.28 0.77 1.31 
General experience intensity 55.20 0.32 3.13 
Host experience intensity 42.71 0.33 3.01 
General experience diversity 69.00 0.63 1.59 
Host experience diversity 11.25 0.68 1.48 
Host institutional change  0.73 0.93 1.08 
Motives for exit: Involuntary exit 0.29 0.03 35.72 
Motives for exit: Poor market performance  0.62 0.02 49.73 
Motives for exit: Poor performance with mode 0.18 0.70 1.43 
Motives for exit: Strategic exit 0.09 0.04 24.16 
Prior (exit) mode: No-equity venture 0.52 0.98 1.02 
Prior (exit) mode: Joint equity venture 0.23 0.78 1.28 
Prior (exit) mode: Wholly owned subsidiary 0.25 0.78 1.28 
Firm age 76.81 0.53 1.91 
Firm size 8.29 0.66 1.51 
Changes in management 0.47 0.93 1.08 
Already present in the market 0.23 0.76 1.32 
Host market size change 0.93 0.89 1.12 
Time-out  9.08 0.86 1.17 
Host market attractiveness change 0.63 0.93 1.07 
Automotive sector 0.21 0.65 1.54 
Retail sector 0.11 0.81 1.23 
Financial services 0.17 0.70 1.43 
Consumer electronics sector 0.08 0.87 1.15 
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model considers the moderating effects of host institutional change on the three experience 
variables. The sixth, seventh, and eighth models consider the moderating effects of market exit 
motives, namely exit due to poor market performance (sixth model), poor performance with mode 
(seventh model) and strategic exit (eighth model). The likelihood-ratio and chi-square tests 
indicate that the independent variables have significant explanatory power, in particular 
concerning the effect of prior exit mode on re-entry commitment (Model 9). As discussed later, 
model indices in Tables 4.7-4.10 indicate that, when significant, widely used explanatory 
variables such as prior experience tend to explain de-escalation than escalation (e.g., Model 12).  
In Tables 4.5 and 4.6, among significant controls, firms operating in the automotive and retail 
sectors are more likely to both escalate and de-escalate commitment than return via the same 
mode of entry; whilst financial service firms appear to have become more risk adverse over the 
time-out period and tend to de-escalate and those in the consumer electronics sector tend to 
escalate commitment to gain more control over their operations. Additionally, larger re-entrants 
are more likely to de-escalate from equity to non-equity (Tables 4.9 and 4.10), indicating that 
larger firms are not necessarily less risk adverse. Furthermore, when firms re-enter a market that 
has grown in size over the time-out period, they are less likely to de-escalate commitment on re-
entry, more specifically to switch from equity to a non-equity mode.  
Time-out is significant and positive only in Model 18 (Table 4.8) on the likelihood of firms 
escalating from no equity to equity (β=0.06, p<0.05) and when the model accounts for market 
exit motives, i.e. the longer re-entrants spend out of the market the more likely they are to 
escalate from equity to non-equity particularly if the exit was associated with poor entry mode 
performance. The duration of the time-out can vary significantly between re-entrants and thus, it 
may be worth unpacking this variable into different time periods8. In turn, favourable changes in 
host market attractiveness make escalation from non-equity to equity less likely (Tables 4.7 and 
4.8). When management changes in the time-out period, firms that were operating via wholly 
owned subsidiaries prior to exit tend to decrease their equity by looking for a partner to re-enter 
with (Table 4.10). Perhaps for some re-entrants the experience accumulated in the past may 
exist at the individual and not the firm level.   
The analyses with regard to the effect of prior experience – host experiential knowledge, 
experience intensity, experience diversity – on re-entry commitment broadly support Hypothesis 
1 in that there is no overall significant independent effect of prior experience on the likelihood of 
commitment escalation or de-escalation over no changes in commitment (Model 2 in Table 4.5). 
Coefficients of host experiential knowledge are only significant (and negative) for commitment 
escalation (joint to wholly owned) in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, see Model 11 (β=-0.02, p<0.05). Also, 
experience diversity is again, negatively (β=-0.33, p<0.10) related to the likelihood of re-entrant 
firms de-escalating from equity to non-equity (Model 19 in Table 4.9). Thus, the more time firms 
have spent in the market prior to exit, the less likely they are to escalate from a joint to a wholly 
                                                          
8 The next chapter focuses specifically on the timing of re-entry decisions also testing for, and examining the different time-out quartiles.  
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owned venture, whereas the more diverse their experience is, the less likely re-entrants are to 
opt to de-escalate to non-equity modes on re-entry. Overall, the effects of prior experience on re-
entry commitment are not highly significant (and often negative) meaning that prior experience 
does not lead to increased resource investment in the host market, for re-entrant firms. 
Hypothesis 2a predicts that favourable changes occurring in the host institutional environment 
during the time-out period will positively influence the likelihood of commitment escalation, which 
is confirmed in Model 3, Table 4.5 (β=0.65, p<0.01), and in Model 12 in Table 4.7 for escalation 
from equity to non-equity (β=0.53, p<0.10) and escalation from joint equity to a wholly owned 
subsidiary (β=0.66, p<0.05). Contrary to Hypothesis 2b, there is no observable effect of host 
institutional change on the likelihood of commitment de-escalation. On their own, host 
institutional changes can explain commitment escalation, but not de-escalation.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that, broadly, the more experience re-entrants possess the less likely they 
will be to alter commitment in response to host institutional changes. Model 4 in Table 4.5 shows 
that the more experience intensity re-entrants possess the more likely they are to de-escalate 
(β=0.86, p<0.01). In turn, the coefficient of experience diversity is as hypothesised, i.e. negative 
and significant on the likelihood of commitment de-escalation (β=-0.72, p<0.01). A high degree 
of experience intensity means that the firm has, indeed, operated for a long time internationally; 
however, it may not have operated in a large number of countries and thus may be more inclined 
to become risk-adverse in the face of institutional change by decreasing involvement in the 
market. Hypothesis 3 received some support for the likelihood of de-escalation since institutional 
changes have no significant moderating effects on prior experience for commitment escalation.  
Model 5 in Table 4.5 shows that only the coefficients for poor mode performance were significant 
and positive for both escalations (β=2.32, p<0.001) and de-escalations (β=0.77, p<0.01). In turn, 
the effect of the other exit motivations on re-entry commitment is not significant. Hypothesis 4 is 
fully supported, whilst Hypothesis 5 is only supported for poor mode performance. Interestingly, 
whereas poor mode performance increases the likelihood of escalating from no equity to equity 
(Model 14, β=1.96, p<0.001) and from joint to wholly owned (Model 14, β=2.34, p<0.001), the 
positive effect of poor mode performance on de-escalation is only for equity to non-equity de-
escalation (Model 22, β=0.70, p<0.05). Re-entrants are less likely to switch commitment from a 
wholly owned to a joint equity despite poor mode performance (Model 22, β=-1.18, p<0.10); firms 
which invest significant resources abroad may be more incentivised to salvage some of those 
resources by re-entering and setting up new wholly owned subsidiaries.  
Results regarding the moderating effects of market exit are mixed. Whereas neither variable was 
significant on its own, poor market performance has a positive and significant moderating effect 
on firms with more experiential knowledge escalating commitment (Model 7) (β=0.04, p<0.05). 
In other words, firms which have spent a longer time operating in the host market prior to exit, 
are more likely to change their commitment upon re-entry and opt for more control over their 
foreign operations when the motive for exit was poor performance in the market. Contrary to the 
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hypothesised relationship, strategic exit has a positive and significant effect on firms with more 
experience intensity escalating commitment (β=1.00, p<0.05) and a negative effect on firms with 
experience diversity escalating commitment (β=-1.73, p<0.05) (Model 8). Perhaps firms which 
are already operating in a large number of countries strategically focus resources in those 
countries and choose not to escalate commitment in the re-entered market (thus, not supporting 
Hypothesis 6). In turn, interacting poor mode performance with prior experience, in fact, reduces 
the significant and positive effect of poor mode performance (Model 7) meaning that broadly, 
experienced entrants tend not to change their commitment as a consequence of poor mode 
performance. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 is only supported for the moderating effect of poor market 
performance. Overall, results show that market exit motivations do not significantly moderate the 
effect of prior experience on de-escalation, only explaining escalation. 
Finally, Hypothesis 8 predicted that re-entrants are likely to renew commitment in the host market 
by opting for the same mode in which they were operating prior to exit. Model 9 in Table 4.6 
shows that a re-entrant that was previously operating in a non-equity mode is less likely to de-
escalate than a firm that was previously operating via a joint venture (β=-5.32, p<0.001) and also 
less likely to de-escalate than a firm operating via a wholly owned subsidiary (β=-5.88, p<0.001). 
Re-entrants that were previously operating in a non-equity mode are also less likely to escalate 
compared to those previously operating within a joint equity venture (β=-0.89, p<0.001). In turn, 
re-entrants previously operating within joint ventures are also less likely to de-escalate compared 
to a wholly owned entry (β=-0.56, p<0.05). Hypothesis 8 received strong support for the effect of 
within-form learning and path dependency rationales on re-entry commitment. In other words, 
regression model results indicate that re-entrants tend to return to previously exited foreign 
markets in the same manner in which they were operating prior to exit, and the effect of within-
form learning is, indeed, stronger for non-equity commitment modes.  
 
  
101 
 
Table 4.5: Multinational logistic regression: Commitment “de-escalation” and commitment “escalation” 
compared to “no changes” in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)a,b,c 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc 
Intercept  0.95 1.20 1.02 0.43 1.30 1.04 1.55 -0.03 4.93 4.88 
Host experiential knowledge   -0.01 -0.00   -0.01┼ 0.00   
Experience intensity   0.05 -0.15   -0.15 0.37┼   
Experience diversity   -0.03 0.13   -0.03 -0.38*   
Host institutional change     0.65** 0.29 0.92** 0.10   
Motives for exit: Poor market 
performance 
        0.20 1.08 
Motives for exit: Poor mode 
performance 
        2.32*** 0.77** 
Motives for exit: Strategic exit         0.21 1.81 
Host experiential knowledge x 
Host institutional change 
      -0.02 0.01   
Experience intensity x Host 
institutional change 
      0.21 0.86**   
Experience diversity x Host 
institutional change 
      -0.29 
-
0.72** 
  
Controls            
Age  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.05 0.07┼ 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.08* 0.03 0.08┼ 0.04 0.07┼ 
Time-out -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.00 
Already present in market -0.28 -0.03 -0.25 0.08 -0.21 -0.02 -0.21 0.18 0.06 0.04 
Changes in management -0.05 0.01 -0.00 0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.00 0.16 -0.14 -0.06 
Automotive  0.91** 0.95** 0.88** 0.97** 0.94** 0.89** 0.92** 0.89* 0.79* 0.92** 
Retail  0.91** 1.22** 0.89** 1.12** 0.93** 1.24*** 0.90** 1.08** 1.06** 1.23** 
Financial services 0.21 0.92* 0.14 0.71┼ 0.28 0.94* 0.24 0.64 0.48 0.95* 
Consumer electronics 1.01** 0.88┼ 0.99** 0.42 0.99** 0.87┼ 0.96** 0.41 1.42*** 0.96* 
Positive changes in GDP/capita -0.08 
-
0.74** 
0.06 -0.84* -0.15 -0.81* -0.09 -0.93* -0.04 -0.82* 
Positive changes in net inflows -0.12 0.09 -.022 0.12 -0.19 0.09 -0.24 0.06 -0.30 0.07 
-2 Log Likelihood 1246 1126 1235 1.086 1165 
Chi-Square  45.730** 47.460* 58.488** 71.481** 146.780*** 
N 738 675 754 669 744 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cReference category is “no changes in commitment” 
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Table 4.6: Multinational logistic regression: Commitment “de-escalation” and commitment “escalation” 
compared to “no changes” in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)a,b,c 
 
  
Variables Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc Esc DeEsc 
Intercept  0.78 0.11 2.781* 0.74 -0.48 0.89 4.77*** -2.75 
Host experiential knowledge 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.64┼ -0.02 -0.01   
Experience intensity -0.09 -0.02 0.03 -0.00 0.84┼ 0.51   
Experience diversity 0.07 -0.03 0.21 -0.15 -1.62* 0.09   
Host institutional change       0.58** 0.17 
Motives for exit: Poor market 
performance 
-0.60┼ -0.78*       
Motives for exit: Poor mode 
performance 
  2.14*** 0.54     
Motives for exit: Strategic exit     -1.41┼ 0.74   
Host experiential knowledge x 
Poor market performance 
0.04* 0.02       
Experience intensity x Poor market 
performance 
-0.16 -0.34       
Experience diversity x Poor market 
performance 
0.05 0.29       
Host experiential knowledge x 
Poor mode performance 
  -0.01 0.00     
Experience intensity x Poor mode 
performance 
  0.03 0.60     
Experience diversity x Poor mode 
performance 
  0.26 0.01     
Host experiential knowledge x 
Strategic exit 
    -0.02 -0.00   
Experience intensity x Strategic 
Exit 
    1.00* 0.40   
Experience diversity x Strategic 
exit 
    -1.73* 0.29   
Prior mode: No equity vs. JV       -0.89*** -5.32*** 
Prior mode: No equity vs. WOS       - -5.88*** 
Prior mode: JV vs. WOS       - -0.56* 
Controls          
Age  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08┼ 0.05 0.02 
Time-out 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Already present in market -0.25 0.11 -0.07 0.12 -0.21 0.03 -0.23 0.24 
Changes in management -0.03 0.15 -0.10 0.14 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.22 
Automotive  0.87** 0.99** 0.62┼ 0.86* 0.82** 1.02** 0.96** 1.79*** 
Retail  0.90** 1.18** 0.91** 1.09** 0.89** 1.10** 1.20*** 1.06* 
Financial services 0.18 0.66 0.42 0.77┼ 0.06 0.64 0.33 0.31 
Consumer electronics 0.96* 0.37 1.32** 0.39 1.01** 0.41 1.12** 1.28* 
Positive changes in GDP/capita 0.05 -0.74┼ -0.50 -0.93** 0.15 -0.92** -0.25 -0.77┼ 
Positive changes in net inflows -0.23 0.13 -0.43* 0.10 -0.24 0.13 -0.16 -0.11 
-2 Log Likelihood 1115 1.047 1104 1011 
Chi-Square  58.134* 126.101*** 69.500** 301.610*** 
N 676 675 676 746 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cReference category is “no changes in commitment” 
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Table 4.7: Multinational logistic regression: Commitment escalation: “No equity to equity” and “joint equity 
to wholly owned” compared to no changes in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)a,b,c 
 
 
  
Variables Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
 
No eq 
to eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
No 
eq to 
eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
No 
eq to 
eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
No 
eq to 
eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
No eq 
to eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
Intercept  -0.77 -0.51 -1.23 0.07 -0.46 -0.10 -0.81 0.64 -2.09 2.99 
Host experiential 
knowledge 
  0.01 -0.02*   0.01 -0.03**   
Experience intensity   -0.44 0.16   
-
0.60┼ 
0.27   
Experience diversity   0.16 -0.00   0.22 -0.12   
Host institutional change     0.53┼ 0.66* 0.45 1.13*   
Motives for exit: Poor 
market performance 
        -1.88 0.18 
Motives for exit: Poor 
mode performance 
        1.96*** 2.34*** 
Motives for exit: Strategic 
exit 
        -3.11 0.52 
Host experiential 
knowledge x Host 
institutional change 
      -0.00 -0.03   
Experience intensity x 
Host institutional change 
      -0.67 0.47   
Experience diversity x 
Host institutional change 
      0.27 -0.50   
Controls            
Age  -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.02 0.04 
Time-out 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.00 
Already present in market -0.29 -0.27 -0.16 -0.42 -0.25 -0.21 -0.15 -0.39 0.04 0.07 
Changes in management 0.26 -0.35 0.25 -0.29 0.27 -0.34 0.24 -0.27 0.20 -0.48┼ 
Automotive  0.79* 0.78┼ 0.76┼ 0.82┼ 0.82* 0.84* 0.85* 0.88┼ 0.80┼ 0.54 
Retail  0.68 0.79┼ 0.70 0.73 0.68 0.81┼ 0.75┼ 0.71 0.90* 0.80┼ 
Financial services -0.67 0.49 -0.65 0.39 -0.64 0.54 -0.58 0.47 -0.44 0.74 
Consumer electronics 1.11** 0.59 0.98* 0.85 1.08* 0.55 0.96┼ 0.81 1.49** 0.95 
Positive changes in 
GDP/capita 
-0.15 0.32 0.27 0.18 -0.25 0.22 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.09 
Positive changes in net 
inflows 
-0.31 0.04 
-
0.46┼ 
-0.01 -0.37 -0.03 
-
0.48┼ 
-0.01 -0.44 -0.15 
-2 Log Likelihood 880.910 801.603 868.043 837.113 786.964 
Chi-Square  33.689* 40.403* 40.227* 53.586* 129.833*** 
N 586 521 581 515 591 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cReference category is “no changes in commitment” 
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Table 4.8: Multinational logistic regression: Commitment escalation: “No equity to more equity” and “joint 
equity to wholly owned” compared to no changes in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)a,b,c 
 
Variables Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
 
No eq to 
eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
No eq to 
eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
No eq to 
eq 
Joint to 
Wholly 
Intercept  -1.17 -0.28 0.50 1.40 - -0.25 
Host experiential knowledge 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 - -0.09 
Experience intensity -0.38 0.07 -0.64 0.05 - 0.44 
Experience diversity 0.05 0.09 0.22 0.26 - -1.15 
Host institutional change     -  
Motives for exit: Poor market performance -0.37 -0.43   -  
Motives for exit: Poor mode performance   1.65*** 2.16*** -  
Motives for exit: Strategic exit     - 1.15 
Host experiential knowledge x Poor market 
performance 
0.02 0.07┼   -  
Experience intensity x Poor market performance 0.30 -0.30   -  
Experience diversity x Poor market performance -0.28 0.42   -  
Host experiential knowledge x Poor mode 
performance 
  -0.00 -0.00 -  
Experience intensity x Poor mode performance   0.06 -0.17 -  
Experience diversity x Poor mode performance   -0.31 0.58┼ -  
Host experiential knowledge x Strategic exit     - -0.07 
Experience intensity x Strategic Exit     - 0.35 
Experience diversity x Strategic exit     - -1.22 
Controls        
Age  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm sizeb -0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Time-out 0.04 -0.03 0.06* 0.00 0.03 -0.04 
Already present in market -0.15 -0.45 -0.02 -0.19 -0.07 -0.40 
Changes in management 0.23 -0.30 0.17 -0.42 0.34 -0.22 
Automotive  0.84* 0.72 0.68 0.40 0.66 0.75 
Retail  0.73┼ 0.69 0.83┼ 0.64 0.75┼ 0.73 
Financial services -0.52 0.41 -0.37 0.60 -0.57 0.33 
Consumer electronics 0.97 0.79 1.29** 1.19┼ 0.98* 0.86 
Positive changes in GDP/capita 0.38 0.03 -0.14 -0.51 0.37 0.27 
Positive changes in net inflows -0.45┼ -0.03 -0.63* -0.22 -0.52┼ -0.00 
-2 Log Likelihood 792.192 727.459 775.969 
Chi-Square  51.200* 115.933*** 67.423** 
N 523 523 523 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cReference category is “no changes in commitment” 
Note: Firms which escalated from non-equity to equity did not report exit due to strategic motives.  
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Table 4.9: Multinational logistic regression: Commitment de-escalation: “Wholly owned to joint equity” and 
“equity to no equity” compared to no changes in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)a,b,c 
Variables Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
 
Wholly to 
Joint 
Eq to no 
eq 
Wholly to 
Joint 
Eq to no 
eq 
Wholly to 
Joint 
Eq to no 
eq 
Wholly to 
Joint 
Eq to no 
eq 
Intercept  -2.74 0.08 -2.63 -1.82 -3.37 0.30 -3.42 -1.97 
Host experiential 
knowledge 
  -0.00 -0.00   0.00 0.01 
Experience intensity   0.14 0.16   0.38 0.34 
Experience diversity   0.04 -0.33┼   -0.15 -0.55* 
Host institutional change     -0.05 0.37 0.01 -0.09 
Motives for exit: Poor 
market performance 
        
Motives for exit: Poor mode 
performance 
        
Motives for exit: Strategic 
exit 
        
Host experiential 
knowledge x Host 
institutional change 
      0.01 0.03 
Experience intensity x Host 
institutional change 
      0.91┼ 0.72┼ 
Experience diversity x Host 
institutional change 
      -0.63 -0.73* 
Controls          
Age  0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.11+ 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.12+ 
Time-out 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.04 
Already present in market 0.13 -0.03 0.18 0.08 0.10 -0.02 0.24 0.20 
Changes in management 0.53 -0.35 0.68* -0.28 0.46 -0.42 0.64+ -0.25 
Automotive  -1.89┼ 1.53*** -1.93┼ 1.68*** -1.93┼ 1.50*** -1.99┼ 1.61** 
Retail  1.26** 0.73 1.28** 0.35 1.25** 0.76 1.23* 0.31 
Financial services 0.27 1.32** 0.32 1.00┼ 0.24 1.37** 0.22 0.95┼ 
Consumer electronics 0.47 0.86 0.19 0.18 0.46 0.85 0.21 0.16 
Positive changes in 
GDP/capita 
-0.41 -0.97* -0.61 -1.07* -0.41 -1.08** -0.64 -1.16* 
Positive changes in net 
inflows 
0.25 0.06 0.33 0.07 0.30 0.03 0.34 -0.05 
-2 Log Likelihood 713.765 606.100 694.888 578.528 
Chi-Square  65.214*** 70.448*** 65.878*** 84.301*** 
N 576 515 574 516 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cReference category is “no changes in commitment” 
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Table 4.10: Multinational logistic regression: Commitment de-escalation: “Wholly-owned to joint equity” 
and “equity to no equity” compared to no changes in commitment (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)a,b,c 
 
 
  
Variables Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 
 
Wholly 
to Joint 
Eq to 
no eq 
Wholly 
to Joint 
Eq to 
no eq 
Wholly 
to Joint 
Eq to 
no eq 
Wholly 
to Joint 
Eq to 
no eq 
Intercept  -3.11 3.02 -3.45 -1.88 -3.52 -1.66 -1.54 -1.71 
Host experiential knowledge   0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
Experience intensity   -0.04 0.06 0.54 0.48 0.33 0.36 
Experience diversity   0.21 -0.23 -0.79 -0.40 0.66 -0.10 
Host institutional change         
Motives for exit: Poor market performance 0.17 0.90 -1.52** -0.09     
Motives for exit: Poor mode performance -1.18+ 0.70*   -1.23 0.35   
Motives for exit: Strategic exit 0.92 1.57     1.44* 0.27 
Host experiential knowledge x Poor market 
performance 
  0.06* -0.00     
Experience intensity x Poor market 
performance 
  -0.39 -0.35     
Experience diversity x Poor market 
performance 
  0.35 0.21     
Host experiential knowledge x Poor mode 
performance 
    -0.03 0.01   
Experience intensity x Poor mode 
performance 
    -0.89 0.43   
Experience diversity x Poor mode 
performance 
    0.43 -0.07   
Host experiential knowledge x Strategic 
exit 
      -0.03 0.01 
Experience intensity x Strategic Exit       0.21 0.20 
Experience diversity x Strategic exit       0.77 0.22 
Controls          
Age  0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.11┼ 0.01 0.10┼ 0.02 0.12* 
Time-out 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 
Already present in market -0.02 0.04 0.21 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.02 
Changes in management 0.50 -0.43 0.70* -0.27 0.68* -0.34 0.66┼ -0.31 
Automotive  -1.74┼ 1.45** -2.03+ 1.66** -1.75 1.60** -1.85┼ 1.70*** 
Retail  1.27** 0.65 1.40** 0.35 1.36** 0.33 1.26** 0.34 
Financial services 0.17 1.36** 0.29 0.90 0.27 1.08┼ 0.28 0.94┼ 
Consumer electronics 0.41 0.91 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.18 
Positive changes in GDP/capita -0.47 -1.12** -0.41 -1.00* -0.45 -1.20** -0.75 -1.13* 
Positive changes in net inflows 0.33 0.01 0.39 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.37 0.06 
-2 Log Likelihood 699.486 594.680 594.809 595.914 
Chi-Square  81.690*** 81.868*** 81.740*** 80.634*** 
N 591 516 516 516 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cReference category is “no changes in commitment” 
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Discussion and conclusions 
Results suggest that contrary to previous findings on de novo entry, prior knowledge and 
experience accumulated over time do not play a key role in re-entrants’ commitment decisions. 
In other words, there is no evidence to suggest that more experienced re-entrants escalate 
commitment when re-entering an exited market. In line with my conceptualisation of re-entry, this 
study indicates that experience may be too vague a notion to be used independently to explain 
changes in re-entry commitment and organisational unlearning may occur when prior knowledge 
cannot be accessed by re-entrants. This means that prior knowledge and experience 
accumulated over time may not always translate into organisational learning particularly when 
this process of learning is interrupted by market exit. Hence, when the process of learning from 
prior experience is not a linear one, it may be difficult to transfer experience accumulated in the 
past to the re-entry commitment decision. Furthermore, as proposed in my conceptualisation of 
the re-entry phenomenon, other drivers such as host institutional changes and exit motivations 
are stronger predictors of whether or not re-entrants change their commitment.  
Broadly, results demonstrate that re-entrants tend to lean more on paradigms of interpretation 
(Schwens and Kabst, 2009) of the exit experience and institutional changes than on learning 
from experience accumulated over time. These findings contribute to distinguishing the re-entry 
phenomenon from that of de novo market entry. Also in line with my conceptualisation of re-entry, 
the mode in which firms were operating prior to exiting the market is a strong predictor of re-entry 
commitment as many firms tend to re-enter in the same manner in which they operated prior to 
exiting the market. For some re-entrants, prior operation modes may have become established 
routines and may be perceived by decision makers as reference points to interpreting re-entry. 
This is particularly the case for exporters, licensors and franchisors which have not experienced 
deep involvement in the market and may have not generated sufficient knowledge and 
experience that they can leverage in order to escalated commitment in the re-entered market. 
This study provides the first empirical evidence that foreign market exit is not an irreversible, win 
or lose process characterised by location and asset specificity (Song, 2013). Drawing upon 
insights from organisational learning and institutional change perspectives, this study proposes 
a new context in which to study the entry mode commitment decisions of multinational firms, 
namely the context of foreign market re-entry. Experience of operating in foreign markets has 
been argued to play a key role in the internationalisation process because understanding how to 
operate in a host market makes firms more confident of their ability to perform there, leading to 
increased resource commitment (Casillas et al., 2015; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; Sharma and Blomstermo, 2003). More recent studies support such a view of 
experience, particularly experiential learning which remains viewed as “the most analysed source 
of foreign knowledge acquisition” (Casillas et al., 2015, p. 103) and that “firms escalate their 
commitment to a given foreign market over time, shifting from joint venture to whole ownership 
as they accumulate relevant experience” (Guillén, 2003, p. 186). This study was conducted in 
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response to calls to revitalise the entry mode agenda by looking beyond initial entry (Hennart and 
Slangen, 2015; Shaver, 2013). Moreover, it addresses calls for a greater recognition of the role 
of institutional changes that may serve as reference points for decision-making together with 
learning from prior experience (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Xia et al., 2009).  
Thus far, in both the IB and strategy literatures, scholars have been concerned with the 
heterogeneity that characterises firm decisions, particularly when faced with complex and 
changing environments (Chang, 1995; Henisz and Delios, 2001). Yet, results suggest that re-
entrants place significant importance to decision specific, within-form experience than on learning 
from international business experience or host market experiential knowledge accumulated over 
time. These findings run counter to the established wisdom that emphasises the positive effect 
of prior knowledge and experience accumulated over time on learning and subsequently on entry 
mode decisions but are rather consistent with the Xia et al. (2009, p. 1291) notion that “[re]entry 
experience in a given country can be an important source of inertia” leading to re-entrants 
returning via the same type of commitment in which they were operating prior to exit. Re-entering 
the market by operating via the same mode may yield benefits in terms of salvaging some of the 
losses that were incurred following exit. These findings provide support for the idea that 
internationalising firms tend to revert to those behaviours most familiar to them when faced with 
highly complex and unusually uncertain decisions (Chan and Makino, 2002; Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007); in this case, re-entry means that firms return to what may be regarded as a 
previously failed internationalisation project. However, when re-entry commitment is driven by 
attempts to reduce uncertainty, it may impede re-entrants from benefitting from prior experience.  
With few notable exceptions (cf. Xia et al., 2009), research has overlooked the effect host market 
institutional changes may have on the current and future applicability of prior knowledge and 
experience. This study made a first step towards extending this area of research by investigating 
how changes that have occurred in host institutions during the time-out period are paralleled by 
re-entrants’ changes in re-entry commitment. Although scholars have taken for granted the 
positive effect of experience on firms entering via high commitment (e.g., Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001), results provide evidence suggesting that decisions firms make also depend 
on their understanding of the need to conform to host institutional environments and legitimacy 
pressures (Chan et al., 2006; Davis et al., 2000; Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; Xia et al., 2008; 
Kostova and Zaheer, 1999). Results showed significant support for the view that changes in 
institutional environments alone can, in fact, lead to changes in organisational strategies (Xia et 
al., 2009). This goes against the idea that changes in institutional environments alone cannot 
explain firm commitment decisions, because broadly, firms may continue to associate the host 
market with high levels of uncertainty despite changes occurring in its institutions (Peng, 2003). 
This study confirms the high explanatory power of institutional theory rationales for re-entrants, 
as favourable changes in host institutions during the time-out period have a positive effect on re-
entry commitment escalation. Hence, re-entrants do respond to positive cues in their host 
environments by increasing their host market resource involvement.  
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Also interesting is that, favourable institutional changes in the host market increase the likelihood 
of commitment escalation on re-entry, whilst no observable effects of institutional change were 
found concerning commitment de-escalation. In fact, it is the interaction between prior experience 
accumulated in the past and institutional change that has a significant and negative effect on 
commitment de-escalation. In other words, re-entrants which are more diverse in their prior 
experience and learning resources are less likely to decrease their commitment when the host 
institutional environment changes favourably and thus, more likely to return via the same mode 
of operation as prior to exit. This means that, contrary to what has been proposed by previous 
research on de novo market entries concerning the positive effects of experience on firms 
adapting to their host institutional environments (Brouthers et al., 2008a; Chan et al., 2006; 
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Xia et al., 2009; Zaheer, 1995), experienced re-entrants are more 
passive in their strategising and, whilst they may not decrease commitment in the market, re-
entrants also do not increase their commitment mode when host institutions are favourable.  
Overall, the results support my conceptualisation that re-entry commitment decisions are also 
the result of firms responding to potential opportunities created by their host institutions. 
Furthermore, this study found that, indeed, responsiveness to institutional changes varies 
according to a re-entrant’s prior experience. This is important since it has been argued that 
multinational firms that are encouraged by local institutions, such as host governments, to 
capitalise on institutional change will receive support and resources from those institutions 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 2009). Based on these results, adding an institutional 
perspective to the organisational learning view has therefore much to offer to the study of foreign 
market (re)entry commitment particularly in regards to contextualising the applicability of prior 
learning and addressing the question of when and why (re-entrant) firms display heterogeneous 
responses to their institutions (Kostova et al., 2008), or in this case, changes that have occurred 
in their host institutional environments during the time-out between exit and re-entry.   
This study also aimed for a more nuanced understanding of organisational learning. Learning 
and organisational memory may not necessarily be fostered by prior experience but also by the 
organisational proximity of a given event and its impact on the organisation (Levitt and March, 
1988). Because this study concerns re-entry, it also examined whether the motivations to exit the 
market exert a significant effect on re-entry commitment as well as on the ability of the re-entrant 
firm to learn from prior experience. Most notably, findings show that firms which have exited due 
to poor mode performance change their commitment rather than returning via the same mode. 
Therefore, as conceptualised in this study, re-entrants react to, and interpret the market exit 
experience, particularly when the motive for exit (i.e. poor performance with commitment mode) 
is closely linked to the nature of the re-entry decision. In some cases, market exit carries a stigma 
of failure and adds to the uncertainty of renewing operations in a foreign market, manifested in 
firms de-escalating commitment. In turn, some re-entrants perceive exit as an opportunity to 
return to the market and re-visit their strategy there, by escalating commitment. Organisational 
learning is fostered significantly by the proximity of the re-entry decision to that of market exit.  
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Consequently, the exit experience is not easily forgotten nor excluded from decisions making, 
irrespective of the changes that may have occurred within the organisation, including changes in 
management (Nummela, 2016). Furthermore, whilst on its own overall poor performance in the 
market did not have observable effects on re-entry commitment; for re-entrants with host 
experiential knowledge, exit has brought with it new learning and a tendency to escalate 
commitment on re-entry. Hence, market exit influences re-entry commitment decisions and also 
moderates the effect of prior experience on foreign market re-entry commitment.  
Indeed, learning from prior experience does not have the strong and positive effect on re-entry 
commitment as it has been found to have on de novo market entry mode choices. Some evidence 
exists that re-entrants do learn from decisions made in the past, however this learning is not 
necessarily transferred to new situations, which is reflected in the tendency to re-enter via the 
same commitment modes. Whilst experienced re-entrants do not proactively react to external, 
institutional changes by escalating commitment when re-entering countries with more favourable 
institutional policies, there is evidence suggesting that, with more experience, re-entrant firms 
have learned sufficiently about that host market to change their commitment when exit has been 
attributed to poor performance. So, re-entrants do not replicate unsuccessful commitment 
strategies and experienced re-entrants in particular do not return to a previously exited market 
via the same commitment if they had previously underperformed in that market. Re-entrants tend 
to alter their commitment when the market exit was due to them performing poorly in the host 
market, and particularly if poor performance was associated with underperforming entry modes.  
By testing for the effects of organisational learning and market exit on re-entry commitment, this 
study may also provide a window into the effects of foreign market exit on firm behaviour which 
remains an understudied area of IB research (Nummela et al., 2016). This study on re-entry 
commitment confirms that re-entrants tend to learn more from their mistakes (Arino and de la 
Torre, 1998) (i.e. poor performance exit) more so than they learn from positive experience.  
Finally, together with the commitment mode chosen, the timing of international expansion is 
increasingly considered a crucial managerial decision (e.g., Delios et al., 2008; Gaba, Pan and 
Ungson, 2002; Guillén, 2002; Isobe et al., 2000; Murray, Min and Gao, 2012; Sapienza et al., 
2006; Schwens and Kabst, 2009). In light of recent calls for papers on the inter-relationships 
between market (re)entry decisions (Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Isobe et al., 2000), 
the relationship between the degree of resource commitment possessed in the market at the time 
of exit and re-entry timing is explored in the next chapter as timing and commitment “had almost 
equal power to predict [foreign market] performance” (Isobe et al., 2000, p. 478). In the next 
chapter, the effects of resource commitment, institutional pressures for legitimacy, organisational 
learning and exit motivations are considered to investigate why some re-entrants wait longer than 
others to re-enter. Since market exit played such a central part in re-entrants’ changes in 
commitment, examining the experience resources of the firm after exiting the market as well as 
the institutional context post exit may explain why some are ‘early’ versus ‘late’ re-entrants.   
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CHAPTER 5: ‘THREE HOURS TOO SOON OR ONE MINUTE TOO LATE?’ 
ANTECEDENTS OF FOREIGN MARKET RE-ENTRY TIMING DECISIONS 
 
Abstract: The Piaggio Group renewed their sales of Vespa in India 13 years after exiting despite 
their two-decade long experience in the market. Honda Motor’s decision to re-enter India’s two-
wheeler market came only one year after exit despite their brief initial foray into the market. These 
examples of re-entries are not unique. This chapter examines the timing of foreign market re-
entry in order to take the very first step towards understanding what distinguishes early movers 
into a previously exited market from later re-entrants. The antecedents of the re-entry timing 
decision are studied from an organisational learning and institutional legitimacy perspectives. 
Furthermore, motives for the exit as well as the degree of resource commitment are also viewed 
as potential determinants of foreign market re-entry timing.  
Introduction 
The timing of international expansion decisions has important consequences for a firm’s 
international competitiveness and survival in foreign markets (Chan et al., 2006; Delios and 
Henisz, 2003; Delios et al., 2008; Gaba, Pan and Ungson, 2002; Guillén, 2002; Isobe et al., 2000; 
Murray, Min and Gao, 2012; Powell, 2014; Sapienza et al., 2006; Schwens and Kabst, 2009). 
Whilst early entry may provide firms with initial competitive advantages in a foreign market, it also 
exposes foreign entrants to several challenges. These challenges have been primarily 
associated with the liability of foreignness arising from the foreign entrant’s lack of experiential 
knowledge (Isobe et al., 2000; Sapienza et al., 2006) and higher costs associated with the 
process of learning about the market since early entrants cannot draw from the experience of 
other firms (Autio et al., 2000; Eriksson et al., 1997; Schwens and Kabst, 2009). In turn, the risks 
associated with foreign entry are reduced for later entrants and their pace of learning tends to be 
increased (Autio et al., 2000; Gaba et al., 2002). Comparing the behaviour of ‘early’ versus ‘late’ 
foreign entrants, or re-entrants in this case, is expected to contribute to our understanding of why 
some firms gain competitive advantages over others (e.g., Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 
2014; Chang, 1995; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Isobe et al., 2000; Schwens and Kabst, 2009). 
Despite the claims that entry timing is interlinked with performance in the host market, few studies 
have focused specifically on examining the antecedents of market entry timing (notably, Gaba et 
al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000; Schwens and Kabst, 2009) to gain a better understanding of what 
influences when firms enter a foreign market, and to the best of my knowledge, so far, no study 
has investigated the timing of foreign market re-entries. Re-entry entails that, after accumulating 
experience with operating in a host market, prior to returning to that market, re-entrants must first 
spend a period of time out. In this study, foreign market re-entry timing is therefore 
conceptualised as the time elapsed between the year in which the firm exited the foreign market 
and the year of re-entry into the previously exited market.  
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Some anecdotal evidence exists that re-entrants vary significantly in regards to the number of 
years spent out of the re-entered market (Crick, 2004; Welch and Welch, 2009). Some 
companies remain committed to the host market and re-enter within a short period of time to 
capitalise on their experience and investment in business networks and relationships, and to 
prevent significant loss of staff (e.g., Hadjikhani, 1996; Javalgi et al., 2011). In turn, other re-
entrants may spend a longer time outside the market. To the latter firms, re-entry may be 
perceived more like de novo entry due to the changes that may have occurred within the firm 
and its environment in the time-out period and the potential challenges of relying significantly on 
prior learning and experiential knowledge. For (most) re-entrants that fall between these two 
extremes, the decision of how long to wait prior to re-entering may be significantly more complex.  
Whilst there is broad recognition of the value of organisational learning and institutional theory 
approaches to explain market entry related decisions such as commitment modes, empirical 
work testing the explanatory power of these views on the timing of (re)entry is scarce. Notable 
exceptions include Casillas and Moreno-Menendez’s (2014) recent study on the nature of the 
relationship between experiential learning and timing of subsequent foreign market entries; 
Guillén’s (2003) paper on the effect of pressures for legitimacy and resultant imitative behaviour 
on the sequence of entries into China; and Sapienza et al.’s (2006) study on the differing effects 
of early versus late market entry on firm survival and profitability. From a learning perspective, 
(re)entering a foreign market, therefore, involves new and risky activities designed to help firms 
gain competitive advantages over their competitors (Makino et al., 2002) which is why the timing 
of entry has been linked to the knowledge and experience resources of the firm. Traditionally, 
experience has been considered to provide new knowledge that then leads to learning as firms 
spread their international presence into various foreign markets and or spend a longer period of 
time in specific markets to deepen their knowledge (Eriksson et al., 1997). Firms with a more 
varied international experience are expected to find it easier to transfer the knowledge and 
experience acquired in one market to international operations in different countries (Barkema et 
al., 1997; Barkema and Drogendijk, 2007; Zhang, Li and Zhou, 2010). The straightforward 
rationale for this is that more experienced firms would have already encountered challenges from 
competitors, national institutions, laws and regulations and may then possess a more 
comprehensive knowledge base from which to learn.  
From an institutional theory view, firms give priority in their decision making to the possibility of 
obtaining legitimacy in the local market as they seek to overcome institutional constraints (Meyer 
et al., 2009). Hence, when entering host markets with underdeveloped institutions, and or 
markets viewed as unattractive by other foreign investors, re-entrants may take longer to re-enter 
due to potential obstacles consisting of inadequate regulatory, legal and political frameworks.   
The present work is a first attempt at investigating foreign market re-entry timing by answering 
the following question; What determines some foreign market re-entrants to wait longer than 
others before re-entering a previously exited market? The time-out period is a unique 
characteristic of the re-entry phenomenon and deserves to be studied alongside other re-entry 
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related strategic choices. Using data on 1,020 re-entry events occurring between 1980 and 2015, 
this study proposes that re-entry timing should be investigated in terms of the re-entrant’s prior 
experience, the degree of host institutional development and the attractiveness of the target 
market at the time of market exit, the motivations for exit and the re-entrant’s strategic goals 
associated with market re-entry. In light of recent calls for papers on the inter-relationships 
between market entry related decisions (Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Isobe et al., 
2000), the relationship between degree of resource commitment at the time of exit and time-out 
is also explored here as previous studies found that timing and resource commitment “had almost 
equal power to predict [foreign market] performance” (Isobe et al., 2000, p. 478).  
The principal argument here is that re-entrants wait longer to re-enter when the host institutional 
environment at the time of exit is underdeveloped, when there are fewer foreign entrants 
operating in the host market, therefore, making that market less attractive, when the exit is 
traumatic and costly and when the market is not strategically important. Whilst firms may be able 
to exploit their experiential knowledge to re-enter soon after exiting, over time this knowledge 
may no longer lead to learning and organisational forgetfulness can occur.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, this study draws on organisational 
learning and institutional theories to develop a theoretical rationale and a set of hypotheses 
concerning how prior knowledge and experience as well as pressures to acquire host market 
legitimacy affect re-entry timing. Next, this study hypothesises about the effects of exit motives, 
resource commitment mode and firm strategic intent on the timing of foreign market re-entry. 
Finally, the study follows with a discussion of the main findings and the potential implications that 
re-entry timing behaviour may have on the competitiveness of these re-entrant firms. 
 
Theoretical Development and Hypotheses 
Organisational learning and experience effects on re-entry timing 
The knowledge that firms need to do well in foreign markets is different from that which they 
possess from operating at home (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977). Firms that diversify into foreign 
markets face an increased liability of foreignness compared to local market players that have 
already been operating in that environment and who may possess superior market and 
institutional knowledge (Zaheer, 1995; Zhang et al., 2010). In particular, early entrants into a 
foreign market tend to experience the liability of foreignness more strongly and as a result, first 
entries into new markets will take more time (Zaheer, 1995). Although firms that expand 
internationally may not benefit from this experience in the short term, over time experienced 
entrants are expected to overcome the initial liability of foreignness, acquire and absorb market 
and institutional knowledge and ultimately speed the pace of expansion (Casillas, Moreno, 
Acedo, Gallego and Ramos, 2009; Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Johanson and Vahlne 
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2009; Gao and Pan, 2010; Sapienza et al., 2006). Hence, foreign (re)entrants may require some 
time to absorb the new knowledge and experience acquired, build relationships with key 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and distributors as well as local institutions (Dau, 
2013) and nurture network relationships that can be leveraged for further expansion in that 
market or other international markets (Johanson and Vahlne, 2006; 2009). Consequently, the 
first steps of a firm’s international expansion process are expected to take longer, whereas when 
firms have acquired prior knowledge and experience and learned to exploit it in subsequent 
international forays, they tend to increase the pace of expansion (Casillas et al., 2009; Casillas 
and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Eriksson et al., 2000; Gao and Pan, 2010; Guillén, 2003). Thus 
far, the market entry literature has conceptualised the relationship between prior knowledge and 
experience and the timing of international expansion as such that, as the experience base of the 
firm grows and the learning becomes greater, the speed of entry, for both initial entries into new 
markets and subsequent expansion into the same markets, also increases.  
When entering a new and potentially uncertain foreign market environment or when expanding 
operations into different international markets, a firm seeks to grow and explore new market 
opportunities. This process of exploring opportunities whilst simultaneously dealing with the risks 
and challenges of potentially unfruitful attempts involves the presence of the liability of 
foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). Consequently, firms that accumulate experience in a host market 
may face a lower liability of foreignness when re-entering that same market since their market as 
well as institutional knowledge bases would be higher (Eriksson et al., 1997; Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977). Although experienced firms may leverage knowledge of one market into another 
(Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014; Eriksson et al., 1997), the time needed to engage in the 
subsequent expansion may be reduced when firms locate operations in markets in which they 
possess experiential knowledge (see Gao and Pan, 2010). Re-entrants already possess 
experiential knowledge from operating in the host market before exit. Based on this rationale, 
one could assume that early re-entrants, in particular, may suffer less from the liability of 
foreignness and their local market as well as institutional knowledge are perhaps superior. All 
else considered, foreign market re-entrants may re-enter the market early (i.e. experience a 
shorter period of time-out) to capitalise on extant knowledge and experience.  
However, a more nuanced understanding of the potential effects of prior knowledge and 
experience indicates that they tend to translate mostly into short term advantages (March, 1991; 
Casillas and Moreno-Menendez, 2014). Overreliance on prior knowledge and experience 
accumulated over time and that have become embedded in the organisation’s memory can lead 
to inertia causing the firm to become more rigid and potentially inhibiting the attainment of newer 
knowledge and capabilities (notably, Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991). In the case of re-
entrants, a longer time-out period may prove beneficial in order to restructure the firm internally, 
to recover some of the costs incurred during market exit and to replace severed relationships 
with various stakeholders. In fact, the links between experience, learning, organisational memory 
and firm strategy may be less straightforward particularly when investigating re-entry timing. 
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During the time-out period the international heritage of the firm could be refreshed (Welch and 
Welch, 2009) making organisational forgetfulness a positive aspect of spending a long time out 
of the market prior to re-entering. Organisational forgetfulness or unlearning of prior patterns of 
behaviour may become helpful to implementing necessary strategic changes prior to re-entering 
the market. Prior knowledge and experience possessed by re-entrants may not be as applicable 
as time passes and the internal and external environments of the firm may change. Following 
this rationale, whereas re-entrants may have a window of opportunity to exploit prior knowledge 
and experience, the more time that passes following exit, the less likely it is for prior knowledge 
and experience to play a role in re-entrants’ decision of when to return to the host market. Hence, 
the effect of prior experience on re-entry timing decisions is such that, 
Hypothesis 1: The more experience re-entrants possessed at the time of market exit, 
the more likely re-entrants are to re-enter relatively early after exiting.  
 
Host institutional quality and foreign market re-entry timing 
A key insight from institutional theory is the acknowledgement of the relationship between 
organisational decision making and the broader environment, in that firm strategy is moderated 
by the characteristics of the institutional environment in which it operates (Meyer and Peng, 2005; 
Meyer et al., 2009) and the effectiveness of firm strategic decisions is contingent on the ability to 
achieve institutional legitimacy (Henisz, 2003). Foreign (re)entrants may adhere to the rules and 
regulations imposed by key institutional actors such as the host government to attain legitimacy 
(e.g., Davis et al., 2000; North, 1990; Hernandez and Nieto, 2015). This reflects the belief that 
the prevalence of below par institutions in a host market leads to increased host market 
uncertainty and unfamiliarity (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Nguyen, 
2005), resulting in higher costs and risks for the foreign (re)entrant (Isobe et al., 2000; Hernandez 
and Nieto, 2015; Meyer et al., 2009; Xu and Shenkar, 2002). Broadly, scholars are in agreement 
that below par institutions or institutional voids tend to increase host market uncertainty and 
potentially even reduce MNEs’ chances to perform successfully in the host market.  
Extant literature has thus far suggested that, when faced with below par institutions or institutional 
voids in the laws, regulations and social configurations of host markets, firms tend to choose 
locations where institutional voids are less prominent (Delios and Henisz, 2003; Francis et al., 
2009; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) or expand via lower commitment modes such as joint ventures 
to counteract the challenges associated with weak institutions (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; 
Delios and Beamish, 1999; Meyer et al., 2009). In other words, the quality of host market 
institutions, particularly that of regulatory institutions has been linked to pressures for legitimacy 
when making host location decisions or commitment mode choices, as institutional actors 
establish in a coercive manner what is and what is not allowed in a given market. Yet, the quality 
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of institutions in a host country can influence not only the location or mode of commitment but 
also the decision of when to enter (Guillén, 2003), or in this case re-enter a market.  
Because the perceived costs and uncertainties associated with reduced institutional quality in 
the host markets may be higher for firms that have already invested in, and subsequently exited 
that market, re-entrant firms have to make strategic choices that help them overcome these 
constraints. This study proposes that the degree of institutionalisation in the host country at the 
time of market exit is highly relevant to, and will influence the re-entry timing strategy, therefore, 
affecting how long re-entrant firms spend out of the market. Specifically, countries with high levels 
of regulatory and general institutional instability tend to be more unpredictable. Ill-enforced laws 
and contracts in a market have been associated with high unpredictability with regards to the 
evolution of that market’s future institutional development (Delios and Beamish, 1999; Meyer et 
al., 2009). High levels of corruption paralleled by a poorly performing system of intellectual 
property rights can generate problems with knowledge transfer and negatively impact investment 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Wei, 2000). Overall, proponents of the institutional view posit that the 
uncertainty generated by reduced institutional quality creates difficulties with firms conforming to 
the local pressures for legitimacy (Chan and Makino, 2007). Since entry and implicitly re-entry 
timing decisions are particularly sensitive to the efficiency of markets (Gaba et al., 2002; Delios 
and Henisz, 2003), in non-developed, emerging markets generally characterised by different 
levels of institutional under-development, re-entrants may take longer to re-enter due to potential 
obstacles consisting of inadequate legal, political and regulatory market frameworks.   
In the specific case of re-entry, firms have the option to avoid investment after exit, if the 
uncertainty associated with the host market is very high, or postpone their re-entry into the 
market. As discussed in the previous chapter with empirical evidence, the quality of institutions 
in a host market does bring with it strategic changes regarding a re-entrant firm’s choice of 
resource commitment in the foreign market. Therefore, the level of development of host 
institutions at the time of exit may also play a significant role in how firms make re-entry timing 
decisions. Firms that do not know how to handle the risks associated with idiosyncratic host 
institutional environments may choose to wait and re-enter at a time when the institutional 
environment is more favourable to doing business there. As also mentioned in the previous 
chapter, institutional change has been regarded as a process that requires significant resource 
investment particularly because key legitimising actors such as local governments may have 
incentives to preserve old institutions and rules of the game (Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003). National institutions, in particular, are expected to take a 
longer time to change (Hernandez and Nieto, 2015; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003). In other 
words, it may take some time for firms to assess the effect of institutional changes and the 
corresponding pressures for legitimacy and adapt their behaviour (Delios and Henisz, 2003) or 
in this case, make the decision to re-enter. Consequently, the following is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: The better the quality of host institutions at the time of exit, the more likely 
re-entrants are to re-enter relatively early.   
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Host market attractiveness and re-entry timing 
Rivalry and competition are important drivers of the foreign market (re)entry timing decisions as 
firms tend to cluster with other firms when entering a host country perceived as attractive and 
legitimate (Yu and Ito, 1988). The presence of other foreign (re)entrants may signal market 
attractiveness to (re)entrants, acting as incentive for foreign market (re)entry. Scholars have 
observed that the phenomenon of clustering extends from foreign entrants imitating the 
international expansion behaviour of other foreign entrants particularly when deciding on the 
timing of (re)entry decisions (e.g., Ang et al., 2015; Delios et al., 2008; Gaba et al., 2002).  
The rationale here is two-fold. First, as social actors, firms may not always have complete 
information about the challenges in their host institutional and competitive environments in order 
to be able to make rational and efficient decisions ex-ante (Hsieh and Vermeulen, 2014; Li and 
Yao, 2010). This has been particularly the case with entering emerging markets traditionally 
characterised by a higher degree of uncertainty as well as high attractiveness due to their 
potential for future growth (e.g., Chan et al., 2006; Cheng and Yu, 2008; Guillén, 2002; Li and 
Yao, 2010). Consequently, firm strategic decisions are nested within their social contexts and in 
order to reduce the uncertainty associated with operating in a given host market, firms may look 
for cues in their environments from other market players perceived as legitimate (Guillén, 2003; 
Li and Yao, 2010). When firm behaviour is shaped by the behaviour of others, a foreign firm will 
choose to be where other foreign entrants have already invested as imitating the behaviours of 
other organisations can be perceived to carry legitimacy to otherwise risky decisions.  
Second, for re-entrants in particular, a timely return to a host market characterised by high 
attractiveness could be also perceived as an opportunity to more rapidly recover financial losses 
incurred upon exit as, in time, the attractiveness of host markets and potential for rapid entries 
may be reduced due to the growing number of potential entrants (Fuentelsaz, Maicas-Lopez and 
Polo, 2002). Scholars (e.g., Li and Yao, 2010; Miller and Eden, 2006) have specifically proposed 
a curvilinear relationship between host market foreign entrants’ density and the likelihood of firms 
establishing subsidiaries there, noting that the positive externalities of co-locating with other firms 
may be, over time, offset by the negative externalities resulting from intensified competition. This 
tends to be the case when early moves into the market may secure less competition (Isobe et 
al., 2000), particularly in emerging host regions where local firms are less endowed with the 
resources and capabilities necessary to compete with foreign players in areas such as branding 
and or marketing (Pan and Chi, 1999; Tan and Vertinsky, 1996).  
Thus, whether imitative behaviour occurs for competitive reasons (Delios et al., 2008; Gaba et 
al., 2002) and or to fit within a social context (Hsieh and Vermeulen, 2014; Guillén, 2003), early 
foreign market (re)entrants tend to convey information to later (re)entrants about the 
attractiveness of the host market and even drive other foreign firms to accelerate their entry into 
that market (Gaba et al., 2002). Because of the potential uncertainty associated with having 
exited the market, re-entrant firms may pay significantly more attention to the actions of other 
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foreign entrants. When more firms are seen to commit resources to a foreign market, non-
entrants can develop a sense of urgency and paranoia associated with potentially missed foreign 
market opportunities or fears that competitors will put up high barriers to deter future entries 
(Gaba et al., 2002). Managers may perceive the risks of not investing in the market as higher 
than the financial losses incurred at exit or than the uncertainty associated with re-entering.  
Following this rationale, re-entrants may choose to avoid being late and potentially missing out 
on opportunities for market growth and development. In such a scenario one would expect re-
entrant firms to interpret competitive behaviour and implicitly market attractiveness, as the 
density of foreign firms operating in the host market at the time of exit. Consequently, the effect 
of host market attractiveness on re-entry timing is hypothesised as follows,  
Hypothesis 3: The more attractive the host market at the time of exit, the more likely re-
entrants are to return relatively early.  
 
The interactions between host institutional quality/host market attractiveness and prior 
experience and their effects on re-entry timing 
The idea that foreign entrants may avoid venturing early into host markets characterised by poor 
quality of institutions and with fewer foreign firms operating there is relatively straightforward. 
Yet, some proponents of the institutional school of thought have suggested that firms’ responses 
to institutional development will vary with the experience profile of the foreign entrant, thus also 
influencing foreign market (re)entry timing decisions (Delios and Henisz, 2000, 2003; Henisz, 
2000; 2003). This is particularly the case when the prior knowledge and experience of the firm 
are relevant in reducing the uncertainty associated with poorly developed institutional 
environments and reducing the need to use other foreign entrants as frames of reference (Delios 
and Henisz, 2003). Having operated in the host market prior to exit, one might argue that re-
entrants have accumulated some degree of experiential knowledge that may help them protect 
themselves against potential threats coming from institutional actors in those markets, such as 
foreign partners, suppliers or distributors that may have become more legitimate to local 
governments (Henisz, 2000). Such learning can, therefore, help reduce the perceived uncertainty 
associated with the degree of development in the host institutional environment at the time of exit 
and firms may no longer be late entrants despite entering lesser developed environments.  
Furthermore, experienced re-entrants could be argued to rely more heavily on learning from their 
own knowledge of, and prior experience with operating in that market rather than choosing to re-
enter late when there is a lower concentration of foreign (re)entrants in the host market. 
Consequently, after having assessed the main effects of prior learning and institutional legitimacy 
rationales separately, this study tests an idea proposed in some notable previous studies (Delios 
and Henisz, 2003), namely that firms with greater levels of experience may have learned more 
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about how to deal with host market uncertainties arising from underdeveloped market institutions 
and lack of significant foreign investment. Thus,  
Hypothesis 4: A re-entrant’s prior experience moderates the positive effect of host 
institutional development on early re-entries.  
Hypothesis 5: A re-entrant’s prior experience moderates the positive effect of host 
market attractiveness on early re-entries.  
 
The relationship between commitment mode prior to exit and re-entry timing 
Timing and mode of entry decisions are inextricably related (e.g., Delios and Henisz, 2001; Gaba 
et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000; Madhok, 1997). Although, as discussed in previous chapters, the 
entry mode literature is extensive, few studies (for a notable exception, see Gaba et al., 2002) 
have paid attention to examining empirically how timing of (re)entry is affected by commitment 
mode (or in this case, the mode in which the firm was operating prior to exiting the market).    
Modes of entry have been classified as equity based or foreign direct investment (equity joint 
ventures, greenfield investments and acquisitions) and non-equity based through arm’s length 
contractual modes such as exporting, licensing, franchising and non-equity alliances. Similar to 
other studies (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Gaba et al., 2002) mode of entry is viewed as the 
degree of equity owned in the host market. The degree of involvement in a foreign market is 
considered important because it affects the strategic options of the firm and the ability to adapt 
successfully to local markets (Ang et al., 2015; Chan and Makino, 2007; Gaba et al., 2002). 
Higher involvement levels such as wholly owned entries have been associated with the enhanced 
market presence (and more rapid initial entry, in the case of acquisitions), reduced distribution 
costs, better service levels and better control over marketing operations (Pan and Tse, 2000).  
In turn, higher resource commitment may limit the strategic flexibility of firms and constitute a 
source of considerable monetary losses on exit (Belderbos and Zou, 2009; Root, 1987). Although 
market exit in itself is not irreversible, some types of market commitments such as wholly owned 
entries involve high resource investment that may potentially be irreversible due to reported 
difficulties in selling off and re-deploying assets (Isobe et al., 2000). In turn, partial ownership via 
joint equity ventures has been associated with a higher degree of flexibility as the firm can 
subsequently choose to terminate the investment or further invest in the market for greater control 
of its operations (Kogut, 1991). Thus, although the depth of experience acquired in the market is 
greater from direct investment, the risks and uncertainties associated with host markets (or 
previously exited markets as it is the case for re-entrants) may be reduced by limiting ownership 
in foreign ventures (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Gaba et al., 2002; Xia et al., 2009). 
From a timing of (re)entry perspective also, not all operation modes share the same level of 
complexity (Gaba et al., 2002). Because early (re)entry is already associated with a high level of 
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uncertainty, especially when host markets have just re-opened to foreign investment 
opportunities, early (re)entrants would be expected to start operating in the market via non-equity 
modes of (re)entry (Gaba et al., 2002; Huang and Sternquist, 2007; Isobe et al., 2000). For re-
entrants in particular, some modes of commitment (i.e. wholly owned subsidiaries) may be 
perceived as more irreversible in that, losses of financial as well as human resources incurred 
upon exiting the market may have been more significant for firms that were previously operating 
via wholly owned subsidiaries. In this case, it seems reasonable to expect that exiting a wholly 
owned subsidiary when leaving the host market prompts later rather than early re-entries. 
In turn, as previously mentioned, non-equity modes are characterised by relatively lower levels 
of risk. Thus, re-entrants that were previously operating via non-equity modes may have found 
their host market operations easier to dissolve and re-implement due to the greater strategic 
flexibility and lower resources requirements (Madhok, 1997). In other words, managers may be 
more willing to return to the market faster if the stakes are low and the losses experienced upon 
exit are not as substantial. This is in line with the findings in the previous chapter that also indicate 
that firms which operate via non-equity modes of entry reduce the uncertainty associated with 
market exit and subsequent re-entry by opting for the same non-equity modes upon returning to 
the market. In a similar manner, sharing ownership with a partner may have reduced the risks 
associated with uncertain host markets (Gaba et al., 2002; Hennart, Kim and Zeng, 1998; Xia et 
al., 2009), and studies have shown that when the foreign entrant exits the market, local partners 
often acquire their stake in the business (e.g., Hennart et al., 1998). Following this logic, one 
might expect that exiting a non-equity venture and exiting a joint venture would be positively 
associated with the likelihood of early re-entries. This study proposes that, 
Hypothesis 6: Firms that were previously operating via non-equity modes are more 
likely to re-enter relatively early.  
Hypothesis 7: Firms that were previously operating via joint equity modes are more 
likely to re-enter relatively early.  
Hypothesis 8: Firms that were previously operating via wholly owned modes are less 
likely to re-enter relatively early.  
 
The effects of market exit motives on re-entry timing 
Actual (re)entry timing decisions should be considered in terms of how (re)entrants view the risks 
and uncertainties associated with returning to a previously exited foreign market (Isobe et al., 
2000; Tan and Vertinsky, 1996). Thus far, the focus has been predominantly on how knowledge 
and experience accumulated in the past tend to influence the learning processes of foreign 
entrants and subsequently those firms’ perceptions of the risks and uncertainties associated with 
entry related decisions. However, as argued when examining re-entry commitment decisions, 
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market exit may be interpreted in many forms, not only as evidence of international market failure, 
much depending on the motivations for exit (Benito and Welch, 1997; Nummela et al., 2016; 
Welch and Welch, 2009). For re-entrants in particular, the motives for the exit, and perhaps the 
trauma associated with having exited the market may influence perceptions concerning the 
attractiveness of that market. Here, prior exit may represent a source of uncertainty particularly 
as empirical research has already suggested that firms carry with them some negative 
experience associated with not having met their initial market entry objectives (Benito and Welch, 
1997; Chen and Wu, 1996). Therefore re-entrants’ decisions of how long to wait between exit 
and re-entry vary according to why they exited the market in the first place. 
Most studies view organisational learning as a linear (often sequential) process of accumulation 
of knowledge and experience that, in time, can be exploited to positively influence strategic 
decisions such as (re)entry timing (e.g., Delios and Henisz, 2003; Delios et al., 2008; Guillén, 
2003; Isobe et al., 2000; Murray, Ju and Gao, 2012). Implicit in these assumptions is the idea 
that there are no important disruptions that occur in a firm’s path to international expansion and 
can affect the likelihood of organisations learning from prior experience. There is little 
consideration here that firms may learn from their mistakes more than from their successes 
(Loustarinen and Welch, 1990). In the previous chapter, I have illustrated with empirical evidence 
that re-entrants do, indeed, replicate prior learned behaviours to reduce uncertainty associated 
with re-entry, however, they are less likely to replicate unsuccessful prior decisions.   
When exit is voluntary, firms may have a limited number of resources to compete and actively 
choose to re-allocate these resources in other markets and re-focus on growth in the home 
market or decrease expansion to increase product diversification (Benito, 2005; Das, 2000; 
Nummela et al., 2016). In the case of voluntary exits, such as poor market performance exits, it 
may mean that the firm had little knowledge of how to operate in the market compared to its 
competitors (Mellahi, 2003; Song, 2013) and may use the time-out period to develop and or 
acquire the necessary resources and capabilities to perform successfully in that market the 
second time around. For these re-entrants, re-entry timing may reflect their attempts to avoid 
previous mistakes, in that when perceptions of markets and the costs and benefits of existing 
strategies change, firms are expected to adapt to those markets by altering their strategies there 
in a timely manner not to miss out on important opportunities (Calof and Beamish, 1995). 
Although it may take time to revisit their strategy and attain the necessary resources the re-enter 
the market, firms may be more likely to be proactive and not postpone their market re-entries to 
ensure that planned changes in strategy are relevant to the host market conditions at the time.  
In turn, when firms are victims of changing circumstances in their external environment that are 
beyond their control, it can lead to involuntary market exit which can impede the continuation of 
a firm’s activities, such as regulations against foreign investment and or the nationalisation of 
industries (Cardon et al., 2011; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Hoskisson et al., 2013). The negative 
feedback from governments and regulators may also result in an inability of the foreign entrant 
to re-enter the market soon after exiting. In this case, it may be reasonable to assume that the 
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host market will most likely continue to be perceived as attractive by the firm, and re-entry is likely 
to occur as soon as the external market exit driving forces are no longer in place (Welch and 
Welch, 2009). Because changes in laws and regulations tend to take a longer period of time to 
become implemented (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Peng, 2003), the hypothesised effect of voluntary 
and involuntary exit motives and the timing of re-entry is as follows,   
Hypothesis 9: Where market exit is voluntary - strategic exit, poor market performance, 
poor mode performance – firms are more likely to re-enter relatively early compared to when the 
market exit is involuntary. 
 
Strategic intent 
Firms make (re)entry decisions that serve their strategic objectives and behaviours, often 
irrespective of changes occurring in their external environments (Cui and Jiang, 2009; Gaba et 
al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). Foreign market (re)entry may therefore be also motivated by a firm’s 
intent to acquire strategic assets that it would not otherwise have access to (Rui and Yip, 2008; 
Wright et al., 2005) and or exploit opportunities for growth by capturing new markets for their 
products (Gaba et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). These objectives may not change significantly 
over time (Isobe et al., 2000), or in this case, during the time-out period, irrespective of the re-
entrant’s prior level of experiential knowledge and or interpretations concerning the market exit 
experience. Furthermore, firms may also pursue strategic intents of a global orientation by 
entering or re-entering a foreign market in order to use that market as a springboard for 
subsequent internationalisation in the host region (Javalgi et al., 2011; Morck, Yeung and Zhao, 
2008). A firm’s strategic intent with regards to global expansion has, thus far, been associated 
with how firms enter foreign markets, i.e. the choice of foreign commitment mode (e.g., Cui and 
Jiang, 2009; Luo and Tung, 2007). To this, some scholars have suggested that the foreign market 
timing decision can also be explained by the extent to which the firm pursues its global strategic 
intents in that market and or host region (Gaba et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). Since these re-
entered markets may be seen as “pawns” in a greater global game, re-entrants’ strategic 
ambitions may significantly impact their decisions of long to wait until re-entering the host market.  
The straightforward rationale for examining the effect of strategic intent in the context of foreign 
market re-entry timing decisions is that, when the investment in a host market is considered 
strategically important, foreign (re)entrants may become less averse to the (financial) risks that 
may arise from altering their strategy in the host market upon re-entry and also less sensitive to 
the losses incurred as a result of poor performance in the market (Isobe et al., 2000). Concerning 
the relationship between a firm’s strategic intent in a foreign market and its market entry timing 
and subsequent success of foreign market decisions, it has been argued that “an MNE should 
carefully implement its entry [timing] strategy for each separate international market because the 
failure or success of the investment in one market will critically influence other activities within 
the [global] network” (Isobe et al., p. 472). For re-entrants also, strategically important foreign 
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markets (such as those markets that warrant the risks and uncertainties associated with re-entry) 
may be perceived as platforms to subsequently enter or re-enter other countries within that host 
region (Cui and Jiang, 2009). As such, one might expect that, when the investment is strategically 
important, re-entrant firms will perceive re-entry as an opportunity and re-enter sooner. Thus, 
Hypothesis 10: Where there is strategic intent, firms will be more likely to re-enter 
relatively early.  
 
Method 
Data Source and Sample Selection 
Data comes principally from business information and research databases Factiva (Dow Jones) 
and LexisNexis (Reed Elsevier), which aggregate content from a large number of licensed and 
reliable data sources. Because foreign market re-entry is an under-researched area, there are 
no pre-existent databases from which to draw re-entry data (see Chapter 3 on methodology). 
This database represents the most authoritative and up-to-date information on re-entry. 
Variables  
Dependent variable 
Previous studies on the timing of foreign market entry tend to examine the order of entry into 
foreign markets by looking at whether firms define themselves as ‘first movers’, ‘early followers’ 
or ‘late followers’ (c.f. Isobe et al., 2000). Given the potential biases arising from this method, 
particularly with regards to the frequency with which respondents (i.e. managers) tend to define 
their organisations as relative ‘first entrants’ into a host market, I decided to use actual time 
periods of (re)entry (see Gaba et al., 2002, p. 41). In this study, the dependent variable 
represents the time that re-entrant firms have spent out of the host market, namely the time 
elapsed between the year of exit and year of re-entry. Factiva and LexisNexis were used to 
identify when re-entrants had exited and re-entered the market to calculate the time-out period 
accordingly. The SPSS software package was used to identify two equal quartiles regarding the 
distribution of the time-out period. The two quartiles were then computed into a dichotomous 
variable measuring whether the re-entrant belonged to the first quartile (“1”) or whether it 
belonged to the second quartile (“0”). The first quartile represents re-entrants that have re-
entered the market relatively early, i.e. within 1-5 years following market exit; these re-entrants 
are referred to as early re-entrants. The second quartile represents re-entrants that have spent 
more than 5 years outside the host market and are therefore referred to in the analysis as 
relatively late re-entrants. In previous studies (notably, Gaba et al., 2002), a period of time of 
around 1 to 5 years has been associated with a firm being an early entrant into a foreign host 
market or in this case, an early foreign market re-entrant.  
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Independent variables 
Firm experience 
Following previous studies (e.g., Luo and Peng, 1999; Brouthers et al., 2008a), the experience 
variables used in this study are measured as follows; general experience intensity (number of 
years internationally since inception), host experience intensity (number of years in the host 
region since inception), general experience diversity (total number of countries internationally), 
host experience diversity (total number of countries in the host region); and host experiential 
knowledge which refers to the number of years the firm operated in that specific host market 
between initial entry and exit. Similar to the previous analysis, factor analysis conﬁrmed that the 
two measures of experience intensity loaded on a single factor (i.e. Cronbach’s alpha = .84) and 
the two measures of experience diversity loaded into another factor (i.e. Cronbach’s alpha = .71). 
This resulted in three experience measures being used in this study namely host country 
experiential knowledge, experience intensity and experience diversity; with the latter two 
experience measures (this time) being calculated at the time of market exit, with a one-year lag. 
Host institutional quality 
Host institutional quality refers to the degree of institutional development in the host market at 
time of exit that may increase investor confidence and decrease legitimacy pressures leading to 
early re-entries. Data on institutions was collected from the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index which derives an overall institutional score for each country for each year whilst considering 
the following factors, namely 1) size of government, 2) legal system and intellectual property 
rights, 3) sound money, 4) freedom to trade internationally, and 5) regulation9. Institutional 
development is measured at the time t-1, respectively with a one-year lag prior to the firm exiting 
the market. Following most recent studies (Hernandez and Nieto, 2015), the focus here is on the 
magnitude of institutional development. The institutional variable is, therefore, a continuous 
variable that reflects the quality of host institutions, i.e. the higher the value the more favourable 
the institutional environment at the time of t-1 exit.  
Host market attractiveness 
This study measures host market attractiveness at t-1 exit, with a one-year lag prior to the firm 
exiting the market. This variable was calculated with a logarithm transformation. This data was 
collected for each year and for each country from the World Bank database and is calculated as 
the value of net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy 
                                                          
9 As mentioned in the previous chapter, additional robustness checks were conducted for the institutional development 
variable; this study also compiled information to measure institutional quality at the time of exit from other databases 
such as the World Bank that have been used in some studies (e.g., Meyer et al. 2009; Xia et al., 2009). 
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from foreign investors, and is then divided by the country’s GDP. This is also a continuous 
variable, i.e. the higher the value the more FDI into the host market at the time of t-1 exit.  
Mode of operation prior to exit 
Multiple searches in Factiva and LexisNexis allowed coding this variable into three dummies 
which took the value of “0” for non-equity ventures, “1” for a joint equity venture and “2” for a 
wholly owned subsidiary. Each variable representing a mode of operation prior to exit took turns 
as an independent variable in the regression models. 
Market exit motives 
Factiva and LexisNexis are used to identify why re-entrants had exited the market and in line 
with previous studies (e.g., Benito, 2005; Nummela et al., 2016) exit motives were classified into 
four categories, namely voluntary exits such as strategic exits; exit due to poor market 
performance and exit due to poor performance with mode; and involuntary exits (e.g., 
government pressures). Dummy variables were created for each of these four exit motives. As 
shown in Table 5.3., the voluntary exit variable is highly correlated to involuntary exit, in that 
when voluntary exit takes the value of “0”, involuntary exit takes the value of “1” (the likelihood of 
voluntary exit was compared to the likelihood of involuntary exit in the regression models).  
Strategic intent 
In this study, strategic intent is a qualitative variable coded from the news articles collected from 
Factiva and LexisNexis. This variable reflects whether the motive to re-enter the market is due 
to its strategic importance to the firm’s global and regional strategy and willingness of the firm to 
learn and change its strategy to further expand into the regional market. This variable takes the 
value of “1” if the market is strategically important and “0” if the motive to re-enter was different.    
Control variables 
This study accounted for firm size, which has been associated with firms possessing more 
resources in order to engage in higher risk and become early (re)entrants (Delios and Henisz, 
2003), and is measured as the value of total assets with a logarithm transformation at the time 
of t-1 exit. Furthermore, since older firms are more likely to show signs of inertia that may prevent 
them from assessing market opportunities in a timely manner (Guillén, 2002; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1984), firm age was computed as the number of years from when the firm was founded 
up to one year prior to market exit. Furthermore, this study documented whether a firm has been 
present in the host market through a different division in the same/different sector at the time of 
market exit. MNEs which have maintained close ties with host markets by operating there via 
other businesses may be more confident and perhaps more likely to re-enter the market sooner.  
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Additionally, regionalisation effects were coded to measure whether there is a regionalisation 
effect between the home origin and destination of re-entry; i.e. whether re-entrants tend to return 
to countries within their home region earlier and re-enter markets further afield after a longer 
time-out period. Various classifications exist in the literature concerning geographic regions. In 
line with previous research (e.g., Rugman et al., 2014), this study looked for regionalisation 
patterns between countries within the European Union, North America, Latin America, APAC, 
and Africa. Finally, four industry dummies are added for the automotive, retail, financial services 
and consumer electronics because around 60 percent of the sample of reported re-entry events 
consists of firms operating in these four industries. The standard deviations and pairwise 
correlations for all the variables are reported in Table 5.1, whilst the means and the variance 
inﬂation factors (VIFs) are reported in Table 5.2. As shown in Table 5.2, the VIFs range between 
1.09 and 4.06, suggesting no serious problems of multicollinearity (cf. Field, 2009)10.  
Model specification 
Foreign market re-entry timing, which in this case is calculated as the time-out period between 
exit and re-entry, is modelled using a binary logistic regression model. This statistical method 
was applied because the dependent variable is a categorical variable with two alternative 
outcomes (i.e. firms belong to quartile 1 and are perceived as early re-entrants or firms belong 
to quartile 2 and are considered relatively later re-entrants); and the mix of both continuous and 
categorical predictor variables which affect the odds of choosing one alternative re-entry time 
frame over another. In this way, one can estimate the effect of the explanatory or independent 
variables on the probability that the firm will re-enter relatively early (i.e. within one to five years 
after exit) compared to relatively later (over five years after exiting).  
Robustness checks 
Thus far, the literature has not engaged significantly with what early and late entry means. For 
instance, since the time-out ranges between 1 year and 50 years, the dependent variable has 
been categorised into four quartiles to provide more insight into the different thresholds at which 
the independent variables have an observable effect on time-out. The SPSS software package 
was used to identify four equal quartiles regarding the distribution of the time-out period. The four 
quartiles were then computed for four different dichotomous variables measuring whether the re-
entrant belonged to a respective quartile (“1”) or otherwise (“0”). The time-out was split into four 
quartiles as follows; first quartile, Q1: 1-2 years, second quartile, Q2: 3-5 years, third quartile, 
Q3: 6-10 years and fourth quartile, Q4: over 11 years. Each of the variables representing a 
quartile took turns in being the dependent variable in the binary logistic models. Results of the 
robustness checks are shown in Appendix 3 (pages 204-210) – no significant differences exist 
to challenge the results reported below.   
                                                          
10 Exception being VIFs for exit motives “involuntary exit”, “poor market performance” and “strategic exit” which have very 
high VIF values because firms that have experienced involuntary exit have not also reported voluntary exits.   
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for re-entry timing (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10) 
Variables 
Std. 
Dev. 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
(1) Time-out 10.5 974 1                        
(2) Host experiential knowledge 17.6 975 
.13 
** 
1                       
(3) General experience intensity 26.6 956 
.10 
** 
.37 
** 
1                      
(4) Host experience intensity  23.5 948 
.10 
** 
.43 
** 
.78 
** 
1                     
(5) General experience diversity  50.3 901 .06* 
.16 
** 
.33 
** 
.27 
** 
1                    
(6) Host experience diversity 7.6 907 
.12 
** 
.10 
** 
.21 
** 
.21 
** 
.55 
** 
1                   
(7) Host institutional quality 1.3 888 
-.39 
** 
-.04 
-.18 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.15 
** 
-.13 
** 
1                  
(8) Host market attractiveness 1.0 907 
-.09 
** 
-.02 
-
.06* 
-.05 
-
.07* 
-.01 
.12 
** 
1                 
(9) Exit mode: Non-equity venture 0.5 976 -.02 -.02 
-
.08* 
-.08 
** 
.13 
** 
.05 .08* .00 1                
(10) Exit mode: Joint equity venture 0.4 976 
-.13 
** 
-.03 -.02 -.00 -.05 .01 -.05 -.01 
-.56 
** 
1               
(11) Exit mode: Wholly owned subsidiary 0.4 976 
.16 
** 
.05 
.11 
** 
.10 
** 
-.10 
** 
-
.07* 
-.04 .01 
-.60 
** 
-.31 
** 
1              
(12) Involuntary exit 0.5 1020 
.34 
** 
.10 
** 
.10 
** 
.05 .02 .01 
-.38 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.02 
.13 
** 
1             
(13) Poor market performance 0.5 1020 
-.29 
** 
-.14 
** 
-
.07* 
-.04 .01 .01 
.26 
** 
.14 
** 
.13 
** 
.02 
-.17 
** 
-.80 
** 
1            
(14) Poor performance with mode 0.4 1020 
-.17 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.04 -.06 -.01 .02 .03 -.01 .01 
.19 
** 
-.20 
** 
-.29 
** 
.36 
** 
1           
(15) Strategic exit 0.3 1020 -.05 .07* -.02 .00 -.03 -.05 
.12 
** 
.02 
-.09 
** 
.01 
.09 
** 
-.20 
** 
-.39 
** 
-.14 
** 
1          
(16) Strategic intent 0.5 1020 
-.17 
** 
-.05 -.05 -.04 .03 .04 
.18 
** 
.04 
.08 
** 
-.02 
-
.07* 
-.32 
** 
.32 
** 
.13 
** 
-.02 1         
(17) Firm age 39.5 974 .06* 
.27 
** 
.61 
** 
.48 
** 
.11 
** 
.06 
-.18 
** 
-.03 
-.13 
** 
.02 
.13 
** 
.07* 
-.09 
** 
-.02 .05 -.03 1        
(18) Firm size 0.4 988 
.16 
** 
.20 
** 
.37 
** 
.32 
** 
.36 
** 
.27 
** 
-.13 
** 
-.06 
-.11 
** 
.02 
.11 
** 
.11 
** 
-.09 
** 
-.02 -.00 -.03 
.32 
** 
1       
(19) Already present in the market 0.3 1020 -.02 
.10 
** 
.19 
** 
.19 
** 
.27 
** 
.14 
** 
.11 
** 
.01 .06 -.04 -.02 
-.16 
** 
.11 
** 
-.04 .05 
.11 
** 
.10 
** 
.26 
** 
1      
(20) Regionalisation 0.4 1020 -.04 
-.10 
** 
-.22 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.24 
** 
.02 .04 
.08 
** 
-
.06* 
-.01 
.08 
** 
-.04 .01 -.05 .05 .02 
-.12 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.05 1     
(21) Automotive 0.4 1020 
.10 
** 
.14 
** 
.25 
** 
.20 
** 
.43 
** 
.25 
** 
-.05 
-
.07* 
.11 
** 
-.01 
-.11 
** 
-.05 
.09 
** 
.09 
** 
-.05 .05 .02 
.20 
** 
.18 
** 
-.12 
** 
1    
(22) Retail 0.3 1020 
-.09 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.15 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.10 
** 
.09 
** 
.10 
** 
.03 
-
.07* 
.02 
-.14 
** 
.13 
** 
.08 
** 
.01 
.11 
** 
-.03 
-.18 
** 
-.13 
** 
.04 
-.17 
** 
1   
(23) Financial 0.3 1020 
.11 
** 
.07* 
.21 
** 
.20 
** 
-.22 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.11 
** 
.01 
-.24 
** 
.03 
.25 
** 
.19 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.11 
** 
.01 
-.16 
** 
.34 
** 
.19 
** 
-.04 .05 
-.22 
** 
-.15 
** 
1  
(24) Consumer electronics 0.3 1020 
-
.07* 
.01 -.01 -.04 .07 .04 -.00 -.02 .07* -.02 -.06 
-
.06* 
.04 -.04 .02 
.08 
** 
-.04 -.01 
.16 
** 
.01 
-.14 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.13 
** 
1 
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Table 5.2: Collinearity diagnostics for re-entry timing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results  
Empirical results are presented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. The estimated coefficients as shown in the 
tables should be interpreted as the amount of increase (or decrease, if the sign of the coefficient 
is negative) in the predicted log odds of the dependent variable that would be predicted by a 1 
unit increase (or decrease) in the predictor variable. A negative coefficient means that the 
predictor variable decreases the likelihood of the firm choosing to re-enter early compared to re-
entering late. In turn, a positive coefficient means that the variable increases the likelihood of the 
firm re-entering early compared to re-entering late. As illustrated in the regression tables, the 
explanatory variables chosen to explain re-entry timing decisions are highly relevant. 
Model 1 in Table 5.3 reports the baseline estimation which includes annual and country indicator 
variables, firm-level controls (firm size, firm age), re-entry specific controls (prior presence in the 
market in a different sector), country level controls (regionalisation effects) and industry controls. 
Firm age decreases the likelihood of early re-entries indicating perhaps that older firms are more 
inert and more likely to wait before re-entering. A similar effect is observed for firm size which, 
perhaps surprisingly, tends to have a negative effect on the likelihood of early re-entries. Although 
Variable name Mean 
Collinearity 
Tolerance 
VIFs 
(1) Time-out 9.08 0.90 1.11 
(2) Host experiential knowledge 16.27 0.74 1.33 
(3) General experience intensity  37.01 0.24 4.06 
(4) Host experience intensity 30.60 0.31 3.25 
(5) General experience diversity  55.00 0.46 2.13 
(6) Host experience diversity 9.33 0.65 1.52 
(7) Host institutional quality 6.58 0.40 2.46 
(8) Host market attractiveness 0.27 0.91 1.09 
(9) Exit mode: Non-equity venture 0.52 0.62 1.60 
(10) Exit mode: Joint equity venture 0.23 0.80 1.25 
(11) Exit mode: Wholly owned subsidiary 0.25 0.78 1.59 
(12) Involuntary exit 0.29 0.03 27.48 
(13) Poor market performance 0.62 0.02 43.32 
(14) Poor performance with mode 0.18 0.77 1.29 
(15) Strategic exit 0.09 0.04 24.40 
(16) Strategic intent 0.35 0.89 1.11 
(17) Firm age 69.59 0.49 2.02 
(18) Firm size 7.26 0.68 1.46 
(19) Already present in the market 0.23 0.73 1.37 
(20) Regionalisation 0.33 0.82 1.21 
(21) Automotive 0.21 0.62 1.59 
(22) Retail 0.11 0.81 1.23 
(23) Financial 0.17 0.67 1.47 
(24) Consumer electronics 0.08 0.83 1.19 
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firm size has been associated with greater resources and ability to leverage economies of scale 
that ensure more rapid entries in the host market (Gaba et al., 2002), perhaps larger re-entrants 
take longer to mobilise and re-deploy their assets following the decision to exit. Prior presence 
in the host market in a different sector has a positive effect on early re-entry; this may mean that 
firms re-enter earlier if they have not lost all connections to the host market. Regionalisation also 
decreases the likelihood of later re-entries as firms tend to return early to markets within their 
home region. As for industry effects, firms operating in retail are more likely to return early. 
Retailers, in particular, tend to rely on economies of scale in international expansion (Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007) and thus, early re-entry may be a proactive strategy of preserving customers.  
Models 2-14 add the hypothesised effects. Specifically, Model 2 in Table 5.3 adds the main 
effects of prior experience on re-entry timing. Hypothesis 1 did not receive support in the 
statistical model, in that more experienced re-entrants are not necessarily more likely to be early 
re-entrants; in fact, the coefficients of prior experience were negative and significant for host 
experiential knowledge (β=-0.01, p<0.05) and marginally significant for experience diversity (β=-
0.15, p<0.10). Looking at the role of prior experience on re-entrants’ likelihood to return to a 
foreign market within 5 years after exiting indicates that experienced firms are, in fact, less likely 
to become early re-entrants, whilst as shown in Appendix 3, Table 5.5, the more experience 
intensity re-entrants possess, the less likely to are to become very late re-entrants (i.e. re-enter 
after 10 years following exit). Perhaps other factors affect the re-entrant’s ability to benefit from 
host market experiential knowledge in the short term after exiting the market. 
Overall, the remaining hypotheses received strong support in the models. Table 5.3 also includes 
the regression models testing for the main effects of host institutional quality and market 
attractiveness on re-entry timing. Model 3 shows that the higher the quality of host institutions at 
the time of exit, the more likely firms are to re-enter within 1 to 5 years (β=0.39, p<0.001). 
Furthermore, compared to the baseline Model 1 or Model 2 (main effects of experience) which 
yield a less significant improvement in the explanatory power; Model 3 shows a relatively high 
chi-square value (i.e. 96.520; p<0.001) indicating the key role played by a firm’s assessment of 
its potential to acquire institutional legitimacy on re-entry timing. These results support the 
conjuncture that institutional forces are more influential to re-entry timing than, for instance, re-
entrants’ prior experience. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported. Furthermore, Hypothesis 3, which 
predicted a positive effect of host market attractiveness on the likelihood of earlier re-entries is 
also supported in Model 4 (β=0.54, p<0.01). Indeed, the presence of foreign entrants in the host 
market makes it more likely for re-entrants to return within 1 to 5 years after exiting the market.  
In turn, Hypothesis 4 predicted that a re-entrant’s prior experience moderates the positive 
relationship between host institutional development and early re-entries. Models 5 and 6 in Table 
5.3 show a positive and significant effect of the interaction between experience intensity and host 
institutional quality on early re-entries (β=0.20, p<0.01). Firms that have been international for 
longer may be better equipped to understand the effect of institutions and thus, to re-enter soon 
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after exit. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is supported for experience intensity. In turn, the interaction 
between host attractiveness and firm prior experience is not significant in Model 6; in fact, adding 
the effect of experience reduces the significance of host market attractiveness. One possible 
explanation for this result is that the confidence gained from exploiting the firm’s own prior 
knowledge and experience may go in contrast with imitating the behaviour of other firms by re-
entering the host market. Hence, the results did not find support for Hypothesis 5.  
In regards to the effect of prior commitment on re-entry timing; indeed, re-entrants that were 
previously part of joint equity ventures tend to be more likely to return within 1 to 5 years (β=0.71, 
p<0.001) and implicitly, less likely to wait longer prior to re-entry. Hypothesis 7 was therefore 
confirmed in Model 8, Table 5.3, whilst Hypothesis 6 was not supported meaning there is no 
significant effect of prior mode being non-equity commitment on late re-entries. It may be that 
firms which were previously operating via non-equity commitment did not acquire the depth of 
knowledge necessary to become early re-entrants. Furthermore, as stated in Hypothesis 8, firms 
that were previously operating through wholly owned subsidiaries tend to be more cautious and 
are thus, unlikely early re-entrants (β=-0.53, p<0.001). To be more specific, in Appendix 3, (Table 
5.9, page 204) it is illustrated that re-entrants which, prior to exit, were operating within wholly 
owned subsidiaries were more likely to re-enter over 10 years after exiting (Q4: β=0.58, p<0.01). 
Therefore, as shown in Model 9, Hypothesis 8 has received strong support in this study. 
Models 10-13 in Table 5.4 test for the effect of exit motives on re-entry timing. As predicted in 
Hypothesis 9, when exit is due to voluntary decisions made by the re-entrant, early re-entry (i.e. 
within 5 years) is likely to occur. Particularly, the regression model’s results show positive and 
significant effects of poor market performance (β=0.49, p<0.05) on the likelihood of firms being 
relatively early re-entrants. Hypothesis 9 is supported, implicitly suggesting that involuntary exits 
may lead to late re-entries, possibly re-entry occurs when the national and or industry-specific 
laws and regulations are removed. Interestingly, adding the effects of exit motives on re-entry 
timing increases significantly the explanatory power of the models (e.g., Models 10 and 11), 
which is a similar result to what I found in the previous analysis concerning the effects of market 
exit on re-entry commitment. Exit is, therefore, critical to understanding re-entry. 
Finally, Model 13 tests for the hypothesised effects of strategic intent on foreign market re-entry 
timing. Hypothesis 10 predicted that when the investment in the host market is of global strategic 
importance, the firm will be more likely to be a very early re-entrant. In this model too, the 
hypotheses are confirmed in that there is a positive relationship between strategic intent and 
early re-entry (β=0. 56, p<0.001) and as illustrated in Appendix 3 (Table 5.11, page 210), there 
is a negative relationship on the likelihood of later re-entries (over 10 years: β=-0.72, p<0.001). 
As discussed later, these findings may speak to the fact that firms may be willing to deal with the 
uncertainties associated with foreign market re-entries if and when the host markets re-entered 
are strategically central to re-entrants’ overall global strategies.  
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 Table 5.3. Results of the binomial regression – Models 1-9: Early versus late re-entrantsa,b (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant  1.04*** 1.04*** -1.81*** 0.83** -2.31** 0.65* 1.26*** 0.97*** 1.14*** 
Host experiential knowledge  -0.01*   0.03 -0.01    
Experience intensity  0.11   -1.21* -0.09    
Experience diversity  -0.15┼   0.12 -0.10    
Host institutional quality   0.39***  0.49***     
Host market attractivenessb    0.54**  0.36    
Host experiential knowledge x Host institutional quality      -0.01     
Experience intensity x Host institutional quality     0.20**     
Experience diversity x Host institutional quality     -0.02     
Host experiential knowledge x Host market attractiveness      0.01    
Experience intensity x Host market attractiveness      0.12    
Experience diversity x Host market attractiveness      -0.08    
Mode prior to exit: Non-equity venture       -0.16   
Mode prior to exit: Join equity venture        0.71***  
Mode prior to exit: Wholly owned subsidiary         -0.53** 
Controls          
Firm age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00* -0.01*** -0.01* -0.00* -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
Firm sizeb -0.09*** -0.06** -0.07** -0.06* -0.01* -0.03 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08*** 
Already present in the market 0.51** 0.51** 0.18 0.25 0.09 0.33┼ 0.51** 0.55** 0.49** 
Regionalisation 0.29* 0.26┼ 0.30* 0.09 0.26 0.09 0.22 0.24 0.28┼ 
Automotive  -0.16 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.15 -0.19 -0.17 -0.22 
Retail 0.35 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.41┼ 0.39 
Financial 0.42┼ 0.29 0.55* 0.74** 0.48┼ 0.61* 0.45┼ 0.50* 0.62** 
Consumer electronics -0.09 -0.17 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12 
Model indices          
-2 Log likelihood 1.240.5 1114.0 1120.1 998.7 999.0 902.7 1185.6 1168.9 1177.4 
Chi-square 75.076*** 61.535*** 96.520*** 44.197*** 88.692*** 33.536** 74.188*** 90.850*** 82.423*** 
N 949 848 879 769 786 690 909 909 909 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
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Table 5.4. Results of the binomial regression – Models 10-13: Early versus late re-entrantsa,b (***p<0.001; 
**p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
 
 
  
Variables  Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Constant  0.49+ 0.86** 1.01*** 0.88*** -2.80** 
Voluntary exit: poor market performance 0.75***    -0.23 
Voluntary exit: Poor mode performance  0.94***   0.50* 
Voluntary exit: Strategic exit   0.49*  0.02 
Strategic intent    0.56*** 0.32* 
Host experiential knowledge     -0.02** 
Experience intensity     -2.88** 
Experience diversity     0.05 
Host institutional quality     0.50*** 
Host market attractivenessb     0.36 
Host experiential knowledge x Host 
institutional quality  
    -0.02** 
Experience intensity x Host institutional 
quality 
    0.33** 
Experience diversity x Host institutional 
quality 
    0.01 
Host experiential knowledge x Host market 
attractiveness  
    0.01 
Experience intensity x Host market 
attractiveness 
    0.17 
Experience diversity x Host market 
attractiveness 
    -0.03 
Mode prior to exit: Non-equity venture     -0.56** 
Mode prior to exit: Join equity venture     0.71** 
Mode prior to exit: Wholly owned subsidiary     -0.71** 
Controls      
Firm age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00 
Firm sizeb -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.02 
Already present in the market 0.41* 0.57*** 0.48** 0.44** 0.32 
Regionalisation 0.28┼ 0.34* 0.27┼ 0.28┼ -0.05 
Automotive  -0.26 -0.28 -0.16 -0.21 0.23 
Retail 0.23 0.27 0.33 0.23 -0.11 
Financial 0.52* 0.49* 0.41┼ 0.49* 0.90** 
Consumer electronics -0.13 -0.06 -0.10 -0.17 0.10 
Model indices      
-2 Log likelihood 1214.7 1213.3 1236.4 1225.7 793.4 
Chi-square 100.849*** 102.204*** 79.188*** 89.877*** 95.943*** 
N 949 949 949 949 658 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
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Discussion and conclusions 
The literature on international business and strategic management reflects the lack of studies 
dedicated to examining the timing of international expansion. In particular, there is no empirical 
evidence that accounts specifically for re-entry. Drawing on the organisational learning and 
institutional theory perspectives, this study covered these gaps in the literature by developing a 
set of hypotheses concerning the antecedents of re-entry timing such as prior experience, 
institutional development, market attractiveness, exit, resource commitment and strategic intent. 
A reminder of the hypothesised relationships and findings is relayed in Figure 5.1.   
The results have several implications in regards to the question posed at the start of this study, 
namely what drives some re-entrants to wait longer than others prior to returning to the host 
market. Later re-entrants are not endowed with the same level of resources as early re-entrants. 
Contrary to previous notable studies (notably, Fuentelsaz et al., 2002), early re-entrants tend to 
be smaller and younger firms re-entering markets within their home region. Based on these 
results, perhaps managers should expect that re-entrants that are smaller in size and younger, 
i.e. without high levels of bureaucratic inertia, as well as those re-entrants that are in possession 
of a regionalisation advantage, may re-enter a previously exited foreign market earlier compared 
to larger and older re-entrants which are less likely to benefit from the same levels of strategic 
flexibility, thus delaying their strategic responses to initial market entry and exit events.  
Most importantly perhaps, the results provide us with further evidence on the importance of 
contextualising the effect of prior knowledge and experience on organisational learning, which 
overall does not have a direct and positive effect on early re-entries as previously suggested for 
de novo entries (e.g. Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; Gaba et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). In other 
words, experienced re-entrants are not necessarily more likely to be early re-entrants. In fact, 
host market specific experiential knowledge has a negative effect on early re-entries. This means 
that firms may need time to distill the lessons learned from operating in the host market, 
particularly as they have to simultaneously manage the potentially traumatic market exit 
experience. Recent literature has not taken into account that knowledge and experience take 
time to become part of organisational learning and routines (March, 1991) and furthermore, not 
all experience may become organisational routines and thus positively influence organisational 
behaviour. Hence, early re-entrants may not benefit from their prior experience with operating in 
the market and re-enter the market when they have unlearned previous behaviours and or when 
the uncertainty associated with that market has become reduced.  
Particularly in the case of experiential knowledge, its usefulness in re-entry decisions may be 
superseded by how firms interpret the market exit experience. In turn, firms in possession of 
experience intensity accumulated from operating internationally for a longer period of time may 
have had sufficient time to distill the lessons learned, which is perhaps why these firms are more 
likely to re-enter early when the host institutional environment offers positive cues (Delios and 
Henisz, 2003). This study reinforces the idea expressed in the previous chapter that knowledge 
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and experience accumulated in the past, on their own, do not necessarily result in organisational 
learning for re-entrants contrary to what scholars have found in studies on de novo entries.  
 
                                       
 
Figure 5.1: An organisational learning and institutional legitimacy perspective on re-entry timing  
 
Second, the results highlight the importance of including institutional and host market specific 
characteristics in our conceptualisations of foreign market (re)entry timing decisions (Isobe et al., 
2000) as they may play a key role in fostering as well as potentially delaying firms acquiring 
legitimacy in a foreign market and subsequently, firm growth. Based on the results of this study, 
re-entrant firms evaluate the quality of host institutions in making their re-entry timing decision. 
This means that favourable conditions in the host institutional environment are, indeed, 
associated with early re-entries (Gaba et al., 2002). Similar results were found concerning host 
market attractiveness meaning that firms are more likely to re-enter early when there is a 
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significant foreign investment in the host market. These results reinforced the role of the 
institutional view in explaining how firms make decisions associated with foreign markets based 
on their expectation of attaining legitimacy in those markets. It also strengthens the overall 
argument in this thesis, namely that foreign market re-entry informs less concerning exploiting 
organisational learning from prior experience accumulated in the past and reveals more about 
how firms respond and react to cues in their host institutional environments and opportunities to 
attain legitimacy from favourable institutions, most often irrespective of their prior experience. 
Indeed, similar to what I found concerning foreign market re-entry commitment decisions, it 
appears that the behaviour of early re-entrants can be better explained by examining factors 
within the host environment than by looking at re-entrants’ level of prior knowledge and 
experience. This highlights the importance of where firms locate foreign activities when they opt 
to re-enter exited markets. Theoretically, extant conceptualisations which view institutions 
principally as carriers of risks and uncertainties to be avoided or dealt with (Peng, 2000) may be 
too reductionist and should make room for research that examines how and when institutions are 
perceived as opportunities to be exploited, via, for instance, early market (re)entries.  
Contrary to previous studies (e.g., Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; Gaba et al., 2002), there is no strong 
evidence to suggest that managers are more willing to re-enter foreign markets earlier when the 
resource commitment is lower, as it would be in the case of operating via non-equity modes. The 
timing of re-entry is, indeed, tempered by commitment mode, but only in the case of joint equity 
ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. Perhaps firms that were previously operating in the host 
market via non-equity modes such as exports or licensing have not acquired the depth of 
knowledge necessary to re-enter the market early. There may also be fewer incentives for these 
firms to quickly recover the losses incurred upon exit which, in the case of firms operating via 
exports or licensing, would be significantly smaller. Since the majority of firms that were operating 
via equity joint ventures tend to either de-escalate or also re-enter via joint ventures (see Chapter 
4), it is not surprising that joint venture commitment is associated with early re-entry. This means 
that firms may not need as much time to re-enter when de-escalating to a non-equity mode or 
when returning via a mode with which the firm already has some experience.  
Whilst joint equity re-entries increase the likelihood of early re-entries, wholly owned subsidiaries 
tend to be harder to implement and costlier to dissolve. Particularly if the re-entrant is to then 
also re-enter the market via own subsidiaries, it may take significantly longer to set up greenfield 
ventures upon re-entry. Where acquisitions are concerned, they may foster faster market entry 
(Tan, 2009) but they can also be costlier and often contingent on the availability of appropriate 
targets. Timing decisions are, to some degree, inter-linked with entry mode commitment choices 
(Gaba et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000); these findings are particularly important for re-entrants 
since previous research has shown that the highest performers in foreign markets are firms that 
both (re)enter early and through high resource commitment modes (Isobe et al., 2000).   
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Results also suggest that market exit carries a stigma of failure and therefore may add to the 
uncertainty of renewing operations in a foreign market, manifested not only in whether firms 
change their commitment upon re-entry but also in how long they wait to go back. Consequently, 
this reinforces previous findings on re-entry commitment, in that market exit plays a key role in 
how firms interpret the success or failure of their initial market forays. When the decision to exit 
is involuntary, firms may not be able to re-enter the market soon after exit but will take advantage 
of changes in the regulations that spurred exit and come back when those are no longer in place.  
This means that the motives for exit are inter-related with the motives of re-entry. It also means 
that organisational learning may not only rest in accumulating experience over time (Casillas et 
al., 2015; Gaba et al., 2002; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Sapienza et al., 2006), but in how re-
entrants perceived and interpret the exit experience and subsequently respond to cues in their 
institutional environments. Also interesting is that firms which have exited voluntarily due to poor 
performance and strategic exits tend to be early re-entrants rather than late ones. This means 
that either firms react and interpret market exit by changing their strategies and adapting to the 
market to avoid underperforming there or perhaps simply re-enter the market due to the limited 
options they have to internationalise without actually having learned significantly from their initial 
foray into the market. In fact, by also testing for the effect of strategic intent on re-entry timing, 
we know that re-entrants choose to re-enter early when the re-entered markets are of strategic 
importance. This, in turn, means that re-entrant firms are willing to deal with the exit stigma and 
the uncertainty associated with early re-entry when re-entry is part of an internationalisation wave 
of penetrating the region, irrespective of whether the firm has learned from its initial foray.  
Overall, the empirical results in this thesis have, thus far, suggested that prior knowledge and 
experience may not always transform into routines and result in organisational learning that can 
be exploited in the short term by re-entrants. Prior knowledge and learning may be set aside, 
disregarded and perhaps even forgotten as firms make re-entry timing decisions according to 
cues from external, host institutions. This means that learning by stages may be more useful 
when firms deal with lower levels of uncertainty and ambiguity (Anand et al., 2014) which is 
actually reflected in the significant role of experience when accounting for more favourable 
institutional conditions. Re-entrant firms also lean more on learning from the exit experience, and 
subsequently make re-entry timing decisions based on how they perceive and interpret exit. 
With regards to the antecedents behind foreign market entry, or in this case, foreign market re-
entry decisions, a growing body of literature suggests that developed market firms and emerging 
market firms are driven by different factors when engaging in international expansion (Cui and 
Jiang, 2009; Hitt et al., 2000; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Rugman et al., 2014). Hence, 
the next chapter examines the motivations to re-enter (and subsequent re-entry decisions) of 
emerging and developed market re-entrants. In particular, the next chapter specifically explores 
whether and how re-entry commitment and timing decisions depend on the home and or host 
market environments re-entered (i.e. developed versus emerging markets).   
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CHAPTER 6: FOREIGN MARKET RE-ENTRY DECISIONS OF DEVELOPED 
AND EMERGING MARKET RE-ENTRANTS 
 
Abstract: Extant literature has proliferated the idea that developed market multinationals (DMMs) 
and emerging market multinationals (EMMs) are somehow different in regards to why, how and 
when they enter foreign markets. Research on EMMs has come centre stage in IB, with a surge 
of studies urging scholars to investigate the differences (if any) between the international 
decisions made by developed and emerging market firms. Neither has considered that this can 
be studied in the context of foreign market re-entry showing that EMMs have not only 
commenced expanding internationally but have also exited and re-entered some foreign 
countries. This study explores DMMs’ and EMMs’ motivations to re-enter and their subsequent 
re-entry decisions by distinguishing between re-entry into developed and emerging markets. 
 
Introduction 
Since the 2000s, academics have been paying particular attention to emerging markets because 
of their increased role in global demand and economic growth (Buckley et al., 2012; Chiao et al., 
2010; Deng, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Luo and Tung, 2007; Meyer et al., 2014; Pan et al., 
2014). In 2015, emerging markets have not only received significant amounts of foreign direct 
investment but have also engaged in international investments themselves accounting for around 
36 percent of world’s FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 2016). Scholars have focused on the theoretical 
underpinnings of this literature because of the ongoing debate over the applicability and 
relevance of conventional international business and management theories to explaining foreign 
market entry strategies of firms entering emerging markets (Demirbag et al., 2008; Meyer and 
Peng, 2004; Rodriguez et al., 2005) and more recently of firms from emerging markets expanding 
internationally (Buckley et al., 2012; Pan et al., 2014; Rugman et al., 2014). The emerging nature 
and transitional characteristics of non-Western markets have led some scholars to suggest that 
emerging markets possess unique characteristics which should be incorporated more into the 
existing literature (Buckley et al., 2012; Child and Rodrigues, 2005; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Meyer 
and Peng, 2004; Lin, 2010). This camp of scholars argues for an application of extant 
theorisations to EMMs’ international expansion decisions whilst others (Luo and Tung, 2007; 
Mathews, 2002; 2006) propose the development of newer theories by exploring the unique forces 
influencing why, when, and how EMMs enter foreign markets. Despite the extensive debate 
about the appropriateness of current perspectives, there is no agreement on the theoretical 
foundations of EMMs’ initial market entry and no studies on re-entry. 
The aim of this exploratory study is twofold. First, research investigating the determinants of 
EMMs’ international decisions is scarce (Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). Moreover, there 
is no research investigating the determinants of re-entry for these firms. This paper characterises 
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and explores the re-entry decisions of DMMs and EMMs. This study is timely because emerging 
economies have been investing significantly abroad (UNCTAD, 2016). It is important because 
the ability of EMMs to commit resources abroad could potentially question some assumptions of 
current theories (Rugman et al., 2014), which requires at the very least, an initial testing of some 
of those theories. In undertaking this exploratory research, this study focuses on the following: 
what are the re-entry determinants and subsequent re-entry decisions of EMMs and DMMs?  
Similar to the broader market entry literature (Surdu and Mellahi, 2016), new trends in the EMM 
literature indicate that any one single theoretical framework is not sufficient to explain why, how 
and when EMMs (re)internationalise, leading to a growth in the use of multi-theoretical 
approaches (Bonaglia, Goldstein and Mathews, 2007; Chen and Chen, 2003; Demirbag, Tatoglu 
and Glaister, 2009). As the potential to support organisational learning in different international 
markets has become important in market entry studies published in the 2000s, this has led to 
combining learning theory with other emergent perspectives such as the institutional view in order 
to understand market entry. Consequently, the theoretical explanation for the foreign market re-
entry decisions of DMMs and EMMs is largely drawn from institutional legitimacy (change) and 
organisational learning perspectives. In so doing, this study will also test some of the key 
determinants associated in the past with (de novo) market entry decisions. 
Second, a growing trend in the foreign investment behaviour of multinational firms has been 
DMMs expanding more into emerging markets and EMMs expanding into both emerging and 
developed markets (UNCTAD, 2016). EMMs may not only differ from DMMs, but EMMs entering 
developed markets may be different from EMMs entering emerging markets (Deng and Yang, 
2015), in the same manner in which DMMs entering developed markets tend to be driven by 
different factors compared to DMMs or EMMs internationalising into emerging markets (Hitt et 
al., 2000; 2004). This, in turn, provides a promising context in which to examine the effects of 
prior learning and institutional change on DMMs’ and EMMs’ foreign market re-entries into both 
developed and emerging markets. Specifically, this study poses another question: what are the 
re-entry determinants and subsequent re-entry decisions of EMMs and DMMs in developed and 
emerging markets? Although home institutions are key push factors for EMMs’ initial foreign 
entries, the effect of host institutions has been neglected. Thus, this study considers re-entrants’ 
motivations and re-entry decisions when (EMM and DMM) re-entrants return to developed host 
markets and when they re-enter less developed, emerging host market environments.  
In the next section, a brief overview is presented to illustrate the theoretical background of EMM 
research. Next, the study draws on the learning and institutional legitimacy perspectives to 
hypothesise the expected relationships between re-entry decisions and determinants associated 
with DMMs and EMMs. The final section of the chapter consists of the results and discussion of 
findings concerning the antecedents and subsequent re-entry decisions of DMMs and EMMs re-
entering both developed and emerging host market locations.     
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Literature background 
Foundational studies on de novo market entry shared the perspective that firm resources should 
be exploited in the host country for direct investment to take place (Buckley and Casson, 1976). 
Following this logic, respectively, if market entry is a function of the exploitation of firm resources 
in foreign markets, then EMMs are less likely to possess the resources of older and larger 
(generally Western) developed market MNEs. Furthermore, if firms with valuable knowledge 
resources internalise the market for those resources and protect their know-how via direct 
investment (Buckley and Casson, 1976), then EMMs’ international expansion would generally 
occur through lower resource commitment modes such as exports. Even so, organisational 
economics theories continue to be used in a large number of EMM studies published in top 
journals (Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). Scholars applying this line of thought are 
primarily concerned with how EMMs undertake international entry strategies via high resource 
commitment modes (i.e. M&As) without possessing the firm-specific advantages that enable 
firms to compete successfully in the focal market (Buckley et al., 2012; Pan et al., 2014). Pan et 
al. (2014) found that firms whose directors were involved in public policy formation downplayed 
the transaction costs associated with internationalisation and chose higher ownership stakes in 
foreign markets. Whilst TCE based theories may still be useful in explaining EMMs’ entry into 
other emerging markets and leveraging their ownership and location advantages, on their own, 
they do little to explain decisions such as entry modes or entry timing into developed markets. 
To this, resource based proponents propose that even when firms possess some advantages, 
they may still require resources from the host environment, in order to learn and tailor products 
to local markets or to acquire companies that are already operating, with some degree of success 
in the host environment (Li, 2003). These studies also attempt to capture how resource profiles 
(together with nature of the transaction) determine initial foreign market entry decisions, in that 
the motivation to acquire complementary (R&D, marketing) resources was associated with 
EMMs’ opting for wholly owned subsidiaries over other modes of entry such as international 
alliances (Chiao et al., 2010). Overall, extant literature suggests that EMMs use direct investment 
strategies to improve their bottom line and exploit their advantages in other emerging economies, 
whilst responding to home institutional pressures to upgrade their resources and capabilities by 
then entering developed countries (Chiao et al., 2010; Hitt et al., 2000; Li, 2003).  
In turn, as discussed at length in previous chapters, the institution-based perspective has evolved 
as a popular line of theorising international market entry strategies because it is expected to bring 
context back to the centre of theoretical debates. For DMMs, idiosyncratic host institutional 
environments characterised by factors such as legal restrictions on foreign ownership, 
investment risk (Brouthers, 2002), host government intervention (Henisz, 2003) and corruption 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005) tend to create market imperfections that determine the value of, and 
potential to expand, firm-specific advantages such as prior knowledge and experience. In 
addressing how host institutional uncertainties may be overcome, scholars suggested that larger 
multinationals may have higher bargaining power over their host institutions (cf. Pan, 2000); 
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imitating the market entry decisions of earlier entrants tends to reduce uncertainty (c.f. Lu, 2002; 
Ma and Delios, 2007; Yiu and Makino, 2002); and entry modes such as equity alliances may be 
more suitable to facilitate local knowledge acquisition from host market partners (Ma and Delios, 
2007; Meyer, 2001). Broadly, these studies propose that when and how firms (predominantly 
DMMs) enter foreign markets is not only different in firm-specific advantages but they vary with 
the affiliations of firms with their host institutional environments (e.g. Luo, 2005; Demirbag et al., 
2007; Isobe et al., 2000; Ma and Delios, 2007; Yiu and Makino, 2002).  
For EMMs in particular, foreign market (re)entry compels them to manage the institutional 
idiosyncrasies of both home and host markets (Rugman et al., 2014). Scholars drawing on the 
institution-based view have been primarily concerned with how home country institutional 
environments shape the international entry strategies of EMMs (cf. Chittoor et al., 2008; Du and 
Boateng, 2015; Hitt et al., 2004). In the context of Chinese MNEs, it has been suggested that 
home government institutions reduced the importance of learning from prior knowledge and 
experience, thereby motivating inexperienced firms to engage in high resource commitment (Lin, 
2010). From an institutional perspective, firms’ actions are also constrained by institutional forces 
within a host country or an industry, which may also limit EMMs’ international entry options and 
motivations. Knowledge that is location based is tied with host market responsiveness since 
EMMs may also need to choose the entry mode strategies which are most likely to enable them 
to develop effective marketing strategies in a timely manner and compete on the basis of their 
brands and not just their manufacturing and logistics capabilities (Bangara et al., 2012). Despite 
being subject to home government intervention, EMMs also have to manage the institutional 
idiosyncrasies of their host environments which may affect the likelihood and speed of their 
engagement in foreign market entry or re-entry in this case, as well as the degree of resource 
commitment in the (re-entered) market (Kedia, Gaffney and Clampit, 2012; Wang et al., 2012).  
 
EMM-centric theories and their interpretation of organisational learning 
EMM-centric theories such as the springboard perspective (Luo and Tung, 2007) and the LLL 
(linkage, leverage and learning) framework (Mathews, 2002; 2006) focus on how EMMs catch 
up with their developed market counterparts; the focus here is on the time-based aspects of 
acquiring knowledge resources and learning (Ge and Ding, 2008; Kedia et al., 2012; Popli and 
Sinha, 2014). Luo and Tung (2007) advocate a ‘springboard’ perspective, implying that EMMs 
use foreign expansion as a springboard to recursively acquire assets that may help them 
overcome the limitations of their home institutional environments and become global players. An 
early movement in the foreign market may not only provide access to technological capabilities, 
critical knowledge and patents, but it may also create barriers for follower firms and ensure 
privileged access to customers, brands and distribution channels. Luo and Tung (2007) provide 
an overarching framework by integrating the firm level motivations (e.g., firm strategic intent and 
strategic objectives) and the external factors (e.g., home governments, global competition) 
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propelling EMMs to internationalise. Popli and Sinha (2014) attested the springboard 
perspective, noting that more experienced Indian MNEs engaged in pre-emptive international 
acquisitions following a clustering of industry level acquisitions. The springboard view highlights 
that, despite the similarities in motivations to become legitimate (in line with institutional theory), 
EMMs responses are also a function of firm-level attributes (Luo and Tung, 2007), such as large 
domestic presence and prior experience (Popli and Sinha, 2014). However, the springboard view 
does not elucidate the post-springboard or post initial entry difficulties EMMs encounter. 
Similarly, the LLL (linkage, leverage and learning) framework is proposed as an alternative to the 
OLI paradigm (Mathews, 2002/2006), for firms seeking to augment, rather than just exploit 
strategic assets. The LLL framework assumes that foreign market entry strategies are based on 
firms’ extensive use of institutional network links to access new resources, and the ability to 
leverage those resources together with complementary capabilities (e.g. rapid imitation, efficient 
followers). Inherent in these assumptions is that resource exploitation and augmentation are 
inter-related (Dunning, 2006); over time, repetition of these link and leverage processes may lead 
to the ability to learn how to succeed globally. Ge and Ding (2008) suggested that the LLL 
framework provides a better explanation for the catch-up strategies of manufacturing EMMs 
which may start their international expansion by creating linkages with firms in developed markets 
and leverage those linkages to lower their production costs and achieve cost leadership; EMMs 
may, later on, focus on innovation or marketing capabilities as sources of competitive advantage. 
Interestingly, Yeoh (2011) also distinguished between ‘early’ EMMs, which possessed 
capabilities in developing new product brands and EMM ‘latecomers’ seeking to offset their 
competitive disadvantages in the entire value chain. Some view the LLL model as a departure 
from established theories due to its extensive focus on how the dynamic pursuit of knowledge 
influences EMMs’ ascension into global players (Kedia et al., 2012). Similar to the springboard 
perspective and other process models (i.e. Uppsala theory), the emphasis is on the temporal 
dimension of knowledge acquisition and entry strategies. 
 
Theoretical development and hypotheses 
Organisational learning and experience effects: Learning within DMMs and EMMs 
Organisational learning provides a basis to explore whether the experience and knowledge 
resources firms possess facilitate entry and performance in markets characterised by institutional 
idiosyncrasies (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2008a; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Xia et al., 2009; Zaheer, 
1995), as well as what knowledge and experience firms need to become MNEs from emerging 
economies (e.g., Bonaglia et al., 2007; Buckley et al., 2012; Chen and Chen, 2003; Li, 2003; Lin, 
2010). From an organisational learning perspective, intangible resources such as prior learning 
and experience become more important when firms enter market environments that are different 
from their home markets. More experienced developed market (re)entrants are expected to 
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better understand and manage the differences that exist between developed and emerging 
markets and that may subsequently threaten firm performance in the host market, such as below 
par enforcement of laws and regulations, planning oriented institutional frameworks and 
comparatively inactive capital markets (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2008a; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; 
Xia et al., 2009; Zaheer, 1995). Learning from prior knowledge and experience may, therefore, 
decrease the perceived distance between developed and emerging market contexts (Barkema 
and Shvyrkov, 2007, Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001). Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) found that 
as MNEs learn about local practices and gain experience in managing foreign affiliates, the initial 
uncertainty and liability of foreignness disappear, motivating firms to engage in further expansion 
in areas of business where they appeared to lack a superior advantage. Gao et al. (2008) also 
highlighted that prior knowledge and experience resources motivated US MNEs to enter the 
Chinese market (see also Barkema and Shvyrkov, 2007; Hitt et al., 2006a; Kotabe et al., 2002).  
Particularly, DMMs expanding into emerging markets may benefit from importing firm-specific 
organisational practices and routines acquired from past experience. Although previous studies 
recognised knowledge as an important part of the foreign market entry process (c.f. Johansson 
and Vahlne, 2003); they often referred to it as ‘generic’ knowledge about the market. Other 
studies highlight the importance to distinguish between experiential knowledge and institutional 
knowledge acquired from operating in different countries, or knowledge acquired over time by 
being internationally diversified for longer (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2008a; Chang and Rosenzweig, 
2001; Gao et al., 2008Xia et al., 2009). The idea that only over time firms truly learn how to 
transfer resources abroad leads to the expectation that experience accumulated in the past 
motivate subsequent entries. Implicit in these assumptions is that DMMs’ re-entries should be 
viewed not only in terms of the initial investment (transaction) costs but also in regards to how 
acquiring knowledge and experience may be leveraged for re-entries in emerging markets. 
The effect of learning from experience when returning to emerging markets is particularly relevant 
for re-entrants. Whilst de novo entries may be perceived by DMMs as opportunities to penetrate 
emerging markets opening up for investment (Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Gao et al., 2008), 
re-entry into these markets may be perceived as riskier given the failed initial attempt. Prior 
experience may, therefore, increase investor confidence in returning to previously exited 
emerging markets. On the other hand, DMMs re-entering developed markets may not require 
such high levels of prior knowledge and experience given the likely similarities between their 
home and host market environments (Brouthers, 2002; Madhok, 1997; Makino and Neupert, 
2000). MNEs from developed markets tend to possess resources which are a better fit with a 
location in other developed markets, thus leading to increased likelihood of DMMs entering those 
markets irrespective of prior experience (Makino and Neupert, 2000). It is proposed that,  
Hypothesis 1a: The more prior experience re-entrants possess, the more (less) likely 
they are to be DMMs re-entering emerging (developed) host markets.  
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In regards to EMMs, a recurring line of inquiry has been what (experience) resources EMMs may 
be able to exploit abroad given that they have relatively recently emerged as global players and 
are, consequently, expected to possess less knowledge of, and experience with, operating in 
international markets (Xu and Meyer, 2013; Wright et al., 2005). Home country institutional 
environments are viewed as key determinants of firm resources and subsequently, market entry 
strategies for these firms (e.g., Brouthers et al., 2008a; Buckley, Clegg et al., 2007b) in which 
case EMMs’ firm advantages tend to be different from those possessed by DMMs. Many EMMs 
tend to start their international expansion by leveraging linkages with DMMs to lower their 
production costs and achieve cost leadership, confirming that EMMs tend to initially enter 
international markets with costs leadership strategies in order to exploit their advantages in low-
cost production (Bonaglia et al., 2007). Because EMMs have primarily learned from institutional 
ties and networks as well as joint venture arrangements facilitated by local governments (Wright 
et al., 2013), it may be difficult for them to distil the lessons learned and subsequently leverage 
this learning and experience in developed markets in which such structures and mechanisms do 
not exist. In other words, the process of learning and knowledge acquisition of EMMs may be 
conditioned, to some degree, by their local market and institutional environments. EMMs may, in 
fact, internationalise to acquire new resources that are not available in their home environments 
(Buckley, Clegg et al., 2007b; Yiu et al., 2007; Wan, 2005; Wang et al., 2012). In studies of 
(Chinese) EMMs, it was suggested that home government support affected risk-taking 
capabilities and reduced the importance of learning from prior knowledge and experience, 
thereby motivating inexperienced firms to enter developed host markets. Hence, despite lacking 
the experience of DMMs, EMMs are subject to home government intervention which increases 
the likelihood of their internationalisation (Deng, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2013; Wang et al, 2012).  
There is growing recognition that firms balance the exploitation of existing knowledge with an 
exploration of new knowledge in foreign markets to enhance their performance (Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010). Since EMMs’ limited international experience is linked with (re)entries into other 
emerging markets (generally more institutionally underdeveloped than their home country), 
Tsang and Yip (2007) summarised that EMMs engage in knowledge exploration in developed 
host markets and knowledge exploitation in other emerging markets (see also Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010). In this case, when re-entering emerging host markets, firms which themselves 
originate from countries characterised by weak institutional environments, i.e. EMMs, tend to be 
less deterred by host country policy risks and uncertainties due to their experience with operating 
in such idiosyncratic institutional environments at home (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Xu and 
Shenkar, 2002). Hence, rather than prior learning being a pre-requisite for re-entry, for EMMs 
which do not possess experience and knowledge advantages traditionally associated with 
DMMs, re-entry into developed markets becomes an incentive to (re)acquire such advantages.  
Hypothesis 1b: The more prior experience re-entrants possess, the more (less) likely 
they are to be EMMs re-entering emerging (developed) host markets.  
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Learning via modes of re-entry: Contextualising changes in re-entry commitment  
Traditionally, scholars have purported that the prior international knowledge and experience 
motivating DMMs would lead these firms to engage in foreign direct investment activities (into 
other institutionally stable, developed markets) by reducing the transaction costs associated with 
initial market entry (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Beamish and Banks, 1987; Buckley and 
Casson, 1976; Hisey and Caves, 1985). In turn, environmental uncertainty arising from entering 
underdeveloped markets is associated with higher costs which would potentially reduce initial 
benefits from (re)entering markets through high commitment modes (Brouthers, 2002; Luo, 2005; 
Meyer, 2001; Meyer et al., 2009; Yiu and Makino, 2002). Whereas prior studies found that DMMs 
entering developed markets opted for high resource commitment modes to avoid the risks of 
knowledge dissipation, the coercive power of institutions in many emerging markets stimulates 
uncertainty avoidance behaviour, increasing the likelihood of firms opting for lower commitment 
modes (Ma and Delios, 2007; Meyer, 2001). Hence, (re)entry commitment modes chosen by 
firms are based not solely on risk minimisation; firms choose commitment strategies that reduce 
risk by balancing control over critical assets with the attainment of new resources from local 
partners, to offset the liability of foreignness (Li et al., 2008b; Martin and Salomon, 2003; Meyer 
and Estrin, 2001). Host country environments are determinants of (re)entry commitment.  
Furthermore, firms are conditioned in their decision making by prior decisions that they have 
already tried and tested (Cyert and March, 1963) because current strategic decisions are not 
separable from previous decision making (Hannan et al., 2002; Rumelt, 1995) and once a 
decision has been made, the range of options available is perceived as reduced (Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007; Lu, 2002). In their study on the relevance of effectiveness of prior learning on 
foreign market entry decisions, Padmanabhan and Rao (1999: 28) explicitly supported the idea 
that “the relevancy and the extent of transferability of prior experience depend critically on the 
degree of similarity between the current decision and prior decisions” (see also Huang and 
Sternquist, 2007; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). As argued in previous chapters, since re-entry 
is a second entry into the market, this contention is most probably valid, particularly for re-entries 
into developed markets which are unlikely to have changed significantly during time-out. Past 
routines may have become a blueprint for how firms operate in the host market (Chang and 
Rosenzweig, 2001; Xia et al., 2009). Hence, both DMMs and EMMs may then make little efforts 
to divert from prior types of commitment when re-entering developed host markets. 
In regards to EMMs, as mentioned earlier, these firms were found to rely more on conventional 
sources of competitive advantage such as low-cost labour and a domination of home markets 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). From an organisational learning perspective, entry modes are 
conceptualised as a means to gain rapid access to knowledge and resources and achieve 
organisational transformation that would enable EMMs to reposition themselves in the global 
value chain and increase the number of their markets and industries (Bianchi, 2009; Hitt et al., 
2000; Kedia et al., 2012). Since it has been suggested that the tacit nature of resources and 
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capabilities that EMMs seek, such as managerial know-how, may not be easily acquired through 
market transactions, (re)entries via high resource commitment modes such as cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions are expected to help EMMs acquire complementary resources to 
overcome their competitive disadvantages (Gubbi, Aulakh et al., 2010; Luo and Tung, 2007) via 
asset enhancement (Kedia et al., 2012; Lin, 2010) and or asset acquisition (Deng and Yang, 
2015; Hitt et al., 2000; Lin, 2010; Rui and Yip, 2008). In turn, these strategic motivations are 
associated with the further global expansion of their businesses through exploratory learning 
(Kedia et al., 2012). Gubbi et al. (2010) and later Deng and Yang (2015) found that the likelihood 
of EMMs’ using entry modes to acquire vital resources via internationalisation is affected by host 
government effectiveness (i.e. whether the EMMs enters a developed or emerging host market).  
Other studies (e.g., Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Chen and Young, 2010; Hope, Thomas and Vyas, 
2011) have also added that EMMs are undeterred by poor previous performance when making 
entry commitment decisions in developed markets. Aybar and Ficici (2009) and later Chen and 
Young (2010) found a tendency for overpayment and engagement in high resource commitment 
modes in the case of Chinese MNEs even when the value-destroying impact of these acquisitions 
on shareholder value has been well documented. Hope et al. (2011) later also confirmed that 
due to lower cost of capital or capital received from governments, EMMs tend to increase the 
price offered to target firms in developed host markets irrespective of own prior performance or 
that of other firms operating in those markets. EMMs re-entering developed markets may be 
unlikely to change their strategies and thus, unlikely to alter their commitment upon re-entry. 
For re-entrants returning to less stable host markets, re-entering via the same modes in which 
they were operating prior to exit may not be a viable option. When exit was due to poor market 
performance, it may mean that the firm had little knowledge of how to operate in the market 
compared to its competitors (Nummela et al., 2016; Song, 2013) and consequently, may choose 
not to re-invest significant resources there when re-entering. On the other hand, re-entrants may 
wish to attain more control over their foreign operations and opt to escalate commitment upon 
re-entry, as it often the case with firms changing their mode of operation following initial entry 
often in response to emerging host market opportunities, i.e. from joint ventures to wholly owned 
subsidiaries (cf. Beamish, 1987). Both DMM and EMM re-entrants may choose to reduce the risk 
and uncertainties associated with high competition and or weaker institutional environments by 
altering their commitment (Gao et al., 2010; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; Wright et al., 2013). Hence, 
this study proposes that the commitment decisions of re-entrant DMMs and EMMs may not 
always differ. Following the rationale that commitment mode decisions are intertwined with the 
institutional environments in which firms operate, this study proposes that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Changes in commitment (escalation and de-escalation) are more (less) 
likely to occur when DMMs re-enter emerging (developed) host markets.  
Hypothesis 2b: Changes in commitment (escalation and de-escalation) are more (less) 
likely to occur when EMMs re-enter emerging (developed) host markets.  
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Who waits longer? Organisational learning and time-out 
As discussed earlier, the time-out period between exit and re-entry ranges from a short re-
evaluation of a firm’s activities in the host market (i.e. one year) to a long period of absence that 
may bring with it organisational forgetfulness and changes in the overall goals of the organisation. 
A disruption in organisational learning and routines such as one caused by market exit has also 
been associated with potential loss of competencies and disrupted ties with the environment and 
relevant stakeholders within it (e.g., Amburgey et al., 1993; March et al., 1991). Therefore, the 
longer the time-out period, the less likely it may be for re-entrants to access the prior knowledge 
and experience that they may have acquired in the past and which may have, to some degree, 
now dissipated. As previously shown in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 (pages 130-131), there are 
differences between re-entrants regarding the duration of time-out and its determinants.  
This section proposes that for re-entrant DMMs, returning to markets similar to their home market 
may mean that less time is necessary to unlearn pre-established routines or adapt to changes 
that may have occurred in the host environment. DMMs may also (re)enter non-developed 
market environments that may have undergone a series of institutional transitions during the 
time-out period, yet this may also mean that some of the intangible resources lost upon exit (i.e. 
business relationships, distribution partnerships) may be harder to recover in institutionally 
idiosyncratic environments than they would be when returning to developed host markets. DMMs 
are likely to be early re-entrants when returning to markets more institutionally similar to their 
home markets, i.e. DMMs are more likely to be early re-entrants into developed host markets.  
In regards to EMMs’ re-entry timing, since pioneering is probably not an option for most of these 
firms, particularly when entering or re-entering developed markets, EMMs are expected to follow 
a gradual expansion process as they learn about foreign markets and benefit from being market 
followers (Isobe et al., 2000; Da Rocha et al., 2012). Isobe et al. (2000) added that international 
expansion depends not only on the ability of firms to innovate and exploit technological 
advantages (i.e. DMMs); noting that being able to identify the institutional idiosyncrasies in host 
markets and secure strong relationships with local communities is increasingly viewed as a 
source of competitive advantage and an important motivation for early market entry in emerging 
market environments (see also Da Rocha et al., 2012; Henisz, 2003). EMMs are expected to 
possess such advantages when entering other emerging markets (Isobe et al., 2000; Da Rocha 
et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2009) and this may also apply to EMM re-entrants. In fact, for re-entrants 
this contention may be even more valid as re-entrant EMMs manage the uncertainties associated 
with re-entry following the previously failed attempt to perform in the host market, in which case, 
a more risk-averse attitude would be to wait longer prior to re-entering markets that are governed 
by potentially different institutional rules and norms as compared to the home market.  
At the same time, this study is proposing that the motivations of DMM and EMM re-entrants are 
more similar than those of DMM and EMM de novo entrants. Thus far, studies have shown that 
EMMs show high commitment in developed host markets, despite their expected resource and 
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knowledge disadvantages. Whilst EMMs may, indeed, perceive developed host markets as more 
uncertain, EMM re-entrants already possess some degree of experiential knowledge from their 
initial foray into those markets, which may reduce that initial liability of foreignness. Hence, I 
proposed that EMMs are also more likely to be early re-entrants into developed markets. 
In turn, re-entrants may face challenges in overcoming the institutional idiosyncrasies of 
emerging market host environments which may delay their re-entry, although this is expected to 
be particularly the case for DMMs re-entrants. Overall, DMMs and EMMs may wait longer to re-
enter emerging markets that are generally characterised by institutional under-development.  
Hypothesis 3a: DMMs are likely to re-enter developed markets earlier and be later re-
entrants into emerging markets. 
Hypothesis 3b: EMMs are likely to re-enter developed markets earlier and be later re-
entrants into emerging markets. 
 
Are DMMs’ and EMMs’ re-entries a response to host institutional changes? 
Scholars have proposed that compared to DMMs, EMMs expanding into emerging markets tend 
to be less sensitive to the institutional idiosyncrasies specific to those markets as they are similar 
to their home market environments and institutions (Lin, 2010; Yang et al., 2009; Wei, Zheng, 
Liu and Lu, 2014). However, as illustrated in previous chapters, the institutional pressures firms 
experienced prior to exit may no longer be relevant. In an organisational model that omits the 
role of changes in institutional pressures for legitimacy, firms would be expected to learn about 
foreign markets and continue their expansion with relative ease, thus benefitting from the learning 
and experience accumulated in the past (Oliver, 1992). Yet, for re-entrants, equally relevant are 
the host institutional changes that may have occurred in the time-out between exit and re-entry.  
Despite similarities and synchronisations in how the economies of emerging markets have 
opened up to foreign investments, institutional changes varied significantly (Chittoor et al., 2008; 
Hoskisson et al., 2000). While Central and Eastern European countries experienced rapid 
transitions to market-based economies, partly due to resources and skills brought in by foreign 
investors; in other emerging economies (e.g., China, Vietnam) the transition to a market-based 
economy was more evolutionary, with governments intervening significantly in firms’ foreign 
strategies (Hitt et al., 2004). Whereas strategising in these markets was not thought of as 
necessary in the past as these now emerging markets were closed to foreign investment, there 
are continuous institutional changes occurring in these economies that (re)entrants may need to 
navigate to regain legitimacy. Re-entry into emerging economies can bring institutional pressures 
because institutions are often plagued by poorly developed intellectual property laws and law 
enforcement mechanisms. The market share seeking strategies of local firms operating in 
emerging markets may also clash with the profit-seeking strategies particularly of DMMs 
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(Hoskisson et al., 2000). Such changes in institutional environments may then make 
institutionalised organisational practices redundant (Oliver, 1992; Peng, 2003) which may 
increase the level of uncertainty associated with strategic decisions and may even temporarily 
increase the costs of operating in emerging markets, particularly when there is resistance to 
change. In turn, favourable changes in host institutions attract re-entrants. 
EMMs tend to be viewed as less responsive to the institutions of host markets (Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010; Isobe et al., 2000), leading scholars to propose that organisational responses to 
host institutional transitions may be different between DMMs and EMMs. Scholars agree that 
EMMs’ strategic intents and subsequent (re)entry decisions are contingent on the rules set by 
their home governments, particularly in markets characterised by high government involvement 
(Gaur, Kumar and Singh, 2014; Yang et al., 2009; Wei et al., 2014). However, institutional voids 
may also make it difficult for EMMs to build reputable global brands and compete on the basis of 
their brands and not just their manufacturing and logistic capabilities (Bangara et al., 2012; Du 
and Boateng, 2015; Popli and Sinha, 2014), therefore challenging how EMMs exploit their 
resources and capabilities in other emerging markets. For re-entrants, host institutional voids 
contribute to the uncertainty that already exists around the re-entry process determining both 
DMMs and EMMs to (re)align their strategies with the host institutional changes.  
Consequently, this study hypothesises that both DMMs and EMMs are likely to re-enter host 
markets that have undergone some degree of favourable institutional changes. In turn, this study 
does not expect a significant relationship between host institutional changes and re-entry of either 
DMMs or EMMs into developed host markets; unsurprisingly, no notable institutional changes 
are expected to have occurred in developed host institutional environments to distinguish 
between EMMs’ and DMMs’ international re-entry decisions into those markets. 
Hypothesis 4a: DMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging markets that have 
undergone favourable institutional changes. 
Hypothesis 4b: EMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging markets that have 
undergone favourable institutional changes. 
 
Host market attractiveness 
As illustrated with empirical evidence in the previous chapter, rivalry and competition are 
important drivers of foreign market (re)entry timing decisions as firms tend to cluster with other 
firms when entering a host country that is viewed as most attractive (Fuentelsaz et al., 2002; 
Guillén, 2003; Li and Yao, 2010; Popli and Sinha, 2014; Yu and Ito, 1988). The presence of other 
foreign (re)entrants signals host market attractiveness to re-entrants, therefore acting as an 
incentive for foreign market re-entries. Scholars have observed that the phenomenon of 
clustering extends from foreign entrants imitating the international expansion behaviour of other 
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foreign entrants particularly when entering (or in this case re-entering) emerging host markets 
(e.g., Ang et al., 2015; Delios et al., 2008; Gaba et al., 2002; Guillén, 2003). Emerging markets 
have been traditionally characterised not only by a higher degree of uncertainty but also high 
attractiveness due to their potential for future growth (e.g., Chan et al., 2006; Cheng and Yu, 
2008; Guillén, 2002; 2003). Therefore, the presence of other foreign players in emerging host 
markets is expected to decrease the perceived uncertainty associated with these markets’ 
institutional inadequacies and increase the opportunity costs associated with operating there 
(Guillén, 2003). Since developed host markets have been characterised by decreased 
opportunities and market saturation and thus, considered to present less opportunities for growth 
in certain industries (e.g., Alexander, 1990; Freeman and Cavusgil, 2007; Popli and Sinha, 2014), 
the growing presence of foreign entrants in those markets too may represent a signal to DMMs 
of their attractiveness, thus potentially prompting re-entries.  
For re-entrants, the rationale is that returning to host markets that are perceived as attractive by 
other foreign players potentially carries legitimacy to an otherwise riskier decision (Fuentelsaz et 
al., 2002). Managers may consider that the risks of not investing in an attractive market may be 
higher than the financial losses incurred following exit, or the uncertainty associated with the re-
entry process. Most studies drawing on the sociological view of institutional theory, - which 
predicts an imitative, or isomorphic behaviour of MNEs in foreign markets (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991) -, have been primarily conducted on DMMs (e.g., Guillén, 2003; Huang and Sternquist, 
2007; Lu, 2002; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Consequently, this study proposes that DMMs are 
expected to reduce the uncertainty associated with re-entry by engaging in imitative behaviour.  
Hypothesis 5a: DMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging (developed) markets 
characterised by high market attractiveness. 
 
Fewer studies have examined whether EMMs also engage in imitative behaviour (Li and Yao, 
2010; Popli and Sinha, 2014). Li and Yao (2010) found that EMMs seldom imitated the behaviour 
of other firms when entering host markets characterised by uncertainty. Thus, in the case of 
EMMs’ foreign market (re)entries, following the behaviours of other organisations may also carry 
legitimacy to otherwise risky decisions. Having said this, more significant evidence exists 
showing that the international expansion decisions of EMMs are driven primarily by the need to 
acquire new resources from developed host market environments and exploit extant resources 
and capabilities in emerging host markets. Previous studies have generally concluded that home 
market intervention leads EMMs to opt for the entry strategies that carry most gains to their home 
institutions (Meyer et al., 2014; Rugman et al., 2014). Hence, the main push factors for EMMs’ 
international expansion consist of government pressures for internationalisation, in which case 
these firms are unlikely to also base their internationalisation decisions by imitating the behaviour 
of other foreign entrants in host markets (Zhao and Hsu, 2007). Additionally, EMMs are already 
relatively late to the internationalisation game, meaning that there will be a greater availability of 
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attractive markets they can re-enter. I propose that the presence of foreign entrants, on its own, 
is unlikely to act as neither a deterrent nor a stimulus for EMMs re-entrants. 
Hypothesis 5b: There will be no observable effect of host market attractiveness on 
EMMs’ re-entries, irrespective of the host markets re-entered. 
 
Re-entrants’ strategic behaviour: Why do DMMs and EMMs re-enter foreign markets? 
Firms make foreign market (re)entry decisions that serve their strategic objectives and 
behaviours (Cui and Jiang, 2009). Foreign market (re)entry decisions may be motivated by a 
firm’s intent to acquire strategic assets that it would otherwise be unable to access (Rui and Yip, 
2008; Wright et al., 2005) and or exploit opportunities for growth by capturing new markets for 
their products (Isobe et al., 2000). In turn, the types of resources and capabilities firms seek is 
expected to vary with their market context (i.e. developed or emerging) (e.g., Chan et al., 2006; 
Chittoor et al., 2008; Hitt et al., 2000; 2004; Luo and Tung, 2007; Peng, 2003).  
Particularly, the extant literature on EMMs’ international activities posits that EMMs’ motivations 
to expand internationally are fundamentally different from DMMs’ foreign market (re)entry 
motives (for recent reviews see Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012; Wright et al., 2013). In a 
notable study, Hitt et al. (2000, p. 450) argue that “although there may be some similarities in the 
resources emerging and developed market firms seek from [international] partners, there are 
differences in the importance each places on certain resources, capabilities, and characteristics”. 
The underlying rationale here is that foreign market (re)entry does not occur in a vacuum, but it 
is in turn nested within the social, political and economic environment in which the firm operates 
(Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999; Hitt et al., 2000). For DMMs, given the saturation of their home 
markets, these firms may pursue strategic intents of a global orientation by entering or re-entering 
a foreign market to use it as a springboard for subsequent internationalisation in the host region 
(Cui and Jiang, 2009; Javalgi et al., 2011; Morck et al., 2008). As shown in Chapter 5, whether 
or not the host markets firms return to are strategically important for the re-entrant firms is an 
important determinant of re-entry. Strategically important markets (that warrant the risks and 
uncertainties associated with re-entry) are often seen as platforms to subsequently (re)enter 
other countries within the host region, particularly for DMMs (Cui and Jiang, 2009). 
Also, the removal of regulatory barriers has been cited as an important driver of (re)entry (e.g., 
Cardon et al., 2011; Chan et al., 2006; Nummela et al., 2016; Peng, 2003); firms may become 
victims of changing circumstances in their external environments that are beyond their control 
and can lead to involuntary market exits. Involuntary exit motives generally refer to forces resting 
within the environments of home and host markets that are not conducive to business 
development and can impede the continuation of a firm’s activities such as regulations against 
foreign investment and or the nationalisation of industries (Cardon et al., 2011; Hoskisson and 
Turk, 1990). In such contexts, firms are generally forced to exit the host market, most often 
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irrespective of their performance prior to exit (Fletcher, 2001); and re-enter most probably when 
the negative feedback from governments and regulators is no longer a threat to their operations 
in that market. Because re-entry is not a discrete occurrence and is inter-linked with market exit 
and de novo entry (Javalgi et al., 2011), re-entrants may use time out to develop or acquire the 
necessary resources and capabilities to successfully re-enter that market. For DMMs in 
particular, their expansion tends to be shaped by these firms’ abilities to organise their resources 
and revisit their market strategies (Hitt et al., 2000; 2004), as well as the entrepreneurial 
orientation and opportunity recognition capabilities of managers (notably, Ireland et al., 2001).  
Variations between the motivations to re-enter are expected to exist between DMMs and EMMs 
as their home environments differ significantly. For instance, in emerging economies such as 
China, EMMs’ (re)entry decisions are expected to be almost entirely driven by the home 
government and government relationships which subsequently shape EMMs’ own strategic 
motivations (Buckley, Clegg et al., 2007b). In other emerging countries also (e.g. Brazil) 
international expansion was found to occur through government supported institutions with these 
political relationships driving expansion for EMMs as they are yet to be replaced with commercial 
relationships (Turner, 2011). Recently, Du and Boateng (2015) found that home governments 
shape the strategies and strategic motivations of EMMs according to the industries in which 
prominent home institutions have a stake. Therefore, unlike their developed market counterparts 
seeking to exploit their capabilities abroad, as well as to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
saturated Western markets by expanding into emerging host locations with potential for growth, 
EMMs are expected to (re)enter foreign markets in order to gain access to new resources and 
organisational learning that would facilitate their expansion as global players and reinforce their 
position in their own home markets (Hitt et al., 2000; 2004). Even here the distinction can be 
made that DMMs seek to attain knowledge about operating in underdeveloped markets, whilst 
EMMs (which have grown at a faster pace, yet remain less resource-endowed) seek specific 
resources and capabilities such as technical and managerial knowledge (Luo and Tung, 2007).  
Overall, the extant literature on the market entries of developed and emerging market firms is in 
strong agreement that EMMs’ strategic intents, and (re)entry motivations are likely to be 
contingent on the rules set by their home governments, in which case the motivations of the firms 
themselves to enter or in this case, re-enter foreign markets have been significantly understated 
in the literature. Given the growing body of literature that conforms to the idea that EMMs and 
DMMs differ significantly in their international expansion motivations (with little focus on what 
those specific differences may be), this study also acknowledges the importance of exploring the 
motivations of both DMMs and EMMs to re-enter. I propose that, 
Hypothesis 6: Motivations to re-enter may vary between DMMs and EMMs irrespective 
of host markets re-entered.   
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Method 
Data Source and Sample Selection 
As mentioned in previous chapters in more detail, data comes principally from business 
information and research databases Factiva (Dow Jones) and LexisNexis (Reed Elsevier), which 
aggregate content from a large number of licensed and reliable data sources (e.g., Li et al., 2008). 
The rationale for this choice of data sources is that there are no pre-existent databases from 
which to draw data concerning re-entrants (see Chapter 3 on methodology). To the best of my 
knowledge, this database represents the most up-to-date information on re-entry. 
 
Variables  
Dependent variable  
The dependent variable represents the different combinations of home and host market 
locations, classified in terms of their level of economic and institutional development. FTSE 
Russell Index was used for an objective and consistent classification of home and host countries; 
the FTSE index provides a classification of “developed” and “emerging” markets using a widely 
accepted range of criteria developed by working closely with institutional investors. The four 
combinations of home-host locations (i.e. “DMM-developed”, “DMM-emerging”; “EMM-
developed”, “EMM-emerging”) were then computed for four separate dichotomous variables. For 
instance, the variable “DMM-developed” measured whether the re-entrant was a developed 
market firm re-entering a developed host market, whilst the variable “EMM-emerging” represents 
an emerging market firm re-entering an emerging host market and so on.  
 
Independent Variables 
Firm experience 
As a reminder, experience is measured as follows; general experience intensity, host experience 
intensity, general experience diversity, host experience diversity and host market experiential 
knowledge. These measures of experience are particularly relevant here given the extant 
research on EMMs’ international activities (e.g. Luo, Xue and Han, 2010; Rugman et al., 2014) 
which highlights that EMMs’ tend to possess less general international experience and overall, 
tend to be more endowed with host region-specific experience resources. 
Changes in commitment 
Changes in commitment represent the difference (if any) in the firm’s mode of operation in the 
host market prior to exit and the mode of re-entry. Consequently, a firm can escalate 
153 
 
commitment, de-escalated commitment or re-enter via the same commitment mode. Searches 
in Factiva and LexisNexis allowed coding this variable (see Chapter 4 for more details). 
Time-out 
Time-out represents the time spent out for the host market, i.e. the time elapsed between the 
year of exit and year of re-entry. Factiva and LexisNexis were used to identify when re-entrants 
had exited and re-entered the market in order to calculate the time-out period accordingly. 
Institutional change 
Data on institutional factors was collected from the Economic Freedom of the World Index and is 
an aggregate measure of five factors, namely 1) size of government, 2) legal system and 
intellectual property rights, 3) sound money, 4) freedom to trade internationally, and 5) regulation 
(e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Jory and Ngo, 2014; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). 
Institutional change is measured at the time t-1 of exit and t-1 of re-entry; i.e. institutional change 
= (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit. As per previous studies (e.g., Bae and Salomon, 2010; Hernandez 
and Nieto, 2015), the focus here is on the magnitude of host institutional change in order to 
assess whether it is DMMs or EMMs (or both) that respond to cues in their host environments.  
Host market attractiveness 
This study measures host market attractiveness at (t-1) re-entry with a one-year lag prior to the 
firm re-entering; this variable is calculated with a logarithm transformation. This data was 
collected for each year and for each country from the World Bank database and is calculated as 
the value of net inflows (new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the reporting economy 
from foreign investors, and is divided by the country’s GDP. This is a continuous variable, i.e. the 
higher the value the more FDI into the host market at the time of t-1 re-entry.  
Market re-entry motives 
Motives for re-entry were also coded from Factiva and LexisNexis and categorised into: “more 
resources” (whether the firm acquired resources that enable it to re-enter), “changes in strategy” 
(whether the firm returned with a different product, price or distribution strategy), “strategic intent” 
(i.e. re-entry is part of broader expansion plan) and “institutional pull” (i.e. removal of regulatory 
and other institutional barriers in the host market). Motives for re-entering the market are 
therefore four dichotomous variables (1;0) that were identified from the news articles and were 
subsequently analysed and coded into the database. This data is based on either the views of 
CEOs via interviews published in the news outlets, an objective analysis of the re-entry event in 
the news outlets (generally by industry analysts) or most often, both sources.11 
                                                          
11 It should be mentioned here that re-entrants may report two or more motives to re-enter as they are not mutually 
exclusive; and can therefore simultaneously take the value of “1” in the coding process. This is also further reflected in 
the lack of multicollinearity reflected in the value of the VIF factors in Table 6.2 below.  
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Control variables 
This study accounted for firm size, which has been associated with firms possessing more 
resources in order to engage in higher risk and resource commitment, and measured it as the 
value of total assets with a logarithm transformation at the time of (t-1) re-entry (Gao and Pan, 
2010). Furthermore, since older firms are more likely to show signs of inertia that may prevent 
them from changing their entry mode patterns (Guillén, 2002; Hannan and Freeman, 1984), firm 
age was controlled for and computed as the number of years from when the firm had been 
founded up to one year prior to re-entry. Some notable studies (e.g., Araujo and Rezende, 2003) 
also suggested that management can alter the direction of an MNE’s international path or re-
shape it altogether; thus, changes in management measures whether the CEO has changed up 
to three years prior to re-entry. Because a firm could engage in more than one re-entry event, I 
documented whether a firm has been present in the host market through a different division in 
the same/different sector at the time of re-entry. As illustrated previously, MNEs which have 
maintained close ties with host markets by operating there via other businesses tend to be more 
confident with their host market operations and more likely to, for instance, re-enter earlier.  
Changing economic factors in the host market have been associated with increased potential for 
market growth (Javalgi et al., 2011), thus changes in host market growth are measured as the 
changes in GDP/capita; i.e. host market growth change = (t-1) re-entry – (t-1) exit. In addition, 
scholars drawing on resource and institution based rationales also pointed out that the unique 
competitive pressures in each industry result in different motivations for, and levels of, resource 
acquisition, and thus, different degrees of internationalisation for firms (Yang et al., 2009; Wei et 
al., 2014). When international competitors entered the consumer electronics sector in China, 
incumbent firms were pushed to establish wholly owned subsidiaries in developed host markets 
to gain direct access to resources, marketing and R&D capabilities that could then be transferred 
back home (cf. Yang et al., 2009). This study too, controls for industry effects in that four industry 
dummies are added for the automotive, retail, financial services and consumer electronics 
because almost 60 percent of the total sample of reported re-entry events consists of firms 
operating in these four industries.  
The standard deviations and pairwise correlations for all the variables are reported in Table 6.1, 
whilst the means and the variance inﬂation factors (VIFs) are reported in Table 6.2. As shown in 
Table 6.2, the VIFs range between 1.03 and 3.13, suggesting no serious problems of 
multicollinearity for the multivariate analysis (Field, 2009).  
 
Model specification 
The dependent variable(s) is(are) modelled using a binary logistic regression model. This 
statistical method was applied due to the characteristics of each of the dependent variables, 
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which is, a categorical variable with two alternative outcomes for each of the four sub-samples; 
and the mix of both continuous and categorical predictor variables which affect the odds of 
choosing one alternative sub-sample over another. In this way one is able to estimate the effect 
of the explanatory variables on the probability that the re-entrant belongs to one of the four home-
host sub-samples namely, DMMs re-entering emerging markets (Q1: “DMM-EM”); DMMs re-
entering developed markets (Q2: “DMM-DEV”); EMMs re-entering developed markets (Q3: 
“EMM-DEV”); and EMMs re-entering emerging markets (Q4: “EMM-EM”). In each of the four 
regression models, the dependent variable was compared with the remainder of the sample (i.e. 
“1” if the firm was a DMM re-entering a developed host market and “0” otherwise, and so on).  
Robustness checks  
Thus far the foreign market entry literature has only engaged with whether firms differ either 
according to the home country or according to the host countries targeted. For robustness 
checks, this study ran a simple binomial regression model analysis by comparing the decisions 
made by DMMs and EMMs where the host market (developed versus emerging) was only 
included as a control variable (see results of the regression models in Appendix 4). As shown in 
Appendix 4, the strategy of pairing the home and host markets and comparing each group with 
the remaining sample of firms is the most suitable to test the hypotheses, since comparing DMMs 
and EMMs without considering the markets re-entered did not render significant results. These 
findings build on the discussion in previous chapters regarding the relevance of host institutional 
environments to firm strategic decisions, such as foreign market re-entry.  
Some additional statistical testing has also been conducted to confirm that the difference 
observed between DMMs and EMMs (and naturally, between EMMs and DMMs re-entering 
emerging versus developed markets) is a true difference and not a random effect (statistical 
artefact) caused by skewed sampling (Shavelson, 1988). Independent-Samples t-tests have 
been conducted particularly to compare whether the re-entry timing of DMMs and EMMs differed 
significantly and whether there are significant differences in their host experiential knowledge.   
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for re-entry location patterns (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼0.10) 
Variables 
Std. 
Dev. 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
(1) Home developed 0.3 1020 1                          
(2) Host developed 0.4 1020 -.01 1                         
(3) Host experience intensity 33.8 986 
.16 
** 
-.09 
** 
1                        
(4) General experience intensity 38.9 997 
.19 
** 
-.17 
** 
.82 
** 
1                       
(5) Host experience diversity  8.0 907 
.09 
** 
-.14 
** 
.22 
** 
.22 
** 
1                      
(6) General experience diversity 57.4 901 
.21 
** 
-.16 
** 
.24 
** 
.30 
** 
.55 
** 
1                     
(7) Host experiential knowledge  17.6 975 
.08 
** 
-.01 
.42 
** 
.37 
** 
.10 
** 
.16 
** 
1                    
(8) No changes in commitment 0.4 976 
-
.07* 
.07* 
-
.08* 
-.08 
** 
-
.08* 
-.03 -.01 1                   
(9) Commitment escalation 0.3 976 .01 
-
.08* 
-.01 .01 .04 .01 -.01 
-.64 
** 
1                  
(10) Commitment de-escalation 0.3 976 
.08 
** 
-.02 
.12 
** 
.10*
* 
.06 .03 .01 
-.62 
** 
-.19 
** 
1                 
(11) Time-out 10.5 974 .06* 
-.14 
** 
.41 
** 
.37 
** 
.12 
** 
.06* 
.13 
** 
-
.07* 
-.02 
.11 
** 
1                
(12) Host institutional changes 0.6 874 -.02 
-.27 
** 
.16 
** 
.15 
** 
.07* .05 .06 
-.09 
** 
.06 .05 
.48 
** 
1               
(13) Host market attractiveness 4.2 981 -.01 
.12 
** 
-.04 
-
.06* 
.01 -.05 -.02 .06 
-.08 
** 
.01 -.02 -.09 1              
(14) Motives for re-entry: More 
resources  
0.3 1020 .02 .07* .01 -.01 -.01 -.05 -.04 .01 .02 -.03 .01 -.02 .06* 1             
(15) Motives for re-entry: Strategic 
intent 
0.4 1020 .04 
-
.06* 
.01 -.00 .00 -.03 .00 .00 -.02 .02 .00 .06 .06 .02 1            
(16) Motives for re-entry: Changes in 
strategy 
0.4 1020 -.01 
.15 
** 
-.08 
** 
-.09 
** 
.03 .03 -.05 -.02 .01 .02 
-.17 
** 
-.13 
** 
.04 
-.10 
** 
.34 
** 
1           
(17) Motives for re-entry: Institutional 
pull 
0.4 1020 -.05 
-.20 
** 
.10 
** 
.13 
** 
.02 .04 .03 -.03 .03 .01 
.26 
** 
.21 
** 
-.15 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.31 
** 
-.35 
** 
1          
(18) Firm age 48.6 1020 
.23 
** 
-.17 
** 
.52 
** 
.65 
** 
.09 
** 
.16 
** 
.28 
** 
-.05 .01 .07* 
.23 
** 
.15 
** 
-.05 -.04 .06* 
-
.07* 
.08 
** 
1         
(19) Firm size 3.3 988 
.21 
** 
-
.07* 
.33 
** 
.37 
** 
.27 
** 
.36 
** 
.20 
** 
-.11 
** 
.05 
.09 
** 
.16 
** 
.09 
** 
-.04 .00 
-
.06* 
-.03 
.11 
** 
.36 
** 
1        
(20) Changes in management 0.4 1020 .07* .04 .05 .06* .04 .05 
.09 
** 
-.01 .01 .01 .03 
-
.06* 
.02 .07* .01 -.01 -.01 
.10 
** 
.18 
** 
1       
(21) Already present in the market 0.4 1020 .04 
.08 
** 
.14 
** 
.16 
** 
.14 
** 
.27 
** 
.10 
** 
.00 -.01 .01 -.02 
-
.07* 
-.02 -.01 .02 
.11 
** 
-.15 
** 
.10 
** 
.26 
** 
.10 
** 
1      
(22) Automotive 0.4 1020 .05 -.03 
.21 
** 
.25 
** 
.26 
** 
.43 
** 
.14 
** 
-.05 .03 .04 
.10 
** 
.05 -.05 .02 -.01 .05 -.05 .04 
.20 
** 
.04 
.18 
** 
1     
(23) Retail 0.3 1020 .05 .05 
-.17 
** 
-.18 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.16 
** 
-.11 
** 
-.05 .03 .02 
-.09 
** 
-.06 
.08 
** 
-.01 .07* 
.11 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.05 
-.18 
** 
-.01 
-.13 
** 
-.17 
** 
1    
(24) Financial 0.3 1020 
.08 
** 
-
.06* 
.24 
** 
.24 
** 
-.19 
** 
-.22 
** 
.07* -.02 -.03 .06* 
.11 
** 
.05 .02 -.00 .07* 
-.16 
** 
.10 
** 
.35 
** 
.19 
** 
-.01 -.04 
-.22 
** 
-.15 
** 
1   
(25) Consumer electronics 0.2 1020 -.03 .01 -.04 -.01 .04 .07* .01 -.03 .04 .00 
-
.07* 
-.01 -.05 -.02 -.01 
.08 
** 
-.04 -.05 -.01 .00 
.16 
** 
-.14 
** 
-.10 
** 
-.13 
** 
1  
(26) Host market growth 0.2 813 -.06 .03 -.01 -.06 -.04 
-
.09* 
-.06 .05 .01 
-
.08* 
.05 -.01 
.10 
** 
.04 .05 
.12 
** 
-.20 
** 
-
.07* 
-.04 -.04 .07* .04 .01 .01 .01 1 
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Table 6.2: Collinearity diagnostics for re-entry location patterns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results  
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 reflect some initial statistical analysis comparing DMMs and EMMs.12 
Broadly, both DMMs and EMMs tend to rely on non-equity modes of commitment such as 
licensing and franchising both in terms of their initial market foray (see Figure 6.1) and when re-
entering previously exited markets (see Figure 6.2). This is perhaps more surprising for EMMs 
as they have been expected to expand into developed markets mainly via acquisitions. In fact, 
the overall proportion of modes tends to change only when (DMM and EMM) firms re-enter 
emerging host markets where wholly owned subsidiaries are overall more popular than joint 
equity modes of re-entry. In turn, the experience profiles and the time-out period of DMMs and 
EMMs share both differences and similarities. Overall, Meanexperiential knowledge_EMMs=12.38 is lower 
than the Meanexperiential knowledge_DMMs=16.89, whilst the Meantime-out_EMMs= 7.28 is also lower than 
the Meantime-out_DMMs= 9.36. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that the highest mean for “host 
experiential knowledge” is for DMMs re-entering emerging host markets. This said, EMM and 
                                                          
12 Although this study does not focus specifically on comparing DMMs and EMMs, the analysis includes some statistical 
analysis such as cross-tabulations and Independent-Sample t Tests.  
Variable name Mean 
Collinearity 
Tolerance 
VIFs 
DMM into developed 0.28 0.82 1.21 
EMM into emerging 0.04 0.95 1.05 
EMM into developed 0.09 0.94 1.06 
Changes in commitment 0.49 0.82 1.22 
Commitment escalation 0.24 0.79 1.26 
Commitment de-escalation 0.25 0.77 1.30 
Host experiential knowledge 16.28 0.77 1.31 
General experience intensity 55.20 0.32 3.13 
Host experience intensity 42.71 0.33 3.01 
General experience diversity 69.00 0.63 1.59 
Host experience diversity 11.25 0.68 1.48 
Time-out  9.08 0.86 1.17 
Host institutional changes 0.26 0.88 1.13 
Host market attractiveness 2.80 0.96 1.03 
Motives for re-entry: More resources 0.15 0.86 1.15 
Motives for re-entry: Strategic intent 0.52 0.62 1.59 
Motives for re-entry: Changes in strategy 0.35 0.58 1.71 
Motives for re-entry: Institutional pull 0.25 0.57 1.73 
Firm age 76.81 0.53 1.91 
Firm size 8.29 0.66 1.51 
Changes in management 0.47 0.93 1.08 
Already present in the market 0.23 0.76 1.32 
Automotive sector 0.21 0.65 1.54 
Retail sector 0.11 0.81 1.23 
Financial services 0.17 0.70 1.43 
Consumer electronics sector 0.08 0.87 1.15 
Host market growth 0.93 0.89 1.12 
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DMM re-entrants are similar concerning their experiential knowledge, i.e. how long they have 
spent in the market prior to exit, when re-entering developed host markets (Q1=16.30; Q2=15).  
In regards to “time-out”, DMMs re-entering developed markets are statistically different from 
DMMs re-entering emerging markets (6.93<10.56, p<0.001). EMMs are more similar in regards 
to time-out duration irrespective of the host markets re-entered although they also re-enter 
developed markets somewhat earlier (7.16<7.33, p<0.05). Perhaps surprisingly, there are lesser 
differences in how long DMMs and EMMs wait to re-enter developed host markets (Q1=6.93; 
Q3=7.16). As discussed later, re-entrant EMMs may be a new breed of EMMs which may not 
suffer from the same knowledge and experience disadvantages associated with de novo EMMs. 
Perhaps re-entrant EMMs share more similarities than differences with re-entrant DMMs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: DMMs and EMMs commitment and experience at the time of market exit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: DMMs and EMMs commitment and time-out at the time of market re-entry 
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Furthermore, the empirical results of the regression models are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. 
The estimated coefficients as shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 should be interpreted as the amount 
of increase (or decrease, if the sign of the coefficient is negative) in the predicted log odds of the 
dependent variable that would be predicted by a 1 unit increase (or decrease) in the predictor 
variable. The dependent variables here are Q1 (DMM into emerging), Q2 (DMM into developed) 
(Table 6.3) and Q3 (EMM into emerging), Q4 (EMM into developed) (Table 6.4). As illustrated in 
the logistic regression tables, the predictor variables chosen are highly relevant in most models. 
Model 1 in Table 6.3 reports the baseline estimation. Firm age increases the likelihood of firms 
belonging to Q1 (DMMs into emerging) and decreases the likelihood of firms belonging to Q2, 
Q3 and Q4. The older the firm, the more likely it is to be a DMM re-entering an emerging market. 
EMMs tend to be younger firms or firms newer to internationalisation. Similarly, firm size tends 
to have a negative effect on the likelihood of firms belonging to Q4 (EMMs re-entering emerging 
markets) and a positive effect on Q1 (DMM re-entering emerging markets). Also interesting is 
that being present in a different sector in the host market has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of firms belonging in Q1 and a negative effect for firms in Q2, and no effect concerning EMM re-
entry. Whilst EMMs have not been around for as long, DMMs may transfer knowledge and return 
to emerging markets where they already have a presence in, whilst in developed markets, the 
institutional proximity may make the need for such continuous market presence less critical.  
Models 2-16 add the hypothesised effects; Model 2 (Table 6.3) and Model 10 (Table 6.4) add the 
main effects of prior experience types. Hypotheses 1a received support in the statistical model, 
in that more experience does appear to increase the likelihood of re-entrants being DMMs 
returning to emerging markets, particularly relevant being general experience intensity (β=0.01, 
p<0.01) and general experience diversity (β=0.01, p<0.001). Furthermore, prior experience 
decreases the likelihood of re-entrants being DMMs returning to developed markets. Hypothesis 
1b is also supported in Model 10. Specifically, whilst general experience diversity decreases the 
likelihood of re-entrants being EMMs returning to emerging host markets, host experience 
diversity is positively related to EMMs re-entering emerging markets. EMM re-entrants’ 
experience is predominantly within the host market region, which also tends to be their home 
region (see Appendix 5). Indeed, most EMM re-entrants have had less time as internationalisers 
and are therefore less likely to have the diversity of experience possessed by DMMs and more 
likely to possess host region experience resources that can be leveraged for re-entry.  
When Model 3 tested for the effects of changes in commitment on DMMs location choices, results 
confirmed that DMMs are less likely to change (i.e. escalate) commitment when re-entering 
developed markets (β=-0.36, p<0.10). In turn, no support was found that DMMs are more likely 
to change commitment when re-entering emerging markets, thus, Hypothesis 2a is only partly 
supported. In turn, there is support for Hypothesis 2b in that EMMs are more likely to escalate 
commitment when re-entering emerging markets (β=0.53, p<0.10) and less likely to escalate (β=-
0.91, p<0.10) and de-escalate (β=-1.91, p<0.10) when re-entering developed host markets. 
160 
 
These findings are in contrast to the view that, DMMs and EMMs differ significantly in their 
commitment choices into developed markets (Wei et al., 2014). Similar to DMMs, EMMs continue 
to pursue strategic goals via the same mode of commitment in developed markets, whilst the 
latter appear to escalate commitment perhaps to adapt to changes in emerging markets.  
Initially, no statistical support was found for Hypotheses 3a and 3b in the regression model to 
suggest that either DMMs or EMMs are more likely to spend more or less time out of developed 
or emerging markets. In turn, the t-Test results discussed earlier (page 157) supported both 
Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b in that DMMs spend a longer time out when re-entering 
emerging markets and less time out when returning to developed markets (see Figure 6.2, Q1 
and Q2). EMMs also spend a longer time out when re-entering emerging markets and less time 
out when re-entering developed host markets (see Figure 6.2, Q3 and Q4). Particularly, one 
explanation for EMMs’ re-entry behaviour may be that the opportunity in developed markets may 
be perceived as higher than the uncertainty associated with home-host market distances. An 
early movement (or in this case, a speedy return) may create barriers for follower firms and 
ensure privileged access to key resources, customers, partners and distribution channels.  
Hypothesis 4a predicted that firms in Q1, i.e. DMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging markets 
that have undergone institutional changes. Hypothesis 4a is supported in Model 5 which shows 
a positive effect of host institutional changes on the likelihood of firms belonging in Q1 (β=1.25, 
p<0.001) and a negative effect on the likelihood of firms in Q2, i.e. DMMs re-entering developed 
host markets (β=-1.24, p<0.001). Hypothesis 4b is also supported in that the likelihood of re-
entrants being EMMs re-entering an emerging market also increases with the degree of 
favourable institutional changes (β=1.02, p<0.001) and is negative in Q4. EMMs are, in fact, also 
sensitive to the institutional changes in emerging markets when deciding where to re-enter.  
Hypothesis 5a predicted that DMMs are more susceptible to imitative behaviour. Indeed, whilst 
there is a positive and significant effect of host market attractiveness on DMMs re-entering 
developed markets (β=0.06, p<0.001), the effect is negative for firms in DMMs re-entering 
emerging markets (β=-0.05, p<0.001), thus only partially supporting Hypothesis 5a. Perhaps a 
growth in the concentration of other foreign (re)entrants in the host market during time-out is not 
the reason for which DMMs re-enter host emerging markets; DMMs may re-enter to achieve first 
mover advantages in growing markets rather than follow other foreign (re)entrants into those 
markets. Hypothesis 5b was supported as EMMs tend not to be influenced by host attractiveness.  
Finally, this study tested for the re-entry motives of DMMs and EMMs. Some interesting results 
were found here revealing that overall, EMMs’ and DMMs’ re-entry motivations are similar when 
re-entering developed markets but differ when re-entering emerging host markets, thus providing 
partial support for Hypothesis 6. Specifically, DMMs re-enter emerging host markets, in part, due 
to host government motivations or removal of barriers that prevented them from operating in the 
market previously. DMMs also have a tendency not to change strategy when re-entering 
emerging markets, whilst both EMMs and DMMs tend to be less likely to use developed host 
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markets as platforms for further expansion within the host region. In turn, DMMs are more likely 
to pursue host regional expansion via re-entry into emerging markets. Overall, results confirm 
the initial proposition of this study, namely that there are both similarities and differences in 
DMMs’ and EMMs’ foreign market re-entry motivations and subsequent re-entry strategies. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Extant literature has focused generally on whether differences between DMMs and EMMs exist 
and not on what drives the decisions of DMMs and EMMs in the context of different types of 
foreign expansion decisions. This study focuses on what drives DMMs and EMMs to re-enter 
foreign markets. Foreign market re-entry is a viable decision for both DMMs and EMMs, and, 
contrary to previous research, this study found both differences but mostly similarities in their re-
entry determinants and subsequent re-entry decisions. Although much remains to be discussed 
particularly concerning the re-entry behaviour of EMMs, some interesting findings exist. 
Key findings concerning the determinants and subsequent re-entry decisions of DMM and EMM 
re-entrants are as follows: (1) DMMs with more experience resources exhibit a general tendency 
to leverage their learning by re-entering emerging host markets, whilst EMMs’ experience is 
mostly regional; (2) a highly uncertain host environment such as that of emerging markets 
prompts both EMMs and DMMs to re-enter emerging markets that have undergone more 
favourable institutional changes; (3) DMMs are likely to display imitative behaviour on re-entry; 
(4) the motivations of EMMs and DMMs to re-enter are similar when re-entering developed 
markets but differ when re-entering emerging markets; (5)  both DMMs and EMMs are late re-
entrants in emerging markets and early re-entrants in developed markets; and (6) both DMMs 
and EMMs tend to re-enter developed host markets in the same manner in which they operated 
prior to exit. Findings indicate that there are both similarities and differences between DMM and 
EMM re-entrants, with more similarities found when exploring re-entry into developed markets. 
There are various implications for theory and practice. First, whilst previous studies underscore 
the many differences between DMMs’ and EMMs’ de novo entry motivations and strategic 
decisions (e.g., Buckley et al., 2012; Luo and Tung, 2007; Mathews, 2006; Peng, 2004; Lin, 
2010), this study found some differences, but mostly similarities between DMM and EMM re-
entrants. These similarities are even more evident when DMMs and EMMs re-enter developed 
host market environments, characterised by institutional stability and perhaps leading to more 
homogeneity in strategic motivations. As previously suggested (Buckley et al., 2012; Pan et al., 
2014), DMMs re-entering emerging markets tend to have more experience than DMMs re-
entering developed markets as well as compared to EMM re-entrants as the latter have arrived 
later to the internationalisation game and have, unsurprisingly, not accumulated general 
international experience from which to draw learning from. For EMM re-entrants which possess 
international experience, this experience is most likely associated with the host markets re-
entered which, indeed tend to be within EMM re-entrants’ home regions (Rugman et al., 2014). 
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Table 6.3: Results of the regression models for location patterns of DMMsa,b 
Variables  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: Q1: Q2: 
Dev-
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Dev-
Em 
Dev-Dev 
Dev-
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Dev- 
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Dev- 
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Dev- 
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Dev- 
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Dev- 
Em 
Dev-
Dev 
Constant  -0.68 0.72 -1.50 0.93 -0.99 1.06 -0.68 0.82 -1.25 1.35 -0.66 0.76 -0.87 0.46 -1.16 0.87 
Host experiential knowledge   -0.01 0.01           -0.01 0.01 
General experience intensity   0.01** -0.01**           0.01** -0.01** 
Host experience intensity   -0.01* -0.01**           -0.01* 0.01* 
General experience diversity   0.01*** -0.01**           0.01*** -0.01* 
Host experience diversity   -0.01 -0.00           -0.01 0.00 
Commitment escalation vs. no 
change 
    0.28 -0.36┼         -0.01 0.06 
Commitment de-escalation vs. no 
change 
    0.05 0.21         -0.07 -0.52* 
Time-out       -0.01 0.01       -0.09*** 0.10*** 
Host institutional changes         1.25*** 
-
1.24*** 
    1.24*** -1.73*** 
Host market attractivenessb           -0.05** 0.06***   -0.04┼ 0.03┼ 
Motives for re-entry: More resources             -0.19 0.18 -0.03 0.123 
Motives for re-entry: Changes in 
strategy 
            -0.30┼ 0.22 -0.40┼ 0.43┼ 
Motives for re-entry: Strategic intent             0.30┼ -0.35┼ 0.06 0.05 
Motives for re-entry: Institutional pull             0.84*** -1.61*** 0.13 -0.80* 
Controls                  
Firm age 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01*** -0.00 0.01*** -0.00* 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01*** -0.00* 0.01*** -0.01** 0.01*** -0.01*** 0.01* -0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.06** 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.06** -0.01 0.06** -0.00 0.07** -0.01 0.09*** 0.00 0.08*** -0.00 0.05┼ -0.01 
Changes in management 0.28┼ -0.31* 0.18 -0.20 0.27┼ -0.28┼ 0.27┼ -0.32* 0.26┼ -0.28┼ 0.22 -0.31* 0.22 -0.32* 0.08 -0.09 
Already present in the market 0.70*** -0.76*** 1.01*** -0.89*** 0.67*** 
-
0.76*** 
0.70*** 
-
0.78*** 
0.58** -0.61** 0.70*** 
-
0.77*** 
0.56** -0.55** 0.86*** -0.64** 
Automotive sector -0.49* 0.35 -0.03 0.18 -0.43┼ 0.29 -0.49* 0.35 -0.55* 0.35 -0.33 0.31 -0.46* 0.33 -0.12 0.34 
Retail sector -0.03 -0.58* -0.23 -0.37 0.01 -0.63** -0.02 -0.59* -0.07 -0.54* -0.05 -0.56* -0.17 -0.38 -0.47 -0.03 
Financial sector -0.10 -0.44┼ -0.44 -0.22 0.00 -0.47* -0.07 -0.48┼ 0.00 -0.55* -0.00 -0.43 0.04 -0.38 -0.14 0.49 
Consumer electronics -0.20 0.26 -0.02 0.17 -0.16 0.15 -0.20 0.21 -0.15 0.20 -0.17 0.18 -0.38 0.40 0.06 -0.07 
Host market growth -0.34 0.07 -0.02 -0.19 -0.30 0.01 -0.32 0.06 -0.64* 0.32 -0.27 -0.02 -0.12 -0.28 0.09 0.31 
Model indices                  
-2 Log likelihood 1050.4 975.6 888.0 854.4 1015.7 937.5 1049.1 973.6 968.7 905.6 1214.4 963.4 1207.1 1069.1 782.5 714.4 
Chi-square  
68.342 
*** 
35.783 
*** 
116.202 
*** 
53.773 
*** 
64.599 
*** 
37.092 
*** 
68.003 
*** 
37.031 
*** 
123.180 
*** 
88.915 
*** 
105.839 
*** 
47.177 
*** 
72.303 
*** 
110.619 
*** 
168.176 
*** 
148.665 
*** 
N 811 811 728 728 783 783 810 8101 791 791 969 969 988 988 689 689 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
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Table 6.4: Results of the regression models for location patterns of EMMsa,b 
Variables 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  Q3:  Q4:  
Em-Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em-
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em-
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em-
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em-
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em- 
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em- 
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Em-
Dev 
Em- 
Em 
Constant  -6.65** -4.47** -5.69** -2.99┼ -5.45** -5.09** -6.53** -4.68** -5.87** -5.39** -6.65** -4.47** -4.44** -2.46┼ -0.65 -3.57 
Host experiential knowledge   0.02 0.00           0.02 0.00 
General experience intensity   -0.00 0.01           -0.01 0.00 
Host experience intensity   -0.00 -0.02           -0.00 -0.02 
General experience diversity   -0.01 -0.02***           -0.01 -0.02*** 
Host experience diversity   -0.05┼ 0.07***           -0.05 0.07** 
Commitment escalation vs. no 
change 
    -0.91┼ 0.53┼         -0.81 0.48 
Commitment de-escalation vs. no 
change 
    -1.91┼ -0.25         -1.81┼ -0.75 
Time-out       0.02 -0.01       0.04 -0.03 
Host institutional changes         
-
1.14*** 
1.02**     -0.65┼ 0.93** 
Host market attractivenessb           -0.03 -0.01   -0.01 0.01 
Motives for re-entry: More resources             0.21 -0.16 0.11 -0.30 
Motives for re-entry: Changes in 
strategy 
            -0.07 0.28 -0.44 0.14 
Motives for re-entry: Strategic intent             -0.76┼ 0.44 -0.83 0.37 
Motives for re-entry: Institutional pull             0.45 0.53 0.53 0.63 
Controls                  
Firm age -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02* -0.01 
-
0.02*** 
-0.01* -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02** -0.01** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02*** -0.01** -0.02┼ -0.01 
Firm sizeb 0.02 -0.16*** 0.07 -0.15*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.02 -0.16*** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.02 
-
0.16*** 
-0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 -0.14** 
Changes in management 0.29 -0.06 0.26 -0.11 0.29 -0.13 0.28 -0.03 0.29 -0.12 0.28 -0.06 0.30 0.07 0.37 -0.32 
Already present in the market 0.14 -0.05 -0.16 -0.42 0.13 -0.01 0.12 0.00 0.25 -0.22 0.14 -0.05 -0.21 -0.07 -0.37 -0.60 
Automotive sector 0.12 0.26 -0.23 -0.54 -0.06 0.37 0.11 0.25 0.06 0.46 0.13 0.26 0.38 0.15 -0.57 -0.11 
Retail sector 1.49* 0.91* 1.46┼ 0.78┼ 1.33┼ 0.96* 1.47* 0.92* 1.52* 0.79┼ 0.50* 0.91* 1.02 0.93* 1.28 0.65 
Financial sector 1.80┼ 2.45** 2.01* 2.58** 1.54 2.25* 1.76┼ 2.46** 1.59 2.38* 1.79┼ 2.44** 1.32┼ 0.52 1.63 2.21* 
Consumer electronics 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 -0.14 -0.11 0.19 -0.04 0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.19 0.19 
Host market growth 1.03 0.58 0.57 0.54 0.88 0.94 1.01 0.59 1.10 0.84 1.08 0.60 1.21 0.66 0.35 1.24 
Model indices                  
-2 Log likelihood 292.4 443.9 257.0 365.6 280.8 429.9 291.8 440.7 279.2 408.0 1107.0 443.5 344.4 529.5 236.0 318.8 
Chi-square  
32.225 
*** 
55.988 
*** 
35.523 
** 
81.656 
*** 
40.798 
*** 
55.431 
*** 
32.659 
*** 
54.403 
*** 
43.329 
*** 
60.405 
*** 
32.791 
*** 
56.193 
*** 
39.507 
*** 
59.322 
*** 
52.369 
*** 
88.628 
*** 
N 811 811 728 728 783 783 810 810 791 791 969 969 988 988 689 689 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
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Even so, this study reveals that EMMs are not only present in the international arena but these 
firms also re-enter both emerging and developed markets, therefore also responding to the 
favourable institutional changes occurring in their host market environments. Hence, even as 
EMMs may expand into developed markets to acquire new resources and capabilities, they may 
still choose to return to, and remain sensitive to the institutional idiosyncrasies of host emerging 
markets. These results contradict prior studies (e.g., Lin, 2010; Yang et al., 2009; Wei, Zheng, 
Liu and Lu, 2014) that have made a case for how EMMs, originating from environments 
characterised by poorly developed institutions are less likely to make decisions based on the 
institutional quality of the markets (re)entered and more likely to prioritise resource seeking 
market expansion in developed host markets (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Luo and Tung, 2007).  
Second, findings here also provide support for the inertia view of organisational learning (Xia et 
al., 2009) as both DMMs and EMMs re-enter via the same commitment modes in which they 
were operating prior to exit, particularly when re-entering developed host markets. Re-entering a 
market previously exited increases the risks associated with that market, particularly in 
developed and potentially saturated host markets where there is less potential for growth and 
further market expansion. EMMs may be known to enter foreign markets to attain resources and 
capabilities (Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Tsang and Yip, 2007); yet, re-entry may mean that once 
some of those resources and capabilities are attained firms tend to become more risk-averse 
and less willing to further escalate commitment into the market. EMMs are also less likely to de-
escalate commitment in developed host markets compared to the rest of the firms in the sample, 
meaning that their objectives in those markets may have remained the same and those resources 
and capabilities sought were better attained by re-entering via the same commitment modes in 
which they were operating prior to exit. For instance, when acquisitions are made in developed 
markets, which are characterised by better quality resources and institutions, firms are expected 
to benefit more, especially in terms of post-acquisition management such as acquiring critical 
knowledge (Nair, Demirbag and Mellahi, 2015) which is expected to increase the likelihood of 
subsequent international acquisition activities particularly from EMMs.  
Also, results in Table 6.5 (Appendix 4) have shown that broadly, DMMs are more likely to de-
escalate than EMMs. These results may mean that EMMs’ strategic objectives in foreign host 
markets have not changed in the time-out period and perhaps these firms have little incentives 
to transfer the experience acquired in the past to change their commitment when re-entering 
foreign host markets. EMMs may also not know how to transfer knowledge accumulated in the 
past (from prior entries) to new decisions such as re-entry which means that process theories 
such as Uppsala stage model and LLL may not be the most suitable to study EMMs’ re-entries. 
Also interesting is that the results in this study do not broadly corroborate previous research 
stating that the acquisition of superior resources such as knowledge is cited as the key motive 
for foreign expansion of EMMs as they enter foreign markets via acquisition strategies (e.g., 
Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Buckley et al., 2012; Buckley, Ellia and Kafouros, 2014). As illustrated in 
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Figures 6.1 and 6.2 above, both DMM and EMM re-entrants frequently use non-equity modes of 
operation in foreign markets (licensing, franchising), whilst the ratio of joint equity to wholly owned 
commitment choices varies slightly depending on the home/host markets. Whilst acquisitions and 
greenfield operations have been suggested as the best routes to access resources in host 
markets, one must consider that, in practice, not all EMMs have strong government (financial) 
support or even host region experience (Ge and Ding, 2008). Some firms are also not part of 
large business groups and may not be highly successful in the domestic market in order to afford 
to change their commitment to higher resource intensive modes or generally, to learn new 
behaviours and routines and operate via a different commitment mode. 
Third, contrary to previous studies (cf. Holburn and Zelner, 2010), EMMs are not immune to the 
institutional transitions occurring in their host markets, as both DMMs and EMMs re-enter 
markets that have undergone favourable institutional changes. Recent studies recognise that 
capabilities, such as brands, marketing and managerial skills are unlikely to be acquired from, or 
enhanced in institutionally underdeveloped markets (cf. Du and Boateng, 2015; Popli and Sinha, 
2014). Unlike initial entrant EMMs, re-entrant EMMs may view other emerging markets not only 
as opportunities to exploit resources acquired at home but also as opportunities to develop 
capabilities that enable them to compete better with global players. Perhaps re-entrant EMMs 
are a new breed of EMMs which have different goals and expectations from foreign markets 
compared with traditional EMMs deemed to have international expansion goals that are 
powerfully inter-linked with their home institutional objectives. This then means that re-entrant 
EMMs may be, to some extent, also driven by commercial objectives rather than solely political 
and institutional goals. Such findings potentially provide opportunities to expand the current use 
of institutional theory since most studies examine the effect of host country factors on DMMs’ 
international expansion, whilst host institutions have been neglected when researching EMMs. 
Fourth, an underlying assumption of previous research (e.g., Guillén, 2003; Henisz and Delios, 
2001) is that firms have a propensity to (re)enter markets with low levels of risk or reduce host 
market risks by following the behaviour of other foreign entrants. Findings support the idea that 
the presence of other foreign entrants signals host market attractiveness to DMM re-entrants, 
therefore acting as an incentive for re-entry particularly into emerging markets. Indeed, as social 
actors, (DMM re-entrant) firms may not always have complete information about the challenges 
in their host institutional and competitive environments in order to be able to make rational and 
efficient decisions ex-ante (Hsieh and Vermeulen, 2014; Guillén, 2003; Li and Yao, 2010). 
However, these ideas are not supported for EMMs’ re-entry behaviour. This means that EMMs’ 
re-entry is not primarily driven by the presence of other foreign firms in host markets. Contrary to 
previous studies (e.g., Guillén, 2003; Li and Yao, 2010), EMMs may be more capable of attaining 
information about the attractiveness of their host markets without using other foreign entrants as 
cues. Consequently, for EMMs, re-entry strategic decisions may not be nested within their 
organisational social contexts and to reduce the uncertainty associated with operating in a given 
host market firms they may also look for cues from business and or institutional networks.  
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Fifth, the results of this study do not fully corroborate the premise in previous research about the 
significant differences that exist in the motivations for foreign expansion of DMMs and EMMs; in 
fact, the motivations to re-enter developed markets are more similar which may mean that the 
resources and growth opportunities that exist in mature, developed markets are perceived by 
DMMs and EMMs alike, for which reason neither tend to view such markets as platforms for 
further expansion in the host region. This said, whilst re-entry motives explain, to some degree, 
the re-entries of DMMs; results are less significant for EMMs since the proportion of DMM re-
entrants in the sample is significantly larger than that of EMMs. Also, it may be that EMMs’ 
motivations are more heterogeneous than previously expected, particularly when further 
distinguishing between re-entry into developed and emerging host markets. Despite similarities 
and synchronisations in how the economies of emerging markets have opened up to foreign 
investments, not all EMMs’ foreign investment strategies and trajectories are the same (Chittoor 
et al., 2008; Hitt et al., 2000; 2004; Hoskisson et al., 2000). Re-entrants’ responses to home 
institutional transitions may differ amongst EMMs from different countries and subsequently may 
influence their re-entry motives. Although emerging economies share several common features, 
they are institutionally heterogeneous and therefore one size may not fit all EMMs. When 
investigating re-entrants, it would be more useful and interesting to further distinguish between 
different types of EMMs rather than merely discuss two broad types (i.e. DMMs and EMMs) of 
re-entrants. Theoretically, this means that institutional theory scholars should be cautious not to 
generalise findings from single countries across institutionally different emerging economies.  
In summary, although there may be significant differences concerning de novo market entries of 
developed and emerging market firms, re-entrant DMMs and EMMs also share similarities. This 
study explored how both types of firms show signs of learning inertia when re-entering developed 
markets, in that they re-enter foreign markets without escalating or de-escalating their 
commitment upon re-entry. Furthermore, both DMMs and EMMs re-enter host markets that have 
undergone favourable institutional changes and tend not to view developed host markets as 
critical opportunities for future international growth. When considering the host markets re-
entered, both spend more time out of emerging markets and less time out of developed markets.  
Also interesting is that there are few patterns identified in the re-entry motives of EMMs meaning 
that re-entrant EMMs may be a more heterogeneous sample of firms whose motivations to re-
enter vary. Whilst re-entrant EMMs may not possess the international experience of DMMs, they 
too have experienced the exit process and proactively decided to re-enter previously exited 
markets particularly as those markets opened to investment opportunities. This alone suggests 
that re-entrant EMMs and re-entrant DMMs may be more similar than they are different in their 
foreign market re-entry choices. Rather than being part of the “first wave” or “second wave” of 
EMM internationalisers, re-entrant EMMs may be directly competing with DMMs and there may 
be benefits in considering them as a new breed of emerging market firms altogether. Some of 
these ideas are expanded in the next chapter which summarises the key points and contributions 
of the thesis and proposes directions for future research in this new area of market re-entry.   
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND  
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
 
 
This chapter summarises the main findings of this thesis together with their contribution to the 
academic literature and business practice (Tables 7.1-7.3). Methodological limitations are 
highlighted in this chapter and followed by several future research directions for researchers 
interested in re-entry and re-entrants. Further knowledge on re-entry and the performance 
outcomes of foreign market re-entry decisions is valuable to both academics and practitioners.    
 
Discussion of findings and implications for theory 
This study empirically questions the positive and linear effects of organisational learning from 
prior experience on re-entry commitment and timing decisions of both developed and emerging 
market re-entrants. In doing so, it contributes to extant literature that studies how organisations 
learn in their international expansion forays by examining foreign market re-entry and integrating 
both organisational learning and institutional theory rationales in the study of re-entrants. Thus, 
this thesis adheres to the rationale that foreign market re-entry decisions that fit the organisational 
capabilities and knowledge resources of the re-entrant firm should also take into consideration 
environmental contingencies such as pressures for legitimacy from institutional actors, 
institutional dilemmas associated with entering underdeveloped host market institutional 
environments and institutional changes occurring in the environment of the firm. Few scholars 
(notably, Brouthers et al., 2008a; Li et al., 2007; Xia et al., 2009) have, thus far, incorporated 
contextual, institutional variables in the theoretical reasoning of organisational learning 
perspectives and none have done so in the context of foreign market re-entry and re-entrants.  
In fact, foreign market re-entry remains an understudied and theoretically overlooked area of 
research. Most of the extant research which focuses on de novo market entry decisions tends to 
view organisational behaviour as predominantly rational and economic driven, focusing on the 
risks, costs and benefits of exploiting firm-specific advantages in foreign markets (i.e. 
organisational economics theories). Studies relying on traditional market entry theories such as 
TCE and or the Uppsala stage model of internationalisation have been criticised primarily for 
their limited ability to explain firm behaviour beyond the initial foreign market entry decision. 
Following the analysis of the literature, I concluded that a line of research based entirely on 
transaction cost rationales or Uppsala model of internationalisation is unlikely to yield significant 
insights into foreign market re-entry phenomena. Hence, while the early market entry literature 
(i.e. TCE, industrial organisation view, Uppsala theory) made significant contributions to the IB 
literature, more recent studies draw from theories that are growing in popularity in the broader 
management literature. Theoretical perspectives such as organisational learning emphasise the 
role of knowledge and experience resources by focusing not only on experiential knowledge but 
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also general experience with operating internationally, knowledge associated with a specific 
decision and knowledge associated with learned behaviours and routines developed over time.  
In regards to extant organisational learning literature, perhaps surprisingly given the numerous 
critiques attributed to it (Blomkvist and Drogendijk, 2013; Delios and Henisz, 2003; Forsgren, 
2002), experiential learning remains “the most analysed source of foreign knowledge acquisition” 
(Casillas et al., 2015, p. 103). Knowledge and learning about foreign markets are expected to 
play a key role in the internationalisation process because understanding how to operate in a 
host market makes foreign entrants more confident in their ability to perform there leading, for 
instance, to increased market commitment. Extant research on de novo entry decisions 
continuously supports such a view that multinational firms are expected to acquire experience 
and make entry mode and timing decisions in a path dependent process. Yet, the extant research 
on de novo market entry has largely been conducted based on the assumptions that international 
expansion is a linear and irreversible process, and thereby firms can only deal with host market 
uncertainty by exploiting previously accumulated knowledge and experience.  
Conceptually, this study proposed that, although de novo foreign market entry decisions may be 
rational, the re-entry behaviour of firms is less straightforward making room for the behavioural 
and sociological explanations that underlie re-entry phenomena. In particular, a key proposition 
of this study is that, whilst de novo entry has the potential to offer a partial conceptual explanation 
for re-entry decisions, due to similarities that may exist between initial entry and re-entry, 
differences are expected to exist between the two internationalisation decisions. Key differences 
expected between de novo entry and re-entry are related to three main points, namely the nature 
of market exit motivations, the duration of the time-out period and the changes that may have 
occurred in the host institutional environment between market exit and re-entry. These three 
points are examined together with other market entry variables to study the re-entry commitment 
choices and re-entry timing decisions of developed and emerging foreign market re-entrants.  
Indeed, it cannot be discounted that re-entrants may possess, and potentially benefit from 
possessing knowledge and experience from their initial market foray in order to manage the 
uncertainties associated with re-entering a previously exited host market. When examining the 
host markets re-entered, this study found that developed market re-entrants, in particular, tend 
to be more likely to re-enter markets dissimilar to their own (i.e. emerging), when in possession 
of superior prior experience resources (Table 7.3). That said, empirical results provide strong 
support for the idea that prior experience accumulated over time, on its own, does not necessarily 
lead to organisational learning, nor does it significantly influence key aspects of the re-entry 
process such as re-entry commitment (Table 7.1) or re-entry timing decisions (Table 7.2). In turn, 
this begs the question: Do re-entrant organisations really learn from their knowledge and 
experience accumulated over time? And if so, is this knowledge transferable to new decisions 
such as re-entry commitment/timing? In fact, this study demonstrated empirically that re-entry 
commitment decisions tend to rely more on paradigms of interpretation of the market exit process 
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than prior knowledge and experience accumulated over time. For instance, re-entrant firms which 
had exited as a result of poor performance with their previous commitment mode are those more 
likely to re-enter by changing the mode in which they were operating prior to exiting.  
In turn, relying on prior knowledge and experience may lead to organisational inertia in that the 
more experienced the re-entrants, the less likely they are to alter modes of commitment upon re-
entry, even when those modes resulted in poor performance and subsequently, exit. What is 
more, re-entrant firms are not more likely to respond to favourable institutional changes by 
increasing their resource commitment when they have accumulated more prior international 
knowledge and experience. For re-entry commitment decisions in particular (see Table 7.1), 
“within-form” experience was highly relevant in that, all else considered, most re-entrants tend to 
re-enter foreign markets via the same modes of commitment in which they were operating prior 
to exit. Extant literature emphasises the positive effects of learning from prior experience, in that 
learning accumulated over time leads to increased confidence and a greater propensity to opt 
for higher resource commitment. In contrast to this literature, this study shows that prior 
experience do not always broaden re-entrants’ capabilities to learn nor do they always increase 
the absorptive capacity of the re-entrant. This means that foreign market re-entrants tend not to 
learn from experience accumulated in the past, nor leverage such experience when deciding how 
to re-enter, i.e. whether or not to escalate or de-escalate commitment upon re-entry.   
In regards to whether and how firms learn from prior experience when making re-entry timing 
decisions (see Table 7.2), prior experience has a negative effect on how long firms wait before 
re-entering. More experienced re-entrants tend to wait longer before re-entering, meaning that 
other factors may affect the re-entrant’s ability to timely benefit from prior knowledge and 
experience. This is in contrast with the idea that entry (or in this case, re-entry) timing is positively 
associated with the degree of experience of the foreign (re)entrant (Fuentelsaz et al., 2012; Gaba 
et al., 2002; Isobe et al., 2000). Even when looking at re-entry timing, motives for exit have a 
higher explanatory power than prior knowledge and experience, in that firms are more likely to 
be late re-entrants when exit is involuntary (meaning that they need to wait until regulations 
change and re-entry is permitted) and early re-entrants when exit is associated with poor 
performance or strategic exit. Furthermore, mode of commitment in the host market had a more 
observable effect on re-entry timing than prior experience, in that late re-entrants tend to be firms 
which were previously operating in the host market via wholly owned subsidiaries. Whilst deep 
involvement in the market translates into more learning for initial entrants, re-entrants interpret 
the exit process negatively when exiting wholly owned subsidiaries, as this means they may have 
incurred more losses following exit, thus also waiting longer to re-enter. Therefore, in the case of 
foreign market re-entry timing decisions also, why re-entrants exit foreign markets influences 
significantly whether re-entrants benefit from experience accumulated in the past. 
Theoretically, some interesting conclusions can be drawn regarding the applicability of extant 
organisational learning and institutional legitimacy rationales for re-entry and re-entrants. The 
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link between prior experience, knowledge, organisational learning and strategic (re)entry 
decisions may be less straightforward than thus far theorised. Indeed, it is difficult to anticipate 
what lessons firms learn from their prior experience and (re-entrant) firms may, in fact, learn more 
from their failures (i.e. the market exit experience) than they do from their successes.  
Whether or not prior experience accumulated over time becomes organisational learning that 
can be utilised in future decision making may depend significantly on re-entrant firms’ own 
interpretations of the exit process, the re-entry opportunities available to them and the changes 
that may have occurred during the time-out period between market exit and market re-entry. 
Furthermore, managers may have their own frames of reference dictating how much is 
remembered from prior experience and how new opportunities such as re-entry are perceived. 
In regards to the effect of organisational learning specifically, this study proposes that re-entrant 
firms may not always be able to establish a cause and effect relationship between their first foray 
into the foreign market and market re-entry. Re-entry, much like other strategic decisions may 
not be linear and unidirectional, but an iterative process of revisiting the phenomenon to unlearn 
prior routines and behaviours and learn the new “rules of the game”. In turn, this may result in 
various interpretations of a strategic decision within the organisation, particularly over the market 
exit experience which, unsurprisingly, tends to add further complexity to the re-entry decision. 
Exit may carry a stigma of failure and add to the uncertainty of renewing operations in a foreign 
market, manifested particularly in regards to how and when firms re-enter. This may lead to firms 
unlearning or even forgetting prior routines and behaviours, responding to cues in their external 
(institutional) environments and or repeating prior decisions, such as prior commitment modes 
without incorporating some of the prior experience and learning into decision-making processes.  
Previous international management and strategy research have repeatedly engaged with the 
idea that highly experienced (generally Western) multinational organisations tend to be more 
confident as well as strategically perceptive and therefore capable of altering their strategies 
successfully in response to changes in their internal and external environments. This study sheds 
light on this new breed of internationalisers, re-entrants, which, although in possession of market 
specific knowledge and experience, choose to be late re-entrants. What is most interesting is the 
strong explanatory power of prior entry modes on re-entry modes. The results of this study 
contradict the idea that prior experiential knowledge is a determinant of entry mode selection; 
specifically, that firms with prior host market-specific knowledge, such as re-entrants, tend to be 
more aggressive in their re-entry commitment decisions. This study’s findings offer strong 
support for the idea that firms prefer an equity-based mode of re-entry if they have previously 
operated in that market via an equity-based mode, irrespective of their prior host market and or 
general international experience. For re-entrants, prior modes are established routines and may 
be seen as reference points to interpreting the re-entry process. From this, one might conclude 
that firms tend to revert to those decisions and behaviours most familiar to them when faced with 
highly complex and uncertain decisions, as with re-entrants returning to previously failed 
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internationalisations projects. This is strongly correlated to practice and to how firms display 
motivations to re-enter in the business press but are yet to re-enter. 
The aforementioned ideas are valid for both developed and emerging market re-entrants which 
share more similarities than differences also contrary to what has been theorised. The study of 
re-entrants and their re-entry choices speaks directly to the idea of there being key differences 
between de novo entry and re-entry, concluding that re-entrant EMMs are a potentially different 
breed of EMMs compared to de novo entrants which are new (and later) to the international 
arena. The previous exploratory study on who re-entrants are revealed that EMMs use a range 
of commitment modes in their international forays, including non-equity commitment entries and 
re-entries. EMM re-entrants also tend to respond to changes in their host institutions, despite 
being stapled with not possessing the knowledge and experience resources of developed market 
multinationals. Again, experience may not be a prerequisite for re-entry in the manner in which it 
has been previously hypothesised. In fact, firms with less experience are also capable of strategic 
decisions that go beyond initial international expansion. Perhaps re-entry events somewhat 
bridge the great resource and experience gap purported between DMMs’ and EMMs’ strategies.  
This thesis advanced the argument that observing host institutional changes presents an 
opportunity to combine institutional and learning perspectives in the context of foreign market re-
entry. In particular, this thesis proposed that organisational unlearning may occur not only as a 
result of the interpretation of the exit process and or the duration of the time-out period but also 
as a result of overall changes in institutional pressures for legitimacy. Re-entrants’ strategic 
decisions also result from attempts to unlearn existing rules of behaviour in order to learn new 
routines and behaviours necessary to remain legitimate in changing institutional environments. 
This study also addressed whether and how re-entrants’ ability to learn and benefit from prior 
knowledge and experience vary with re-entrants’ responses to institutional pressures for 
legitimacy and institutional changes. Particularly interesting is that the quality of host institutions, 
as well as the presence of other foreign firms attaining legitimacy in host institutional 
environments, are strongly associated with earlier market re-entries. This means that re-entrants 
may pay attention to cues in their institutional environments irrespective of the learning acquired 
from prior experience. Combining and integrating institutional and learning perspectives would 
provide a more comprehensive explanation of re-entry decisions. Extant institutional theory 
rationales have thus far proven to contribute significantly to explaining re-entry. 
With few exceptions (e.g., Xia et al., 2009), extant studies make assumptions that host 
institutional environments are stable, thereby overlooking how institutional changes may 
influence international expansion decisions. In an organisational model that omits the role of 
institutional legitimacy and particularly, institutional changes, firms would be expected to learn 
about foreign markets and continue their expansion with relative ease, thus benefitting from the 
learning and experience accumulated in the past. In practice, based on the results obtained in 
this study, for re-entrants, this is not the case. Institutional quality and development and in 
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particular institutional change, take priority when firms consider how and when to re-enter as well 
as which markets to return to. This study illustrates empirically that re-entrants proactively 
respond to changes in their environments rather than continuing to exploit their prior learning and 
experience when making re-entry choices. This means that favourable changes in the host 
institutional environment of the firm during the time-out period create new opportunities for firms 
to acquire legitimacy in the market (Xia et al., 2009), as demonstrated by the positive effect of 
institutional transformation on the likelihood of re-entrants changing their commitment when re-
entering the market. Furthermore, there is a positive effect of institutional changes on the 
likelihood of both developed and emerging market firms engaging in foreign market re-entries.  
Although in the international management literature, scholars have been concerned with the 
heterogeneity that characterises firm decisions, particularly when faced with complex and 
changing environments (Chang, 1995; Henisz and Delios, 2001); the empirical findings in this 
thesis demonstrate that, irrespective of their previous knowledge and experience, the uncertainty 
associated with key (re)internationalisation decisions tends to be reduced when institutional 
environments are perceived favourably and or when host markets are highly attractive for the re-
entrant firm, thus significantly increasing the chances of re-entrants displaying imitative 
behaviour. This means that learning from knowledge and experience accumulated over time is 
perhaps less useful than previously suggested, and in fact, firms that are rich in experience 
resources tend to be less flexible. Previous theorisations that champion the effect of 
organisational learning on firm behaviour have not contextualised the effect of learning from prior 
knowledge and experience. Consequently, including institutional rationales into an organisational 
learning perspective does not require an alteration of core concepts – prior knowledge and 
experience – but rather it requires a complex conceptualisation of the applicability and usefulness 
of prior experience to changing institutional environments, as well as looking beyond the initial 
market entry decision at new phenomena such as foreign market re-entry. 
 
Implications for practitioners 
Foreign market exit should not be viewed as a permanent solution for multinational firms whether 
they originate from developed or emerging market environments. In international business 
research, initial entry is commonly viewed as being an irreversible process. Yet, this study has 
shown that firms also re-enter previously exited foreign markets. From a practitioner’s 
perspective, this means that firms which follow the prescription of irreversibility of international 
operations may miss out on potential host market opportunities if they do not consider re-entry 
as a viable strategic option. Since re-entrants are a breed of internationalisers the literature has 
been silent about (although as illustrated with examples, in practice, they are in fact, not a “new” 
breed of internationalisers at all), understanding what re-entrant firms should do when re-entering 
a previously exited market (i.e. the performance outcomes of their decisions), first requires a 
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good understanding of how re-entrants behave and more importantly, what the key antecedents 
associated with re-entry behaviour  (and potentially re-entry performance) are. 
For re-entrants, previous modes of operation reflect on how the firm chooses to re-commit to 
foreign markets. Operating via the same commitment mode may yield benefits in terms of 
salvaging some of the intangible (possibly even tangible) investments that were lost after exit. 
However, when this behaviour is driven by an attempt to reduce the uncertainty associated with 
re-entry, it may also represent an impediment to re-entrants exploiting previous experience and 
or responding to changes in their host environments via commitment choices. I propose that it is 
important for potential re-entrants to understand the contextual influence of the failed attempt in 
terms of both the role of the MNE’s previous experience with the host market as well as the 
potential changes occurring in host institutional environments during the time-out period.  
Firms that are encouraged by local institutions such as governments, to capitalise on host 
institutional changes may receive support and resources from key institutional actors in the local 
market (Meyer et al., 2009). This may decrease the need to possess significant experience with 
operating in the market. The choice of re-entering via a higher commitment equity mode may 
present risks in environments that have recently transitioned like some in this sample (Newman, 
2000; Peng, 2003), but may also present benefits for firms to capitalise on growing host markets 
such as that of South Africa, where restrictions were imposed on foreign investment and foreign 
firms were forced to exit the market. The lifting of international trade barriers represents an 
opportunity to overcome potentially adverse market exit experience and invest more resources.  
Interestingly, most firms in the sample operate in industry sectors where there are multiple 
commitment choices available to them and yet choose to return in the same manner in which 
they were operating prior to exit. This begs the question: Is re-entry commitment behaviour 
indicative of learning myopia? Little learning from prior experience accumulated over time 
characterises re-entry which means that other factors such as aforementioned institutional 
changes and exit motivations are prioritised in managers’ calculations regarding re-entry. This 
also means that firms that are considered to be endowed with different levels of resources for de 
novo entry such as developed and emerging market MNEs are now on a more “levelled playfield” 
as the latter are no longer associated with a liability of newness from being late to the international 
arena. This also means that, irrespective of their home markets, re-entrants compete mainly on 
their abilities to recover after market exit and tune in to changes in their host institutions rather 
than competing on the basis of the resources and capabilities developed in the past.  
In regards to foreign market re-entry timing in particular, there are several implications for 
practising managers. Most importantly, the quality of host institutions, the actions of other foreign 
entrants as well as a firm’s own strategic intents and interpretations of potential strategic failures 
(i.e. market exit) matter for early re-entry. The motivation for early re-entry comes indeed in 
response to the behaviour of other foreign firms and implicitly, the need to overcome competitive 
pressures by acquiring institutional legitimacy and by re-entering before competitors move in. 
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Managers are more willing to re-enter markets early also when the resource investment prior to 
exiting was less significant such as in the case of joint equity ventures. Firms operating via wholly 
owned subsidiaries are therefore less susceptible to competitive pressures and short-term risks 
and more focused on recouping previous losses and preparing to set up new subsidiaries in the 
host market, as indicated by the tendency of firms to re-enter markets in the same manner in 
which they operated prior to exit. Since favourable host institutions favour early re-entries, re-
entrants evaluate the level of business and political risk in host markets, making the locational 
features of re-entered markets particularly important for firms considering re-entry. This is more 
so the case when markets re-entered are central to their foreign expansion. For instance, Aviva’s 
(UK) decision to re-enter Singapore came in 2010 when other Western insurers (e.g., Prudential 
Financial) re-entered the market and represented a platform to further their Asia strategy.  
Following the empirical results, host institutions are the key enablers for re-entry, in that both 
developed and emerging market re-entrants are shaped by institutional pressures for legitimacy 
and institutional changes in terms of their strategic decisions such as when and how to re-enter. 
From a practitioner’s perspective perhaps rather than worrying about local partners and other 
choices, the key determinant of re-entry (particularly for firms wishing to gain a competitive 
advantage over their competitors) should be the quality of host institutions (to decrease to risks 
of exit) and or when favourable institutional changes occur (to favour re-entry). Examples include 
highly experienced, global US technology companies Google and Yahoo that clashed with the 
Chinese government over issues such as censorship, leading to exit and difficulties in re-
entering. As with de novo entry, re-entry may depend on firms’ relationships with host institutions.   
In other recent cases of re-entry, companies that perhaps do not want or have not planned to re-
enter may be forced to do so by factors such as home market saturation, competitive pressures 
as well as pressures for growth and expansion. Peugeot Citroën’s plans to re-enter the US 
market come at a time when no French car manufacturers have been able to penetrate the 
market since the 1990s and is posited to be part of the company’s financial and strategic 
restructuring. This example illustrates the hurdles of being late to the market when all other 
automotive companies already have established dealers in the US or even manufacturing 
subsidiaries. Partnerships have not worked in the US market for companies such as Groupe 
Renault (France), which places further constraints on the re-entry commitment mode as a long 
time has passed since their exit (the 1970s for Citroën and 1990s for Peugeot) and 
unsurprisingly, no dealers of Citroën or Peugeot still exist in the US. There may be significant 
consequences of not having learned or not being able to transform prior knowledge and 
experience into organisational learning and routines, and subsequently leveraging the lessons 
learned when making foreign market re-entry decisions. These examples further emphasise the 
importance of not waiting too long before re-entering a previously exited market, particularly in 
competitive industries where opportunities may be lost and changes in competition (in developed 
markets) and institutions (in emerging markets) may make previous experience not applicable. 
Thus, waiting too long between exiting and re-entering a foreign market matters for re-entrants.  
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Table 7.1: Summary of findings Chapter 4 
Hypotheses  Findings Other comments 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, prior experience will not influence the likelihood of commitment escalation over 
no changes in commitment or the likelihood of commitment de-escalation over no changes in commitment. 
Supported  Table 4.4, Model 2, page 100 
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, favourable institutional changes occurring in the host market during the time-
out period will positively influence the likelihood of commitment escalation over no changes in commitment. 
Supported  Table 4.4, Model 3, page 100 
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, favourable institutional changes occurring in the host market during the time-
out period will negatively influence the likelihood of commitment de-escalation over no changes in commitment. 
Not supported 
No significant effect, Table 4.4, Model 3, 
page 100 
Hypothesis 3: The more experience re-entrants have, the less likely they are to escalate or de-escalate 
commitment in response to host institutional changes that have occurred during the time-out period and the 
more likely they are to return via the same mode. 
Partially supported 
Supported for experience diversity on 
commitment de-escalation, Table 4.4, 
Model 4, page 100 
Hypothesis 4: Strategic exit will not have observable effects on the likelihood of commitment escalation or 
commitment de-escalation over re-entering via the same mode. 
Supported Table 4.4, Model 5, page 100 
Hypothesis 5: Voluntary exit - poor market performance, poor performance with previous commitment mode 
- will increase the likelihood of commitment escalation and the likelihood of commitment de-escalation over re-
entering via the same mode compared to involuntary exit, and this relationship is likely to be stronger for exit 
due to poor performance with previous mode.   
Partially supported 
Supported for the effect of poor 
performance with entry mode for both 
escalation and de-escalation, Table 4.4, 
Model 5, page 100 
Hypothesis 6: Voluntary exit (poor market performance, poor performance with previous mode) will moderate 
the effect of experience on re-entry commitment, such that the more experience re-entrants have the more 
likely they are to escalate and de-escalate commitment than re-entering via the same mode, as compared to 
those which have experienced involuntary market exits.   
Supported Table 4.5, Models 6, 7, page 101 
Hypothesis 7: Strategic exit will not have observable effects on the likelihood of commitment escalation or 
commitment de-escalation over returning via the same mode, irrespective of the degree of experience of re-
entrants. 
 
Not supported  Table 4.5, Model 8, page 101 
Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, firms are more likely to re-enter a foreign market in the same commitment 
mode in which they were operating prior to exit, and this relationship is stronger for non-equity commitment. 
Supported  Table 4.5, Model 9, page 101 
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Table 7.2: Summary of findings Chapter 5 
 
  
Hypotheses  Findings Other comments 
Hypothesis 1:  The more experience re-entrants possessed at the time of market exit, the more likely re-
entrants are to re-enter relatively soon after exiting (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Not supported  
A negative effect of host experiential 
knowledge and experience diversity on 
early re-entry, Table 5.3, Model 2, page 130 
Hypothesis 2: The better the quality of host institutions at the time of exit, the more likely re-entrants are to 
re-enter relatively early (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Supported  Table 5.3, Model 3, page 130 
Hypothesis 3: The more attractive the host market at the time of exit, the more likely re-entrants are to re-
enter relatively early (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Supported  Table 5.3, Model 4, page 130 
Hypothesis 4: A re-entrant’s prior experience moderate the positive effects of host institutional development 
on early re-entries (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Supported  
Supported for experience intensity, Table 
5.3, Model 5, page 130 
Hypothesis 5: A re-entrant’s prior experience moderate the positive effects of host market attractiveness 
on early re-entries (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Not supported  
No significant effects found, Table 5.3, 
Model 6, page 130 
Hypothesis 6: Firms that were previously operating via non-equity modes are more likely to re-enter 
relatively early (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Not supported  
No significant effects found, Table 5.3, 
Model 7, page 130 
Hypothesis 7: Firms that were previously operating via joint equity modes are more likely to re-enter 
relatively early (i.e. between 1 to 5 years). 
Supported  Table 5.3, Model 8, page 130 
Hypothesis 8: Firms that were previously operating via wholly owned modes are less likely to re-enter 
relatively early (i.e. between 1 to 5 years).  
Supported  Table 5.3, Model 9, page 130 
Hypothesis 9: Where market exit is voluntary - strategic exit, poor market performance, poor mode 
performance – firms are more likely to re-enter relatively early (i.e. between 1 to 5 years) compared to when 
the market exit is involuntary. 
Supported  Table 5.4, Models 10-12, page 131 
Hypothesis 10: Where there is strategic intent, firms will be more likely to re-enter relatively early (i.e. 
between 1 to 5 years).  
Supported  Table 5.4, Model 13, page 131 
177 
 
 
Table 7.3: Summary of findings Chapter 6 
Hypotheses  Findings Other comments 
Hypothesis 1a: The more prior experience re-entrants possess, the more (less) likely they are to be DMMs 
re-entering emerging (developed) host markets.  
Supported  
Supported for general experience intensity 
and diversity, Table 6.3, Model 2, page 162 
Hypothesis 1b: The more prior experience re-entrants possess, the more (less) likely they are to be EMMs 
re-entering emerging (developed) host markets.  
Supported  
EMMs experience is host region related, 
Table 6.4, Model 10, page 163 
Hypothesis 2a: Changes in commitment (escalation and de-escalation) are more (less) likely to occur when 
DMMs re-enter emerging (developed) host markets.  
Not supported  Table 6.3., Model 3, page 162 
Hypothesis 2b: Changes in commitment (escalation and de-escalation) are more (less) likely to occur when 
EMMs re-enter emerging (developed) host markets.  
Supported  
Supported for commitment escalation, 
Table 6.4, Model 11, page 163 
Hypothesis 3a: DMMs are likely to re-enter developed markets earlier and be later re-entrants into 
emerging markets. 
Supported  
Table 6.3, Model 4, page 162, see also 
Figure 6.2, page 158 
Hypothesis 3b: EMMs are likely to re-enter developed markets earlier and be later re-entrants into 
emerging markets. 
Supported  
Table 6.4, Model 12, page 163, see also 
Figure 6.2, page 158 
Hypothesis 4a: DMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging markets that have undergone favourable 
institutional changes. 
Supported  Table 6.3, Model 5, page 162 
Hypothesis 4b: EMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging markets that have undergone favourable 
institutional changes. 
Supported  Table 6.4, Model 13, page 163 
Hypothesis 5a: DMMs are more likely to re-enter emerging (developed) markets characterised by high 
market attractiveness. 
Partially supported   
There is a positive relationship between 
market attractiveness and re-entry into 
developed host markets, Table 6.3, Model 
6, page 162 
Hypothesis 5b: There will be no observable effect of host market attractiveness on EMMs’ re-entries, 
irrespective of the host markets re-entered. 
Supported  Table 6.4, Model 14, page 163 
Hypothesis 6: Motivations to re-enter may vary between DMMs and EMMs irrespective of host markets re-
entered.   
Partially supported  
Table 6.3-6.4, Models 7 and 15, pages 162-
163 
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The theoretical implications and contribution of re-entry research in relation to what we already 
know about the foreign market entry literature are summarised in Table 7.4 below.  
Table 7.4: Contributions to the literature: Re-entry versus “de novo” entry 
“De novo” foreign market entry literature 
assumptions 
Foreign market re-entry findings 
 
Foreign market entry is an irreversible, win or lose 
process whereby market exit tends to be viewed as 
permanent 
Foreign market exit is not always permanent as firms re-
enter previously exited foreign markets after a period of 
time out. 
Prior knowledge and experience provide a 
reference point to understand the foreign market 
entry decisions of firms 
There were no significant effects of experience on re-entry 
decisions 
Knowledge and experience accumulated in the 
past generally have a positive effect on 
organisational learning  
For re-entrants, it is not just the experience accumulated in 
the past but how market exit is interpreted. Firms learn 
more from their failures than their successes meaning that 
the relationships between knowledge, experience, learning 
and re-entry choices are not as straightforward. 
Experiential knowledge is the most effective source 
of organisational learning 
Firms may place more emphasis on the characteristics of 
the knowledge acquired such as its recency (i.e. duration of 
time-out) or proximity to the organisational decision rather 
than general knowledge about the market. 
Knowledge and experience accumulated in the 
past make firms more confident in their ability to 
perform in the foreign market leading to increased 
resource commitment over time 
Firms tend to lean more on paradigms of interpretation of 
the exit experience rather than learning from experience. 
This suggests that prior learning is not necessarily 
transferable to new decisions. 
Firms tend to reduce the uncertainty associated 
with foreign markets by repeating the same entry 
mode commitment decisions leading to “learning 
inertia” 
Indeed, some re-entrants tend to re-enter via the same 
commitment mode in which they were operating prior to exit 
unless that mode underperformed in the initial foray. 
Knowledge and experience accumulated in the 
past reduce host market uncertainty increasing the 
likelihood of firms becoming early entrants 
Host market knowledge has a negative effect on early re-
entries meaning that not all experiences become routines 
and lead to learning. Organisational unlearning can occur 
after a time-out period either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Institutional environments are stable over time and 
thus the knowledge and experience accumulated in 
the past can be exploited in future decisions 
The past is not always a good predictor of the future, 
particularly when the experience accumulated in the past is 
not in line with changes in institutions. Favourable 
institutional change tend to create legitimacy opportunities 
for re-entrants.  
Firms repeat organisational practices that have 
gained them legitimacy in the past 
Firms may repeat the same strategies that were in place 
prior to exit (e.g., commitment modes) unless those 
practices were, in themselves, a motivation to exit the 
market.  
Highly restrictive host institutional environments 
motivate investors to operate via co-operation 
modes to facilitate local market adaptation  
Indeed, unfavourable host institutional changes decrease 
the likelihood of commitment escalation upon re-entry. 
Possessing learning and experience makes firms 
less sensitive to institutional idiosyncrasies  
Re-entrants pay attention to cues in their host institutions 
irrespective of prior experience 
Organisations sharing the same environment tend 
to be isomorphic with one another 
Imitative behaviour tends to influence the re-entry timing 
choices of DMMs but not of EMMs. 
EMMs and DMMs are different in their foreign 
market entry motivations and strategic decisions. 
There are more similarities than differences between EMM 
and DMM re-entrants concerning why, when and how they 
re-enter. 
EMMs do not have the necessary resources and 
capabilities to compete with DMMs 
General experience may not be a prerequisite for re-entry 
as EMMs re-enter both developed and emerging markets.  
The acquisition of superior resources such as 
knowledge is the reason why EMMs engage in 
commitment modes such as M&As 
EMMs re-enter via different forms of commitment including 
greenfield, M&As as well as co-operative and non-equity 
commitment modes. 
EMMs are not sensitive to institutional 
idiosyncrasies of other emerging host markets 
EMMs re-enter emerging markets generally when those 
markets have undergone favourable institutional changes 
thus reacting to host market institutional cues. 
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Methodological limitations 
The main limitations relate to the availability of data. In a nutshell, business press articles 
published in databases such as Factiva and LexisNexis generally cover news about large, 
predominantly multinational firms, whereas very few articles are written on smaller organisations 
re-entering foreign markets. This is perhaps due to the “celebrity” status of larger multinationals 
as well as the potentially greater impact associated with relatively larger firms re-entering a 
foreign market after having abandoned their operations there. Indeed, we also know that small 
exporters tend to exit and re-enter foreign markets on a regular basis as part of their international 
business model, however, this is not reflected in the data, as over 85 percent of re-entrants are 
large firms. This said, my review of studies on market entry related topics reflects similar 
constraints, and the study of larger, public firms is preferred precisely because more firm level 
as well as re-entry specific data is more likely to be accessible for large organisations.  
It should also be highlighted that due to the heterogeneity of the sample (several home and host 
markets, various industries and different exit and re-entry points in time), there is some degree 
of researcher discretion in the choice of variables to match the availability of data. Most 
relevantly, the measures of organisational learning comprise how firms learn from direct 
experience. Other sources of learning are not captured in this study. Hence, it would be 
interesting to replicate this study by also examining whether firms learn from the experience of 
others via business and or institutional networks, or how learning from operating in one market 
may be transferred into a different market to develop an even better understanding of how 
specifically organisations develop paradigms to learn from different types of experience. It may 
be that internal and or external (other than institutional) changes have occurred in the time-out 
period that have not been captured which, in turn, may positively as well as negatively affect the 
ability of re-entrant firms to benefit from, and exploit prior knowledge and experience (e.g., this 
may include more specific and minute changes in the regulations and practices of different 
industries not captured by the institutional measures used).  
Aside from the variables used in the empirical analysis (i.e. changes in host institutions, changes 
in market attractiveness, changes in management and so on) I have not been able to gather even 
more specific further information about re-entrants’ strategic decisions following the market exit 
- such as whether some firms are exiting one market and re-entering another, shutting down all 
international operations, re-entering markets similar to the one exited therefore, potentially 
acquiring more up-to-date experience and so on – which could have served as explanatory 
variables to further distinguish between foreign market re-entries and re-entrants. In particular, 
none of the variables captures what modes of commitment re-entrant firms have used in other 
international forays and whether there is a pattern that can be identified in their decisions, thus 
leading to re-entry via the same commitment modes. Having said this, re-entrants in the database 
originate primarily from industries where various entry/re-entry commitment modes are 
traditionally used such as in retail and automotive sectors (it should be mentioned here that, for 
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firms operating in industries such as the fast food industry, where franchises are the most 
frequently utilised commitment mode strategies, additional robustness checks were conducted).  
Finally, similar to most studies, this study focuses on formal institutions. Hart (2001) argued that 
it is difficult to “incorporate informal norms into the theory of organizations… although there has 
been some interesting recent work on this topic, this work has not to date greatly changed our 
views about the determinants of organizational forms.” (p. 15); partly explaining why the literature 
on the effects of institutional pressures for legitimacy focuses on formal institutions. In turn, this 
study coded for “motives for exit” and “motives for re-entry” in order to capture the potential effect 
of informal institutions, i.e. the unwritten ‘rules of the game’ in driving re-entrants out of the market 
and or potentially preventing their timely re-entry into previously exited markets. Furthermore, 
every effort was made to ensure that various sets of measures were used reflecting host 
institutional pressures for legitimacy and changes in the formal institutions of host markets. 
 
Directions for future research 
This section covers five broad directions for future research for scholars interested in re-entry. 
First, in the hypotheses and empirical tests, this study refers broadly to the effect of an increase 
in firm experience on re-entry commitment, without investigating the different thresholds of 
experience that may affect re-entry commitment differently. At a given level on the experience 
curve, knowledge absorption could be optimal allowing the firm to learn and capitalise on its prior 
experience. After a given level of experience, re-entrants may become inert and overconfident in 
their knowledge base and perhaps less able to embrace, and adapt to, changes in their 
environments. Future research could examine in detail at what levels of experience firms decide 
to change their commitment upon foreign market re-entry. Given the importance that prior 
knowledge and experience have received in market entry literature, it would be useful to better 
understand whether re-entrants tend to accumulate a certain level of experience before venturing 
back into a previously exited foreign market and the effect of this decision on the type of re-entry 
commitment chosen. Although the empirical evidence thus far indicates that re-entry decisions 
are not influenced by experience accumulated over time, the link between prior experience, 
learning and re-entry decisions may not be as simple as this, since this is merely preliminary 
research on the re-entry phenomenon. Thus, it would be interesting to assess which types of 
experience matter and when. Prior experience accumulated over time may be more relevant 
when paired with learning from business networks and home and or host institutional 
relationships. Here, one might also consider whether, in the context of uncertain decisions such 
as that of foreign market re-entry, institutional ties have the potential to replace the need for other 
firm level resources such as prior knowledge and experience. By introducing resource based and 
organisational learning rationales to extant theorisations, scholars could contribute to the limited 
literature on the characteristics of firms that can leverage their resources beyond initial market 
entry (i.e. re-entrants) and whether and how investment location matters. 
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Second, at present, the data does not capture firms which have exited foreign markets and have, 
to date, not renewed their operations there. In fact, following more recent notable examples of 
companies such as Peugeot (in the US), Google (in China), Virgin Media and Nokia (in India) 
and so on, there is a gap between showing interest in previously exited markets and firms actually 
re-entering. Future research could consider more fully why some firms re-enter foreign markets 
and whether the motivation to renew operations is related to the re-entry commitment decision 
or the decision to wait longer prior to re-entering. Furthermore, it would be interesting to compare 
and investigate in more detail whether the re-entry motivations of firms differ not only amongst 
developed versus emerging market re-entrants but also amongst re-entrants from different 
emerging home markets. For this, primary case study research could provide insight into the 
uncertainty and cognitive boundaries surrounding re-entry, by delving deeper into how and why 
firms make strategic decisions such as re-entry. In particular, one might expect this would also 
show the extent to which other factors may be at play when firms make re-entry commitment 
decisions that influence their direction of involvement in the foreign market. This may be of 
particular relevance since we now know that commitment escalation and de-escalation are driven 
by dissimilar factors. It would be interesting to further address the issue of why some re-entrants 
align themselves with institutional environments and others appear not to respond in a timely 
manner to institutional changes, thus delaying their decision to re-enter the market.   
Third, this study has focused on understanding the foreign market re-entry phenomenon by 
explaining and interpreting the antecedents of re-entrants’ behaviour and key strategic re-entry 
decisions. Consequently, an important question that I have not been able to answer here 
concerns the consequences of foreign market re-entry decisions, particularly to provide more 
concrete recommendations as to what re-entrant firms should do and which strategy is most 
profitable. Therefore, a fruitful area for future research would be to examine the performance 
implications of foreign market re-entry decisions. For instance, early (re)entry is expected to 
provide firms with competitive advantages in foreign markets, whilst later (re)entrants are 
expected to potentially benefit from the experience and strategic decisions of their more impatient 
counterparts. Hence, there may be merit in investigating the following question, “Do early re-
entrants truly perform better than later re-entrants”? Furthermore, equity modes of commitment 
have been associated with better performance outcomes (e.g., Chen and Hu, 2002; Ripolles and 
Blesa, 2012), which begs the question “Does re-entering via equity commitment modes also lead 
to better performance for re-entrants as it does for de novo entrants”? Also, all else considered, 
a topical question at present would be: “How do EMMs perform compared to their developed 
market counterparts and does this vary with the host markets re-entered”? A growing number of 
studies generalise concerning the failed internationalisation attempts of some firms from 
emerging markets; yet, the experience of serial re-entrants such as Tata Motors Ltd., Aptech 
Ltd., Claris Lifesciences Ltd., Life Insurance Corporation of India (India), Chery Automobile Ltd., 
TCL Group, Haier Group, Lenovo Group Ltd. (China), SABMiller PLC., Foschini Group, Old 
Mutual PLC. (South Africa), Proton Holdings Bhd. (Malaysia) reflect otherwise. 
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Also concerning the performance implications of re-entry decisions, a further avenue for 
exploration is to investigate whether firms that have exited and re-entered a foreign host market 
ultimately perform better than those which have initially entered and remained there. Again, using 
the example of the French automaker Peugeot, whilst the company abandoned its US operations 
in the early 1990s, other automakers such as BMW and Volvo (which operate in the US at 
present) remained and endured the weak auto sales and operating losses around that recession 
period. These are particularly important questions because, in the case of imminent failure, it is 
important for firms to understand how to reverse their entry course into key host markets as well 
as understand which strategies have proved more successful for other foreign market re-
entrants. Overall, discussions on the implications of initial market entry or market exit should also 
incorporate discussions about foreign market re-entry as they are often inter-linked. 
Fourth, the study has not examined the network level of analysis in the context of foreign market 
re-entry. Perhaps some re-entrants rely on home and or host network-based resources, that have 
the potential to facilitate as well as constrain their progress in different (developed versus 
emerging) host markets. We know little about what network relationships are most valuable and 
whether network resources, such as founders’ social capital, are more beneficial when re-
entering developed host markets, than for instance, home government ties. Thus far, networks 
have been studied in a static manner, generally by testing the effect of factors such as the number 
of executive social ties (Zhao and Hsu, 2007) or linkages with various domestic government and 
financial institutions (Bianchi, 2009), whilst the effects of the different networks may not be 
independent of each other. A better understanding of network dynamics would be a topical area 
of research at present and may also help researchers recognise whether and how firms adapt 
their re-entry strategies such as commitment modes, to potentially reinstate their roles in their 
host market networks following the period of time spent out of that host market.  
The fifth and final point is that it may prove useful for future re-entry research to consider whether 
the international decisions and performance of private sector both DMMs and EMM re-entrants 
may be more linked to individual factors such as managerial characteristics and abilities than 
institutions (Bianchi, 2009; Bonaglia et al., 2007). Scholars could examine and compare the role 
of decision makers in shaping both DMMs’ and EMMs’ re-entry commitment and timing, thereby 
assisting them to derive value from their re-entry decisions. In emerging markets, where the 
“rules of the game” are highly informal, a contribution could be made by investigating not only 
the role of formal institutional actors (e.g., governments) but also the micro-foundations of 
management research because individuals and their interactions may matter significantly to the 
usefulness and application of prior learning as well as to how re-entrants interpret the initial entry 
and exit process and subsequently re-create and re-capture value internationally. This thesis 
concludes that key questions about the foreign market re-entry strategies of firms are yet to be 
answered, which in turn provides opportunities for researchers interested in the area of re-entry.  
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APPENDIX 1: Systematic review methodology 
Chapter 1 adopted a systematic review approach to capture an extensive and diverse body of 
the market entry literature and minimise researcher bias (Transfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003). 
This review is part of a paper published in IBR - Surdu, I. & Mellahi, K. (2016). “Theoretical 
foundations of equity based foreign market entry decisions: A review of the literature and 
recommendations for future research”. International Business Review, 25(5): 1169-1184. In line 
with the review scope, I excluded studies where the unit of analysis was business groups and 
macro country, industry, or subsidiary level studies and excluded studies focusing on activities 
related to post-market entry such as subsidiary knowledge transfer.  
Literature search  
The literature search followed the standard approach used to review international business (IB) 
studies (e.g., Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012). This limited the search to full academic 
articles published in broad and specialist journals that publish IB research, namely Academy of 
Management Journal (AMJ), Academy of Management Review (AMR), Journal of Management 
(JM), Journal of Management Studies (JMS), Management Science (MS),  Strategic 
Management Journal (SMJ), Organization Science (OS), Organization Studies (OSS) ; and key 
IB journals, namely International Business Review (IBR), Journal of International Business 
Studies (JIBS), Journal of International Management (JIM), Journal of World Business (JWB), 
and Management International Review (MIR). Only journals that were indexed in the ISI Web of 
Knowledge database were included. The inclusion of broad and specialist journals helps ensure 
a representative coverage of the foreign market (re)entry literature which transcends IB. 
The sample 
The next step was to identify the articles to be reviewed. Whereas some authors (e.g., 
Jormanainen and Koveshnikov, 2012) use keyword searches to identify the articles in their 
reviews, I decided to manually search all issues of selected journals published between 1970 
and 2013. The initial piloting using kewords suggested that a number of papers do not use foreign 
market entry in the title, abstract and/or keywords. Then, I chose to include articles published 
since the 1970s in order to provide a comprehensive review as possible, but also because early 
studies still inform current foreign market (re)entry research. In the initial stage of the sampling 
selection, I read all abstracts and identified all articles whose title and abstract referred to, and 
or focused exclusively, on foreign market entry and or re-entry decisions. While identifying the 
papers, the focus was on judging from the title and/or abstract the paper examined exclusively 
market entry/re-entry decisions. This process resulted in the selection of 1,312 academic articles. 
For papers which did not depict with accuracy the research scope in their title or abstract, I read 
carefully the introductory and methodology sections to ensure that they were relevant and 
correctly classified and coded. 257 articles were eliminated. 1,055 academic articles were 
included in my analysis of the foreign market entry/re-entry literature.  
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In the final step of the sampling process, I read the 1,055 articles to extract relevant information 
using a standard protocol which includes the focus of the paper on a specific market entry 
decision, theoretical perspective(s) used, author citations, and key findings. Given the long time 
span, and similar to other reviews (e.g., Xu and Meyer, 2013), I categorised articles into 
“episodic” periods and used ten-year time frames to facilitate the analysis. Then, I classified the 
articles according to the theoretical lens(es) adopted. The theories can be grouped into two broad 
categories: “traditional” IB/foreign market entry theories that have been applied since the 1970s 
and 1980s, namely transaction cost (TCE)/internalisation theories, the eclectic paradigm/OLI and 
the Uppsala stage theory of internationalisation; and “non-traditional”, i.e. emergent, theories 
which were introduced to the foreign market entry field around the 1990s and have become 
increasingly popular in the 2000s. The latter group includes primarily resource-based 
perspectives13, institution-based views, network theory and real options theory14. 
 
Publication patterns, types of articles, and general citation structure 
The current outpouring of foreign market entry research started with a steady trickle of articles in 
the 1970s. The number increased from 56 articles in the 1970s to 652 articles published between 
2000 and 2013. Table 1.3 illustrates the pattern of publications over time. The table reveals the 
space devoted to foreign market entry research relative to other management topics published 
in mainstream journals. The publication pattern reveals that, despite the apparent growth in the 
number of papers, foreign market entry studies continue to represent a small proportion of the 
total number of studies published in management journals, from one percent in the 1990s to still 
fewer than two percent in the 2000s. In turn, foreign market entry studies are published 
predominantly in core IB journals (82 percent, 862 articles). Specifically, between 2000 and 2013, 
around 18 percent of studies published in IB journals were on foreign market entry. Most of the 
studies during the latter period deal with foreign market entry decisions in emerging markets. 
Overall, JIBS published the highest number of foreign market entry papers (25 percent, 267 
studies), followed by IBR (182), MIR (175) and JWB (162).  
As shown in Table 1.3, foreign market entry studies represent just one percent of the total number 
of studies published in generic management journals since the 1970s; in part, as per the 
discussion in Chapter 1, due to the prevalence of studies drawing on traditional theories such as 
internalisation/TCE theory. This said, of the 193 foreign market entry articles published in generic 
management journals, nearly 60 percent were published in the 2000s (133 studies) which 
suggests that the foreign market entry literature may be starting to gain some relevance within 
the broader management community. As explained in the main body of this thesis, this increase 
observed in the number of foreign market entry papers published in management journals in the 
                                                          
13 I included not only Barney’s (1991) resource based view, - but classified organisational (dynamic) capabilities, and 
organisational learning theories under resource based theories (see Meyer and Peng, 2005). Furthermore, the knowledge 
based view was also added to this category since, by distinguishing between different knowledge capabilities, it is widely 
recognised as an extension of the resource based view rather than a theory of the firm in its own right (see Phelan and 
Lewin, 2000, for a more detailed discussion). 
14 Real options theory has not been discussed in an individual section in light of the (still) small number of studies. 
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1990s and more so in the 2000s corresponds with foreign market entry scholars borrowing 
theories and concepts that are popular in management, such as resource and institution based 
theories. The foreign market entry literature is dominated by empirical studies representing 
around 80 percent (838 studies), with conceptual studies (including 26 reviews) representing 14 
percent (149 studies), followed by perspectives and commentaries (five percent, 54 studies) and 
meta-analyses (one percent, 14 studies). Amongst empirical studies, there is a strong propensity 
towards quantitative methodologies (88 percent, 740 studies), typically using regression analysis 
of survey data. These findings reflect the fact that leading IB journals in the field have traditionally 
been dominated by quantitative methodologies. Table 1.4 classifies empirical and conceptual 
studies according to each major strand of theoretical perspectives. As it can be observed in Table 
1.4, there is a small proportion of conceptual studies, potentially signalling that fewer efforts are 
directed towards developing foreign market entry (or re-entry) specific theories, or towards 
tailoring and refining existing perspectives. 
The citations analysis for foreign market entry papers in our sample is provided in Table 1.5. A 
majority of market entry papers (74 percent) have received less than five citations per year, of 
which eight percent have zero cites. Johanson and Vahlne (1977) and Kogut and Singh (1988) 
have been cited more than 1,000 times, whilst six other papers have been cited over 500 times 
(e.g., Dunning, 1988; Hitt et al., 1997). These findings seem to indicate that, only a limited number 
of initial market entry studies have become truly influential in the academic community.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the analysis revealed that some of the theories are 
more influential and cited more than others. Table 1.2a and Table 1.2b (Chapter1, pages 31-32) 
illustrated the most impactful studies drawing on each major theoretical strand. Traditional foreign 
market entry theories - TCE/internalisation theory and Uppsala process theories - have been 
published predominantly in IB journals such as JIBS and IBR (13 out of 24 articles respectively). 
When drawing on non-traditional theories, i.e. resource-based and institution perspectives, 
foreign market entry studies appear to make a significantly stronger contribution to the broader 
management field, particularly through publication in AMR and AMJ (12 out of 17 articles 
respectively). In Table 1.2a and Table 1.2b, special attention is paid to the degree to which ideas 
incorporated in market entry theories have received empirical support, for which reason, the 
analysis of the literature examines systematically whether some of these notable studies do not 
support the key premises of a theory (classified as “no support”); whether an extension of a 
theory/contingency perspective is suggested (“partial support”) or whether the contributions of a 
theory are confirmed and supported (“support”).  
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Table 1.3: Publication patterns of foreign market entry studies in top journals (1970-2013) 
 
 
 
 
Generic management journalsa 
 
 
 
 
IB journalsb    
Period Number of foreign market entry studies 
Foreign 
market 
entry 
/Total 
studies 
% 
 
Number of foreign market entry studies 
 
Foreign 
market 
entry 
/total 
studies 
% 
Overall no. of 
foreign market 
entry 
studies/year 
Overall 
no. of 
studies
/year 
 
SMJ 
1980 
JMS 
1964 
AMJ 
1958- 
OS 
1990 
OSS 
1980 
AMR 
1976 
MS 
1955 
JM 
1975 
  
JIBS 
1970- 
MIR 
1960- 
IBR 
1993- 
JWB 
1965- 
JIM 
1998- 
    
1970-1979 N/A 1 1 N/A N/A 1 1 0 4/2,612 0.2 18 10 N/A 24 N/A 52/1,177 4.4 56 3,789 
1980-1989 5 0 1 N/A 0 0 0 1 7/3,526 0.2 39 29 N/A 32 N/A 100/1,079 9.3 107 4,605 
1990-1999 21 4 8 4 2 1 6 2 48/4,451 1.1 71 38 35 36 12 192/1,209 15.9 240 5,660 
2000-2013 47 28 26 10 4 4 5 10 134/7,842 1.7 139 98 147 70 64 518/2,909 17.8 652 10,751 
Overall no.  
of foreign 
market entry 
studies/journal 
 
73 33 36 14 6 6 12 13 193/18,431 1.0 267 175 182 162 76 862/6,374 13.5 1,055 24,805 
aSMJ = Strategic Management Journal; JMS = Journal of Management Studies; AMJ = Academy of Management Journal; OS = Organization Science; OSS = Organization Studies; AMR = Academy of Management Review;  
MS = Management Science; JM = Journal of Management; bJIBS = Journal of International Business Studies; MIR = Management International Review; IBR = International Business Review; JWB = Journal of World Business;  
JIM = Journal of International Management. 
Note: We used Business Source Premier Database to calculate the total number of studies published in each journal.  
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Table 1.4: Distribution of broad types of foreign market entry articles according to major 
theoretical perspectives (1970-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.5: General citation structure in foreign market entry research 
 
Abbreviations: TC, total citations; TC/Y, total citations per year since publication until Sept. 2015 
Source: Web of Knowledge 
Broad type 
of article 
Number of studies per theoretical strand 
Organisational 
economics/TCE 
theories  
(380) 
Uppsala stage theory 
of internationalisation 
(118) 
RBTs 
 
(190) 
Institutional 
theory 
(106) 
Network 
theories 
(53) 
Real options 
theory 
(16) 
Empirical  
 327 105 162 97 49 15 
Conceptual 
 
53 13 28 9 4 1 
TC Number of papers % of papers TC/Y Number of papers % of papers 
≥1000 citations 2 papers 0.2% ≥50 C/Y 1 paper 0.1% 
≥500 citations 6 papers 0.6% ≥40  C/Y 5 papers 0.5% 
≥250 citations 29 papers 2.8% ≥30  C/Y 6 papers 0.6% 
≥100 citations 125 papers 12.0% ≥20  C/Y 16 papers 1.5% 
≥50 citations 115 papers 11.0% ≥10  C/Y 90 papers 8.5% 
≥10 citations 376 papers 36.0% ≥5  C/Y 156 papers 14.8% 
≤10 citations 402 papers 38.0% ≤5  C/Y 781 papers 74.0% 
of which  
“no citations” 
80 papers 8.0%. 0 C/Y 80 papers 8.0% 
Total 1,055 papers  Total 1,055 papers  
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APPENDIX 2: Most influential multi-theoretical studies 
 
Table 1.6: Most influential multi-theoretical studies, empirical findings and contributions (2000-2013) 
 Theory J TC Author(s) Y TC/Y 
1 TCE/Internalisation theory, Institutional theory JIBS 342 
Buckley, P. J.; Clegg, L. J.; Cross, A. R.; Xin, L.; 
Voss, H.; Ping, Z. 
2007 42.75 
2 
TCE/Internalisation theory, RBV, Organisational learning 
theory 
AMJ 676 Hitt, M. A.; Hoskisson, R. E.; Kim, H. 1997 37.56 
3 
RBV, Institutional theory SMJ 224 
Meyer, K. E.; Estrin, S.; Bhaumik, S. K.; Peng, M. 
W. 
2009 37.33 
4 
TCE/Internalisation theory, Institutional theory, Cultural 
distance theory 
JIBS 273 Brouthers, K. D. 2002 21.00 
5 
Organisational economics theories, RBV, Institutional theory JIBS 195 Meyer, K. E.; Peng, M. W. 2005 19.50 
6 
TCE/Internalisation theory, Organisational capabilities theory SMJ 304 Madhok, A. 1997 16.89 
7 
TCE/Internalisation theory, Cultural theory, Knowledge-based 
view 
SMJ 196 Chang, S.-J.; Rosenzweig, P. M. 2001 14.00 
8 
TCE/Internalisation theory, Organisational learning theory AMJ 81 Li, D. A. N.; Eden, L.; Hitt, M. A.; Ireland, R. D. 2008b 11.57 
9 
TCE/Internalisation theory, Knowledge-based view JIBS 134 Martin, X.; Salomon, R. 2003 11.17 
10 
Organisational economics theories (Hymer; Caves), 
Institutional theory, RBV 
AMJ 150 Isobe, T.; Makino, S.; Montgomery, D. B. 2000 10.00 
11 
TCE/Internalisation theory, Institutional theory JIBS 138 Lu, J. W. 2002 10.62 
12 
Institutional theory, Organisational learning theory JM 84 Gaur, A. S.; Lu, J. W. 2007 10.50 
13 
RBV, Institutional theory JM 70 Brouthers, K. D.; Brouthers, L. E.; Werner, S. 2008a 10.00 
Note: Studies included with >=10 citations per year; Source: Web of Knowledge  
Abbreviations: J, journal; TC, total citations since publication; Y, year of publication; TC/Y, total citations per year since publication until Sept. 2015 
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APPENDIX 3: Robustness checks for Chapter 5 on re-entry timing 
 
 
Table 5.5. Results of the binomial regression – Base model and EXPERIENCE effectsa,b,c 
(***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 
Constant  -0.99*** 0.00 -1.42*** -2.28*** -1.08** 0.12 -1.03** -2.68*** 
Host experiential 
knowledge 
    -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Host experience 
intensity 
    0.08 0.08 0.14 -0.26* 
Host experience 
diversity 
    -0.08 -0.14 0.08 0.11 
Controls         
Firm age -0.01*** -0.01** 0.00 0.01*** -0.01* -0.01** 0.00 0.01*** 
Firm sizeb 0.01 -0.12*** 0.04 0.09** 0.02 -0.10*** 0.00 0.09** 
Already present in the 
market 
0.14 0.53** -0.23 -0.43* 0.07 0.61** -0.21 -0.47* 
Regionalisation 0.05 0.33* -0.44** 0.09 0.09 0.25 -0.40* 0.10 
Automotive  0.12 -0.34 -0.24 0.40┼ 0.18 -0.20 -0.34 0.35 
Retail 0.67** -0.24 -0.39 -0.09 0.39 -0.17 -0.29 0.06 
Financial 0.13 0.36 -0.29 -0.34 -0.06 0.38 -0.23 -0.24 
Consumer electronics 0.14 -0.55 0.54┼ -0.62┼ 0.31 -0.53 0.61┼ -0.63 
Model indices         
-2 Log likelihood 1040.2 1009.3 1054.1 985.4 919.2 911.5 940.2 881.2 
Chi-square 30.905*** 53.022*** 23.474** 72.424*** 23.375* 50.838*** 22.191* 65.799*** 
N 949 949 949 949 848 848 848 848 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
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Table 5.6. Results of the binomial regression – Effects of HOST INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT and 
FDI inflowsa,b,c (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
Variables 
Model 3 Model 4 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 
Constant  -2.64*** -2.17*** -1.40** 1.47** -1.19*** -0.16 -1.36*** -2.28*** 
Host institutional 
quality 
0.23*** 0.28*** 0.01 -0.56***     
FDI inflowsb     0.36* 0.26 -0.52** -0.22 
Controls         
Firm age -0.00* -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.01** -0.00 0.00┼ 0.01** 
Firm sizeb 0.01 -0.10*** 0.03 0.08** 0.01 -0.10*** 0.02 0.10** 
Already present in the 
market 
-0.07 0.31 -0.31 0.15 0.09 0.52** -0.30 -0.33 
Regionalisation 0.03 0.34* -0.43** 0.11 0.04 0.30┼ -0.35* 0.06 
Automotive  0.15 -0.25 -0.24 0.35 0.17 -0.31 -0.15 0.22 
Retail 0.53* -0.33 -0.47 0.36 0.60* -0.30 -0.39 0.06 
Financial 0.20 0.42 -0.22 -0.66* 0.23 0.49┼ -0.10 -0.89** 
Consumer electronics 0.45 -0.41 0.52┼ -0.88* 0.37 -0.51 0.45 -0.53 
Model indices         
-2 Log likelihood 989.3 941.0 994.4 786.2 914.9 952.1 840.2 644.7 
Chi-square 35.314*** 54.571*** 24.234** 118.411*** 25.062** 33.572*** 24.082** 41.172*** 
N 878 878 878 878 882 882 882 882 
 aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
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 Table 5.7. Results of the binomial regression – Moderating effects on EXPERIENCEa,b,c (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10)
Variables 
Model 3 Model 4 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 
Constant  -2.89*** -2.31** -1.04 1.74* -1.46*** -0.08 -0.78* -2.78*** 
Host institutional quality 0.27** 0.34** 0.01 -0.74***     
Host FDI inflowsb     0.23 0.16 -0.81** 0.49 
Host experiential knowledge -0.00 0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01┼ 
Experience intensity -0.73 -0.76 0.25 1.03* -0.05 -0.05 0.21 -0.19 
Experience diversity -0.04 -0.04 -0.24 -0.21 -0.12 -0.02 0.14 -0.03 
Host experiential knowledge x Host institutional quality  -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01*     
Experience intensity x Host institutional quality 0.12 0.12 -0.02 -0.24**     
Experience diversity x Host institutional quality 0.01 -0.00 0.05 -0.04     
Host experiential knowledge x Host FDI inflows      0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.04** 
Experience intensity x Host FDI inflows     -0.00 0.16 -0.11 0.01 
Experience diversity x Host FDI inflows     0.20 -0.22 -0.07 0.23 
Controls         
Firm age -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01* -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01* 
Firm sizeb 0.02 -0.01** -0.00 0.10** 0.05 -0.08** -0.00 0.08┼ 
Already present in the market -0.22 0.34 -0.32 0.27 -0.03 0.42* -0.33 -0.10 
Regionalisation 0.06 0.26 -0.42* 0.16 -0.10 0.18 -0.31 0.26 
Automotive  0.18 -0.18 -0.38 0.53┼ 0.36 -0.17 -0.30 0.12 
Retail 0.29 -0.27 -0.38 0.46 0.30 -0.25 -0.25 0.19 
Financial 0.06 0.43 -0.15 -0.78* 0.11 0.54┼ -0.01 -1.25** 
Consumer electronics 0.42 -0.39 0.58┼ -1.01* 0.51 -0.38 0.40 -0.94┼ 
Model indices         
-2 Log likelihood 869.2 852.7 888.0 684.8 804.1 808.5 754.7 568.4 
Chi-square 32.951** 53.589*** 24.423┼ 120.286*** 24.933┼ 30.995* 26.696┼ 40.318*** 
N 779 779 779 779 688 688 688 688 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
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Table 5.8. Results of the binomial regression – Effects of HOST MARKET SIZEa,b,c (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; 
*p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
 
 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 
Constant  -2.04** -1.65* -0.67 0.32 
Host GDP per capitab 0.11 0.16* -0.08 -0.29** 
Controls     
Firm age -0.01* -0.00 0.00* 0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.02 -0.10*** 0.05┼ 0.07* 
Already present in the market -0.04 0.43* -0.32 -0.05 
Regionalisation 0.02 0.29┼ -0.47* 0.19 
Automotive  0.30 -0.22 -0.17 0.02 
Retail 0.60* -0.25 -0.62* 0.23 
Financial 0.28 0.56* -0.20 -1.30** 
Consumer electronics 0.46 -0.46 0.43 0.87┼ 
Model indices     
-2 Log likelihood 958.4 912.1 936.3 628.5 
Chi-square 20.784* 42.555*** 30.251*** 47.552*** 
N 810 810 810 810 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
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Table 5.9. Results of the binomial regression – Effects of PRIOR MODEa,b,c (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
Variables 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 
Constant  -0.86** 0.11 -1.82*** -2.18*** -1.10*** -0.05 -1.51*** -2.10*** -0.97*** 0.07 -1.62*** -2.21*** 
Non-equity -0.15 -0.04 0.26┼ -0.06         
Joint equity venture     0.42** 0.42* -0.44* -0.51**     
Wholly owned subsidiary         -0.27 -0.45* 0.09 0.58** 
Controls             
Firm age -0.01*** -0.00* 0.00* 0.01*** -0.01** -0.00* 0.00* 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00┼ 0.00* 0.01*** 
Firm sizeb 0.01 -0.12*** 0.05┼ 0.08** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.05┼ 0.08** 0.01 -0.11*** 0.04 0.07** 
Already present in the market 0.13 0.54** -0.30 -0.36┼ 0.14 0.56** -0.32 -0.39* 0.11 0.53** -0.28 -0.37┼ 
Regionalisation 0.04 0.25 -0.40* 0.13 0.05 0.26 -0.42** 0.14 0.07 0.30┼ -0.42** 0.09 
Automotive  0.11 -0.37 -0.21 0.40┼ 0.12 -0.35 -0.21 0.39┼ 0.09 -0.39 -0.18 0.43┼ 
Retail 0.64** -0.27 -0.32 -0.10 0.71** -0.21 -0.37 -0.17 0.68** -0.22 -0.33 -0.20 
Financial 0.14 0.38 -0.28 -0.39 0.18 0.39 -0.34 -0.37 0.24 0.50┼ -0.36 -0.52┼ 
Consumer electronics 0.44 -0.61┼ 0.66* -0.75┼ 0.46 -0.58┼ 0.65* -0.77* 0.43 -0.61┼ 0.67* -0.75┼ 
Model indices             
-2 Log likelihood 1004.3 976.3 993.0 931.6 999.7 971.2 990.4 925.1 1003.2 971.6 995.4 922.7 
Chi-square 32.528*** 49.759*** 28.685** 72.157*** 37.098*** 54.940*** 31.356*** 78.630*** 33.599*** 54.518*** 26.283** 81.001*** 
N 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 909 
 
 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
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Table 5.10. Results of the binomial regression – Effects of EXIT MOTIVESa,b,c (***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
Variables 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 
6-10 
yrs 
>11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 
6-10 
yrs 
>11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 
6-10 
yrs 
>11 yrs 1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 
6-10 
yrs 
>11 
yrs 
Constant  -0.86** 0.09 
-
1.44*** 
-2.60*** 
-
1.77*** 
-0.08 
-
1.38*** 
-1.68*** 
-
1.35*** 
0.08 
-
1.36*** 
-
2.11*** 
-
0.99*** 
-0.02 -0.02 
-
1.41*** 
Involuntary exit -1.06*** -0.50** 0.12 1.18***             
Poor market performance     0.93*** 0.10 -0.05 -0.91***         
Poor performance with 
commitment mode 
        1.29*** -0.33 -0.27 
-
1.11*** 
    
Strategic exit             -0.20 0.74** 0.74** -0.19 
Controls                 
Firm age -0.01** -0.00┼ 0.00 0.01*** -0.01** -0.00┼ 0.00 0.01*** -0.01** -0.00* 0.00 0.01*** 
-
0.01*** 
-0.00* -0.00* 0.00 
Firm sizeb 0.02 -0.11*** 0.04 0.08** 0.02 
-
0.12*** 
0.04 0.09** 0.00 
-
0.12*** 
0.04 0.09*** 0.01 
-
0.12*** 
-
0.12*** 
0.04 
Already present in the market -0.03 0.45* -0.20 -0.17 0.03 0.52** -0.22 -0.28 0.24 0.51** -0.24 -0.49** 0.15 0.50** 0.50** -0.22 
Regionalisation -0.03 0.30┼ -0.43** 0.19 0.03 0.33* -0.44** 0.12 0.13 0.32* -0.45** 0.04 0.06 0.29┼ 0.29┼ -0.44* 
Automotive  0.03 -0.40 -0.23 0.52* 0.02 -0.36 -0.23 0.52* -0.05 -0.32 -0.22 0.53* 0.12 -0.33 -0.33 -0.24 
Retail 0.50┼ -0.34 -0.37 0.20 0.54* -0.26 -0.38 0.09 0.57* -0.22 -0.37 0.00 0.68** -0.27 -0.27 -0.39 
Financial 0.20 0.40 -0.30 -0.48┼ 0.22 0.37 -0.30 -0.47┼ 0.26 0.34 -0.31 -0.39 0.13 0.35 0.35 -0.28 
Consumer electronics 0.36 -0.59┼ 0.55┼ -0.62 0.38 -0.55┼ 0.54┼ -0.63┼ 0.48 -0.56┼ 0.53┼ -0.67┼ 0.41 -0.36┼ -0.56┼ 0.55┼ 
Model indices                 
-2 Log likelihood 1012.2 1002.3 1053.6 941.0 1012.1 1008.9 1054.0 955.9 991.6 1006.8 1052.4 962.2 1039.7 1000.6 1053.6 982.5 
Chi-square 
58.865 
*** 
59.941 
*** 
23.953 
*** 
116.804 
*** 
58.992 
*** 
53.373 
*** 
23.581 
** 
101.907 
*** 
79.537 
*** 
55.472 
*** 
25.189 
** 
95.659 
*** 
31.426 
*** 
61.697 
*** 
23.956 
*** 
75.334 
*** 
N 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
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Table 5.11. Results of the binomial regression – Effects of STRATEGIC INTENTa,b,c 
(***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05; ┼p<0.10) 
 
aNation and annual fixed effects included in all models, but not reported.  
bVariable is a logarithm.  
cQuartile 1 (1-2 years), Quartile 2 (3-5 years), Quartile 3 (6-10 years), Quartile 4 (over 11 years). 
 
 
Variables 
Model 13 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 6-10 yrs >11 yrs 
Constant  -1.23*** -0.00 -1.40*** -2.10*** 
Strategic intent 0.65*** 0.02 -0.08 -0.72*** 
Controls     
Firm age -0.01** -0.00* 0.00 0.01*** 
Firm sizeb 0.01 -0.12*** 0.04 0.09** 
Already present in the market 0.06 0.53** -0.22 -0.35┼ 
Regionalisation 0.02 0.33* -0.44** 0.10 
Automotive  0.06 -0.35 -0.23 0.46* 
Retail 0.54* -0.25 -0.38 0.08 
Financial 0.21 0.36 -0.30 -0.43┼ 
Consumer electronics 0.32 -0.55 0.55┼ -0.56 
Model indices     
-2 Log likelihood 1023.2 1009.3 1053.9 968.8 
Chi-square 47.865*** 53.033*** 23.699** 89.033*** 
N 949 949 949 949 
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APPENDIX 4: Robustness checks for Chapter 6 on the re-entries of DMMs and EMMs 
 
Table 6.5: Results of the logistic binomial regression model for antecedents and re-entry decisions of 
DMMs compared to EMMs 
 
Model 
1 
Model 
 2 
Model  
3 
Model  
4 
Model  
5 
Model  
6 
Model  
7 
Model  
8 
Constant  0.42 0.05 0.62 0.45 0.87 0.72 0.99 0.61 
Host experiential knowledge  -0.01      -0.01 
General experience intensity  -0.00      -0.00 
Host experience intensity  0.01      0.01 
General experience diversity  0.02***      0.02*** 
Host experience diversity  -0.03      -0.02 
Commitment escalation vs. no 
change 
  -0.03     0.03 
Commitment de-escalation vs. 
no change 
  0.79┼     1.23* 
Time-out    -0.00    -0.01 
Host institutional changes     -0.25   -0.23 
Market attractiveness      0.00  -0.00 
Motives for re-entry: More 
resources 
      0.12 0.03 
Motives for re-entry: Changes 
in strategy 
      -0.03 -0.01 
Motives for re-entry: Strategic 
intent 
      0.16 0.09 
Motives for re-entry: 
Institutional pull 
      -0.47 -0.73* 
Controls          
Firm age 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 0.01* 
Firm size 0.11*** 0.08* 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 0.11** 0.11** 0.08* 
Changes in management 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Already present in the market 0.03 -0.37 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.10 -0.55* 
Automotive sector 0.23 -0.43 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.31 0.31 -0.32 
Retail sector 1.18** 1.07** 1.12** 1.17** 1.09** 1.19** 1.05** 0.84* 
Financial sector 2.30** 2.49*** 2.06** 2.29** 2.13** 2.32** 2.09** 2.06** 
Consumer electronics -0.04 -0.14 0.04 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.08 0.05 
Host market growth -0.78 -0.62 -0.98 -0.78 -1.06┼ 0.18 -1.21* -0.94 
Host market developed 0.25 0.40┼ 0.19 0.23 0.13 -1.11┼ 0.11 0.25 
Model indices          
-2 Log likelihood 579.9 495.0 563.8 577.9 556.2 570.8 551.8 561.8 
Chi-square  85.790*** 102.048*** 85.985*** 83.908*** 81.420*** 89.786*** 85.820*** 110.048*** 
N 811 728 783 810 790 806 790 728 
Note: The re-entry decision is modelled as a comparison of the re-entry antecedents and decisions made by DMMs 
compared to EMMs. The estimated coefficients as shown in the tables should be interpreted as the amount of increase (or 
decrease, if the sign of the coefficient is negative) in the predicted log odds of the dependent variable that would be predicted 
by a 1 unit increase (or decrease) in the predictor variable. For instance, a positive coefficient means that the predictor 
variable increases the likelihood of the firm being a DMM over an EMM; i.e. broadly, DMMs are more likely to de-escalate 
commitment than return via the same mode compared to EMMs (Model 3).  
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APPENDIX 5: Foreign market re-entrants’ regionalisation patterns 
 
 Table 6.6: Regionalisation patterns of re-entrants: Distribution of home and host regions re-entered15 
                                                          
15 APAC was further unpacked here to highlight the relatively strong tendency for regionalisation of re-entrants.   
Home/Host  Europe 
North 
America 
South 
America 
Asia 
(emerging) 
Asia 
(Japan) 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
Africa Total  
Europe 
134 
events 
36 events 32 events 157 events 8 events 18 events 
30 
events 
415 
events 
North 
America 
63 
events 
6 events 31 events 140 events 
22 
events 
12 events 
61 
events 
335 
events 
South 
America 
1 event 3 events 2 events 1 event 0 events 0 events 1 event 
8 
events 
Asia 
(emerging) 
19 
events 
15 events 5 events 70 events 
12 
events 
8 events 
5 
events 
134 
events 
Asia (Japan) 8 events 19 events 8 events 54 events 0 events 4 events 
4 
events 
87 
events 
Australia 
and New 
Zealand 
2 events 2 events 0 events 10 events 0 events  4 events 1 event 
19 
events 
Africa  4 events 2 events 2 events 2 events 0 events 2 events 
10 
events 
22 
events 
Total  
231 
events 
73  
events 
80  
events 
434 
events 
42 
events 
48  
events 
112 
events 
1020 
events 
